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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 In the post Cold War period peace operations have been increasingly 
seen as promising tools for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, consequently, a growing number of peace operations have been 
established since the 90s’. However, many of these missions failed to live up 
to the high expectations they had raised. Their main shortcoming can be 
identified in the failure to protect civilians. In some cases, this failure 
consisted in the inability to halt the perpetration of gross human rights 
violations and international crimes that occurred while the peace operation 
was deployed, or soon after its withdrawal, such as the case of the failure to 
protect the Tutsi population during the Rwanda genocide in 1994, the 
deployment of UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) 
notwithstanding. Similarly, one may think of the failure of UNPROFOR 
(United Nations Protection Force) in Bosnia to protect the Muslim Bosnians 
who sought refuge in the Potocari Compound in the safe area of Srebrenica. 
In other cases, the conduct of missions’ components directly contributed to 
or consisted in violations of international law, as it was the case, for example, 
in Kosovo during UNMIK administration and KFOR deployment. More 
recently, one can recall the cholera epidemic outbreak in Haiti during 
MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) of 2011. The 
origins of the outbreak have been found by several scientific studies in the 
reckless conduct of the UN and of the UN Nepalese contingent. On the one 
hand, the Napalese contigent wasn’t properly screened, thus including 
subjects affected by the disease. On the other hand, Nepalese forces failed to 
properly construct their camp, where the poor hygienic conditions of the 
infrastructures, namely of the camp pipeline, caused the contamination of the 
main island’s river. 
In response to these events we have witnessed in the last twenty years 
a growing demand for justice brought about by individuals, associations, 
human rights advocates and scholars. The most evident trace of this quest for 
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justice is certainly to be found in the numerous lawsuits filed before national 
courts and the Strasbourg Court such as the cases of the Mothers of 
Srebrenica v the UN and the Netherlands, the Nuhanovic v the Netherlands 
and Mustafic v the Netherlands, the Bici and Bici v the UK, the Behrami and 
Saramati and the Al Jedda cases, to offer an array of well-known examples. 
Besides judicial proceedings, public opinion has also raised its voice to 
demand  justice from States and the UN for wrongful acts carried out in peace 
operations. The leverage exerted by the public opinion has pushed some 
governments to resign as well as international organizations to develop 
instruments to respond to instances of aggrieved individuals, such as, for 
example, the Ombudsperson in Kosovo, the UNMIK Human Rights Advisory 
Panel (HRAP) and of EULEX Human Rights Review Panel (HRRP), to cite 
a few.  
Against this backdrop, the present research aims at inquiring how 
international law regulates the consequences of the occurrence of a wrongful 
act in peace operations. In order to answer this main research question the 
study will first delimit the scope of analysis, namely defining peace 
operations. Secondly, it will highlight that several ‘responsibility regimes’ 
come into question when a wrongful act is carried out in peace operations, 
namely international responsibility, accountability and liability. Thirdly, the 
focus will move to the so-called problem of ‘many hands’. That is to say, 
when multiple actors are involved, the question is raised as to who should 
bear responsibility, and whether and to what extent responsibility should be 
apportioned among them. Fourthly, the analysis will turn to remedies 
described under the different ‘responsibility regimes’ available to parties 
affected by a wrongful act. 
The need to begin the research looking for a tentative definition of 
peace operations lies with the terminological confusion that is generally 
associated with peace operations. Both international organisations’ practice 
and academic literature resort in different instances to different terms, namely 
peacekeeping, peace operations, peace support, and peace enforcement. It 
will be first inquired whether this troubled lexicon refers to discrete concepts 
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or rather it is the result of different political and policy considerations. The 
analysis will then move from language to substance. It will be analysed what 
makes peace operations what they are, that is to say, what are the legal bases 
under international law for the establishment of peace operations, and what 
are their essential features that separate them from other interventions of the 
international community such as, for example, the intervention upon 
invitation or enforcement actions undertaken under the collective security 
system ex art. 42 of the UN Charter. Some authors have maintained that the 
initial model of peace operations has ‘exploded’,1 while others have claimed 
that a continuity can be traced through the ‘normative model’ thereof, 
constituted essentially by the consent of the host State, impartiality and the 
limited use of force.2 The research will verify these two main hypotheses and 
conclude that peace operations have evolved around landmark events (and 
failures) as those described at the outset of this introduction.  
Moreover, it will be noted that the crucial shift from inter-State to 
intra-States conflicts has urged peace operations to adapt to a significantly 
changed scenario where there is often very little, if not any, peace to keep and 
where these operations are increasingly called to discharge quasi-
governmental tasks, ranging from civilian protection to the promotion of the 
rule of law, to the interim administration of a territory. As it will be 
demonstrated, this core evolution of the geo-political scenario has had no 
small impact on the constituting elements of peace operations. Where the 
consent of the host State may not be enough to guarantee the mission’s 
success, absent the cooperation on the field of the main actors involved in the 
peace process. Impartiality has been stretched so far as to include the 
possibility to legitimately target certain actors that are hampering the peace 
process, so called ‘spoilers’. Eventually, the limited use of force has become 
increasingly less limited, so as to include – as just mentioned – the use of 
force against specific subjects to protect the mandate, in what are now called 
                                                 
1   Picone, “Il peacekeeping nel mondo attuale. Tra militarizzazione e amministrazione 
fiduciaria”, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, vol. 79, 1996, pp. 5-33. 
2   Frulli, Le operazioni di Peacekeeping delle Nazioni Unite. Continuità di un modello 
normativo, Editoriale Scientifica 2012. 
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‘robust’ or ‘militarised’ operations. 
In sum, it will be shown that peace operations are to be understood as 
field operations, composed both of national military and civilian components, 
following a UN mandate, aimed at managing conflicts from the moment of 
their eruption to the prevention of their relapse. Peace operations include 
peacekeeping, robust operations and peace building. They can be authorised 
and led by the UN or authorised by a UN mandate and led by a regional 
organisation. These operations have significantly evolved in the last 20 years, 
where the model has neither ‘exploded’ nor enjoyed true continuity. By 
contrast, while retaining the same labels (consent, impartiality, limited use of 
force) their meanings have significantly changed along with the main 
evolution of peace operations. 
Once delimited the scope of analysis, it will be possible to move to 
the issue of responsibility. It is widely understood under general international 
law that the occurrence of an internationally wrongful act, attributable to a 
State or to an international organisation will entail the latters’ international 
responsibility, namely calling into question the application of the 2001 ILC 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts3 (DARS) and of the 2011 ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organisations for Internationally Wrongful Acts4 (DARIO). 
Hence it would have seemed logical to carry out the analysis of the 
responsibility issue exclusively through the prism of international 
responsibility. However, the law of international responsibility alone would 
have proven insufficient for the purpose of the intended analysis on the firm 
grounding that more than one ‘responsibility regime’ exists in peace 
operations.  
The term ‘responsibility regimes’ is used here to refer to three 
concepts generally associated with the legal notion of responsibility, namely 
                                                 
3    Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and 
submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report (A/56/10), in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two. 
4    Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and 
submitted to the General Assembly (A/66/10), in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two. 
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international responsibility, accountability, and liability. Authorative 
statements, such as the 1996 SG Report on Administrative and Budgetary 
Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations5 as 
well as relevant agreements as the UN and the NATO Model Status of Force 
Agreements6 (SOFAs) and the UN Model Memorandum of Understanding7 
(MOU), reveal that the language makes reference to several responsibility 
regimes, especially international responsibility and liability. Scholarly 
writings also tend to resort to different concepts, namely international 
organisations’ accountability and international responsibility. The existence 
of different regimes is also confirmed by the complexity of legal relations 
existing between  and among the various actors involved in peace operations. 
As a consequence of serving as the leading organisation of a peace operation, 
the United Nations will have a direct relationship with both Troop 
Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the host country as well. Generally, these 
relationships are regulated by two different agreements, the MOU and the 
SOFA respectively. Furthermore, the leading organisation may enter into 
legal relationships with individuals, for example, due to its responsibility vis 
à vis third parties for damages which may occur during the mission, or for 
contractual purposes. In United Nations-authorised peace operations the 
United Nations will not have the direct relationship with TCCs or the host 
State. By contrast, the leading regional organisation will enter into 
agreements with those States contributing to the mission and with the host 
State. Hence, the plurality of actors involved in peace operations and the 
diverse relationships that may arise between and among them when a 
wrongful act occurs call into question different responsibility regimes.  
The idea of a plurality of responsibility regimes is inspired to a certain 
extent by the literature concerning ‘multilevel accountability’, where 
“accountability extends over multiple levels of government, straddling the 
                                                 
5    A/51/389 (1996). 
6     UN Model SOFA, A/45/594 (1990); NATO Model SOFA, Agreement between the Parties 
to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces, 19 June 1951, last 
updated 14 October 2009. 
7  A/C.5/60/26, chapter 9. 
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boundary between the national and the international level”.8 In contrast and 
differently from the cited literature, the present study relies on the notion of 
responsibility, rather than accountability, as overarching concept. 
Accountability has gained great momentum in recent international law 
discourse, especially concerning the exercise of growing powers entrusted 
with international organisations and the related need for their control.9 
However, it will be shown that the notion of accountability has a very recent 
origin and it derives from a very specific sociological tradition, namely the 
19th century post-Jacksonian North American context. The precise meaning 
of accountability as a legal concept remains elusive and consequently fits 
rather difficulty in most domestic legal systems, where the term lacks a 
textual translation.  
By contrast, the notion and the conception of responsibility derives 
from the ancient Roman law tradition, namely from the ‘Lex Aquilia de 
damno’ of the III century b.c., the legacy of which has been enshrined in the 
modern legal systems of most European countries.10 According to this theory, 
who breaches a legal command, through a willful act, shall be sanctioned. 
This notion is strictly linked to a moral conception of responsibility, whereby 
the willful violation of a legal command also amounts to a breach of the moral 
imperative of neminem leadere. The sanction essentially translates in the 
obligation of reparation. This ancient conception had significant influence not 
only on European domestic legal systems, but also on early international law 
writings on State responsibility of Grotius and de Vattel, for example.11 As a 
consequence, it seems more accurate to consider international responsibility, 
accountability and liability as species of the broader genre of the legal 
category of responsibility. 
                                                 
8  Nollkaemper, “Multi-level Accountability: A Case Study of Accountability in the 
Aftermath of the Srebrenica Massacre”, in Broude-Shany (eds), The Shifting Allocation 
of Authority in International Law, Hart, 2008, pp. 345-367; see also Palchetti, “Unità, 
pluralità o inutilità dei regimi di responsabilità internazionale applicabili alle 
organizzazioni?”, in Il futuro delle organizzazioni internazionali: prospettive giuridiche, 
Editoriale Scientifica, 2015, pp. 43-60.     
9  See infra chapter II, para. 3. 
10  Bianca, Diritto civile. La responsabilità, vol. V, Giuffrè Editore, 1994, pp.  534 ff.  
11  See infra chapter II, para. 2. 
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 As to the third issue, concerning the attribution and distribution of 
responsibility for wrongful acts occurred in peace operations, the study will 
consider whether a customary rule has emerged under international law to 
determine whose responsibility – of TCCs, international organisations or both 
– is entailed. Differently from the analysis carried out in the previous chapter, 
the matter of attribution of responsibility will be dealt with under the 
viewpoint of the law of international responsibility of States and international 
organisations. It is well known that attribution is a constitutive element of 
international responsibility, while under other responsibility regimes an 
inquiry on the so called ‘subjective element’ is not required. Moreover, the 
relevance of attribution rules under the law of international responsibility is 
demonstrated by the approach chosen by most courts in dealing with the issue 
of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts in peace operations.12 Also 
in literature the main focus rests on the quest for the appropriate criterion to 
attribute wrongful conducts under the law of international responsibility. 
Consequently, in order to answer the question as to who (TCC, international 
organisations or both) should bear international responsibility for wrongful 
acts carried out in peace operations, the analysis will turn to the rules of 
attribution of conduct under the law of international responsibility. More 
precisely, the study will investigate whether articles 6 (attribution of conduct 
of organs of the organisation)13 and 7 DARIO (attribution of conduct of State 
organs placed at the disposal of an international organisation)14 constitute a 
codification of current customary law on the attribution of conduct applicable 
in peace operations. To this end, the study will first look into the drafting 
history of article 6 and 7 DARIO, taking into account the opinio iuris States 
and international organisations expressed during the DARIO drafting 
                                                 
12  See infra chapter III, para. 7. 
13  Art. 6 DARIO stipulates that: “[t]he conduct of an organ or agent of an international 
organization in the performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an 
act of that organization under international law, whatever position the organ or agent 
holds in respect of the organization. The rules of the organization shall apply in the 
determination of the functions of its organs and agents”. 
14  Art. 7 DARIO prescribes as follows: “[t]he conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or 
agent of an international organization that is placed at the disposal of another international 
organization shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organization 
if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct”. 
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process; second, relevant international organisations’ practice will be 
analysed. Third, judicial practice of national courts and of the Strasbourg 
Court will be taken into account; eventually, completing the study with the 
contribution offered thus far by the intense doctrinal debate on the matter.  
Light will be shed on the difficulties in applying the DARIO 
provisions. On the one hand, widespread disagreement exists on whether art. 
6 or art. 7 should regulate attribution of wrongful conduct in peace operations. 
The quarrel rests essentially on the legal status of UN-led peace operations, 
where the Organisation maintains that peace operations are UN subsidiary 
organs and national troops contributed thereto are ‘transformed’ into UN 
subsidiary organs. This view clearly triggers the application of art. 6 DARIO 
and implies an exclusive attribution of conduct to the UN. By contrast, many 
States and the ILC itself have expressed the view that peace operations, 
whether led or authorised by the UN, shall be considered national organs 
placed at the disposal of the organisation leading the operation. This second 
hypothesis calls into question the application of art. 7 DARIO, premised on 
the effective control test. On the other hand, even if one concludes in favour 
of the application of art. 7 DARIO, its interpretation remains uncertain due to 
the elusive meaning of ‘effective control’. Strictly linked to the interpretation 
of effective control are two further questions. Whether dual or multiple 
attribution (both to TCC and the UN or leading regional organisations) is 
allowed under the law of international responsibility; and whether one should 
endorse the so called ‘reciprocal approach’ of effective control,15 whereby the 
criterion is used not only to attribute a wrongful conduct of state organs 
placed at their disposal to international organisations, but also to attribute the 
same conduct to the sending State. In other words, following the ‘reciprocal 
approach’, the interpreter would apply art. 7 DARIO both to attribute an 
international wrongful act to the receiving organisation (e.g the UN) and to 
the sending State (e.g. TCCs). No fall-back on the DARS would thus be 
                                                 
15  D’Argent, “State Organs Placed at the Disposal of the UN, Effective Control, Wrongful 
Abstention and Dual Attribution of Conduct”, in Questions of International Law, 2014, 
pp. 17-31 and Spagnolo, “The ‘reciprocal’ approach in article 7 DARIO: A reply to Pierre 
d'Argent”, ibidem, pp. 33-41. 
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necessary as attribution will be based on the inquiry of which entity (IOs or 
State) has exercised effective control over the impugned conduct. 
The study will conclude on this point that no customary law has 
emerged on the attribution of internationally wrongful acts in peace 
operations. The ILC DARIO, namely arts 6 and 7, constitute an example of 
progressive development rather than of codification of international customs. 
Moreover, it is maintained that the different interpretations of effective 
control offered by courts and authoritative statements derive from the 
divergence between a normative and a factual interpretation of attribution. 
Under a normative conception, attribution of conduct depends on where 
political authority is vested. Whereas according to a factual understanding of 
attribution, attention is paid to the chain of command and control of an 
operation, inquiring where operational control is vested. It will be shown that 
most of the confusion in the interpretation of effective control lies with the 
failure to differentiate between these two aspects. 
Lastly, the study will inquire what are the remedies available to 
aggrieved parties of wrongful acts occurred in peace operations. The present 
analysis embraces the notion of remedies as elaborated in human rights law 
and prefers it to other concepts of the parlance of the law of international 
responsibility, as for example the implementation of responsibility. This lens 
allows a better understanding of peculiarities of legal relations existing both 
between individuals and States or international organisations, and between 
States and international organisations. The focus on remedies will also further 
clarify that different responsibility regimes apply in peace operations, giving 
enough espace de manoeuvre to explore their features.  
Remedies under international law enjoy a twofold meaning. Firstly, 
the procedural understanding identifies remedial institutions and procedures 
to which injured parties can bring their claims. Secondly, the substantial 
notion of remedies refers to the outcome of the procedure or proceeding 
instituted by the injured party, also called redress. Particular attention will be 
devoted to the procedural aspect of remedies available in peace operations. 
 It will be shown that the claims systems developed by the UN and 
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NATO are to be considered under the purview of the ‘liability regime’, 
whereby only compensation of damages come into question and the duty of 
international organisations (and States) is not premised on the occurrence of 
an internationally wrongful act. Other instruments such as the Kosovo 
Ombudsperson, the UNMIK HRAP, the EULEX HRRP, ad hoc inquiry 
commissions can be considered as accountability mechaninsms. These are 
characterised by their lack of mandatory powers, where the outcome consists 
in recommendations that the international organisation may decide to 
implement, or ignore. Moreover, no obligation to redress damages potentially 
assessed through these procedure is envisaged for international organisations; 
to be more precise, in some cases, the possibility to issue recommendations 
concerning compensation for damages have been expressly excluded from 
their mandate.16 Eventually, it will be underscored that remedies available 
under the ‘international responsibility remedies’ are largely underdeveloped. 
As it concerns issues arising between sending States, host States and 
international organisations, a general waiver of claims is stipulated under the 
mission’s SOFA or MOU. Claims not excluded are generally settled 
amicably, or via arbitration, which also implies that they are confidential; 
with the sole exclusion of the lump sum agreements in the case of ONUC 
mission in Congo in the 1960s, whose peculiarities will be analysed in detail. 
As to claims between individuals and States or individuals and international 
organisations, the study will show that international responsibility has been 
adjudicated only by domestic courts (and by the Strasbourg Court). These 
considerations raise two more issues; on the one hand, one shall take into 
account the impact of UN immunity from domestic jurisdiction on the quest 
for justice described at the outset of this introduction. On the other hand, 
domestic case law has dwelled on the question of which international norms 
confer individually enforceable rights, often denying the application of 
international treaty provisions to individuals-State claims.  
 Eventually, the study will conclude inquiring whether these ‘multi-
level’ responsibility regimes and the related ‘multi-level remedies’ have been 
                                                 
16 See infra, chapter IV. 
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able to fulfill the growing demand for justice generated by the significant 
failure to protect civilians during peace operations over the last 20 years. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
THE QUEST FOR A DEFINITION 
OF PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
 
1. The troubled lexicon of peace operations 
 
 Diverse terms are used to refer to the wide spectrum of peace and 
security activities undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations. Both 
official documents and scholarship resort to a variety of wording, the most 
common of which include peace operations, peacekeeping, peace support 
operations and peace enforcement. 1 The present chapter aims at highlighting 
the main contours and divides of these concepts in order to endorse a working 
definition of peace operations useful to delimit the scope of analysis that 
focuses on the legal consequences of harmful conducts occurring in their 
                                                 
1   The literature on peace operations and on the definitions thereof is vast. Inter alia, 
Higgins, United Nations peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, Oxford University 
Press, 1969-1981; Cassese (ed.), United Nations Peace-keeping. Legal Essays, Sijthoff 
and Noordhoff, 1997; Picone, “Il peacekeeping nel mondo attuale. Tra militarizzazione e 
amministrazione fiduciaria”, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 1996, p. 5-33; Labouda, 
“Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement”, in MPEPIL, ; Conforti, “L’azione del Consiglio 
di Sicurezza per il mantenimento della pace”, in Picone (ed.), Internventi delle Nazioni 
Unite e Diritto Internazionale, Cedam, 1995, pp. 1-14; White, Keeping the Peace, 
Manchester University Press, 1997; Pineschi, Le operazioni delle Nazioni Unite per il 
mantenimento della pace, Cedam, 1998; Cellamare, Le operazioni di peace-keeping 
multifunzionali, Giapichelli, 1999; Gargiulo, Le Peace Keeping Operations delle Nazioni 
Unite, Editoriale Scientifica, 2000; Coleman (ed.), International Organizations and 
Peace Enforcement, Cambridge University Press, 2007; Kondoch (ed.), International 
Peacekeeping, Ashgate, 2007; White, “Peace Operations”, in Chetail (ed.), Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 814-823; Oswald-Durham-
Bates (eds), Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations, Oxford University Press, 
2010; Odello-Piotrovwicz (eds), International Military Missions and International Law, 
Brill, 2011; Bothe, “Peacekeeping Forces”, in EPIL, 2011; Id., “Peacekeeping”, in 
Simma-Kha-Nolte (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Oxford 
University Press, 3rd edition, 2012, pp. 1171-1199; Frulli, Le operazioni di Peacekeeping 
delle Nazioni Unite. Continuità di un modello normativo, Editoriale Scientifica 2012; 
Bartolini, Lo status del personale delle forze armate italiane operante in missioni 
all’estero e in contesti di cooperazione militare, Il Saggiatore, 2012; Dayal-Mojé 
Howard, “Peace Operations”, in Katz Cogan-Hurd-Johnstone (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Organizations, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 191-210. 
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context.  
Several classifications have been proposed in literature to systematise these 
operations, some authors have classified peace operations by their mandate’s 
core content, so distinguishing between: a) monitoring/observer missions, b) 
traditional peacekeeping, c) multidimensional peacekeeping and d) peace 
enforcement.2  
Others, instead, have proposed a ‘diachronical approach’ highlighting how 
peace operations have changed over time, namely referring to so-called 
‘generations’ of peace operations.3 Whereas the ‘first generation’ of 
operations, deployed from 1956 and 1989, consisted of interpositions forces 
deployed to supervise cease-fires following inter-state conflicts and to 
prevent conflict recurrence.4 Operations of the ‘second generation’, 
established after the end of the Cold War, are characterised by broad mandates 
including the discharge of sovereign functions (e.g. civilian protection, 
delivery of humanitarian aid, supervision of electoral operations, etc.).5 
Second generations operations are also referred to as ‘multidimensional’ or 
‘multifunctional’ operations.6 Eventually, ‘third generation’ operations, 
established from the 1990s’ on, are classified as ‘peace enforcement’ 
missions, where the Security Council authorises the use of force to ‘impose’ 
or ‘enforce’ the peace, typically in situations of intra-State conflicts.7 Other 
authors prefer to use ‘peace support operations’ as a general term, even 
though quite imprecisely considering that – as it will be demonstrated further 
– it pertains exclusively to the parlance of NATO operations.8 
                                                 
2   Doyle-Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative 
Analysis”, in The American Political Science Review, vol. 94, 2000, pp. 779-801; see also 
Dayal-Mojé Howard, “Peace Operations”, supra note 1. 
3  Freudenschuss, “Drei Generationen von Friedensoperationen der Vereinten Nationen: 
Stand und Ausblick”, in Österreichisches Jahrbuch für international Politik, vol. 10, 
1993, pp. 44; Coforti-Focarelli, Le Nazioni Unite, Cedam, 10th edition, 2015, pp. 309 ff.  
4   Freudenschuss, p. 52 ff.; Coforti-Focarelli, pp. 309-310; see also Picone, “Il peacekeeping 
nel mondo attuale”, supra note 1, pp. 6-7. 
5  Coforti-Focarelli, supra note 1, p. 309; see also Picone, “Il peacekeeping nel mondo 
attuale”, supra note 1, pp. 8-9. 
6  Coforti-Focarelli, supra note , pp. 310. 
7  Freudenschus, supra note 3, pp. 60 ff.; Coforti-Focarelli, pp. 310 ff.; see also Picone, “Il 
peacekeeping nel mondo attuale”, supra note 1, pp. 9-10. 
8  Zwanenburg, Accountability in Peace Support Operations, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, in 
particular at pp. 11 ff.; for a definiton of peace support operations see infra para. 3.4. 
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Eventually, it has also been noted that most efforts made in literature to 
systematise these notions have a mere ‘classificatory value’, while they fail 
to offer means to understand such a complex phenomenon.9  
Against this background, the rationale of this chapter is not only 
methodological, but also substantial, considering that nomina sunt 
consequentia rerum.10 The study investigates the roots of this diverse 
terminology, it inquires whether different definitions relate to different 
historical scenarios or rather stem from policy and political hurdles that 
prevent from reaching a shared definition. Moreover, the chapter discusses 
the core elements of peace operations, namely consent of the host State, 
impartiality and the limited use of force. It analyses this triad of concepts in 
order to determine whether they have been immune to change, as some 
authors maintain11, or rather whether significant evolutions have taken place 
beneath relatively static labels. 
 The study illustrates how evolution is a key element to consider when 
analysing peace operations, and which has shown to be a dynamic instrument 
of crisis management that has been deployed since 1956, though not without 
significant changes. In the words of the Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, in 
its interview for the International Review of the Red Cross, peace operations 
have evolved around certain landmark events.12 The chapter, then, considers 
relationships among historical events and the core features of peace 
operations, particularly as they change over time. The analysis acknowledges 
difficulties in identifying a commonly shared definition of peace operations 
accepted by the main actors, namely the UN, NATO and member States. It 
also recognises existing limitations that emerge when attempting to define 
broad categories – such as robust peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and 
enforcement – whose lines increasingly tend to blur. The chapter concludes 
                                                 
9 Picone, “Il peacekeeping nel mondo attuale”, supra note 1, pp. 10 ff. 
10  The expression is believed to origin from the grandiose codification of ancient Roman 
Law achieved under the Emperor Giustiniano, the Corpus Iuris Civilis, namely from one 
of its components Institutiones, II, 7, 3. Later, the expression has been brought to a 
broader audience thanks to Dante in Vita Nova, XIII, 4.  
11  In particular, Frulli, supra note 1. 
12  “Interview with Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye”, in International Review of the Red 
Cross, vol. 95, December 2013, pp. 485-493. 
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with an elaboration of a working definition that not only takes into account 
the evolving nature of peace operations but also would prove useful for the 
overall research that focuses on the legal consequences of internationally 
wrongful acts occurring in their context. 
Considering that “peacekeeping is the invention of the United 
Nations”,13 and that peace operations are always established following a 
mandate of the world Organisation (regardless of their nature of UN-led or 
UN-authorised missions), the main focus of the analysis rests on UN doctrine 
and UN practice. Nevertheless, ample reference is also made to NATO 
doctrine and practice, and to national military doctrines of some major 
influential States in the context of peace operations. 
 
 
 
2. The questioned legal basis of peace operations  
 
 Many authors have maintained that the creation of UN peacekeeping 
is the response to the Organisation's inability and unwillingness to establish a 
UN force under article 43 of its Charter. 14 Despite having been created by the 
UN, peacekeeping is nevertheless the product of a practice developed in the 
absence of any express Charter provision. This lack of solid constitutional 
grounding is likely a core reason for its troubling definition. A lively doctrinal 
debate has been carried out on the matter seeking to identify the legal basis 
of UN peacekeeping. It has been suggested, for example, that the legal 
grounding should be identified in the powers entrusted in the Organisations 
under chapter VI of the Charter.15 In the opinion of the Secretary General 
                                                 
13 An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, A/47/277 
– S/24111, 17 June 1992, hereinafter Agenda for Peace, para. 46: “Peace-keeping can 
rightly be called the invention of the United Nations”. 
14 Inter alia, Higgins, “Second-Generation Peacekeeping”, in Higgins, Themes and 
Theories, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 285 ff. and Conforti-Focarelli, Le Nazioni 
Unite, Cedam, 10th ed., 2015, pp. 305 ff. 
15  See in particular the Opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice in 1962, 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 151, in particular at p. 
163 ss. 
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Hammarskjöld peacekeeping’s legal basis was to be found in between chapter 
VI and chapter VII, in what he called chapter VI½. More convincingly, it has 
been maintained that peacekeeping missions have developed by way of 
customary law to ‘complement’ the UN Charter; although disagreement still 
exists as to the relevant chapter – whether Chapter VI or Chapter VII – under 
which this new custom has emerged.16 Other authors have understood the 
phenomenon of peacekeeping as a possible expression of art. 40 of the UN 
Charter.17 
While many scholars have attempted to identify the legal basis of 
peace operations generating an intense debate, the UN has not shown a similar 
interest in this inquiry, nor it has sought to justify in legal terms these 
operations. For many years, all the relevant documents constituting what can 
be called the UN doctrine on peace operations, have completely omitted the 
discourse on the legal basis. Neither the 1992 Agenda for Peace, nor its 1995 
Supplement, nor the 2000 Brahimi Report offer elements to the debate. Only 
in 2008, the UN has expressed in the Capstone Doctrine its opinion on the 
matter, where the UN has a wide espace de manœuvre. First the Capstone 
Doctrine stated that “[t]he legal basis for such action [peacekeeping] is found 
in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter”.18 More importantly for the 
present analysis, the document further specified that   
 
                                                 
16  Picone, “Il peacekeeping nel mondo attuale”, supra note 1, considers that the customary 
norm on peacekeeping can be derived from chapter VI, while Conforti, “L’azione del 
Consiglio di Sicurezza per il mantenimento della pace”, supra note 1 and Conforti-
Focarelli, Le Nazioni Unite, supra note 3, at p. 316 ff., understood peacekeeping as a 
custom derived from chapter VII; Conforti-Focarelli observe that only by considering 
peacekeeping as expression of chapter VII powers of the SG one can arrive at the 
conclusion that there is an obligation for all member States to contribute to the expenses 
incurred by the Organisation for the establishment and maintenance of these missions, Le 
Nazioni Unite, at p. 317. For a general overview on the legal basis of peacekeeping see 
Tanzi, “Prospects of Revision of the UN Charter”, in Prospects for Reform of the UN 
System. International Symposioum, Cedam, 1993, pp. 454-479; Orakhelashvili, “The 
Legal Basis of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations”, in Virginia Journal of 
International Law, vol. 43, 2002-2003, pp. 485-524. 
17  Nasu, International Law on Peacekeeping. A Study og Article 40 of the UN Charter, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2009. 
18  United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, 18 January, reviewed on January 
2010, hereinafter Capstone Doctrine, p. 13. 
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United Nations peacekeeping operations have traditionally been 
associated with Chapter VI of the Charter. However, the Security 
Council need not refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when 
passing a resolution authorizing the deployment of a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation and has never invoked Chapter VI. 
In recent years, the Security Council has adopted the practice of 
invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the 
deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations into 
volatile post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain 
security and public order.19  
 
The Capstone Doctrine underscored the political reasons of the reference 
made to Chapter VII in the following terms 
 
 The Security Council’s invocation of Chapter VII in these 
situations, in addition to denoting the legal basis for its action, can 
also be seen as a statement of a firm political resolve and a means 
of reminding the parties to a conflict and the wider United Nations 
membership of their obligation to give effect to Security Council 
decisions.20 
 
In sum, the Capstone Doctrine seems to confirm the position expressed by 
those scholars that have identified the legal basis of peace operations in a 
custom developed in the context of Security Council’s powers ex chapter 
VII.21 
 
 
3. ‘What’s in a name?’ Analysing the terminology of peace 
operations 
 
3.1.Peacekeeping operations 
 
 The UN first attempted to codify principles and practice of peace 
                                                 
19  Ibidem, pp. 13-14. 
20 Ibidem, pp. 14. 
21 Supra, note 16. 
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operations in 1965, when the General Assembly appointed a Special 
Committee to address the whole question of peacekeeping.22 The Committee 
was unable to reach a commonly accepted definition of peacekeeping, mainly 
due to opposing views expressed by States on the dividing line between 
peacekeeping and enforcement actions.23 It is instructive to note, as it will be 
further elaborated, that the identification of a threshold separating 
peacekeeping from enforcement is still a vexed issue some 50 years later.24  
 Evolution, as a distinctive feature of UN peace and security activities, 
is traceable through landmark events. The end of the Cold War bought about 
the first meeting held by the Security Council (SC) at the level of Heads of 
State and Government. At the conclusion of the meeting the SC invited the 
then Secretary General (SG) Butros Ghali to provide for “analysis and 
recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within 
the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United 
Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping”.25 
Accordingly, the Secretary General in June 1992 issued the well-known 
report An Agenda for Peace.26 The document describes peace-keeping as 
 
the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with 
the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United 
Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as 
well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for 
both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.27 
 
This description suggests that in 1992 peacekeeping included conflict 
prevention and peacemaking. It must be noted, though, that the Secretary 
General's Report identified three main sets of activities to preserve or restore 
                                                 
22  GA/RES/2006 (XIX), 18 February 1965. In particular the Committee was set out to 
undertake consultations and make proposals to overcome the financial difficulties 
emerged in relations to peacekeeping operations. 
23  For an extensive analysis of the topic see Gargiulo, Le Peace Keeping Operations delle 
Nazioni Unite, supra note 1, in particular at pp. 11-16. 
24  Infra, para. 3.3. 
25   Security Council statement, 31 January 1992. 
26   Agenda for Peace, supra note 13.  
27   Ibidem, para. 20. 
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peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping.28 An Agenda 
for Peace focused also on ‘post-conflict peace-building’, but in the definitions 
section of the document no description is offered of this concept.29 Peace-
building is described as ‘the construction of a new environment’ and 
represents the ‘counterpart’ of preventive diplomacy: the latter is to avoid a 
crisis while peace-building is to prevent recurrence.30  
 The blurred contours of peace and security activities as presented in 
An Agenda for peace had become less uncertain after the elaboration found 
in the 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace.31 Only few years divide the 
two reports, but this time lapse was characterised by dreadful events that have 
dramatically changed the geopolitical scenario of conflicts as well as altered 
some peacekeeping features.  
 In 1994, despite deployment of the ‘UN Assistance mission in 
Rwanda’ (UNAMIR), the international intervention was not able to prevent 
the genocide of Tutsi by the Hutu ethnic component of Rwanda.32  Then, 
notwithstanding the deployment of the ‘United Nations Protection Force’ 
(UNPROFOR) in the Balkans in 1995, the town of Srebrenica in Bosnia 
Herzegovina was the theatre of the first reported European genocide 
following World War II.33 Concurrently in Somalia, the ‘United Nations 
Mission(s) in Somalia’  (UNOSOM I and II), between 1992 and 1995, have 
been assessed as the most serious failure of UN intervention in a humanitarian 
crisis; because of the high number of UN personnel fatalities, due to the 
serious crimes and human rights violations perpetrated by all parties 
(including peacekeepers), and given the general inability to restore to any 
extent rule of law in the country.34 
                                                 
28   Idem. 
29   Agenda for Peace, para. 20. 
30   Ibidem, para. 57. 
31  Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the 
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60, S/1995/1, 25 January 
1995, hereinafter Supplement to an Agenda for Peace or Supplement. 
32  Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, Arrow Book, 2003; Garapon, Des crimes qu’on ne 
peut ni punir ni pardonner, Edition Odile Jacob, 2002.  
33  Hoare, The History of Bosnia, Saqi, 2007; Magno, La guerra dei dieci anni, Saggiatore, 
2001. 
34  Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo, Cambridge University 
Press, 2007; Pontecorvo, “Somalia e Nazioni Unite”, in Picone (ed.) Interventi delle 
  21 
 In his follow-up report, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, the 
Secretary General Boutros Ghali aimed to shed light on these major 
shortcomings of UN crisis management efforts and to point to the new 
challenges posed by dramatic changes of the geopolitical scenario.35  
According to the data and figures reported till December 1994, 17 
peacekeeping missions were deployed of which the 82% related to conflicts 
within States.36 The Supplement, designed in a very different manner from 
the previous report, did not focus on official definitions but rather highlighted 
features of the new conflict and post-conflict contexts and presented 
implications these change had for peace and security activities. It referred in 
particular to the Bosnian and the Somalian conflicts and to related UN 
missions that had been deployed.37 Moreover, the SG underlined that the 
implementation of complex negotiated peace agreements to prevent conflict 
recurrence between warring parties had called upon a new type of UN 
commitment that required an “unprecedented variety of functions”.38 These 
new operations were termed ‘multifunctional’,39 a precursor to what is 
nowadays defined ‘multi-dimensional’ missions.40 
 The Supplement further detailed ‘instruments for peace and security’ 
as: i) preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; ii) peace-keeping; iii) peace-
building; iv) disarmament; v) sanctions; and vi) peace enforcement.41 
Compared to the 1992 Agenda for peace, in 1995 preventive diplomacy and 
                                                 
Nazioni Unite, supra note 1, pp. 201-259; id., Armed Conflict in Somalia under 
International Law, Satura Editrice, 2012. 
35  Bothe, “Peacekeeping”, supra note 1, in particular at p. 1176. Higgins, Themes and 
Theories, supra note 14, p. 286 ff.  
36  Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, para. 11. 
37  Ibidem, para. 19. 
38  Ibidem, para. 21: “the supervision of cease-fires, the regroupment and demobilization of 
forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design 
and implementation of de-mining programmes; the return of refugees and displaced 
persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing 
administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of 
respect for human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and 
electoral reforms; the observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of 
elections; and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and 
reconstruction”. 
39 Ibidem, para. 21. 
40  Supra, note 13. 
41  Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, para. 23. 
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peacemaking had evolved into a single category, while peace-building and 
peace enforcement had acquired discrete identities; while disarmament and 
sanctions were considered for the first time as peace and security tools.  
 The current definition of peacekeeping is to be found in the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, known as the 
Capstone Doctrine.42 This document, issued by the Peacekeeping Best 
Practice Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 2008, 
and revisited in 2010, sets out the definitions of UN peace and security 
activities. It enumerates regulating principles and indicates best practices 
emerged from missions’ lessons-learned.  
 The Capstone Doctrine describes a “spectrum of peace and security 
activities”, which includes discrete features of conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building.43 A 
focus on the concept of peacekeeping is instructive to highlight how these 
features have changed over time in response to certain crucial events. 
Peacekeeping is defined as “a technique designed to preserve the peace, 
however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing 
agreements achieved by the peacemakers”.44 Capstone underscores that these 
activities are “the result of an evolution that started with mere interposition 
forces supervising cease-fires” 45 to later including complex activities 
involving various components of military, police and civilian actors that aim 
at creating the basis for ‘sustainable peace’. The described composite 
‘spectrum’ of tasks, then, evolves into a ‘new generation of multi-
dimensional peacekeeping’.46  
                                                 
42  Capstone Doctrine. 
43  Capstone Doctrine, part I, chapter 2.1. 
44  Ibidem, p. 18. 
45  Idem. 
46  Ibidem, p. 22. It must be noted that the term ‘multi-dimensional’ has been used for the 
first time in relations to peacekeeping operations in the 2003 Handbook on United 
Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. Given the pragmatic nature and the 
goal of the document, the Handbook does not provide for a precise definition of 
‘multidimensional’, while it rather focuses on the practical aspects of the setting, 
deployment and implementation of the various mission's tasks. These operations are 
described as the evolving point of peacekeeping operations “composed of a range of 
components including military, civilian police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, human 
rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender”, Handbook on 
United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices 
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 This evolution responds to significant changes in the geopolitical 
scenario, notably from inter-state to intra-state conflicts, whose main features 
are internal struggles between paramilitary groups, civil wars of religious or 
ethnic character, often in the context of failed or failing States where the lack 
of institutions and infrastructures prevail. These situations call for a much 
more articulate intervention than mere cease-fire supervision or the 
deployment of interposition forces to keep the peace. Multi-dimensional 
peacekeeping operations, then, offer a more nuanced and elaborated kind of 
intervention process that the Capstone Doctrine describes in three discrete 
phases: i) stabilisation; ii) peace consolidation and long-term recovery; and 
iii) development. 47 Moreover, ‘new generation’ operations are designed to 
interact with a much broader array of actors, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and NGOs, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, as well as local institutions.48 
 Within these modern multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations one 
can observe both horizontal and vertical dimensions at play. The horizontal 
dimension of an operation can be described in diachronic terms as the mission 
evolves from a first phase of stabilization to a last period of recovery and 
development; while the vertical dimension is informed by cooperation among 
diverse actors involved in the post-conflict process, performing a wide range 
of tasks that span humanitarian assistance to political and economic 
governance support.49 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 2003, p. 1.  
47  Capstone Doctrine, pp.  22-25, in particular figure 2 at p. 23. 
48  Idem. 
49  The Capstone doctrine analytically describes traditional peacekeeping task. They consist 
in: “Observation, monitoring and reporting – using static posts, patrols, overflights or 
other technical means, with the agreement of the parties; Supervision of cease-fire and 
support to verification mechanisms; Interposition as a buffer and confidence-building 
measure”, at p. 21. An even more exhaustive list is provided for in the Handbook on 
United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, supra note 30, at pp.1-2. 
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3.2. Peace operations 
 
 In 2000 the UN started a reform phase of peacekeeping which took 
place along the contours traced in the Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations.50 The document, known as the Brahimi Report, from the 
name of the appointed special representative, for the first time refers to peace 
operations rather than to peacekeeping. It describes the need of a reform of 
peace and security activities emerging not only from the change in the overall 
conflict and post-conflict landscape but also from major failures occurred 
during peacekeeping operations, namely in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia.51 
With the Brahimi Report, the term peace operations has started to be used 
generally in UN terminology to include the array of peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peace-building. The document did not give an official 
definition of peace operations but instead stated that these entail three 
principal activities: i) conflict prevention and peacemaking; ii) peacekeeping; 
and iii) peace-building.52 Interestingly, from 2000 on, the label ‘peace 
operations’ has coexisted with previously used terms as, in particular, 
peacekeeping. Some reports and policy papers refer to peace operations 
exclusively, while still others include ‘peacekeeping’.53 
 As concerns the more recent Capstone Doctrine, it presents several 
terminological inconsistencies. In fact, the main focus of the document, 
                                                 
50  Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 
August 2000, hereinafter Brahimi Report. 
51  Supra, notes 24-26. 
52  Brahimi Report, para.10.  
53  For example, the Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, supra 
note 30; The document on DPKO reform strategy called Peace Operation 2010; The 
Capstone Doctrine full title is United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: principles and 
guidelines. It is noteworthy to signal that in October 2014, the Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, chaired by Jose 
Ramos-Horta from East Timor. The Panel's mission is to issue a new report on the state 
of the art of peace operations and to provide for recommendations for future reform. In 
other words, the appointed rapporteurs have been asked to produce a “reform report” that 
will serve the same goal fulfilled 14 years ago by the Brahimi report. Interestingly enough 
the terminology used for this newly-established Panel refers to Peace Operations and not 
to peacekeeping, not differently from the 2000 Panel chaired by Brahimi, providing 
further evidence of parallel use in UN doctrine of different terms to define peace and 
security activities. See Secretary-General's statement on appointment of High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations, New York, 31 October 2014, available at 
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8151. 
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according to its title (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: principles 
and guidelines), is peacekeeping. Nevertheless, the text uses the broader 
‘peace and security activities’, which includes conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.54 A 
formal definition of peace operations is given only in an appended glossary, 
referred to as Annex 2, as “field operations deployed to prevent, manage 
and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence.”55 Thus, 
it can be suggested that peace operations are viewed as field missions, 
including both military and civilian components, aimed at managing conflicts 
from the moment of their eruption to the prevention of their relapse. It can be 
inferred, therefore, that this definition includes peacekeeping and peace-
building, while conflict prevention and peace-making would fall outside the 
scope of the term as they consist of diplomatic efforts that do not fit the 
narrower definition. It is less evident, however, whether peace operations also 
include peace enforcement.  
 Since the context for UN peace operations may involve cooperation 
with other command forces, it is instructive to compare how other Member 
States define the term. Recent United States military doctrine endorses the 
lexicon of peace operations and offers an annotated definition of the concept 
 
[p]eace operations are crisis response and limited contingency 
operations, and normally include international efforts and military 
missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the 
environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate 
the transition to legitimate governance. [They] may be conducted under 
the sponsorship of the United Nations, another intergovernmental 
organization, within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally.56 
 
The doctrine further specifies that peace operations include peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding, peacemaking and conflict prevention as well as ‘military 
                                                 
54   Capstone Doctrine, chapter 2.1. 
55   Capstone Doctrine, Annex 2, p. 98. See also Oswald-Durham-Bates (eds), Documents on 
the Law of UN Peace Operations, supra note 1, in particular at pp. 2-3. 
56   USA Joint Chief of Staff, Peace Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3, 1 August 2012, p. 
vii. 
  26 
peace enforcement operations’.57 Direct reference to the UN and others 
implies, rightly or wrongly, a shared understanding of the scope and breadth 
of jointly sponsored peace operations. Here we can understand that from the 
US military point of view, peace enforcement is part and parcel of the peace 
operation toolkit.  
 Moreover, it indicates that these missions can be deployed under the 
aegis of the UN or of another organisation, led by a coalition of states or 
unilaterally. The main divide is generally identified by UN-led and UN-
authorised missions, whereas the former are not only authorised but also 
conducted under the command and control of the UN, the latter are 
established by a UN SC resolution but are mandated to regional organisations 
as NATO, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of Western 
African States (ECOWAS), and others.58  
 
 
3.3. Peace enforcement operations 
 
 The UN describes peace enforcement in the Capstone Doctrine as 
involving 
 
the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a 
range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such 
actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in 
situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.59 
 
If peace operations are understood to include both military and civilian 
                                                 
57   Idem. 
58   Labouda; Bothe; White, Keeping the Peace; Coleman (ed.), International Organisations 
and Peace Enforcement, all supra note 1; Lattanzi-Spinedi (eds), Le organizzazioni 
regionali e il mantenimento della pace nella prassi di fine XX secolo, Editoriale 
Scientifica, 2004; Cellamare, “Le attività di mantenimento della pace nei rapporti tra 
Nazioni Unite e organizzazioni regionali (I parte)”, in La Comunità Internazionale, vol. 
1, 2013, pp. 51-76; id., “Le attività di mantenimento della pace nei rapporti tra Nazioni 
Unite e organizzazioni regionali (II parte)”, in La Comunità Internazionale, vol. 2, 2013, 
pp. 233-259. 
59   Capstone Doctrine, p. 18. 
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components, or both ‘international efforts and military missions’, as 
suggested by the US military,60 then, according to the Capstone Doctrine UN 
peace enforcement should be considered as an exclusively-militarized 
solution. Furthermore, the Doctrine specifies that so called ‘robust 
peacekeeping’61 diverges from peace enforcement as the former involves the 
use of force at the ‘tactical level’ with the consent of the host authorities 
and/or the main parties, while the latter does not require the consent of the 
parties and may involve the use of military force at the ‘strategic or 
international level’.62 The terms ‘tactical level’ and ‘strategic level’ are 
widely used in military operations’ jargon, the former refers to the battlefield 
dimension while the latter to the institutional/political dimension.63 The 
distinction may result quite clear when we refer to the chain of command and 
control of an operation, where, for example, the UN mandate defines the 
strategic framework of a mission, where the decision of a State to contribute 
its troops and assets to a peace operation is taken at the strategic – i.e. 
political/institutional – level.64 Whereas instructions and order given to 
peacekeepers’ units operating on the field by their military commander 
pertains to the tactical level. On the contrary, it is less evident what should be 
understood as use of force at the ‘strategic or international level”.65 One may 
suggest that this expression refers to the use of force in the relations between 
States as prescribed in the Charter, thus in self-defence or within the collective 
security system.  
 Again, it is instructive to examine UN frequent-partner statements on 
the lexicon of peace enforcement. The latest NATO Joint Allied Doctrine 
                                                 
60   Supra note 56. 
61  For the use of the terms ‘robust’ and ‘militarised operations’ see Higgins, “Second 
Generation Peacekeeping”, supra note 14; Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in 
the Twenty-First Century, Hart, 2011.  
62  Capstone Doctrine, pp. 19, 34-35. 
63  For a thorough analysis of the chain of command and control in peace operations, see 
infra, chapter III. 
64  The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, defines the ‘tactical level’ as “[t]he level 
at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish 
military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units”, APP-06, April 2008 
(hereinafter NATO Glossary), p. 2-T-2.  
65 The NATO Glossary defines the ‘strategic level’ as “[t]he level at which a nation or group 
of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, 
including military, resources to achieve them”, p. 2-S-12. 
  28 
defines peace enforcement as 
 
A peace support effort designed to end hostilities through the 
application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of 
military force. It is likely to be conducted without the strategic consent 
of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties.66 
 
NATO focuses here on the lack of consent includes not only that of the host 
country but also the possibility of consent of multiple ‘conflicting parties’. 
NATO also does not concentrate on the differences between robust 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but rather on the divides between peace 
and war efforts. In fact, in NATO doctrine the aim of peace enforcement is to 
‘’compel major conflicting parties to reach a settlement, by impartial use 
force to halt the conflict in accordance with an authorization of the Security 
Council ex Chapter VII of the UN Charter”.67 This contrasts with the aim of 
war which must be viewed more specifically as to ensure a military victory 
of one side over the other.68  
 US military doctrine describes peace enforcement in more general 
terms: as coercive operations tailored to compel compliance with resolutions 
or sanctions.69 While mentioning only en passant that consent of the host 
country or of other parties is not required, it stresses the necessity for the 
mission to be and remain impartial.70 
 The presence of an ever-expanding array of views of peace 
enforcement may lead one to be inclined to question the value of using it at 
all.  It appears that peace enforcement is characterised by coercive actions, 
possibly authorised by a UN SC resolution under Chapter VII, deployed in 
the absence of consent of the host state. It should be differentiated from other 
forms of peace operations that include in their mandate a coercive use of 
                                                 
66  Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, AJP-3.4.1(A), 
December 2014, para. 0113. 
67  Ibidem, paras 0015-0116. 
68  Ibidem, para. 0116. 
69  USA Joint Chief of Staff, Peace Operations, supra, note 56: “Application of military 
force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel 
compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and 
order”, at p. I-8. 
70  Idem.  
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force, which are generally referred to as robust or militarised peace 
operations. In these cases, the consent of the host state is a key element that 
must always be present.  
 What is far from clear is the distinction between peace enforcement 
and, let us say, ‘full enforcement’, the latter understood as the codified 
authorisation to member states, under art. 42 of the Charter, to take ‘all 
measures’ necessary against another State to restore international peace and 
security; as it has been the case of the Korea War, operation Desert Storm in 
Iraq and recently the actions carries out against Libya. In this regard, the 
wording peace enforcement appears to be misleading due to its foggy 
contours easily crossing over into notions of enforcement, on the one hand, 
and peace operations, on the other hand. In addition to its vagueness, the 
category of peace enforcement does not prove to be of any particular use 
when other classifications exist, namely robust or militarised peace operation 
as opposed to enforcement.71  
 The identification of precise contours of peace enforcement may offer 
academics one of the most vexing aspects of the peace operations lexicon 
while showing practitioners no clear choice. In the opinion of some authors, 
the notion of peace enforcement has emerged recently as a terminological 
response to the development of peace operations increasingly including an 
enforcement element, namely the authorisation to use force beyond self-
defence.72 However, the term peace enforcement coexists with other similar 
– but not always identical – wording, namely robust peacekeeping, militarised 
peacekeeping and (just) enforcement. These parallelisms unfortunately lead 
less to clarity than to confusion. Accordingly, the present analysis will not 
endorse the term peace enforcement. The chapter will rather keep distinct the 
notions of peace operation, including robust missions, from pure enforcement 
                                                 
71  For the use of the terms robust and militarised operations see Higgins, “Second 
Generation Peacekeeping”, supra note 14; Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in 
the Twenty-First Century, Hart, 2011. As to the notion of enforcement, see Klappe that 
divides peace enforcement from full-scale enforcement operations, in “The Law of 
International Peace Operations” in Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
72  See in particular Higgins, “Second Generation Peacekeeping”, supra note 14, at p. 285; 
Labouda, “Peacekeeping and Peace enforcement”, supra note 1, at paras 30 ff. 
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actions. As it will be further elaborated, the watershed between the two 
concepts is not as much the extent of the use of force allowed in the mission, 
but rather the presence of consent of the host country.73  
 
 
3.4. Peace support 
 
 It is worth highlighting that NATO uses a different lexicon from UN 
doctrine, whereas NATO resorts to the term ‘peace support’ to indicate what 
the UN calls the spectrum of peace and security activities or peace operations. 
The latest NATO definition of peace support is set out in the 2014 Allied Joint 
Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support and reads as follows: 
“Efforts conducted impartially to restore or maintain peace. Peace support 
efforts can include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding”.74  
  A diachronic analysis of NATO doctrine shows major evolutions. The 
most significant trend lies with a shift towards the use of briefer and less 
detailed definitions, and the resort to quite generic terminology. Perhaps the 
most evident trace of this trend can be seen in the title of strategic documents. 
In 2001 the Allied Joint Doctrine on the matter was titled ‘Peace Support 
Operations’. The same terminology was used in the document that is 
considered a NATO equivalent of the UN Capstone Doctrine (2010 Allied 
Joint Doctrine) 75 as well as in the 2008 NATO Glossary of Terms and 
Definitions issued by the Standardization Office.76 Quite recently, in 
December 2014 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has eliminated the 
word ‘operations’ from its glossary and replaced by the term ‘efforts’.77 The 
                                                 
73  Infra, para. 4.1.  
74  Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, AJP-3.4.1(A), 
December 2014, para. 0104. PSOs indicate an area of engagement very wide, see 
Keuhner, “The Impact of Organised Crime on Peace Support Operations”, in Arnold (ed.), 
Law Enforcement Within the Framework of Peace Support Operations, Martinus Nijhoff, 
2008, pp. 75-104. 
75  Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-01(D), December 2010, in particular at paras 0246-0247.  
76 NATO Glossary. 
77  AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2014, supra note 74. 
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more general terminology of ‘peace support efforts’ is likely to definitively 
take over the previous lexicon of ‘peace support operations’. In fact, on the 
one hand, the 2014 Joint Doctrine clearly states that the document is meant 
to supersede the precedent 2001 Allied Joint Doctrine, on the other hand the 
lexicon attached to the 2014 Joint Doctrine specifies the proposed 
modification to the existing glossary and they all include the term ‘effort’.78  
As to NATO definitions of peace support, it is interesting to compare the 
most significant documents issued by the organization in the last 14 years. In 
2001, peace support operations were defined in a very elaborated manner as 
 
multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in 
support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the 
UN or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), involving military forces and diplomatic and 
humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long-term 
political settlement or other specified conditions. They include 
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian 
relief.79   
 
Seven years later, in the NATO Glossary the definition has been simplified 
and limited to an 
 
operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and 
military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter 
purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such 
operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace 
enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian 
operations.80 
 
In 2014, eventually, in the Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution 
to Peace Support NATO has defined peace support in an even more synthetic 
manner as  
                                                 
78  NATO letter of promulgation of AJP-3.4.1(A) and attached Lexicon, part II, p. LEX-3 and 
LEX-4. 
79  Peace Support Operations, AJP-3.4.1, July 2001, at para. 0202. 
80  NATO Glossary: ‘peace support operations’. The purpose of the documents issued by the 
Standardization is precisely to provide for a shared and agreed upon terminology among 
all NATO Member States. This is probably one of the reasons why this second definition, 
while not divergent, is clearly more generic than the previous one and thus perhaps better 
suited to encompass the constant evolution of peace and security tasks.  
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Efforts conducted impartially to restore or maintain peace. Peace support 
efforts can include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding.81  
 
Notwithstanding the differences in the previous versions, some significant 
elements of coherence can be identified in the study of these different 
wordings. First, all documents stress the role of impartiality as key element 
of peace support (operations). Second, the goal of NATO action does not 
change the achievement of peace. Third, NATO Doctrine is quite consistent 
when enumerating peace support tasks: conflict prevention, peacemaking, 
peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace-building. It must be noted 
though that -according to the 2014 Joint Doctrine- humanitarian intervention 
now falls outside the scope of peace support efforts. Fourth, wide reference 
is made to UN doctrine: the terms used to identify the various activities stem 
from the Capstone Doctrine. In fact, another characteristic of the evolution 
process of definitions consists in the progressive approximation of NATO 
doctrine to UN strategic papers, that emerges in particular from the latest 
Allied Joint Doctrine of 2014.82 Despite the self-evident similarities, the 2014 
NATO Doctrine states that peace-support related terms might have a different 
meaning in the use of other actors and warns that the differences should be 
clarified in the early stage of the operation planning, in order to avoid 
inconveniences.83 Interestingly enough, the issue of the need of a UN 
authorisation to establish a NATO peace enforcement operation has been the 
object of an intense debate between Member States during the drafting 
process of the latest Allied Joint Doctrine on Peace Support. The lack of 
consensus on the legal sources of legitimacy of peace enforcement efforts is 
probably the main reason of the broad definition of the term and of the lack 
                                                 
81  AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2014, supra note 74, para. 0104. 
82  The proximity of NATO position to UN doctrine is particular manifest in the comparison 
of the figure that explains the interactions or grey areas between the diverse peace and 
security activities. See Capstone Doctrine, cit., at p. 19 and AJP-3.1.4(A), 2014, at para. 
01.06. Moreover, also NATO understanding of peacekeeping is ‘multi-dimensional’ in 
nature, a term that as seen above typically defines ‘new generation of peacekeeping’ in 
UN lexicon (para. 0121).  
83  Ibidem, para. 0106. 
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of reference to UN basic rules on the use of force.84   
 
  
4. The key elements of peace operations – the trinity of virtues? 
 
 Peace operations consist in a very complex and varied set of activities 
that range from peace-making to robust peacekeeping, to peace building. 
Notwithstanding the evident differences among these types of operations, 
some fundamental principles have been identified along the development of 
peace operations practice. The core principles regulating peace operations are 
generally identified in the triad composed of the consent of the host State, 
impartiality and the limited use of force. It must be noted that these elements 
stem primarily from UN practice and UN doctrine. In fact, the first 
theorisation of the triad dates back to the 1958 Hammarskjold report on 
UNEF mission.85 Subsequently, from 1958 on, these three principles have 
been constantly and consistently recalled in all UN documents on peace 
operations. Thus, these key elements have progressively emerged from the 
development of peace operations practice in the last 60 years and are now 
crystallized in the major pieces of UN and military doctrines, and are 
generally endorsed by scholarly writings as well. 
                                                 
84  The opposed positions on the matter are exemplified in particular by the reservations 
formulated to the Allied Joint Doctrine by Germany, on the one side and the US, on the 
other side. The former has clearly stated that UN Security Council resolutions are not the 
sole legal basis of peace enforcement, others are an invitation by the host country and an 
agreement with the legitimate government. As to this last case, in our opinion, several 
doubts remain in order to define a ‘legitimate government’ in particular in the case of 
failed states or in civil wars. The US, instead, has specified that peace enforcement 
necessarily requires UN SC authorization ‘in accordance with the UN Charter’, see AJP-
3.4.1(A), p. V. 
85 Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the 
Force: Report of the Secretary-General, A/3943, 9 October 1958, hereinafter 
Hammarskjold Report. The Report concerned the deployment of United Nation 
Emergency Force to monitor the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel following the Suez 
crisis, UNEF is unanimously considered the first peacekeeping operation and a clear 
example of the ‘tradition model’ of peacekeeping as it was mandated to merely supervise 
a cease-fire and the presence of the contingents on the ground was meant as a mere 
interposition force between two States. Another peculiar feature of UNEF lays with the 
source of its authorization: it was established by a General Assembly resolution (1001 
(ES-I), 7 November 1956), differently from the majority of missions that have been 
deployed following a Security Council mandate.  
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  It has been argued that the three constitutive elements of peace 
operations represent a normative model of peace operations and that a 
continuity in this normative model can be identified.86  The present paragraph 
aims at highlighting the features of each element and to show that they are 
the result of an evolution, rather than an example of continuity. It is 
indisputable that the UN, but also NATO and other national military 
doctrines, have resorted to these concepts since the first deployments of peace 
operations. Nevertheless, it will be shown that the terms consent, impartiality 
and limited use of force have been used as fixed labels while the very meaning 
of the concepts has widely evolved. Hence, it seems more appropriate to talk 
about an evolution of the normative model of peace operations rather than 
continuity thereof.  
 Besides the so-called ‘trinity of virtues’ (consent, impartiality and 
minimum use of force), 87 some scholars and certain military doctrines have 
pointed out the centrality of other principles as well. These additional 
concepts generally refer to operational factors of success and stem from a 
lessons-learned approach.88 For example, the Capstone Doctrine lists: 
legitimacy, credibility and promotion of local ownership as ‘other success 
factors”.89 2014 NATO Allied Joint Doctrine mentions a similar set: political 
                                                 
86 Frulli, supra note 1. It must be specified that the author refers in particular to UN 
peacekeeping operations rather than to peace operations in general. Nevertheless, the 
present thesis claims that the triad of principles applies not only to peacekeeping but also 
to the broader spectrum of peace operations activities, thus the evolution-lines traced for 
peacekeeping are relevant also to peace operations in general. 
87  White names it the ‘trinity of virtues’ in White, “Towards Integrated Peace Operations: 
the evolution of Peacekeeping and Coalitions of the Willings”, in Odello-Piotrovwicz, 
International Military Missions and International Law, Brill, 2011, pp. 1-23, in particular 
at p. 7. The expression is endorsed also by Labouda, Peacekeeping and Peace 
enforcement, supra note 1. Levine uses the even more picturesque term: ‘holy trinity”, 
see Levine, “Peacekeeper Impartiality: Standards, Process and Operations”, in Journal of 
International Peacekeeping, vol. 15, 2011, pp. 422-450.  
88  Lessons learned have become crucial in peace operation both for the evolution and the 
improvement:  for example the UN Policy, Evaluation and Training Division was 
established on 1 July 2007 with the task of collecting, organising and disseminating 
lessons learned from every peace operation: see 
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org. See also Benner-Mergenthaler-
Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations, Oxford University Press, 2011, where 
the authors have developed an interesting concept of ‘organizational learning’. 
89  “International legitimacy is one of the most important assets of a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation. The international legitimacy of a United Nations peacekeeping 
operation is derived from the fact that it is established after obtaining a mandate from the 
United Nations Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance 
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primacy, legitimacy, perseverance and promotion of local ownership.90 US 
military doctrine on peace operations is particularly rich in enumerating what 
are called the ‘fundamentals of peace operations’. In addition to the three core 
principles of consent, impartiality and limited use of force, there are another 
thirteen elements.91 Other authors have reiterated legitimacy92 as well as 
added an operation’s collective financing.93   
 That Capstone uses the term ‘other success factors’ seems to suggest 
that the triad of consent, impartiality and limited use of force might be 
                                                 
of international peace and security. […] The credibility of a United Nations peacekeeping 
operation is a direct reaction of the international and local communities’ belief in the 
mission’s ability to achieve its mandate. Credibility is a function of a mission’s capability, 
effectiveness and ability to manage and meet expectations. Ideally, in order to be credible, 
a United Nations peacekeeping operation must deploy as rapidly as possible, be properly 
resourced, and strive to maintain a confident, capable and unified posture. […] National 
and local ownership is critical to the successful implementation of a peace process. In 
planning and executing a United Nations peacekeeping operation’s core activities, every 
effort should be made to promote national and local and ownership and to foster trust and 
cooperation between national actors. Effective approaches to national and local 
ownership not only rein- force the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support 
mandate imple- mentation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any national 
capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn”, Capstone Doctrine, pp. 
36-40, italics added. 
90  Political Primacy: […] NATO forces should retain planning processes that are flexible 
enough to support and reflect the political strategy and can be readjusted to exploit 
political opportunities as the peace process develops; for example, helping to implement 
agreements made during peace negotiations. Legitimacy can be viewed in two parts. First, 
the legitimacy required to mount a peace support effort, and second, the legitimacy 
achieved by implementing the mandate in a manner that reflects the other principles of 
peace support. Establishing and maintaining legitimacy is an ongoing task requiring 
constant monitoring and assessment. […] Legitimacy: the legitimacy of a peace support 
effort will be a crucial factor for drawing support within the international community, 
contributing nations, the conflicting parties and local population. However, the perception 
of legitimacy will vary between the different audiences. […] Perseverance:  NATO forces 
should adopt an approach that continually takes into account the long-term objectives that 
support the end state. […] For example, identifying any senior command or key decision-
making posts that may benefit from a degree of continuity either through prior experience 
of the region, or through proven expertise in a particular area. […] Promotion of Local 
Ownership: Every effort should be made to foster and promote local ownership through 
continual engagement with the state and its national programmes, civil society and the 
creation of a climate of trust, and cooperation between all parties. Programmes that have 
local ownership are more likely to be sustainable than those programmes without it […]”, 
AJP-3.4.1(A), 2014, paras 0227-0238, italics added. 
91  These are: transparency, credibility, freedom of movement, flexibility and adaptability, 
civil-military harmonization and cooperation, objective/end state, perseverance, unity of 
effort, legitimacy, security, mutual respect and cultural awareness, current and sufficient 
intelligence. Peace Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3, 1 August 2012, chapter I, para. 
3.  
92  Coleman (ed.), International Organisations and Peace Enforcement, supra note 1. 
93  Gargiulo, Le Peace Keeping Operations delle Nazioni Unite, supra note 1, in particular 
at p. 331. See also White, Keeping the Peace, supra note 1, in particular at pp. 237-239. 
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considered as success factors as well. Differently, these features are expressly 
indicated as ‘basic principles’ of UN peacekeeping.94 In NATO and US 
doctrine, the other elements are not separate from the triad and they do not 
appear to presume a hierarchy of principles. As a consequence, this 
combination of heterogeneous categories leads to some confusion that calls 
for further clarification on the very key elements of peace operations. It seems 
reasonable to affirm that while the triad represents the three core principles 
of peace operations, these elements are also to be considered as success 
factors.95 Legitimacy, credibility, perseverance and other elements may 
determine or hamper the mission’s success, but cannot be considered as core 
principles defining peace operations. In other words, the triad of consent, 
impartiality and limited use of force makes peace operations what they are; 
while all other features may influence the success of an operation but do not 
shape the operation itself. In fact, as it will be further elaborated, peace 
operations are designed along the lines traced by these key elements. 
According to these premises the following analysis will focus on the 
examination of the key elements of peace operations intended as: consent, 
impartiality and limited use of force.  
 
 
 
4.1. Consent of the host State 
 
 Consent is generally referred to as the first key element of peace 
operations. Its centrality can be understood in light of the core principles 
regulating international relations, mainly the sovereign equality of States and 
the prohibition to interfere or intervene in domestic affairs, particularly as 
enshrined in article 2.7 of the UN Charter. The present analysis sheds light on 
                                                 
94  Capstone Doctrine, pp. 31-35. 
95  In the words of the Secretary General Butros Ghali: “Analysis of recent successes and 
failures shows that in all the successes those principles [the consent of the parties, 
impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence] were respected and in most 
of the less successful operations one or other of them was not”, Supplement to an Agenda 
for Peace, para. 33.  
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two main issues related to the notion of consent. First, it investigates whose 
consent is required, seeking to identify which actors are entitled to express 
legitimate consent to the deployment of a peace operation. Second, the 
chapter explores the relationship between two different dimensions of 
consent: strategic and tactical. In particular, it questions whether both 
strategic and tactical consent are to be considered key elements of peace 
operations or if the latter is rather one of the success factors mentioned above.  
 The Hammarskjold Report on the UNEF mission addressed the 
consent of the host state, and more precisely of the ‘Government concerned” 
as early as 1958.96 The Report mentioned clearly that in case of a conflict 
between two or more States, the consent to the deployment of an interposition 
mission is to be expressed by all the parties concerned, meaning by all the 
official governments. Thus, the consent in the case of UNEF was expressed 
by Egypt and Israel in the General Armistice Agreement. It should be 
specified, though, that Israel expressed a general consent to the establishment 
of the interposition mission, but it did not agree to have ‘boots on the ground’ 
in its own territory. Hence military personnel were deployed only on the 
Egyptian side of the border.97 While it might seem obvious that consent must 
be derived from legitimate governments in the aftermath of an inter-state 
conflict, the issue is less clear in civil wars, intra-state struggles between 
armed groups, and failed States. The significant increase of these types of 
conflicts constitutes precisely the major change, and challenge, of the 
geopolitical scenario that has occurred starting in the 1990s.  
The shift from inter-state to intra-state conflicts, and the related 
emergence of non-state actors, has had substantial implications in the 
evolution of peace operations. The change in the features of consent is one of 
these. In the post-cold war era the parties are no longer (former belligerent) 
States, but more likely a State and inside armed groups, different militias 
guided by warlords in the absence of a legitimate government, a State and its 
                                                 
96  Hammarskjold Report, para. 155. 
97  For a mission's analysis see, inter alia, Frulli, supra note 1, in particular at pp. 31 ff. and 
Gargiulo, supra note 1, in particular at pp. 200 ff. See also White, Keeping the Peace, 
supra note 1, at pp. 233 ff. 
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neighbouring countries financing paramilitary groups to fuel the intra-state 
conflict. In these cases, it is no longer evident who is the legitimate entity to 
express consent. An overview on peace operations practice is useful to shed 
some light on this topic.  
The engagement of the UN in the case of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo is a clear example of an intra-state conflict where the stability of 
the country has been constantly undermined by recurrent cycles of violence 
carried out by a myriad of armed groups, often supported by neighbouring 
countries. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, that concluded the second 
Congo war, was signed in 1999 between the governments of DRC, Angola, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The agreement foresaw the 
establishment of a  monitoring mission and in November 1999 the Security 
Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).98 The signatories of the 
agreement included governmental forces of the mentioned States and only 
some of the militias involved in the long-lasting struggles.99 Namely, the 
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation 
of Congo (MLC) were parties to the accord, while all other forces were 
expressly defined as ‘armed groups’ and not considered actors of the peace 
process.100 In other words, the parties to the peace process, being 
governments and selected paramilitary groups, have been deemed by the UN 
the legitimate actors to express the consent to the deployment of the peace 
operations. Moreover, the signatory parties have pointed at the groups who 
were not to be considered legitimate actors; thus paving the way to the 
                                                 
98  S/RES/1279, 30 November 1999, the terms of the mission were envisaged in chapter 8 of 
the Ceasefire, Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, chapter 8, para. 2.2 a), reported in UN doc. 
S/815, 23 July 1999. It is worthwhile noting that the proposal made by the negotiator 
included some peace enforcement tasks including inter alia “tracking down and 
disarming armed groups’. The proposal was not upheld in the first phase of the 
MONUSCO mandate, but in 2013 the UN took a very decisive offensive mandate against 
armed groups, see infra para. 2.3. 
99  The annex to the cease-fire provides for detailed list of the armed groups included and of 
those expressly excluded from the negotiation, Annex 'C' of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement, reported in UN doc. S/815, 23 July 1999. 
100 Among these groups it is worth mentioning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which 
has become so notorious for the commission of international crimes to gather the attention 
of the International Criminal Court, idem. 
  39 
creation of a specific category that was later named in peace operation 
parlance as ‘spoilers’.101  
 The deployment of MONUC encountered several hurdles in the 
dealings with the Congolese government of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila 
and due to endless confrontations of numerous militias on the Congolese 
territory.102  
Seeking to address this issue, in May 2010 the UN Security Council 
established a new operation, the ‘United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (MONUSCO) deployed 
in July 2010.103 MONUSCO has a more robust mandate to use ‘all necessary 
measures” to protect civilians and assist the national army, called FARDC 
(Les Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo), to stabilize 
the country, in particular minimizing the threats to civilians and to the overall 
stability of the country by the most active paramilitary groups, namely ‘23 
March Movement’ (M23), the ‘Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda’ (FDLR), the ‘Lord’s Resistance Army’ (LRA).104 A further 
significant change in the mandate occurred in March 2013 when the UN SC 
took the unprecedented decision to establish the ‘Force Intervention Brigade’ 
(FIB) as a pure enforcement unit within the peacekeeping mission.105 Here, 
                                                 
101 Brahimi Report, para. 21: “Groups (including signatories) who renege on their 
commitments or otherwise seek to undermine a peace accord by violence”. In the 
definition of the High Level Panel on Threats and Challenges and Change: “factions who 
see a peace agreement as inimical to their interests, power or ideology, use violence to 
undermine or overthrow settlements”, UN doc. A/59/565, 2004, para. 222. To be precise, 
spoilers–factions undermining the peace process–generally gain this label after they have 
haltered a peaceful settlement, but it is interesting to note that in the case of Congo, some 
groups have been considered spoilers since the very beginning of the peace process.  
102  Autessere, The Trouble with the Congo, Cambridge University Press, 2010; Maiden, 
“Transformative Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, in Journal of 
International Peacekeeping, vol. 18, 2014, pp. 102-122. Political problems were partially 
resolved by the death of President Kabila that brought to power his son, Joseph Kabila, 
who proved to be more open to international intervention in the DRC. As it concerns the 
lack of cooperation on the ground with MONUC, the situation was not addressed by the 
UN by seeking the consent of the warring parties, but rather by a series of broader political 
agreements with the neighbouring countries, on the one hand, and, on the other, by several 
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103  S/RES/1925, 28 May 2010. 
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the SC acting under chapter VII mandated the FIB to “carry out targeted 
offensive operation [...] to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, 
neutralize these groups, and to disarm them”.106  The creation of the FIB has 
posed questions on respect of the basic principles of peace operations, in 
particular of impartiality and limited use of force. These aspects will be 
addressed in the following paragraphs.  
As it regards specifically consent, the analysis of the situation in the 
DRC allows to draw some conclusions on the features of the consent 
expressed to the establishment of MUNUC, first, and MONUSCO later. It 
can be argued that the legitimate entities to express consent to the operations 
have been identified, first in the Congolese government and in the 
governments of the neighbouring countries. Furthermore, only two armed 
groups engaged in the Congo war, namely the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo were considered 
‘main parties’. All other militias were labelled as ‘spoilers’ since the 
beginning of the peace process and neither their consent nor their cooperation 
‘on the ground’ has ever been sought. So much so that in 2013 an enforcement 
unit was established within the UN mission to neutralize these armed groups.  
 The situation in Somalia has been described by many commentators 
and by the Security Council itself as a unicum in the history of peace 
operations.107 Notwithstanding its uniqueness, the Somalian crisis represents 
a perfect example to underscore the difficulties in gathering consent to deploy 
a peace operation in a failed State. Following the fall of the Said Barre regime 
in 1991, Somalia was devastated by a bloody civil war carried out by various 
opposed factions among which the two major groups headed by General 
Aideed (United Somali Congress) and by Ali Mahdi, (that later become the 
interim president of Somalia). The situation raised the grave concern of the 
international community also preoccupied of the humanitarian crisis worsen 
                                                 
Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Issue Brief, July 2013, 
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107 Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo, Cambridge University 
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by the famine that was devastating the population. A ceasefire was finally 
signed by the two factions in Mogadishu on 3 March 1992 and the 
intervention of the UN was sought by the parties to monitor its 
implementation, accompanied by a widespread consent of most actors 
involved in the peace process. 108 This widespread consent was the result of a 
complex negotiation process carried out by a UN technical team guided by 
the Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, appointed Special Representative for 
Somalia.109  
With resolution 751 of April 1992 the UN established the ‘United 
Nation Operation in Somalia’ (UNOSOM I).110 Despite the broad 
acknowledgement of the mission by all the parties concerned in this early 
phase, it is reported that the initial deployment of UNOSOM I was slowed 
down by a significant lack of cooperation on the ground.111 The renegade 
rivalry between the factions combined with gross incidents committed under 
the UN flag hampered the operation's effectiveness since its start.112 Soon 
after, the conflict erupted again and led to the collapse of a central government 
with which to negotiate. Somalia was once more devastated by warring 
militias, while the population was affected by recurring humanitarian 
emergencies.113 To face this situation the SC took the unprecedented decision 
to first increase the strength of the operation,114 then to authorise, under 
chapter VII, all necessary measures to create a secure environment to 
guarantee the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population and 
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protect UN personnel who suffered severe injuries and losses.115 This 
signalled a transformation of a peacekeeping mission into an enforcement 
operation and as such delegated command to member States that set up a 
multinational force led by the US, named United Nations Task Force 
(UNITAF).116 UNIFAT was soon re-transformed in UNOSOM II, which had 
a chapter VII mandate, but a reduction of force level was soon prescribed by 
resolution 879 (1994). UNOSOM II was eventually withdrawn in March 
1995, being considered one (if not ‘the’) major failure in UN peace 
operations.117  
 As to the element of consent, it is evident that in the early phase of 
UNOSOM the UN sought broad consent of the main parties. Differently from 
Congo, the impression is that, initially, the parties were all brought to the 
negotiation table and finally agreed on the UN mission’s establishment. As to 
the lack of cooperation on the ground, it appeared to be the consequence of a 
change in the strategic and tactical attitude of all parties, that were concerned 
more to expand their interests, rather than to foster a peace process. The 
extreme fragmentation, combined with the disappearance of the central 
government did not present a situation for the UN to develop an ‘anti-spoilers 
strategy’ as in the DRC. That in Somalia any local actor was probably to be 
considered a spoiler, the UN (and the US-led mission) tried to address the 
situation with several enforcement mandates. With no legitimate actors, and 
no consent, the enforcement option seemed the only available. Considering 
the current situation in the country, one tends to conclude that it was not the 
best option.   
 The case of Lebanon and the establishment of the ‘United Nation 
Interim Force in Lebanon’ (UNIFIL) also provide for some relevant insights 
to examine the element of consent. UNIFIL I was first established in 1978 
according to Security Council resolutions 425 and 426. UNIFIL I was 
established with the consent of the government of Lebanon -the very 
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mission’s host country- and of the government of Israel who committed to 
put to an end its invasion of South Lebanon. Besides, the consent of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was not considered necessary, 
despite the PLO controlled some areas of South Lebanon. The absence of the 
consent of ‘non-governmental’ parties, namely of the PLO, caused significant 
problems in to the deployment of UNIFI I, especially in the zones controlled 
by PLO.118 The evolution of the mission, with the deployment of UNIFIL II, 
followed a partially different approach. UNIFIL II was established in 2006 
with the consent of the government of Lebanon,119 but the consent of the 
Hezbollah movement was somehow taken into account. It is reported that the 
firm opposition of Hezbollah’s leader to a change in the UN mandate, 
allowing UNIFIL II to directly disarm the armed group and not only to assist 
the Lebanese army in doing so,120 caused a deadlock in the negotiations that 
eventually refrained the UN from adopting a new resolution in the intended 
direction.121  
 It seems correct to conclude that the legitimate actor to express 
consent is generally identified in the government of the host State. In some 
cases, on a non-consistent basis, the UN has also sought the consent of the 
‘main parties’ intended as representatives of groups, formally combatant but 
now willing to participate in the peace process. In other situations, instead, 
the UN has preferred to achieve the consent of neighbouring countries to a 
broad peace framework, rather than to involve the warring factions present in 
the territory. In the case of the DRC many armed groups were identified since 
the beginning as non-parties to the peace settlement and negotiations were 
not carried out with them; while broad agreements were sought solely among 
the governments of the region with the good offices of the UN.122  In other 
cases, a UN Team was sent to Somalia with the precise task of negotiating 
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with the plurality of factions involved in the civil war. As a result, most 
groups, not only the interim government, expressed their consent to the UN 
operation. Despite its start, UNISOM I lost the consent and the cooperation 
of all groups, that re-engaged in the conflict. Thus, the UN decided to issue 
an enforcement mandate to keep operating in the absence of consent. But this 
option has proved not to be a successful precedent to imitate in future 
missions. In Lebanon the leverage of consent has been used by the Hezbollah 
movement to bend the will of the Organization to certain extents, but it did 
not prevent the mission to be deployed.  
The requirement of consent to the deployment of peace operations 
seems to bring about some unavoidable risks of manipulation from the parties 
involved, but this does not prevent that consent is considered a necessary 
element of legitimacy of peace operations.123 
It has been maintained that the key element of consent has been 
progressively ‘tempered’ with the principle of effectiveness, hence consent 
of the main parties should include to some extent the need of cooperation by 
all or at least most of actors operating on the ground.124 The official doctrines 
seem to keep distinct – though strictly linked – the concept of strategic 
consent, on the one hand, and of cooperation, on the other hand.   
The UN Handbook on multidimensional peacekeeping operations 
refers to ‘consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict” as one of the 
basic principles for military activities in peace operations.125 NATO Allied 
Doctrine only mentions the ‘strategic consent of the main parties”, specifying 
that only the main parties have enough power to influence the political 
process.While informal parties may sometime be included in the process it is 
not deemed necessary to acquire the consent of all parties.126 Moreover, it is 
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affirmed that “while consent may be given at the strategic level, this may not 
be reflected at the tactical level” of local groups.127 Despite this distinction, 
the document does not further elaborate on the features of tactical consent and 
on the implications of the lack thereof. US Peace Operations doctrine does 
not discuss the issue but rather focuses on the relation between a general level 
of consent and the required force capability of the peace operation. It states 
that “as consent becomes more general, the PO force can reduce its force 
capability”, while “as the level of consent decreases, the level of force 
capability to enforce compliance should increase, creating conditions for 
peace enforcement operation”.128  
 Though many uncertainties of the full nature of consent remain, some 
conclusions can be drawn. Peace operations are generally established with the 
consent of the government of the host state on whose territory the mission is 
deployed. Consent of the host state is the key element of the legitimacy of the 
operation. It can be expressed in unilateral declarations, exchange of letters, 
peace agreements, and ceasefires accords. In some cases, consent can 
embrace the commitment to the peace settlement of the main parties to the 
conflict, namely neighbouring countries and armed groups; the latter’s 
consent, albeit not considered a key element of legitimacy of the operation, is 
welcome. ‘Strategic consent’ does not imply cooperation (also referred to as 
‘tactical consent’) of local actors; nor is ‘tactical consent’ required as a key 
element of peace operations. Tactical consent may, however, significantly 
affect the success of an operation as well as influence the level of force 
required. Where cooperation from local actors is lacking, where some actors 
behave as spoilers, affecting the implementation of the mandate, the peace 
operation generally increases the level of force through a robust mandate. The 
presence of the strategic consent of the host state is the element that divides 
peace operations from enforcement. Only when strategic consent is 
completely absent the operation is (or becomes) an enforcement operation.  
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4.2 Form neutrality to impartiality 
 
 Impartiality is widely considered the second key element of peace 
operations. Despite its centrality, the contours of the concept are not precisely 
defined. Impartiality was first mentioned in the Agenda for Peace, where it 
was twinned with the notion of neutrality.129 Later, in the Supplement to an 
Agenda for Peace, the reference to neutrality disappeared and the focus 
remained only on impartiality.130 Some authors have used both concepts, 
neutrality and impartiality, without clear distinctions, nevertheless the 
following analysis shows that the two notions are far from synonymous.131 
 In the first decades of peace operations, the lines between neutrality 
and impartiality were quite blurred. The 1958 Hammarskjold Report on 
UNEF focused on the concept of neutrality.132 Here, neutrality was 
understood as ‘non-interference’ in international political issues by restricting 
the participation of troops whose involvement would compromise objectivity 
of the mission.133  That is to say that the military force deployed must not 
include units from any of the permanent members of the Security Council, 
nor of States that might have a special interest in the situation.134 This 
principle resulted in the significant participation of neutral States that 
appeared to be ideal for this purpose.135  
In turn, the concept of neutrality was abandoned as the notion of 
impartiality emerged in clear juxtaposition. This change was one of the 
consequences of the dramatic shift in the geopolitical scenarios, namely from 
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inter-states to intra-state conflicts and of the related emergence of non-state 
actors, that later led to the creation of the ‘spoilers’ category.136 The new 
generation of conflicts are generally characterized by internal struggles 
between armed groups, by civil wars often of religious or ethnic connotation, 
sometimes by failed States and serious problems of internal law and order. 
Accordingly, peace operations were no longer required to act as neutral buffer 
entities to watch over the respect of ceasefires. In this changed scenario, peace 
operations have been expected to take active roles in fostering the fulfillment 
of the peace process between the parties, and sometimes against some parties 
considered spoilers of the peaceful settlement.  
Moreover, the elaboration of the concept of impartiality has been the 
result of the shortcomings of peace operations in the 1990s, in particular the 
failure to protect civilians in conflict and post-conflict situations. As already 
mentioned, peace operations deployed in Rwanda, Bosnia Herzegovina and 
Somalia have shown structural problems, such as the inability of the UN to 
play a decisive role in preventing atrocities by not taking a position in inter-
ethnic conflicts in their exercise of a neutral mandate. Thus, peacekeepers 
have been accused to have acted as bystanders to atrocities perpetrated against 
civilian populations.137  
In response to these accusations, the UN has developed more 
proactive policies including a wider mandate to protect civilians and a more 
robust use of force.138 Beginning with the Brahimi Report, UN doctrine has 
expressly differentiated impartiality and neutrality. The Brahimi Report states 
that “impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties 
in all cases for all time”.139 Hence, the evolution of the concept implied that 
a peace operation must be impartial in the dealings with the parties but not 
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neutral in the execution of the mandate.140 Accordingly, the operation “must 
actively pursue the implementation of [the] mandate even if doing so goes 
against the interests of one or more of the parties”.141 The Capstone Doctrine 
has further elaborated on the concept of impartiality, clarifying that “United 
Nations Peacekeeping should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to 
the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate”.142 
Peacekeepers must act as ‘good referees’, that is to say, super partes but strict 
in sanctioning infractions by actors that violate peace process 
engagements.143  
NATO doctrine also underscores the need to distinguish between 
impartiality and neutrality, expressly endorsing the former: the conduct of a 
peace support operation “should never be neutral in the execution of the 
mission”.144 US military Doctrine, besides stating that impartiality shall not 
be confused with neutrality, stresses that the principle of impartiality applies 
to the parties to the dispute only and is not relevant to the so called spoilers.145 
This clarification captures the core meaning of the evolution the notion of 
impartiality in peace operations. Peace operations are deployed in 
increasingly hostile environments where not all actors are committed to the 
peace process and the risk of personal security of civilians and UN personnel 
is high. As a consequence, post-1990s operations have been asked to 
discharge robust mandates even against some targeted actors.  
 The principle of impartiality has been recently stretched – in the 
opinion of some commentators – to a risky breaking point.146 The Security 
Council, acting under chapter VII, has created in March 2013 the ‘Force 
Intervention Brigade’ (FIB).147 The mandate has authorized the FIB to  
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carry out targeted offensive operations [...] either unilaterally or 
jointly with the FARDC, [...] in strict compliance with 
international law, […] to prevent the expansion of all armed 
groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them.148   
 
The unprecedented creation of the FIB has raised many concerns among  
Members. In particular, Guatemala and Argentina have highlighted the risk 
of transforming a peacekeeping mission into an enforcement operation, thus 
compromising the element of impartiality.149 Moreover, to some 
commentators the FIB would likely be considered a party to the conflict. 
Accordingly, the Brigade is not an impartial force; that is why the unit is 
expressly bound by international humanitarian law in the letter of the 
mandate.150 Despite doubts expressed by some SC Members, the resolution 
has been approved unanimously upon the consideration that the FIB is created 
“on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to 
the agreed principles of peacekeeping”.151 Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the 
sole inclusion of such clause would prevent from the creation of a precedent.  
 However, the FIB so far has proven to be an effective instrument, so 
much so that the M23 surrendered in late 2013. Thus the MONUSCO 
mandate, including FIB, has beem recently extended until 31 March 2017.152 
Its success suggests the likelihood that similar units will be deployed in the 
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future in particular complex scenarios.  
 Careful elaboration, then, of the use of impartiality in the sense of a 
‘good referee’ has allowed the UN to sanction infractions to peace settlements 
by embracing robust mandates and thus keeping to its principle respecting the 
threshold between peace operations and enforcement actions. 
 
 
4.3 Limited use of force 
 
 The Capstone doctrine refers to the principle of ‘non-use of force 
except in self-defence and defence of the mandate’ as the third key element 
of peace operations.153 The content of this principle seems self-evident: the 
military component of peace operations shall refrain from using force, as long 
as it is not essential to self-defence or to defend the operation's mandate. 
Whether self-defence is limited to the personal integrity of personnel or if it 
extends to the protection of premises and assets, however, is not clear. 
Similarly, it is not clear what the defence of the mandate should imply. 
Moreover, uncertainties exist as to the identification of the legal basis 
regulating the use of force in peace operations.  
Diverging hypotheses have been put forward in the literature, 
respectively focusing on self-defence as an inherent individual right of 
peacekeepers,154 or as the right of self-defence of States in international 
relations enshrined in article 51 of the UN Charter,155 or as tentative extension 
of art. 51 to international organisations.156 Some others have concluded that 
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the use of force in peace operations is a form of law-enforcement with the 
consent of the host State.157 This paragraph seeks to clarify the aspects in 
point to provide for a comprehensive understanding of the principle of the use 
of force in peace operations. It analyses some examples of national and 
international doctrines, combined with scholarly literature, to show the 
evolution of the use of force in peace operations. 
It is believed that the principle of the use of force in self-defence in 
peace operations only dates back to the 1958 Hammarskjold report.158 It 
seems more accurate to affirm that Secretary General Hammarskjold did not 
codify a principle regulating the use of force as such, but rather it only 
specified the extent of the right of self-defence entrusted to UN contingents. 
It is worth recalling that the UNEF mission was established by a General 
Assembly resolution, thus any authorization to use force was excluded as not 
falling under the competence and powers of the GA.159 In fact, the Report 
stated that “men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the 
use of armed force but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with 
arms”.160 Accordingly, UNEF units were equipped only with weapons 
necessary for self-defence. As to the extent of self-defence defence, the UNEF 
report provided for little guidance, as it only specified that units were allowed 
to respond to any attempt to impose the withdrawal from their positions.161 
Further clarification is offered by the 1964 Secretary General Report on the 
mission in Cyprus that stated that self-defence embraces the defence of UN 
posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack, as well as the support of 
other personnel under armed attack.162 Some cases in which the units may be 
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entitled to act in self-defence were expressly listed, including, by way of 
example, attempts by force to disarm and attempts by force to prevent 
peacekeepers from carrying out their responsibilities.163 Some decades later, 
the 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace has formulated the principle 
regulating the use of force in peace operations in its current wording: ‘non-
use of force except in self-defence’. The Supplement made reference to 
consent, impartiality and non-use of force as the key elements of peace 
operations, but it did not elaborate on the content thereof. Nevertheless, the 
position paper offers interesting insights on peace operations that were 
reported to fall short of the three key elements.164 In particular, the 
Supplement refers to the cases of Somalia and Bosnia Herzegovina where the 
mandate was changed several times to authorise a proactive use of force.165 
In other words, it highlights the need emerged from the field to increase the 
resort to force in peace operations. Many factors have determined the 
emergence of a new trend toward a more extensive use of force in peace 
operations, which has led to the elaboration of the new formula: ‘non-use of 
force except in defence of the mandate’. The failure to protect civilians, 
shown by the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, by the Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, by the endless humanitarian crisis in Somalia, combined with 
the change of the characteristics of conflicts and the related emergence of 
spoilers proved to constitute a serious threat not only for the peace process, 
but also for human security of civilians and UN personnel. As a consequence, 
the Brahimi Report in 2000 has called for the development of a robust 
doctrine and realistic mandates.166 Along with the evolution of the concept of 
impartiality discussed earlier, the Report had also significantly influenced the 
contents of the principle of the use of force. In fact, the document stated that 
peace operations must be carried out professionally and successfully, thus 
military units “must be capable of defending themselves, other mission 
                                                 
163  Ibidem, para. 18. 
164  The term ‘position paper’ was used by the same SG Boutros Ghali to define the document, 
see the full title: Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary 
General on the Occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, supra note 31. 
165  Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, paras 34-37. 
166  Brahimi Report, p. IX. 
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components and the mission's mandate”.167 Accordingly, troops must have 
robust rules of engagements (RoE) and be appropriately equipped in order to 
constitute a realistic deterrent threat168.  
This evolution has brought about two main changes: first, in these 
operations the use of force is not limited to self-defence but also extends to 
the defence of the mandate, meaning security and freedom of movement of 
personnel and the protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence; second, as a direct consequence, from 2000 on peace operations are 
generally defined ‘robust’ or ‘militarised’.169 Despite these considerations, 
the latest codification of the principle of the use of force in UN peace 
operations doctrine still uses the lexicon of ‘non-use of force except in self-
defence and defence of the mandate’.170 The following analysis of the most 
recently established missions investigates whether this formula is in line with 
current practice or whether it corresponds to political or policy constraints. 
Moreover, it sheds light on the fundamental principles regulating the use of 
force in peace operations and the limitations thereof in order to verify which 
of the suggested doctrinal understandings is the more suitable to the subject 
in point. 
 The ‘United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone’ 
(UNAMSIL), established in 1999, was the first example of a peace operation 
where the use of force beyond self-defence was expressly provided in the 
mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.171 Resolution 1270 (1999) 
authorised the mission “to take the necessary action to ensure the security and 
freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas 
                                                 
167  Ibidem, p. X. 
168 Ibidem, para. 51. The rules of engagement (RoE) are the complex set of principle and 
norms regulating the resort to force of the military component of a mission. The RoE 
contribute to frame the overall setting of rules of conduct in peace operations and 
therefore will be dealt with in chapter III. 
169 Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century, Hart, 2011; 
Labouda, “Peacekeeping and Peace enforcement”, supra note 1; Higgins, Second 
Generation Peacekeeping, supra note 14. See also the analysis of militarised operations 
carried out by Roscini in “The United Nations Security Council and the Enforcement of 
International Humanitarian Law”, in Israel Law Review, vol. 43, 2010, pp. 330-359, in 
particular at pp. 348-352. 
170  Capstone Doctrine, p. 34, italics added. 
171  S/RES/1270, 22 October 1999. 
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of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence”.172 UNAMSIL was characterised by the extensive use of 
force throughout the whole mission, whereby the authorisation to take all 
necessary action was reiterated in the following mandates that have 
progressively expanded the strength of the operations.173 Besides, in July 
2000, UNAMSIL launched a targeted operation called ‘Tunderboldt’ to 
disperse a militia known as ‘Westside Boys’ who were in control of the town 
of Masiaka. The operation was described as a pre-emptive strike against the 
rebels who allegedly were planning to attack UN peacekeepers. 
 The shift towards a proactive use of force in Sierra Leone was a 
reaction to the widespread violence carried out against UN military personnel, 
which culminated in the kidnapping of about 500 UN peacekeepers.174  In the 
words of the then SG Kofi Annan, ‘Thunderbolt’ was carried out in the 
discharge of UNAMSIL mandate, for “anyone who attempts to attack the 
peacekeepers would know that they will defend themselves and that there will 
be a price to pay”.175 The lexicon used by the Secretary General echoed the 
concept of self-defence, nevertheless it seems evident that the use of force in 
UNAMISIL, which included a preentive strike against rebel militias 
(operation ‘Thunderbolt’), was far beyond self-defence. 
In the same years, the ‘United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (MONUC) was established.176 The initial 
mandate did not foresee any authorisation to use force beyond self-defence, 
but only one year after, in 2000, the SC passed a resolution, acting under 
Chapter VII, authorising MONUC to “take the necessary action, in the areas 
                                                 
172  Ibidem, para. 14. 
173 The sequence of the mandate since the deployment in 1999 to the transformation of 
UNAMSIL into the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) in 2005 
is available on the mission website at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/UnamsilRS.htm.  
174 Forth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 
S/2000/455, 19 May 2000, in particular at section VII. See also Sloan, supra note 152, at 
pp. 165-181. 
175 Daily Press Briefing by Office of Spokesman for Secretary-General, 24 July 2000, 
available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000724.db072400.doc.html. See also 
“Annan Justifies UN's ‘Preemptive Strike’”, in Agence France Presse, July 25 2000, 
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176  S/RES/1279, 30 November 1999.  
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of deployment of its infantry battalions [...] to protect United Nations […], 
ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect 
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”.177 The evolution of the 
mission's efforts in the DRC is particularly relevant to the analysis of the use 
of force. The operation in Congo has gone through significant transformations 
since the deployment of ONUC in 1960. Despite the efforts of the 
international community, the situation in the country has always proved to be 
critical. As a consequence, the response of UN has been more than robust. As 
just mentioned, in 2000 MONUC had been authorised to take all necessary 
action to fulfil its mandate. Ten years later, the operation was transformed into 
the ‘United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ (MONUSCO).178 SC resolution 1925 (2010) 
authorized MONUSCO “to use all necessary means, within the limits of its 
capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its 
protection mandate” 179 to fulfil specific tasks set out in the mandate, namely 
the protection of civilians, the logistical support to the DRC Army to fight the 
rebel group known as Lord Resistance Army and the enforcement of the 
embargo. The robust use of force and the elaborated mandate was not 
sufficient to address the dramatic situation in the country. In November 2012, 
the armed group March 23 (M23) took control of Goma, the second largest 
Congolese city at the border with Rwanda. The occupation was carried out 
despite the presence of about 1.700 MONUSCO troops. After the fall of 
Goma, the UN mission was harshly criticized for its failure to accomplish the 
                                                 
177  S/RES/129, 24 February 2000, para. 8. 
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mandate.180 Following these events, as already mentioned, the UN SC took 
the unprecedented decision to establish an enforcement unit under the 
command and control of MONUSCO Force Commander: the ‘Force 
Intervention Brigade’ (FIB).181 Thus, the SC acting under chapter VII of the 
Charter created the first combat unit within a peace operation with the specific 
task of neutralizing armed groups. The mandate authorized the FIB to  
 
carry out targeted offensive operations[...] either unilaterally or jointly 
with the FARDC, [...] in strict compliance with international law, […] 
to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, 
and to disarm them.182   
 
As explained earlier, the creation of the FIB has raised many concerns among 
Security Council Members and commentators, as to the respect of the 
elements of impartiality and use of force in self-defence and defence of the 
mandate.183 Despite these doubts, the FIB has been deployed and is still 
operational as the MONUSCO mandate, including the Intervention Brigade, 
has recently been extended until 31 March 2017.184 MONUSCO and its FIB 
show the extent to which the key element of non-use of force except in self-
defence and defence of the mandate’  have been stretched in recent practice, 
to include offensive actions against targeted actors. 
 Besides the peculiarities of MONUSCO, the practice of the newly-
established UN peace operations constitutes further evidence of the trend to 
resort to increasing pro-active use of force provided for in SC mandates. The 
‘United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali’ 
                                                 
180  International Peace Institute, The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of 
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(MINUSMA) has been established by SC resolution 2100 (2013),185 
following a request of the transitional government of Mali.186 The transitional 
government was created in the context of a framework agreement fostered by 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), after the coup 
d'Etat carried out by the military junta called ‘Comité national pour le 
redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’Etat’, composed of 
disaffected soldiers from the Malian army. 
  The situation in Mali is characterised by chronic instability and by the 
inability of governmental authority to achieve effective control throughout 
the country. Various tribes are fighting to occupy strategic areas, while 
Islamic armed groups and terrorist organisations have moved their 
headquarters in the country after the international military intervention in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.187 Moreover, the strategic position of Sahel coupled 
with the lack of a law and order system has transformed the region in the 
perfect crossroad for all sort of smuggling activities dominated by criminal 
organisations.188 In this context characterised by deep instability and by the 
presence of rival armed tribes’, criminal organisations and terrorist groups, 
the SC opted for a robust mandate of MINUSMA. Resolution 2100 (2013) 
authorised, under Chapter VII, MINUSMA to “use all necessary means, 
within the limits of its capacities and areas of deployment, to carry out its 
mandate as set out” in the specific paragraphs of the resolutions.189 In 
particular, the extensive use of force has been authorised to protect civilians 
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and UN personnel; to support humanitarian assistance; to protect from attack 
cultural and historical sites; to support for national and international justice.190  
 Similarly to MONUSCO, the SC  foresaw the resort to all necessary 
means in very specific terms: only to discharge expressly named tasks. It is 
worth mentioning that this initial limitation of use of force to listed tasks has 
been superseded in June 2014, whereas the new mission mandate simply 
“authorizes MINUSMA to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate, 
within its capabilities and its areas of deployment”, without further 
specifics.191  
 Moreover, the two resolutions have authorised France, that meanwhile 
had deployed ‘Opération Serval’ upon the request of intervention of the 
transitional Malian government,192 “to use all necessary means […] to 
intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and 
serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General”.193 In addition to the 
presence of French troops, in February 2013 the European Union launched a 
military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces 
(EUTM Mali) that was extended till May 2016.194 For the sake of 
completeness it is correct to specify that no authorisation to use force is 
envisaged in the SC mandate for the EUTM mission, nor in the Council 
Decision, as EUTM Mali expressly “shall not be involved in combat 
operations”.195 
 The ‘United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)’ is the most recently 
established UN peacekeeping mission.196 The official deployment has taken 
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violations committed by the Central African contingents supported by AU peacekeepers. 
Human Rights Watch, “Central African Republic: Peacekeepers Tied to Abuse”, 2 June 
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place in September 2014 in the form of a transfer of authority from the 
previous African Union-led ‘International Support Mission in the Central 
African Republic’ (MISCA).197 The situation in Central African Republic 
(CAR) is characterised by political instability and recurring cycles of violence 
involving armed groups of religious connotation. Clashes between the 
Muslim ‘Séléka’ (alliance) and the Christian ‘anti-Balaka’ (anti-machete) 
movement have disseminated death and insecurity throughout the country, 
affecting primarily civilian population198.  As a result, hundreds of thousands 
of CAR inhabitants are internally displaced and it is believed that more than 
2,5 million people (half of the population) are in need of humanitarian 
assistance.199 Against this background, the UN SC, acting under Chapter VII,  
authorized MISCA to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate within 
its capabilities and its area of deployment.200 In this case, the authorisation to 
resort to extensive use of force is not limited to certain mandate tasks, as it is 
for MONUSCO, on the contrary, all necessary means are authorised for the 
discharge of the whole mandate which embraces numerous tasks ranging 
from the protection of civilians to demobilisation and disarmament of former 
combatants.201  
 Moreover, the resolution of the SC has authorised France, that had 
lunched ‘Opération Sangaris’ to strengthen the forces already present in the 
CAR and to support the peace operations deployed, “to use all necessary 
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means to provide operational support to” the missions (MISCA first, later 
transformed in MINUNSCA).202  
 To complete the picture of the international intervention in the CAR, 
it is worth signalling that in February 2014 the Council of the European Union 
has established a EU military operation: EUFOR RCA.203 As to the principles 
regulating the use of force, no express definitions are to be found in the 
Council Decisions. Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP simply refers to the UN 
SC mandate and seems to suggest that the authorisation to take all necessary 
means is to be intended to EUFOR as well.204   
 The analysis of peace operations’ practice from the establishment of 
UNAMSIL in 1999 to the deployment of the recent MINUSCA in 2014 shows 
a significant evolution of the key element of ‘non-use of force except in self-
defence (and defence of the mandate)’. All the missions in point (UNAMSIL, 
MONUC, MONUSCO, MINUSMA, MINUSCA and EUFOR RCA) have 
been authorised by the SC, acting Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take all 
necessary action to fulfil the mandate. 
  In a first phase, the use of force has been authorised in very specific 
terms to discharge only limited tasks: namely protection of civilians and of 
UN personnel and some others, depending on each particular situation. Later, 
as shown by the second mandate of MINUSMA and of MINUSCA, all 
necessary measures were foreseen to fulfil the entire mandate in the absence 
of provided exceptions. Moreover, while it can be maintained that SC 
resolutions concerning all other operations have envisaged a use of force 
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limited to the defence of the mandate, it seems evident that ‘Operation 
Thunderbolt’ (UNAMSIL) and the actions of the FIB (MONUSCO) have 
extended the notion of defence of the mandate to include pre-emptive and 
pro-active use of force against targeted elements, generally considered 
spoilers. 
  Despite the self-evident development of the use of force in peace 
operations, UN parlance still resorts to the concept of ‘non-use of force except 
in self-defence and defence of the mandate’. As mentioned above, not only 
this notion is recalled in most of SC resolutions, but is has been codified in 
these terms in the most recent UN Doctrine.205 To further highlight these 
inconsistencies, it is worth making reference to other relevant documents 
concerning peace operations. 
  The latest NATO Allied Joint Doctrine on Peace Support mentions 
‘the use of force’ as one of the principles of peace support efforts, but then it 
specifies that it should be restricted to self-defence and defence of the 
mandate and it can be seen as predominantly reactive rather than pre-
emptive.206 At the same time, the Allied Joint Doctrine acknowledges that the 
use of force provides credible deterrence both to convince conflicting parties 
to negotiate and to dissuade spoilers to hamper the peace process.207 On a 
different line, the US military doctrine on peace operations appears to have 
the most straightforward approach to the issue and it just refers to the concept 
of ‘restraint and minimum force’.208 
 In the light of the recent practice, it is unlikely to affirm that the ‘non-
use of force’ is the dominant principle in peace operations. It seems more 
appropriate to refer to the notion of ‘limited use of force’, whereas the 
limitation is not self-defence, but rather the defence of the mandate. 
Considering that the mandate's tasks expressly envisage the protection of UN 
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personnel, it appears redundant to talk about limited use of force in self-
defence and in defence of the mandate. To be more precise, the concept of 
self-defence is a legacy of peacekeeping origins, typically identified in the 
UNEF mission of 1956. As shown by the study carried out so far, the only 
element still present in contemporary peace operations is the consent of the 
host state; while the term neutrality has been abandoned to endorse the more 
elaborated notion of impartiality; the non-use of force except in self-defence 
-understood as an inherent right of peacekeepers- has been superseded by the 
need to resort to force in order to face more complex and dangerous scenarios. 
Thus, the UN wording ‘non-use of force except in self-defence and defence 
of the mandate’ appears more respondent to a political will to stick to a 
traditional understanding of peacekeeping rather than respondent to the 
evolving reality of peace operations. 
 As to the international law principle regulating the use of force in 
peace operations, in light of the presented analysis none of the scholarly 
hypotheses elaborated so far seems appropriate or up to date. As signalled by 
some authors, the focus on the right to self-defence both as individual inherent 
right and as a right stemming from art. 51 of the Charter is misleading.209 In 
fact, as just shown, the right to self-defence of personnel is not separate from 
the concept of the ‘defence of the mandate’, as the latter includes expressly 
the task of protection of UN personnel, that also extends to missions' premises 
and assets. Moreover, no reference to art. 51 is made in any SC resolutions. 
It is submitted that the appropriate lens of analysis is not self-defence, but the 
use of force in the collective security system, namely the powers of the 
Security Council under chapter VII, in particular ex art. 42. It must be noted 
that no mention to article 42 is made in the resolutions, nevertheless the 
wording of the mandates is precisely art. 42-like. In fact, the resolutions of 
UNAMSIL, MONUC, MONUSCO, MINUSMA, MINUSCA and indirectly 
EUFOR RCA, were taken under Chapter VII of the Charter on the premise 
that the given situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security 
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and the mandates have authorised the missions to take ‘all necessary means’ 
or ‘all necessary action’.  
 Thus, the right to use force stems directly from the authorisation of 
the Security Council, while the limitations to the use of force do not depend 
on the right of self-defence but are shaped in each mandate, according to the 
tasks specifically set for in the given mission. The use of force is thus limited 
to the discharge of the mandate, differently said -in UN parlance- the use of 
force is limited to the defence of the mandate. Accordingly, the basis for the 
operations’ deployment and the regulation of the use of force are not 
dissimilar from an enforcement action. As already highlighted above, the 
watershed between peace operations (including robust or militarised ones) is 
the consent of the host State, while this key element is clearly lacking in pure 
enforcement actions. 
 
 
 
5. A working definition of peace operations 
 
 The terminology used to refer to peace and security activities is, as we 
have seen, broad and at best inconsistent. As explained, the most recurrent 
terms are peacekeeping, peace operations, peace support and peace 
enforcement. Endorsing the notion of peace operations as the core subject of 
the analysis responds to an array of considerations. First, ‘peace operations’ 
is a general term, whereas peacekeeping refers to one of the activities 
included within peace operations. Second, the term ‘peace operations’ has 
been elaborated in the world's largest and farthest reaching organization, 
whose mandate is to promote international peace and security, that of the UN. 
This is in stark contrast to peace support, which is the product of regional 
organisations, such as NATO. Considering the core role played by the UN in 
this field it seems more appropriate to refer to UN lexicon. Moreover, the 
term peace operations is broadly used also in scholarly literature, whereas 
peace support is not preferred.  
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 Peace operations are understood as field operations, composed both 
of military and civilian components, aimed at managing conflicts from the 
moment of their eruption to the prevention of their relapse. Peace operations 
include peacekeeping, robust operations and peace building; while conflict 
prevention and peacemaking fall outside the scope of the term as they consist 
in diplomatic efforts, that are not likely to be defined as field operations. As 
both practice and case law that will be examined in the following sections 
will show, internationally wrongful acts have occurred (and are likely to 
occur) during peace operations, intended as field missions.  
 The category of peace enforcement is not endorsed in the present 
study as it is considered either misleading or of limited use. The research will, 
on the contrary, make reference to robust peace operations, considered 
missions authorised by the SC to resort to force in a significant manner to 
achieve the mandate, including taking military actions against targeted actors, 
as occurred in Sierra Leone with UNAMSIL and is presently happening in 
the DRC with the FIB of MONUSCO. Full scale enforcement actions ex arts. 
39 and 42 of the Charter, mandated by the SC to member States and carried 
out against another State, such as the operation of 1990 in Iraq and recently 
in Libya, are not regarded to any extent as peace operations and therefore fall 
outside the scope of this research. The watershed between the notions of 
peace operations and enforcement can be identified in the element of consent 
of the host State, which is never a prerequisite for enforcement operations. 
 The key elements of peace operations, i.e. what defines them and 
divides them from other types of crisis management efforts, are the consent 
of the host State in whose territory the mission is to be deployed; impartiality 
in the discharge of the mandate, currently understood as ‘good referee 
behaviour’ that includes the power to sanction  –  by using military force  –  
actors that spoil the peace process and the mandate fulfillment; limited use of 
force authorised by the SC, generally acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
that entrusts the mission with the power to use force within the limits sets for 
in the resolution, namely the discharge of the specific tasks envisaged in the 
mandate.  
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  Moreover, peace operations can be carried out directly under the 
command and control of the UN or be mandated to regional organisations as 
NATO, the AU and ECOWAS. As it will be shown, this difference has 
significant implications in terms of chain of command and control; 
nevertheless, both structure share the core feature of being deployed 
according to a mandate of the Security Council.
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CHAPTER II 
 
RESPONSIBILITY REGIMES IN PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
1. A plurality of responsibility regimes 
 
 
 Peace operations concern a wide range of subjects, from the United 
Nations and regional organisations such as NATO or the EU, to Member 
States and, eventually, individuals. While these parties differ vastly in 
characteristics such as size and scope of involvement, they each remain 
subject to specific responsibility regimes governing peace operations. Each 
follows a different set of rules under the umbrella of a particular operation 
and different relationships may exist between and among various 
participating parties in the overall context of a particular mission.  
 As a consequence of serving as the leading organisation of a peace 
operation, the United Nations will have a direct relationship with both Troop 
Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the host country as well. Generally, these 
relationships are regulated by two different agreements, the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) and the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) 
respectively.1 Furthermore, the leading organisation may enter into legal 
relationships with individuals, for example, due to its responsibility vis à vis 
third-parties for damages which may occur during the mission, or for 
contractual purposes.  
 In United Nations-authorised peace operations, on the other hand, the 
UN will only set forth the mission's mandate while a regional organisation 
will take the lead. In this case, the United Nations will not have a direct 
relationship with TCCs or the host state. By contrast, the leading regional 
                                                 
1 Model Memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and participating 
State contributing resources to United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, A/C.5/66/8, 27 
October 2011, Chapter 9; Model Status-of-forcesAagreement for Peace-Keeping 
Operations, A/45/594, 9 October 1990. 
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organisation will enter into agreements with those States contributing to the 
mission and with the host State.2 To complicate matters further, the 
responsibility regimes of regional organisations may vary significantly from 
that of the United Nations.3 Hence, the plurality of actors involved in peace 
operations and the diverse relationships that may arise between and among 
them when a wrongful act occurs, call into question different responsibility 
regimes.  
 The term ‘responsibility regimes’ is used in the present chapter to refer 
to three concepts generally associated with the legal notion of responsibility, 
namely, international responsibility, accountability, and liability. Some 
authoritative statements and scholarly writings use the term accountability as 
a general concept that would include both international responsibility and 
liability,4 while others simply employ these three terms interchangeably.5 As 
a result of this practice, what emerges over time and through various instances 
where responsibility comes into question during peace operations is a general 
lack of clarity differentiating the use of these terms.  
                                                 
2 See for example the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding 
the Status of their Forces, 19 June 1951 (hereinafter NATO SOFA); Agreement between 
the Member States of the European Union concerning the status of military and civilian 
staff seconded to the institutions of the European Union, of the headquarters and forces 
which may be made available to the European Union in the context of the preparation 
and execution of the tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, 
including exercises, and of the military and civilian staff of the Member States put at the 
disposal of the European Union to act in this context (hereinafter EU SOFA), C 321/6, 
31 December 2003. 
3 Infra, paras. 4 ff.  
4 International Law Association, Accountability of International Organisations, final 
report, 2004 (hereinafter ILA Report); Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights, Accountability of International Organisations for Human Rights 
Violations, Draft resolution, 6 November 2013. Reinsch, “Securing the Accountability of 
International Organisations”, in Global Governance, vol. 7, 2001, pp. 131-149; Wellen, 
Remedies against International Organisations, Cambridge University Press, 2002, where 
the author illustrates ‘the accountability regime for international organisations’, at pp. 7 
ff;  Wouters-Brems-Smis-Schmitt (eds), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by 
International Organisations, Intersetia, 2010; see also the most recent debate within the 
American Society of International Law that unfolded in the following publications: 
Hovell, “Due Process in the United Nations”, in American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 110, no. 1, 2016, pp. 1-48; Tzanakopoulos, “Theorizing or Negotiating the Law?: A 
Response to Devika Hovell”, in AJIL Unbound, 22 July 2016; Freedman, “UN-
Accountable?: A Response to Devika Hovell”, ibidem; Gordon, “Due Process and the 
Iraq Sanctions: A Response to Devika Hovell”, ibidem. 
5    ILA Report, supra note 4; Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations, A/51/389 (1996). 
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 The present work aims at highlighting the main features of these three 
responsibility regimes that are called into question in peace operations when 
a wrongful act occurs or when an actor has been damaged by a conduct carried 
out in the course of an operation. This chapter explores whether the 
terminological differences between international responsibility, 
accountability, and liability have legal implications for the various issues that 
arise in peace operations, namely questions of attribution, the implementation 
of accountability/responsibility by injured parties and reparation instances. 
 
 
 2. International responsibility  
 
The present section aims at highlighting the most relevant facets of 
international responsibility for the purpose of the current analysis, namely 
noting the differences and similarities among the diverse responsibility 
regimes (intentional responsibility, accountability and liability). Moreover, 
the following paragraphs seek to shed light on the issues related to the 
implementation of international responsibility in the context of peace 
operations. 
 International responsibility can be defined as the legal relationship 
that arises from the breach of an international obligation, attributable to a 
State or to an international organisation, in the absence of circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness.6 Hence, the attribution of conduct and the 
                                                 
6 Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law, New York University Press, 
1928; Anzilotti, Scritti di Diritto Internazionale Pubblico, Cedam, 1956; Ago, Scritti 
sulla Responsabilità Internazionale degli Stati, Jovene Editore, 1986; Spinedi-Simma 
(eds), United Nations Codification of State responsibility, Oceana Publications, 1987; 
Jimenez de Arechaga-Tanzi, “La Responsabilité des Etas”, in Bedajaoui (ed.) Droit 
International, bilan et perspectives, Pedone, 1991, pp. 367-403; Spinedi, “Responsabilità 
Internazionale”, in Enciclopedia Giuridica, vol. XXVIII, 1991; Ragazzi (ed.), 
International Responsibility Today. Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter, Brill, 2005; 
Spinedi- Gianelli-Alaimo (eds), La codificazione della responsabilità internazionale 
degli Stati alla prova dei fatti: problemi e spunti di riflessione, Giuffrè, 2006; Arcari, “La 
responsabilità internazionale”, in Scovazzi (ed.) Corso di diritto internazionale, Giuffrè, 
vol. 2, 2006, pp. 255-377; Crawford-Pellet-Olleson (eds), The Law of Internaitonal 
Responsibility, Cambridge University Press, 2010; Crawford, State Responsibility. The 
General Part, Cambridge University Press, 2013; Pustorino, “Responsabilità 
internazionale degli Stati”, in Enciclopedia del Diritto – Annali, Giuffrè, vol. VII; 
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internationally wrongfulness of the act are the constitutive elements of 
international responsibility. By contrast, neither damage nor fault are 
considered essential features, that is to say that a State or an international 
organisation would incur their international responsibility insofar as an act or 
omission, attributable to them, is in breach of a norm of international law.7  
 Accordingly, the term responsibility deals with the consequences 
under international law of internationally wrongful acts.8 These consequences 
consist mainly of the duty imposed on the responsible entity to cease the 
wrongful act and to provide full reparation, to which correspond the right of 
the injured party to obtain full reparation.9 
 Due to the historical primacy of States as main international law 
actors, the law of international responsibility was first developed to regulate 
State responsibility. The most significant codification effort is widely 
considered to be the ILC ‘Draft Articles Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (DARS), concluded in 2001 after about fifty 
years of study.10 Due to the centrality of States in international relations and 
in international law-making, the long work of the ILC was firmly grounded 
on the extensive practice and opinio iuris of States. Consequently, the 
principles and rules elaborated in the DARS have received wide endorsement 
                                                 
Hartwig, “International Organizations or Institutions, Responsibility and Liability”, in 
MPEPIL, 2011. 
7 Tanzi, “Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence of an Internationally Wrongful 
Act?”, in Spinedi-Simma (eds), United Nations codification of State responsibility, supra 
note 6, pp. 1-33; Tanzi, Introduzione al diritto internazionale contemporaneo, Cedam, 
2016, at pp. 381 ff.; on the different categories of damages see Fasoli, La riparazione dei 
danni immateriali nei rapporti tra Stati, Editoria Scientifica, 2012. 
8  A/57/10, 2002, chapter VIII, para. 465. 
9 Ago, supra note 6, at p. 367. In Ago’s opinion, this new legal relation that stems from the 
wrongful act is characterised not only by the above-mentioned restorative consequences, 
but also by aspects of “punitive nature” (“aspects afflictifs”) as, for example, 
countermeasures or the obligation for third party not to cooperate with the responsible 
State or organisation in case of breaches of peremptory norms of international law, 
ibidem, at pp. 369-370. 
10 Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and 
submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report (A/56/10), in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two. The topic of State 
responsibility was considered by the ILC "suitable for codification" for the first time in 
1949, later in December 1953 the GA with res. 799 (VIII) requested the ILC to undertake 
the codification of the principles regulating State responsibility deemed “desirable for the 
maintenance and development of peaceful relations between”. Eventually, the ILC started 
its works in 1964, see A/CN. 4/165, 7 February 1964. 
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by States and are generally considered representative of the state of the art of 
customary law on State responsibility.11 
 In stark contrast, the responsibility of international organisation 
remains a quite under-developed branch of the law of international 
responsibility, although it has been subject to a codification process by the 
ILC, culminated in the adoption by the General Assembly of the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO).12 In 
this case, the ILC work was quite expeditious, especially when compared to 
the efforts required for the DARS’ accomplishment.13 This was probably due 
to the meaningful precedent constituted by the DARS, that were already 
completed by the time the ILC started its codification of the responsibility of 
international organisations and on which the Commission extensively relied. 
In the opinion of some scholars, this choice resulted in a questionable ‘copy-
and-paste’ approach, according to which the ILC would have not taken in due 
consideration the differences between international organisations and 
States.14 It seems questionable, however, to conclude that the ILC did not take 
into account the peculiarities of international organisations, given, for 
example, the express reference made to their distinguishing features, while 
codifying the issue of attribution, as well as given the attention devoted to the 
role played by the ‘rules of the organisation.15   
                                                 
11 Dupuy, “Quarante ans de codification du droit de la responsabilité internationale des 
États: un bilan”, in Revue générale de droit international public: droit des gens histoire 
diplomatique, droit pénal, droit fiscal, droit administratif, vol. 107, 2003, pp. 305-348. 
12 Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and 
submitted to the General Assembly (A/66/10), in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two. 
13 The General Assembly in January 2002 requested the ILC to begin its codification on the 
topic in A/RES/56/82, para. 8, a few months afterwards, in May 2002, the ILC decided 
to include the matter in its programme of work (A/57/10, 2002, chap. VIII) and in 2003 
the Commission issued its first report A/CN.4/532. 
14 For a general overview on the critique of the so called ‘copy and paste approach’, see 
Ahlborn, “The Use of Analogies Drafting the Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations: An Appraisal of the 'Copy-Paste Approach'”, in International 
Organizations Law Review, vol. 9, 2012, pp. 53-66; Blokker, “Preparing Articles on 
Responsibility of International Organisation: Does the International Law Commission 
Take International Organisations Seriously?”, in Klabbers-Wallandahl (eds), in Research 
Handbook on the Law of International Organisations, Edward Elgar, 2011, pp. 313-341; 
D'Aspremont, “The Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations: 
Magnifying the Fissures in the Law of International Responsibility”, in  International 
Organizations Law Review, vol. 9, 2012, pp. 15-28. 
15 As it concerns attribution see the analysis provided in chapter III, with particular attention 
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 It cannot be ignored, however, that the DARIO have not obtained the 
same consent enjoyed by the DARS, especially by international organisations 
themselves. Significantly, many international organisations have been 
reluctant to accept the principles enshrined in the DARIO and in some cases 
certain organisations have even refused to acknowledge the validity of core 
rules codified therein, as for example in the case of rules on attribution of 
conduct and full reparation.16  
 Moreover, cases concerning the responsibility of international 
organisations are very scarse, that show the inner difficulties of the 
implementation of international responsibility vis-à-vis international 
organisations. These hurdles are mainly due to the absence of judicial 
mechanisms to settle potential disputes, considering that international 
organisations are generally immune from national jurisdictions and, at the 
                                                 
to the notion of ‘effective control’. With regard to the rules of the organisation see 
Ahlborn, “The Rules of International Organisations and the Law of International 
Responsibility”, in International Organizations Law Review, vol. 8, 2011, pp. 397-482. 
16  As it will be elaborated more in detail in the following chapters, the main international 
organisations engaged in peace operations, namely the UN, NATO and the EU, have 
expressed opposed views to the ones put forward by the ILC during the elaboration of the 
DARIO. Also, following the adoption by the GA of the DARIO the practice of these 
organisations contrasted with the principles and rules spelled out in the Draft Articles. By 
way of example, the UN has maintained that UN peacekeepers are ‘transformed’ in UN 
subsidiary organs, therefore their wrongful conduct will be attributed to the Organisation 
as long as the latter is exercising authority and control over those organs, Comments and 
Observation Received from International Organisations, A/CN.4/637/Add.1, pp. 9-14 
Differently, NATO has observed that the ILC work didn’t seem to fully contemplate the 
implications of the structure and functioning of the Organisation. It underlined that the 
decision-making process is based on consensus and recalled the claims settlement 
procedures where the duty to compensate rests only on member States. Seemingly NATO 
intended to imply that wrongful conducts cannot be attributed to the Organisation, on the 
contrary, only the responsibility of Member States may be entailed, Comments and 
Observation Received from International Organisations, A/CN.4/637, pp. 11-13. The EU 
was even more explicit on the issue while negotiating its possible accession to the ECHR, 
when it clearly stated that acts or omission of persons employed or appointed by member 
States implementing EU law, in particular in the context of an operation “pursuant to a 
decision of EU institutions”, are attributable only to member States, Draft Explanatory 
Report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Council of Europe, 
47+1(2013)007, 2 April 2013, see infra chapter IV. Another significant example concerns 
the rule of full reparation and full compensation provided for in the DARIO. The relevant 
practice of claims commissions in peace operations shows that both the UN and NATO 
envisaged several limitations, by imposing financial ceilings and also by limiting the 
nature of compensable damages (for a thorough analysis on the matter, see infra chapter 
IV). This non-endorsement of the rule prescribing the duty to provide for full reparation 
was also questioned in clear terms by the UN when submitting its last observation to the 
ILC, see A/CN.4/637/Add.1, pp. 29-30, see also infra para. 2.2. 
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same time, are not subject to the jurisdiction of international courts. 
Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms are rare and, as it will be shown 
more in detail, depend almost entirely on the good will of the organisation in 
point. Anyhow, most of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms do not deal 
with the international responsibility of an organisation but rather with its 
accountability or its liability in compensation.17 Thus, the few instruments 
available to adjudicate claims between international organisations and other 
entities (States and individuals) offer very little material for the study of the 
responsibility of international organisations. As it will be demonstrated, this 
has significant implications in the context of peace operations, where the 
tension among the practice of States, the policy of international organisations 
and the instances of individuals is particularly evident. 
 
 
2.1 The origins and evolution of international responsibility 
 
 The concept of responsibility has deep roots in almost all domestic 
legal systems and enjoys a widely-shared definition. Responsibility is 
generally described as ‘the necessary corollary law’18 or in the words of 
Crawford and Olleson “international responsibility is the necessary corollary 
of obligation,” where every breach of international law by a subject entails its 
international responsibility.19  
 As noted by some authors, international responsibility was originally 
elaborated as an analogy from the domestic legal relationships between actors 
operating in national legal systems. International responsibility is thus a 
natural feature of the interplay between States at the international level.20 
                                                 
17 Infra, para. 4 ff. 
18 Pellet, “The Definition of Responsibility in International Law” in Crawford-Pellet-
Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, pp. 5-15. 
19 Crawford-Ollesson, “The Character and Forms of International Responsibility”, in 
Crawford-Pellet-Olleson (eds), The law of Internaitonal Responsibility, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, pp. 443-476, at p. 443. 
20 Koskeniemi, “Doctrines of Responsibility” in Crawford-Pellet-Olleson (eds), pp. 45-51, 
at p. 47. 
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Hence, international responsibility can also be understood as a corollary of 
States sovereignty and more precisely of the principle of the sovereign 
equality of States that in the free exercise of their powers enter in mutual 
relationships and acknowledge the possibility of being held responsible for 
wrongful acts.21  
 Despite having always been recognised as a general tenet of 
international law, international responsibility as we know it today is the result 
of an evolution that has taken place mainly over the last fifty years. It is 
noteworthy that the term (international) responsibility did not appear in the 
early studies to which we usually date back the theories of international 
responsibility. By way of example, Grotius theorised the obligation existing 
under the law of nature to make reparation for the damage caused, while never 
mentioning the concept of responsibility as such.22 Similarly, in the writings 
of De Vattel, the focus rested on the obligation to make reparation, whereas 
the notion of responsibility was never resorted to.23 Also the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, in 1928, defined responsibility as a general principle 
of international law in the following terms  
 
it is a principle of international law, and even a general 
conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an 
obligation to make reparations.24 
 
The modern theorisation and codification of the law of international 
responsibility is due to the scholarship of Anzilotti, later endorsed and 
magnified by the work of Ago, who contributed to the present codification of 
the DARS in the role of ILC Special Rapporteur. Anzilotti was the first to 
describe international responsibility as the new legal relation that arises 
between the injured State and the responsible State from an internationally 
wrongful act that can be attributed to the latter.25 Ago, in turn, traced the 
                                                 
21  Pellet, supra note 18, p. 5, Eagleton, supra note 6 pp. 5-6.  
22  Pellet, idem and Koskeniemi, supra note 20, at p. 47. 
23  Koskeniemi, idem. 
24  Permanent Court of International Justice, Factory at Charzow, Merits, 1928, Series A, n. 
17, p. 4, para. 29.  
25 “Al fatto illecito, cioè, in generale parlando alla violazione di un dovere internazionale, 
si collega così il sorgere di un nuovo rapporto giuridico, tra lo Stato al quale è imputabile 
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conception of this new legal relationship even further back in time, precisely 
to the writings of Grotius, who had theorised the ‘maleficium’ as an 
autonomous source of legal obligations as under the law of the land. In other 
words, Ago noted that already Grotius, in its De Iure Belli ac Pacis, identified 
in the ‘maleficium’ – which can be translated in this context as the 
internationally wrongful act – the generative cause of a new legal relation 
between the injured party and the responsible party. The peculiar feature of 
this further legal relationship is precisely to be ‘new’, that is to say it 
originates from the wrongful act itself and has a different content from the 
legal relation deriving from the obligation that has been breached. 26 
Ago also explored the principles underlying State responsibility, and 
– after having examined all the relevant theories developed up to that moment 
– came to the interesting conclusion that it is of very little importance to 
identify the general principle from which we may infer the fundamental tenet 
of international responsibility. Ago pointed out that despite some minor 
divergence in its formulation, the responsibility for internationally wrongful 
acts is recognised by unanimous practice (i.e. generally accepted by the 
unanimity of actors). Hence, the principle on which international 
responsibility is based does not need to be deducted from other principles, by 
contrast, it is to be inferred from the widespread, consistent and homogeneous 
practice of States.27  
  As it concerns the responsibility of international organisations, some 
considerations are in order. The emergence of international organisations as 
new actors of international law is now to be considered a classic topic of 
international law, literature and practice form a vast body of work with its 
analysis falling far outside the scope of the present study.28 Suffice it to note 
                                                 
il fatto di cui si tratta [...] e lo Stato verso cui sussisteva il dovere inadempiuto”, Anzilotti, 
Corso di diritto internazionale, vol. I, Cedam, 1955, p. 385.  
26 Ago, supra note 6, p. 366. 
27 “[...] le principe fondamental dont il s'agit n'a aucun besoin d'etre justifié ou établi par 
la voie d'une déduction d'autres principes. En effet, en dépit de quelques variations de 
formulation, il est expressénment reconnu, ou du moins clairement présupposé, par une 
pratique unanime – et, d'ailleurs, aussi par l'unanimité des auteurs”, Ago, ibidem, pp. 
365-366. 
28 See the, sometimes opposed, theories concerning international organisations, Klabbers, 
“Contending Approaches to International Organisations: Between Functionalism and 
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that it is now generally accepted that international organisations are subjects 
of international law.29 As subject of international law they have rights and 
duties and thus would bear international responsibility for their wrongful acts. 
 Despite the apparent parallelism between the international 
responsibility of States and of international organisations as subjects of 
international law, the development and implementation of the responsibility 
of international organisations have proven to be quite problematic. 
 
 
2.2 Responsibility of international organisations: some difficulties 
 
 As we have just discussed, international responsibility is premised on 
the legal personality of a subject under international law. Hence, international 
organisations are considered able to enjoy rights and have duties as legal 
persons and to bear international responsibility not differently than States. 
                                                 
Constitutionalism”, in Klabbers-Wallendahl (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of 
International Organizations, Edward Elgar, 2011, pp. 3-32; Seyersted, Common Law of 
International Organisations, Nijhoff, 2008; White, The Law of International 
Organisations, Manchester University Press, 2005. The debate was recently revived 
within the ESIL discussing and questioning the centrality of functionalism as core 
principle of international institutional law, see Klabbers, “The EJIL Foreword: The 
Transformation of International Organizations Law”, in European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 26, 2015, pp. 9-82; Klabbers, An Introduction to International 
Organizations Law, Cambridge University Press, 2015; Boisson de Chazournes, 
“Functionalism! Functionalism! Do I Look Like Functionalism?”, in European Journal 
of International Law, vol. 26, 2015, pp. 951-956; Nollkaemper, “Saving the Scarecrow”, 
ibidem, pp. 957-973; Sinclair, “The Original Sin (and Salvation) of Functionalism”, 
ibidem, pp. 965-973; Zanghì, Diritto delle organizzazioni internazionali, Giapichelli, 3rd 
ed., 2013; Pérez González, “Les organisations internationales et le droit de la 
responsabilité”, in Revue Générale de Droit International Public, vol. 92, 1988, pp. 63-
102; Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, 
Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2005; Klein, La responsabilité des organisations 
internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et en droit des gens Bruylant, 1998; 
Katz Cogan-Hurd-Johnstone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Organizations, Oxford University Press, 2016. 
29 The legal personality of international organisations was clearly affirmed by the ICJ in the 
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 73, in particular at para. 37. See Arangio Ruiz, Diritto 
internazionale e personalità giuridica, Unione tipografico-editrice Torinese, 1971; 
Conforti, Diritto Internazionale, Editoriale Scientifica, 2010, at p. 29 ff.; Mauro, “La 
personalità giuridica internazionale delle organizzazioni internazionali”, in Del Vecchio 
(ed.), Diritto delle organizzazioni internazionali, supra note 6, pp. 43-75; Sarooshi, 
“Legal Capacity and Powers”, in Katz Cogan-Hurd-Johnstone (eds), supra note 28, pp. 
985-1004. 
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Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that international organisations are very 
different subjects of international law compared to States. With regard to the 
international responsibility of the UN, in particular, Eagleton noted that  
 
 the United Nations is not organized in the same way as is a 
State; it does not perform the same functions as does a State; 
and the procedures developed to fit existent States do not fit 
so well the unique character of the new legal person.30 
 
It has already been highlighted that the ILC has been deemed partially unable 
to encompass all the peculiarities of international organisations when 
codifying their responsibility in the DARIO. In this regard, the ILC has 
seemingly played a quasi-legislative role, fostering a progressive 
development of international law in this field rather than its codification.31  
One of the most problematic aspects of the ILC’ push towards a progressive 
development of international organisations’ responsibility consists in having 
disregarded the opinio iuris of the organisations themselves. By way of 
example, in the observations submitted by NATO to the ILC in 2011, it is 
clearly stated that the Organisation has legal personality under international 
law, but, at the same time, the NATO seemed to imply that wrongful conducts 
have to be attributed solely to member States or to the host State of an 
operation.32 The reference to the functioning of the Organisation appears to 
suggest that there would be no scope for the international responsibility of 
NATO because such responsibility is entailed and shared by Member States.33 
To further demonstrate this assumption, the observations submitted to the ILC 
describe the procedures for the settlement of claims, which prescribe an 
elaborate burden-sharing mechanism, where States shall compensate pro 
                                                 
30  Eagleton, “International Organizations and the Law of Responsibility”, in Recueil des 
cours, 1950, pp. 319-425, at pp. 401-402. 
31  Pustorino, supra note 6, see also Shraga, “ILC Articles on Responsibility of International 
Organizations: The Interplay between the Practice and the Rule (a View from the United 
Nations)”, in Ragazzi (ed.), Responsibility of International Organizations: Essays in 
Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie, Njihoff, 2013, pp. 201-210; Peters, “International 
Organisations”, in Katz Cogan-Hurd-Johnstone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Organizations, Oxford, 2016, pp. 34-59. 
32 A/CN.4637, pp. 11-13. 
33   Idem. 
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quota the injured party. NATO, instead, plays a bureaucratic/administrative 
role limited to the handling of claims, while no duty to compensate injured 
parties rests on the Organisation itself.34 Even if NATO observations did not 
address the topic in an outspoken manner, seemingly the Organisation 
intended to conclude that its responsibility would not be entailed by wrongful 
acts carried out by its Member States operating in the framework of a NATO 
mission.  
 As it concerns the United Nations, when submitting its observations 
to the ILC, the Organisation maintained that UN operations conducted under 
United Nations command and control are to be considered subsidiary organs 
of the UN.35 Consequently, in the UN opinion, national forces placed at the 
disposal of the Organinsation are ‘transformed’ into UN subsidiary organs.36 
Accordingly, the UN resisted the proposed draft article on the attribution of 
conduct of seconded organs stating that  
 
 in the practice of the UN, therefore, the test of ‘effective 
control’ within the meaning of draft article 6 [now art. 7 
DARIO] has never been used to determine the division of 
responsibilities for damage caused in the course of any given 
operation between the United Nations and any of its 
contributing States.37 
 
Moreover, the UN added further elements of complexity to the issue of 
attribution of conduct in peace operations by affirming that, in order to 
determine the attribution of wrongful acts in peace operations, the 
Organisation “has been guided by the principle of command and control over 
                                                 
34 “Finally to be noted, but perhaps of most direct relevance to the question of legal 
responsibility, are the NATO procedures for settlement of claims. The procedures 
applicable to claims arising among NATO member States are set forth in article VIII of 
the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of 
Their Forces of 19 June 1951. Through the Agreement among the States Parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace 
regarding the Status of Their Forces of 19 June 1995, its provisions also apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to all States participating in the Partnership for Peace programme”, idem. See 
also art. VIII of the Model NATO SOFA, 19 June 1951, extensively analysed in chapter 
III, para. And in chapter IV, para.  
35 A/CN.4/637/Add.1, p. 10. 
36 Ibidem, p. 13. 
37 Ibidem, pp. 13-14. 
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the operation or the action in question”.38 As it will be explained in detail in 
chapter III, the issue of command and control is separate from that of the legal 
status of the entity whose conduct is in question. If one considers national 
forces contributed to a UN mission as subsidiary organs of the Organisations, 
attribution under the law of international responsibility should operate under 
art. 6 DARIO (i.e. attribution of conduct of an organ of the Organisation). By 
contrast, if one deems national troops are organs seconded to the 
Organisation, attribution should follow art. 7 DARIO (i.e. attribution of 
conduct of seconded organs), and the ‘effective control’ test would apply.  
 As to the issue of command and control, identifying who is the actor 
(whether a TCC or the UN) that is exercising command and control is a matter 
of fact and may have nothing to do with the legal status of the organ in 
question. Furthermore, in its observations to the ILC, the UN substantially 
refused to acknowledge the principle of full reparation, underlying that in 
peace operations reparation is generally limited to compensation and that 
several limitations to compensation are admissible and justified due to 
financial constraints and to the very nature of these operations.39  
 As far as the European Union is concerned, its observations submitted 
to the ILC showed a limited interest to participate in the creation of the rules 
on attribution and, while acknowledging the existence of the debate on the 
criterion of ‘effective control’, the EU did not express its view on the issue.40 
The Organisation rather preferred to highlight the strengths of the EU regime 
of responsibility, noting that the “European Union’s institutions are fully 
accountable vis-à-vis each other and European Union member States for acts 
and failure to act”.41 It also added that, “the Union does not invoke 
                                                 
38 Ibidem, p. 10. 
39 Ibidem, pp. 29-30. For a more detailed analysis of the limitations and their rationale see 
infra chapter IV.  
40 “Regardless of the merits of the disagreements, the question must be asked whether the 
international practice is presently clear enough and whether there is identifiable opinio 
juris that would allow for the proposed standard of the International Law Commission 
(which thus far has not been followed by the European Court of Human Rights) to be 
codified in the current draft. There is no doubt that this remains a controversial area of 
international law, in relation to which one can expect a steady stream of case law not only 
from the European Court of Human Rights, but also from domestic courts, in addition to 
voluminous academic writings”, A/CN.4/637, p. 22. 
41 Ibidem, p. 23. 
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jurisdictional immunity when European Union acts are challenged by private 
parties, as long as this is done in European Union courts”; 42 however, the 
latter statement does not apply in the case of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy actions (i.e. EU peace operations).43 
 Even if subsequent to the adoption of the DARIO, it is worth 
considering also the position expressed by the EU during the negotiations 
concerning its accession to the ECHR. The 2013 Draft Explanatory Report to 
the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the ECHR 
expressed for the first time the EU position on the rules on attribution of 
conduct in the following terms 
 
Under EU law, the acts of Member States or of persons acting on their 
behalf implementing EU law, including decisions taken under the 
Treaty on the European Union […]and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union […] are attributed to Member States. Conversely, 
acts, measures and omissions of the EU institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies, or of persons acting on their behalf are attributed to the EU in 
whichever context they occur, including with regard to matters related 
to the EU common foreign and security policy. 44  
 
In sum, even if the Accession Agreement has not entered into force, and most 
likely never will, this statement expresses very clearly the EU opinio on the 
matter. Consequently, we can conclude that also the EU seems to have 
eventually rejected the rule on attribution of conduct enshrined in the DARIO. 
The state of the art of the responsibility of international organisations 
is thus characterised by a significant asymmetry between the rules ad 
principles elaborated in the DARIO and the practice, or sometimes the total 
                                                 
42   Idem.  
43   On EU operations see Roscini, “L’art. 17 del Trattato sull’Unione Europea e i compiti 
delle Forze di pace”, in Ronzitti (ed.), Le Forze di Pace dell’Unione Europea, Rubettino, 
2005, pp. 49-79; Webber, “The Common Security and Defence Policy in a Multilateral 
World”, in Koutrakos (ed.), European Foreign Policy. Legal and Political Perspectives, 
Edward Elgar, 2011, pp. 205-234; Naert, “The International Responsibility of the Union 
in the Context of its CSDP Operations”, in Evans-Koutrakos (eds), The International 
Responsibility of the European Union: European and International Perspectives, Hart, 
2013, pp. 313-338; Spagnolo, L'attribuzione delle condotte illecite nelle operazioni 
militari dell'Unione Europea, Editoriale scientifica, 2016. 
44   Draft Explanatory Report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Council 
of Europe, 47+1(2013)007, 2 April 2013, art. 21a. 
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lack of practice. These unresolved tensions contribute to portraying the image 
of an ‘international responsibility à la carte’, where the most relevant 
international organisations operating in the context of peace operations 
choose to apply only some of the principles and follow selective rules 
governing international responsibility. NATO recognises its international 
legal personality, while dismissing its international responsibility for 
wrongful actions carried out by NATO forces. The UN does not apply the 
article that was precisely designed to regulate attribution of conduct in peace 
operations (namely art. 7 DARIO on seconded organs), nor the general 
principle of full reparation, while it maintains that UN Forces are transformed 
in subsidiary organs. The EU has elaborated its own ‘rule’ on attribution 
following to the adoption of the DARIO. 
 The divide between the rules supposedly applicable and the practice 
are further deepened by the concrete difficulties of holding an international 
organisation responsible under international law due to the lack of 
adjudication mechanisms, combined with the immunity issue. The growing 
role of international organisations characterised by the significant shift of 
powers described above is thus not accompanied by the development of 
effective mechanisms to implement their international responsibility.  
 This gap has had at least two evident consequences. On the one hand, 
growing attention has been paid to alternative responsibility regimes, namely 
accountability and liability. On the other hand, the lack of implementation 
mechanisms to invoke the responsibility of international organisations has 
pushed individuals affected by the exercise of powers of organisations 
conducting peace operations to turn to domestic jurisdictions (and regional 
courts of human rights). As a result, in the last 15 years we have witnessed a 
significant increase in national case law concerning the responsibility of 
States participating to peace operations.  
 The resort to domestic jurisdiction and the consequent focus on the 
responsibility of TCCs has brought about a sort of ‘legal nonsense’ that 
deserves some attention, with particular reference to the UN. Due to UN 
immunity from domestic jurisdiction and considering that no international 
  82 
courts or tribunals have jurisdiction over the Organisation, UN responsibility 
has never been adjudicated by national or international courts. By contrast, 
States participating in UN peace operations have been condemned for 
breaches of international obligations, when the wrongful act has been deemed 
attributable to them. In sum, the UN maintains to be internationally 
responsible for wrongful acts occurred in UN-led peace operations, but no 
mechanisms are available to injured parties to implement this responsibility. 
Moreover, when individuals resort to domestic courts to adjudicate 
international responsibility for wrongful acts occurred in peace operations 
and seeking redress for the damage suffered, Contributing States are the sole 
actors to bear international responsibility. 
This focus on the international responsibility of contributing States 
produces a further asymmetry: the uneven distribution of responsibility 
between TCCs. Not all domestic legal systems are equally accessible, for 
example due to language difficulties or procedural constraints. Not all troop 
contributing States are bound by the same international rules or are parties to 
regional human rights instruments. As a result, some TCCs are de facto more 
‘internationally responsible’ than others. By way of example, the UK and the 
Netherlands have been condemned several times before their domestic courts, 
as well as before the Strasbourg court, for violations occurred in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq, while other coalition partners non-party 
to the ECHR have avoided similar judgments, even though they might have 
been involved in the same facts.45 One may also think of the recent case of 
                                                 
45 House of Lords, Appeal and cross appeal judgment, Attorney General v Nissan, UKHL 
3, 11 February 1969; ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Behrami and Behrami v France and 
Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, nos 71412/01 and 78166/01, Admissibility 
Decision, 2 May 2007; District Court of The Hague, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the 
Netherlands and the United Nations,  RDBH:A8748, 16 July 2014; ECtHR, Grand 
Chamber, Al Skeini et al. v the United Kingdom, no. 55721/07, Judgment, 7 July 2011; 
ECtHR, Third Section, Stiching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands, no. 
65542/12, Decision, 11 June 2013; Court of Appeal of the Hague, Nuhanović v the 
Netherlands, LNJ: BR5388, 5 July 2011; Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Nuhanović 
v the Netherlands, 12/03324 LZ/TT, 6 September 2013; House of Lords, Al-Jedda v 
Secretary of State for Defence, UKHL 58, 12 December 2012; England and Wales High 
Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Mohammed et al. v Secretary of State et al., EWHC 
1369, 2 May 2014; Court of Appeal, Secretary of State v. Mohammed et al., EWCA 3846, 
30 July 2015; ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Hassan v. the United Kingdom, no. 29750/09, 
Judgement, 16 September 2014; ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Jaloud v. the Netherlands, no. 
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the lawsuit brought before US Courts claiming the responsibility of the UN 
for the epidemic outbreak in Haiti.46 While it may appear at this time as mere 
speculation, nonetheless many would agree with the assumption that if the 
wrongful conduct had been carried out by a European TCC, and not by the 
UN Nepal contingent, we would have probably seen some domestic 
judgments dealing with the international responsibility of the sending State 
(potentially followed by subsequent Strasbourg case law). To date none such 
lawsuit has been reported against the State of Nepal. 
 In conclusion, it seems urgent to find an answer to the issue 
highlighted by Eagleton some forty years ago, that still appears very relevant 
today. While its original focus was mainly on the responsibility of the UN, 
Eagleton’s leading question can equally extend to all international 
organisations 
 
  One may therefore properly ask whether the United Nations should be 
adapted so as to fit into the usual procedures [of international 
responsibility], or whether new procedures need to be developed to fit 
the unusual status of the United Nations.47 
 
In order to offer a contribution in this regard, the present research will now 
analyse the other responsibility regimes that come into question in peace 
operations and will devote its final part to the study of available remedies and 
to some hypotheses to develop more effective ones.  
 
 
3. Accountability: looking for a general definition  
 
 Accountability is generally defined as the duty to account for the 
                                                 
47708/08, Judgement, 20 November 2014. 
46 United States District Court Southern District of New York, Georges et al. v United 
Nations et al., n. 13-cv-7146(JPO), Opinion and Order, 15 January 2015; United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Georges et al. United Nations et al., n. 15-455-
cv, Judgment, 18 August 2016. 
47 Eagleton, supra note 30, at p. 402. 
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exercise of the powers entrusted to a given entity.48 It involves the entity’s 
justification towards other actors that will be assessed against certain 
standards, where the failure of the entity to live up to the standards in point 
could result in some forms of sanctions.49 In more general terms, it has also 
been described as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the 
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum 
can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
consequences”.50 
 The concept has a twofold meaning: it is understood as the duty of an 
entity to give account of the exercise of its powers vis à vis others, and as the 
possibility for other actors to hold to account an entity for the exercise of its 
powers.51 The first aspect (to give account) concerns a general obligation for 
the subject in point to grant access to information and to provide for reporting 
mechanisms. One may think about, for example, the right/duty to access to 
information in environmental matters stipulated in the Aarhus Convention52; 
the monitoring activities of the Secretary General over several aspects of UN 
peacekeeping missions, such as the implementation of the measures on sexual 
exploitation and abuse in peace operations;53 the duty to report periodically 
to the Secretary General imposed on Coalition of States authorised by the 
                                                 
48 ILA Report, supra note 4, p. 5. 
49 Grant-Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Powers in World Politics”, in American 
Political Science Review, vol. 99, 2005, pp. 29-43; see also Curtin-Nollkaemper, 
“Conceptualising Accountability in International and European Law”, in Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law, vol. 36, 2005, pp. 3-20, in particular at p. 4. 
50  Bovens, “Analysing and assensing Accountability: A conceptual Framework”, in 
European Law Journal, vol. 13, 2007, pp. 447-468, at p. 450. 
51 Curtin-Nollkaemper, supra note 49, in particular at p. 7. 
52  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (so called Aarhus Convention), 25 June 1998, 
Art. 3, para. 2: “Each Party shall endeavour to ensure that officials and authorities assist 
and provide guidance to the public in seeking access to information”. 
53  With Resolution 57/306, 22 May 2003, the General Assembly has requested the SG to 
issue an annual report on the implementation in peace operations of the Bulletin on 
Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse 
(ST/SGB/2003/13). Since 2006 the SG has been conducting this monitoring activity 
publishing a detailed report every year (last published A/71/97, 23 June 2016); for a 
doctrinal analysis on the measures to combat sexual exploitation and abuse in POs see: 
Ndulo, “The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women 
and Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions”, in Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, vol. 27, 2009, pp. 127-161; Burke, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by 
UN Military Contingents: Moving Beyond the Current Status Quo and Responsibility 
Under International Law, Brill, 2014. 
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Security Council to conduct chapter VII military operations.  
 The second and more stringent meaning of accountability (to hold to 
account) is not limited to access to information, but has rather to be regarded 
as a process that enables a subject to verify whether the powers entrusted to 
a given entity have been exercised in compliance with applicable standards, 
with the possibility to attach certain consequences to a failure to respect these 
standards, which are typically found in compliance mechanisms established 
in diverse realms of international law. For example, in environmental matters 
we can mention the Compliance Committee established by the Aarhus 
Convention, cited earlier;54 we can think of compliance mechanisms 
instituted by several human rights treaty instruments as the Human Rights 
Committee of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights or the 
European Committee of Social Rights of the Council of Europe. Other 
interesting examples of compliance mechanisms are constituted by the 
creation of the UN Ombudsperson to oversee the Security Council’s targeted 
sanctions,55 and of the Ombudsperson established in Kosovo in the early 
phase of UNMIK deployment, later de facto substituted by the UNMIK 
Human Rights Advisory Panel, and of the parallel Human Rights Advisory 
Committee of EULEX.56 Also there exist examples of ad hoc accountability 
mechanisms such as commissions of inquiry or inspections panels.57 
 
                                                 
54   Supra, note 52.  
55   SC/RES 1730 (2006) and SC/RES 1904 (2009), see Klabbers, “Self-Control: 
International Organisations and the Quest for Accountability”, in Evans-Koutrakos (eds), 
The International Responsibility of the European Union. European and International Law 
Perspectives, Hart, 2013, pp. 75-99. 
56 The first mechanism was established in March 2006 by the Special Representative to the 
SG of the UNMIK mission (UNMIK/REG/2006/12) to address human rights violations 
complaints filed by individuals against UNMIK, the panel that has now terminated its 
mandate was entrusted with limited powers, namely to receive the complaint, carry out 
investigations and issue a report with recommendations to be submitted to the SG. The 
Panel had no power to grant compensation nor any other remedy to the victims, nor to 
adjudicate the responsibility of the Organisations. Similar considerations apply to the 
correspondent EU mechanisms that is to be considered to some extent the successor of 
the UN mission and its related compliance mechanism. For further considerations see 
infra, chapter IV.  
57 See the considerations of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs, supra note 
4, see also Dekker, “Accountability of International Organisations: An Evolving Legal 
Concept?”, in Wouters et al. (eds), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by 
International Organisations, Intersetia, pp. 21-36. 
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3.1 The origins and evolution of accountability 
 
The origins of the notion of accountability date back to the early 19th 
century, precisely to the American conception of the civil servant elaborated 
following the so-called ‘Jacksonian revolution’. According to the meaningful 
shift brought about by the innovative ideas of the American President Andrew 
Jackson, civil servants were to be considered as individuals working for the 
government and not privileged officials legibus soluti, as happened, by 
contrast, in most European States. As a consequence of their role, civil 
servants, had to be accountable vis à vis their citizens. This ideology has 
deeply influenced the relationships between the subjects exercising 
governmental authority and the citizens in whose name that authority was 
exerted, paving the way for what has been later called ‘democratic 
governance’.58  
 Accountability has gained great momentum starting from the 1990's, 
when it has begun to influence the general discourse on responsibility, first in 
domestic legal systems and later at the international level. The concept was 
first employed in the context of national democratic governance. In this 
regard, accountability indicated the mechanisms a government should 
implement for its action to be transparent, efficient and responsive towards 
its citizens.59  
 Since the beginning of the present century, the term has started to 
expand far beyond national borders and has garnered the attention of scholars 
and practitioners at the international level. More precisely, the notion has been 
initially employed in the field of international economic institutions, namely 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade 
Organisation and later extended to international organisations in general.60 
                                                 
58 Hafner, “Accountability of International Organisations: A Critical View”, in St. John 
Macdonald-Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal 
Ordering of the World Community, Leiden, 2005, pp.  585-630. 
59 See Curtin-Nollkaemper, supra note 49; Mulgan, “‘Accountability’: An Ever Expanding 
Concept?”, in Public Administration, vol. 78, 2000, pp. 555-573. 
60 Gellert, “L'Accountability, un Concept Adapté aux Organisations Internationales?”, in 
Revue Belge de Droit International, vol. 2, 2010, pp. 476-497, in particular at p. 477; 
Dekker, “Accountability of International Organisations: An Evolving Legal Concept?”, 
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The term accountability, despite its domestic origins, is now mainly used in 
relation to international organisations and, as will be shown, is generally 
preferred to the notion of responsibility. This is particularly evident when 
looking at authoritative statements and reports such as the International Law 
Association ‘Report on the Accountability of International Organisations’ or 
the Council of Europe Draft Resolution on ‘Accountability of International 
Organisations for Human Rights Violations’.61 
 The need to develop forms of accountability of international 
organisations was determined by the shift in global governance characterised 
by the increasing transfer of powers by States to international or 
intergovernmental organisations. The growing powers entrusted to these 
entities, and their capacity to impact on the life of States and individuals were 
not counterbalanced by the democratic exercise of these powers. Hence, the 
demand for accountability has grown together with the growing role played 
by international organisations. Moreover, as noted by some authors, the 
“growing awareness of the internal pathologies and ideological biases of the 
most dominant international institutions”62 has led to a severe legitimacy 
crisis.63 Against this ‘crisis’, Peters notes ‘the new buzzword’ for legal 
scholars and practitioners alike is accountability.64 The growing interest 
around the concept of accountability in the international law debate is also to 
be understood as an attempt to supersede a major shortcoming of the 
‘functionalist approach’. Functionalism has proved to be too limited in terms 
of accountability as it focuses mainly on the relationship between the 
                                                 
supra note 57, at p. 22; KLabbers, “Making Sense of Accountability in International 
Institutional Law: An Analysis of the Final Report of the ILA Committee on 
Accountability of International Organizations from a Conceptual Legal Perspective”, in 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 36, 2007, pp. 83-118.  
61 Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Accountability of 
International Organisations for Human Rights Violations, supra note 4. 
62   Collins-White, “Moving Beyond the Autonomy-Accountability Dichotomy: Reflections 
on Institutional Indipendence in the International Legal Order”, in International 
Organizations Law Review, vol. 7, 2010, pp. 1-8, at p. 2.  
63   See also Peters, “International Organizations and International Law”, in Katz Cogan-
Hurd-Johnstone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations, Oxford 
University Press, 2016, pp. 34-59, at p. 41 ff.; the author refers to the core example of the 
legittimacy crisis the ICC is facing, being considered by many developing Countries as 
‘neocolonial instruments’, ibidem, p. 42. 
64    Peters, supra note 63, at p. 42. 
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organisation and its member States (also called ‘shareholders’)65, whereas the 
interest of individuals and third States (also referred to as ‘stakeholders’)66 
affected by the actions of international organisations where not taken into 
account. 
 Two main international law theories have given particular weight to 
the concept (and the role) of accountability of international organizations, 
namely global constitutionalism and global administrative law.67 Where the 
former underscores the need for the development of additional accountability 
forums available to aggrieved individuals,68 while the latter focuses on 
mechanisms to be designed to ensure accountability without unduly 
compromising efficacy.69 
 The discourse on accountability has certainly the merit of seeking to 
fill the legal gap created by the growing powers exercised by international 
organisations combined with the growing role of the individual in 
international law.70 However, as to the proposed solutions to actually fill this 
gap some concerns immediately arise. Even as one would wonder what 
accountability actually implies for the organisations and for those asking for 
                                                 
65   Idem.  
66   Idem. 
67  Kingsbury-Krisch-Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law”, in Law and 
Contemporary Problems, vol. 68, 2005, pp. 15-61; Kingsbury-Casini, “Global 
Administrative Law Dimensions of International Organizations Law”, in International 
Organizations Law Review, vol. 6, 2009, pp. 319-358; Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ 
in Global Administrative Law”, in European Journal of International Law, vol. 20, 2009, 
pp. 23-57; Cassese, “Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global 
Regulation”, in New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 37, 
2005, pp. 663-694; Peters, “Are we Moving towards Constitutionalization of the World 
Community?”, in Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, 
Oxford University Press; Klabbers, The Constitutionalization of International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2009; Peters, “Humanity as the Alpha and Omega of 
Sovereignty”, in European Journal of International Law, vol. 20, 2009, pp. 513-544. 
68   See for example Peters, “International Organizations and International Law”, supra note 
63. 
69   Kingsbury-Krisch-Stewart, supra note 67, at p. 18. 
70  As noted by Peters, while the traditional functionalist approach does not deny that 
organisations should serve human needs and interest, it however considered that 
individuals’ need shall be ‘mediated’ by their States, that are members to a given 
organisation. This need for ‘State mediation’ results in a lack of democratical 
accountability of international organizations to natural persons. Especially when 
considering that actions and omissions of many organisations do not necessarly impact 
on nationals of member States. See Peters, “International Organisations and International 
Law”, supra note 63, at pp. 45-46. 
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accountability, one would first have to resolve the question of a precise 
meaning of accountability.  
 As noted earlier, accountability as a non-legal concept originates from 
the North American tradition of democratic governance of the early 19th 
century and is today utilized in international law to describe the need for 
international organisations to give account for the exercise of their powers. 
However, the term lacks a generally shared definition in international law and 
notably does not translate in most non-Anglo-Saxon languages.71 This 
suggests that the notion has been exported from specific socio-political 
contexts and, despite being generally welcomed in the international legal 
discourse, we would find significant difficulties in systematising the concept 
into most legal systems, especially of Roman-Germanic legal traditions.72 
 The main effort to systematise the notion of accountability of 
international organisations was made in 2004 with the, already mentioned, 
ILA Report on Accountability of International Organisations.73 The thorough 
analysis carried out by the ILA begins with a statement that has had much 
ado: “power entails accountability, that is the duty to account for its 
exercise”.74 The Report provides for a very articulated, though quite 
unsatisfying analysis. Accountability – in the ILA’s view – can take four 
different forms: legal, political, administrative and financial.75 At the same 
time, three levels of accountability exist: i) accountability understood as both 
internal and external scrutiny and monitoring; ii) tortious liability for 
damages resulted from conducts constituting a breach of internal law rules 
and iii) international responsibility (i.e. responsibility for internationally 
wrongful acts).76 
 In sum, the ILA presented accountability as an overarching concept 
that includes all forms of responsibilities that may be entailed by international 
                                                 
71 Infra, para. 3.1. 
72 ILA Report; Hafner, “Accountability of International Organizations”, ASIL Proceedings, 
vol. 97, 2003, pp. 236-240; Hafner, “Accountability of International Organizations”, 
supra note 58, in particular at p. 586; Mulgan, supra note 58, at p. 555. 
73 ILA Report. 
74 ILA Report, at p. 5. 
75 Idem. 
76 Idem. 
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organisations. Some aspects of this construction appear particularly 
questionable as, for example the notion of liability that is defined ‘tortious’ 
and derives from breaches of international law. As will be illustrated below, 
the generally accepted notion of liability excludes an inquiry on the 
lawfulness of the conduct and rather focuses on the damage as the constitutive 
element.77 A form of responsibility stemming from a breach of international 
law rules is, on the contrary, international responsibility, as codified in the 
Draft Articles of the International Law Commission, where damage is not an 
essential element.78 Moreover, as proposed in the ILA Report, accountability 
results in a fragmentation of discrete notions, including different forms and 
levels. As a result, instead of clarified, the concept looks more opaque and 
seemingly too complicated to be applied practically. 
 It also appears questionable that accountability should be understood 
as an umbrella term that includes several forms of responsibility. As it has 
been already pointed out in the previous paragraphs, it would seem more 
accurate to maintain that accountability, liability and international 
responsibility (of States and international organisations) describe separate 
regimes of responsibility. In our opinion, the notion of accountability is too 
vague and unfamiliar to most domestic legal systems to rise to a broad, all-
encompassing category of law. Despite the ILA’s endorsement of this term in 
its codified articulation, we find no choice but to reject its extended, 
ambitious legal implications on rather firm ground, in place of the more 
measured approach, as we shall see. This chapter will thus consider 
international responsibility, accountability and liability as separate, though 
interconnected, responsibility regimes.  
 
 
3.2 Accountability in peace operations 
 
 As already explained, the notion of accountability has been fostered 
                                                 
77 Infra, para. 4 ff.  
78 Supra, para. 2 ff. 
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and generally welcomed by international lawyers and scholars. For example, 
some authors have noted how accountability enables the discourse on 
responsibility of international law actors to move beyond the traditional 
concept of international responsibility and liability of States and international 
organisations.79 In the opinion of other scholars, this evolution is particularly 
evident with regard to international responsibility of international 
organisations, an area where, as already shown, the ILC’s work represents 
more an example of progressive development rather than of codification of 
international law.80 Moreover, what are the very legal obligations incumbent 
upon international organisations is not clearly defined, and thus it would 
appear particularly difficult to state that an internationally wrongful act has 
entailed the responsibility of an organisation.81 In this context, it has been 
pointed out that it would prove more effective to regard a conduct as 
‘undesirable’ rather than as ‘unlawful’.82 As a consequence, accountability 
would have the merit of pursuing a broader aim compared to the limited 
obligations stemming from international responsibility; namely, it would 
include various instruments of control of public powers and thus it would 
represent a useful tool to limit abuses of power.  
 It has also been underscored that accountability would leave scope to 
the role of individuals that would have access to accountability mechanisms, 
whereas tools of international responsibility, especially of international 
organisations, are generally precluded to them.83 In fact, accountability would 
not be as limited in scope as international responsibility and the related 
accountability mechanisms would go beyond sole judicial review, 
superseding most of the procedural hurdles encountered by claimants before 
national or international courts, such as jurisdiction, immunities, legal 
standing, etc.84 In this sense, some theories has conceptualised accountability 
                                                 
79 Curtin-Nollkaemper, supra note 49, at p. 9. 
80 Peters, “International Organisations and International Law”, supra, at p. 63. Dekker, 
“Accountability of International Organisations: An Evolving Legal Concept?”, supra 
note 57. 
81   Klabbers, “Self-Control”, supra note 55. 
82   Ibidem, at p. 97. 
83 Curtin-Nollkaemper, supra note 49.   
84 Idem. 
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as a ‘social relationship’ that over time will produce the effect of learning and 
socialisation, rather than of sanctioning the organisation for an unlawful 
action.85  
 Filling the conceptual or normative gap in terms of responsibility of 
international organisations is not the only reason that explains the openness 
to embrace the notion of accountability shown by international organisations 
themselves. Accountability, in fact, may provide greater freedom and less 
restriction than international responsibility. Since accountability aims at 
measuring the conduct of international organisations against generic 
applicable standards, as a consequence it may not require the precise 
identification of the rules international organizations are bound by. Moreover, 
the failure to live up to the applicable standards does not have the same legal 
consequences prescribed under the law of international responsibility in two 
main contexts. First, the implementation of accountability mechanisms does 
not depend on an inquiry into the wrongfulness of the conduct of the 
organisation, that is to say whether there was breach of a norm of international 
law.86 Second, accountability does not imply any right of the potential injured 
parties –  be that of a State or an individual – to an effective remedy, in order 
to obtain redress of damage suffered. 
 Moreover, we should not forget that this softer form of responsibility 
that accountability prescribes depends almost exclusively on the good will 
and on the good faith of the organisations under scrutiny. In other words, as 
Klabbers has described, accountability of international organisations 
manifests in a form of ‘self-control’ or ‘self-regulation’.87 So, although it is 
true that public awareness and diplomacy can influence the development of 
                                                 
85  The discourse on accountability as a ‘social relationship’ focuses mainly on the role of 
accountability mechanisms developed by financial institutions, see Ebrahim-weisband 
(eds), Global Accountabilities: Participation, Pluralism, and Public Ethics, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, see also Klabbers, “Self-Control”, supra note 55. 
86 Few mechanisms constitute an exception to this construction, namely the above 
mentioned UNMINK HRAP and EULEX HRRP, where it was clearly spelled out which 
was the normative framework against which the action of the organisation will be 
assessed, identified in the main human rights treaty instruments, see infra chapter IV.   
87  Klabbers, “Self-Control: International Organisations and the Quest for Accountability”, 
supra note 55; See also id., “Unity, diversity, accountability: The Ambivalent Concept of 
International Organisation”, in Melbourne Journal of International Law, vol. 14, 2013, 
pp. 1-22. 
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accountability instruments, international organisations still have a wide scope 
to turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to instances of accountability. As it concerns 
public awareness more specifically, accountability not only depends on the 
will of States and international organisations to develop appropriate 
instruments of responsibility, but it is also deeply influenced by the strength 
of public opinion itself and by the echo that a given event may create.  
The complex interplay between all these factors in the realm of 
accountability may lead to quite uneven, unfair results. To consider an 
example of vastly differing responses to similar situations, one need only 
compare the response of the public opinion to the UN failure to protect 
civilians during peacekeeping missions in Rwanda in 1994 to that in Bosnia 
just two years later in 1996.  
Recall, on the one hand, the failure of the ‘Mission des Nations Unies 
pour l'Assistance au Rwanda’ (MINUAR) to protect civilians from the 
Rwanda genocide in 1994, and in particular to the case of the school in Kigali 
that was under the responsibility of the UN Belgium contingent, where about 
three thousands Tutsi sought refuge. On the other hand, we can recall the 
dreadful events of the fall of Srebrenica in 1996 and, in particular, of the 
Potocari compound, which was at the time under the responsibility of the 
Dutch Battalion seconded to ‘United Nations Protection Force’ 
(UNPROFOR). In Rwanda, the Belgian State decided to unilaterally 
withdraw all its troops contributed to the UN Mission in the worse days of 
the genocide attack. Accordingly, the contingent stationed in Kigali left the 
school- compound, which had offered a safe shelter to some 3000 Tutsi. Few 
hours after the Belgian withdrawal, almost all the people present in the 
compound, left without protection, were killed by the Hutu.88  
 The facts in Srebrenica were characterised by a higher level of 
complexity, due to the articulated chain of command and control through 
which the decisions were taken in that emergency situation. For the purpose 
of the present analysis, suffice it to say that the UN and the Dutch government 
                                                 
88 See the detailed factual background emerging from the case Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira et 
al. v Belgium and ors, Court of first instance of Brussels, RG No 04/4807/A, 07/15547/A, 
8 December 2010. See also infra, chapter III, para. 6 ff.  
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decided to evacuate the area, afterwards the safe area of Srebrenica fell in the 
hands of Mladic's troops (the commander of the Army of Republica Srpska). 
The Potocari compound was abandoned as well and the Muslim refugees, 
who were sheltered there, were handed over to General Mladic. After the 
departure of UN forces, most of them were executed by Mladic's troops and 
all the men were separated from the rest and then summarily killed, in what 
was later ascertained as the first genocide on the European territory after 
World War II.89 Against these similar factual backgrounds, the reaction of the 
public opinion and the individual demand for justice have been very different.  
In terms of accountability, only following the Balkan tragedy have the 
UN and the Netherlands been urged to account for what happened. The UN 
issued a Srebrenica Report in 1998 apologizing for not having being able to 
prevent those events.90 The Dutch government was forced to resign due to the 
scandal generated in the public opinion by the decision to leave the refugees 
without effective protection.91 Associations and foundations were created by 
the relatives of the victims to pursue justice before national and international 
courts, both against the State and the UN. As a consequence, several 
proceedings were initiated leading to ground-breaking rulings in term of 
international responsibility of the State.92 
 By contrast, the Kigali case, involving the responsibility of the 
Belgian government (and of the UN to a certain extent), had generated no 
such reaction. No Reports or Security Council Resolutions were issued to 
give account of the actions that contributed to that tragedy. No government's 
resignation was reported, nor judicial proceedings initiated by victims’ 
families, with the sole exception of the Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira case in 
                                                 
89 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v Tadic, case n. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997; ICJ, 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2007, p. 43. 
90   Report of the Secretary General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 ‘The 
Fall of Srebrenica’, A/54/549 (1999). See also Nollkaemper, “Multi-level Accountability: 
A Case Study on Accountability in the Aftermath of the Srebrenica Massacre”, in Broude-
Shany (eds), The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law, Hart, 2008, pp. 
345-367, at p. 348. 
91   Nollkaemper, “Multi-level Accountability”, at p. 348. 
92   See infra, chapter III. 
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2003, that was later discontinued, probably following ex gratia payments 
offered by the government to the claimants.93  
 It is thus evident that accountability, both at the domestic and at the 
international level, depends significantly on civil society awareness and on 
the pressure that public opinion is able and willing to put on the responsible 
entities, whether they are national governments or international organisations. 
In other words, accountability does not arise simply from the fact that the 
exercise of powers by a State or an international organisation has caused a 
wrongful outcome (notwithstanding whether the conduct also constituted a 
breach of international law). Accountability, in the sense of holding to 
account, rather refers to a series of ex post mechanisms that have to be 
‘activated’ from stakeholders. By contrast, liability arises from the simple fact 
that a damage has been caused, while international responsibility is entailed 
by the breach of any international obligation attributable to the State or the 
Organisation in the absence of circumstances precluding wrongfulness. The 
injured party would indeed trigger the available judicial or extra-judicial 
mechanisms in order to obtain some form of reparation, but responsibility and 
liability arise independently of the invocation.  
 Differently, accountability – i.e. the possibility to hold a subject 
accountable in the exercise of its powers – would depend, first, on the 
awareness of the stakeholders involved. Second, it would depend on the good 
will of States and international organisations to develop accountability 
mechanisms to enable stakeholders to hold them accountable.94 The pressure 
put on the UN for the events in Srebrenica has forced the Organisation to 
issue a report and later a resolution. Similarly, the critiques received during 
the Interim Administration of Kosovo have guided the decision of the UN to 
establish the Human Rights Advisory Panel (HRAP); example that has been 
followed by the European Union by creating the EULEX Human Rights 
                                                 
93 Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira et al. v Belgium et al., supra note 88, see the comment to the 
judgement by Ryngaert in Oxford Reports on International Law, ILDC 1604 (BE 2010), 
and of the same author “Apportioning Responsibility Between the UN and Member States 
in UN Peace-support Operations”, in Israel Law Review, vol. 45, 2012, pp. 151-178. 
94   For the understanding of ‘stakeholders’ in this context see supra note 66. 
  96 
Review Panel.95 However, the example of the HRAP has never being 
replicated in any other UN peace operation. Moreover, in the case of the 
epidemic outbreak in Haiti, the UN has denied any form of accountability and 
had even refused to establish the local review board that is generally created 
in UN peace operations to handle compensation claims of private law 
character. The UN has justified its denial by saying that “considerations of 
these claims would necessarily include a review of political and policy 
matters” and thus are precluded under section 29 of the General Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN.96 It thus seems that if an 
international organisation does not acknowledge its own accountability there 
will be no accountability.   
 In conclusion, some concerns can be raised when referring to the 
accountability of international organisations. The term accountability was 
forged at the domestic level and it is strictly linked to the discourse on 
democratic governance, namely the duty of public servants to give account of 
the powers they exercise to the citizens in whose name they are operating. 
This ‘soft form’ of responsibility, mainly of political nature, can prove to be 
particularly meaningful in the relationship between a Sate and the individuals 
that may be affected by the exercise of State powers. Citizens have powerful 
instruments to hold a State accountable, such as their vote, their capability to 
generate public opinion, and their right to protest. Even aliens can demand 
some sort of accountability, especially in the context of international 
investments and commerce. One may think, for example, of the decision of 
some Dutch companies to withdraw from a contract with the government of 
Israel concerning housing construction, considering that those buildings 
would have eventually contributed to the Israeli’s unlawful policy of land-
grabbing in the occupied territories.97 Furthermore, political accountability at 
                                                 
95   See infra, chapter III. 
96 Letter of the United Nations Under Secretary General for Legal Affairs, 21 February 
2013, availble at http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/20130705164515.pdf. 
97 The news was reported on the website of the ‘Shares project’ run by the University of 
Amsterdam and are available at http://www.sharesproject.nl/news/dutch-government-
urges-local-company-no-to-participate-in-east-jerusalem-project/ and at 
http://www.sharesproject.nl/news/dutch-company-terminates-involvement-in-project-in-
east-jerusalem-in-view-of-possible-conflict-with-international-law/. 
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the national level is just one of the forms of responsibility that natural and 
legal persons can resort to against State powers. Civil and administrative 
courts, together with administrative procedures, are available in most rule-of-
law countries to challenge acts and omission of States and to seek 
compensation for the damages suffered. 
 As it concerns accountability between States, it belongs to the very 
nature of international relations and ultimately to international law itself, 
which is informed by the principle of sovereign equality. Diplomatic pressure, 
countermeasures, retaliations, and so on, one can assume that they all 
participate in the family of accountability of States vis à vis other States. 
Besides, States can always resort to a plurality of instruments to resolve cases 
that may arise between them, from mediation to international dispute 
resolution, either before the international courts or through arbitration.  
 When it comes to the relationship between international organisations 
and aggrieved natural persons, accountability seems to have a much more 
limited reach. Accountability of international organisation does not regulate 
relationships between equal subjects of international law, and this disparity 
risks to affect the functioning and effectiveness of accountability. An 
international organisation cannot neither be pushed by the vote of its citizens 
– for it has none – nor be influenced by the choice of foreign investors as 
could a State. While member States, and sometimes other international 
organisations98, may have a say in accountability, thereby triggering 
accountability mechanisms, more than likely such an imposition would pose 
a conflict of interests.99 It is unlikely, for example, that a NATO State would 
question the Organisation's accountability for the latter’s actions in a given 
operation that caused severe damages to civilians, especially when the State 
in question has participated to that operation.  
In conclusion, while the ongoing debate on accountability of international 
organisations is certainly contributing to a progressive filling of the legal gap 
                                                 
98 Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Accountability of 
International Organisations for Human Rights Violations, supra note 4.  
99 See the reflections proposed by Gordon, “Due Process and the Iraq Sanctions: A Response 
to Devika Hovell”, supra note 4. 
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described at the outset of this analysis, nonetheless the inner shortcomings of 
accountability should not be underestimated.                               
 
 
1. Liability 
 
 The regime of liability is characterised by the obligation to pay 
compensation for the damage caused, regardless of the wrongfulness of the 
conduct causing the harm.100 Differently from international responsibility, 
liability does not arise from a breach of an international obligation.101 In the 
words of Barboza “only the material damage puts into motion the 
mechanisms of liability”.102 While the principle of liability in the realm of tort 
law is a long-accepted principle in domestic legal systems, at the international 
level liability of States and international organisations lacks commonly 
shared definitions and rules. Nonetheless, from the ILC’s attempts to codify 
the issue and from the treaty practice of States, some general principles can 
be inferred.  
                                                 
100 Tomuschat, “International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not 
Prohibited by International Law: The Work of the International Law Commission”, in 
Francioni-Scovazzi (eds.), International responsibility for Environmental Harm, Nijhoff, 
1991, pp. 37.72; Barboza, “International Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts 
Not Prohibited by International Law and Protection of the Environment”, in Recueil des 
Cours, vol. 247, 1995, pp. 291-405; Boyle, “State Responsibility and International 
Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not prohibited by International Law: A 
Necessary Distinction?", in The international and comparative law quarterly, vol. 39, 
1990, pp. 1-26; Dupuy “À propos des mésaventures de la responsabilité internationale 
des États dans ses rapports avec la protection internationale de l’environnement’ in 
Prieur-Lambrechts (eds), Les Hommes et l’environnement: Quels droits pour le vingt-et-
unieme siecle?: Études en hommage à Alexandre Kiss, Frison-Roche Paris, 1998, pp. 269-
282; Montjoie, “The Concept of Liability in the Absence of an internationally Wrongful 
Act”, in Crawford-Pellet-Olleson (eds), The law of international responsibility, Oxford, 
2010, pp. 503-513; Boyle, “Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited 
by International Law”, ibidem, pp. 95-104; Fitzmaurice, “International Responsibility and 
Liability” in Bodansky-Brunnéè-Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law, Oxford, 2007, pp. 1010-1035; Tanzi, “Liability for Lawful Acts”, in 
MPEPIL, February 2013. In some less recent literature, the term liability was used to 
describe the obligation to “pay money in order to fulfil a contractual commitment”, but 
this is not the meaning referred to in the present section. See Schemers, “Liability of 
International Organisations”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 1, 1988, pp. 3-
14, in particular at p. 4. 
101 Supra, para. 4 ff.  
102 Barboza, supra note 100, p. 313. 
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 Liability in international law has been the object of a long study and a 
progressive codification process by the ILC. In 1978 it started its seminal 
project on ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising from 
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law’. The ILC had eventually 
transformed its sweeping study into two separate, though connected, reports, 
namely ‘The Prevention of Transboundary Damage from Hazardous 
Activities’ and ‘International liability in Case of Loss from Transboundary 
Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities’.103  
 According to the structure proposed already in the late 1970s', 
international responsibility is entailed by any violation of international law 
attributable to a State, also in the absence of a material damage, that is not 
considered a constitutive element of international responsibility.104 As a 
consequence, harmful outcomes of State actions or omissions not prohibited 
under international law were generally excluded by the regime of 
international responsibility, hence no protection was afforded to actors that 
suffered a damage resulting from a lawful conduct.105 The need to fill this 
conceptual and normative gap was particularly evident in the context of 
environmental protection for hazardous activities that might cause 
transboundary harms, as for example, the production of nuclear energy, 
chemical industries with high risk of polluting effects, and outer space 
activities.106 Considering that most of these activities are conducted by private 
operators, acting on the territory of a State, and not by the State itself, the 
                                                 
103 ILC Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 
adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10) and 
Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of 
hazardous activities, adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth 
session, in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly at that session (A/61/10), 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two. 
104 Tanzi, “Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence of an Internationally Wrongful 
Act?”, in Spinedi-Simma (eds), United Nations Codification of State Responsibility, 
Oceania Publications, 1985, pp. 1-33; on the different categories of damages see Fasoli, 
La riparazione dei danni immateriali nei rapporti tra Stati, Editoria Scientifica, 2012. 
105 Boyle, “State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of 
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law”, supra note 100. 
106 Tumuschat; Boyle, “State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law”; Tanzi, “Liability for Lawful 
Acts”, all supra note 100. 
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liability regime consists essentially of obligations for the State to prevent the 
occurrence of harm as well as the duty to mitigate or eliminate the harmful 
effects that may have occurred.107 In other words, the idea put forward by the 
ILC was to construct the liability regime not only around the obligation to 
compensate for the damage resulting from lawful – but harmful – acts, but 
also to impose on States a series of due diligence obligations. At the same 
time, though, the scope of these obligations had to be compatible with the free 
exercise by States of their sovereignty over their own territory.  
The attempt of the ILC to codify international liability was inspired by three 
principles 
1) every State must have the maximum freedom of action within its 
territory compatible with respect for the sovereign equality of 
other States; 
2) the protection of the rights and interests of other States requires 
the adoption of measures of prevention and reparation for injury; 
3) the innocent victim should not be left to bear his own loss.108 
 
Probably due to the inner difficulties to reconcile such opposed tenets – 
coupled with the opposition of States towards the creation of complex 
preventive rules – the final version(s) of the Draft Articles on International 
Liability has never seen the light.  
 Despite the failure to conceptualize liability under international law, 
the notion has not been abandoned, on the contrary it has had some fortune 
both in States’ treaty practice109 and in the practice of international 
organisations, especially in the context of peace operations, as will be 
analysed in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
                                                 
107 Tanzi, “Liability for Lawful Acts”. 
108 A/CN.4/413, paras 85-86. 
109 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969; 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972, 961 
U.N.T.S. 187; Article 235 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
provides that “States are responsible for the fulfilment of their international obligations 
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall be 
liable in accordance with international law”, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 
235 (1), 1982. 
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4.1 Liability and international responsibility: main differences 
 
 The distinction between liability and responsibility is not always easy 
to grasp, especially considering that the lines separating the two concepts tend 
to blur in practice. By way of example, liability has been used in the case law 
of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)  to indicate the 
obligation to pay compensation deriving from the international responsibility 
of a State.110 Another relevant example of the confusion between the two 
notions can be found in the 1996 Secretary General Report on Administrative 
and budgetary aspects of the financing of the UN peacekeeping operations, 
where the ‘principle of liability’ applicable to UN operations is described in 
the following terms: 
 
 The international responsibility of the United Nations for the 
activities of United Nations forces is an attribute of its 
international legal personality and its capacity to bear 
international rights and obligations. It is also a reflection of the 
principle of State responsibility widely accepted to be 
applicable to international organizations that damage caused in 
breach of an international obligation and which is attributable 
to the State (or to the Organization), entails the international 
responsibility of the State (or of the Organization) and its 
liability in compensation.111 
 
The distinction has been criticised in scholarly writings, suggesting that it 
would have proven more effective to use the term liability to include all 
situations where obligations to compensate arise, in order to foster a more 
comprehensive discourse on reparation for damages under international 
law.112 This dichotomy has also been defined ‘implausible’ upon the 
                                                 
110 ITLOS, Seabed Dispute Chamber, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring 
Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 
2011. 
111 A/51/389 (1996), para. 6, italics added. 
112 Nollkaemper-Jacobs, “Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual 
Framework”, in Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 36, 2012-2013, pp. 359-348, 
in particular at p. 414 ff. 
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consideration that almost all topics dealt with by the ILC in the Draft Articles 
on liability could have been analysed and solved through the prism of State 
responsibility.113 While these critiques are certainly well founded, it will be 
demonstrated that some conceptual differences exist between these two forms 
of responsibility and that their implications, especially in the context of peace 
operations, are far from being merely theoretical. 
 First, international liability is not contingent on a finding of 
wrongfulness of the conduct that caused the damage, whereas international 
responsibility has never been entailed in the absence of a breach of 
international law. This feature may cause certain actors to prefer the regime 
of liability instead of international responsibility. They may accept to redress 
the damage caused while refusing, at the same time, any acknowledgement 
about the occurrence of an internationally wrongful act attributable to them, 
which is often the case of subjects involved in military operations.114 
 Second, the centrality of (material) damage in the liability regime is 
not mirrored in the law of international responsibility, where damage has been 
excluded from the constitutive elements of responsibility.  
 Third, reparation in the field of liability has neither the same 
characteristics nor the same function of reparation in international 
responsibility. Reparation under the law of international responsibility has to 
be full, this explains the primacy of the restitutio in integrum form of 
reparation, when feasible. Also in the case of compensation per equivalente, 
reparation has to be full, including both damnum emergens and lucrum 
cessans. The rationale of full reparation in international responsibility rests 
with the aim it has to pursue, namely the elimination of all the consequences 
of an act that is unlawful in the international legal order. In other words, 
reparation would be full inasmuch as it would allow the victim to eliminate 
                                                 
113 Boyle, “State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of 
Acts not prohibited by International Law”, supra note 100, in particular at p. 21-22; in 
the opinion of the author the most valuable contribution made by the Draft Articles on 
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114  Infra, chapter IV.  
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all the consequence of the illicit action.115    
 As it concerns liability, reparation – rectius compensation – is not 
tailored at eliminating all the consequences of an act that is not prohibited 
under international law, but rather at providing the injured party with some 
forms of indemnity. Accordingly, compensation does not have to be full and 
it may well be limited by several ceilings imposed by the liable party itself, 
as it is, for example, a well-established policy of international organisations 
engaging in peace operations.116 
 Fourth, attribution is absolutely central in the law of international 
responsibility, for it constitutes the so-called subjective element of 
responsibility, which identifies the link between the wrongful conduct and the 
State or the Organisation responsible. The design of attribution rules has been 
probably the most titanic effort of the ILC, while codifying the DARS and the 
DARIO. The difficulties encountered during the drafting process are also 
reflected in the problems faced by many national and international courts in 
applying those rules to the case at hand, often resulting in different – if not 
diametrically opposed – interpretations.117   
 In the case of liability, the link between the action or omission of the 
State and the damage occurred is not as central as in the law of international 
responsibility. As explained by the Special Rapporteur Barboza, for the 
purposes of liability it does not come into question to determine whether the 
conduct of private operators can be attributed to the State, that is to say if it 
can be considered an act of the State. The issue is rather to attribute the 
harmful consequences of the conduct of another subject to the State.118 Thus, 
in the view of the ILC, attribution for the purpose of liability has a territorial 
character, whereby suffice it to prove that the activity causing the damage 
                                                 
115  Barboza, supra note 100. 
116 Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the 
Republic of South Sudan Concerning the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, 8 
August 2011, Art. VII: “Limitation of Liability of the United Nations [...]: Upon 
determination of liability as provided in this Agreement the United Nations shall pay 
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117  See the thourough analysis of this point presented in chapter III. 
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took place on the territory of the State, or that is was in any case under its 
control.119  
 Fifth and last, the liability regime is constituted of primary rules that 
include both the obligation to compensate and a series of due diligence norms, 
as opposed to international responsibility, which concerns exclusively 
secondary norms arising from a breach of international rules attributable to a 
State (or to an international organisation); hence the obligation to make 
reparation is just one of the duties arising from an international law violation.  
 
 
4.2. The relevance of liability in peace operations 
 
 Liability regimes are very common in the context of peace operations, 
especially in the practice of international organisations. The term ‘liability’ 
was already being used as early as 1980 by the UN Office of General Service 
of the Field Operation Division in a report discussing the liability of the 
United Nations in the case of an accident involving British-owned helicopters 
put at the disposal of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), as well 
as in another report centred upon the “liability of the United Nations for the 
payment of rent for premises” occupied by UN peacekeeping forces in a host 
State.120 The 1996 Report of the Secretary General elaborated a complex set 
of rules to regulate the responsibility of the Organisation towards third parties 
for activities of United Nations forces.121 The Report focused on the notion 
of liability, namely it enunciated the ‘principle of liability’ that is described 
as a corollary of the international responsibility of the UN, premised on its 
legal personality under international law.122 As consequence of the 
acknowledgement of its international responsibility and liability, the UN 
undertook to settle third party claims for damages caused by member of its 
                                                 
119  Montjoie, supra note 100. 
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forces by means of standing claims commissions.123 The document also 
delimited the scope of UN liability in three regards: ratione materiae, ratione 
temporis and financially. 
 First, third party liability of the United Nations is limited to damages 
caused by the forces in the performance of their duties, with the consequence 
that harmful outcomes of ‘off-duty’ actions would fall outside the scope of 
protection afforded to third parties by the UN liability regime.124 Within the 
category of ‘on-duty’ actions, the liability of the UN is further delimited by 
the concept of ‘operational necessity’. In other words, if the damage “results 
from necessary actions taken by a peacekeeping force in the course of 
carrying out its operations in pursuance of its mandates,” then it would not be 
compensated.125 Although some criteria have been elaborated by the UN to 
describe the precise scope of this concept, the Organisation itself admits that 
the determination of ‘operational necessity’ rests within its discretionary 
power.126  Second, not all damages would be compensable under UN liability 
in peace operations, only claims for personal injury, illness or death would be 
receivable and the compensable loss would cover exclusively the economic 
damage (e.g. health care, loss of income, burial expenses, etc.), while non-
economic damages (e.g. pain, punitive damages, etc.) will not be refunded.127 
Third, claims will not be received after six months from the moment the 
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124 A/51/389 (1996), para. 7, for the definition of off-duty actions see United Nations Legal 
Office, Liability of the United Nations for claims involving off-duty acts of members of 
peacekeeping forces, United Nations Judicial Yearbook, 1986, pp. 300 ss. On the 
numerous limitations imposed on international organisations liability see also Shraga, 
“UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and 
Responsibility for Operations-Related Damages”, in American Journal of Internaitonal 
Law, vol. 94, pp. 406-412, where the author describes the so called ‘principle of limited 
liability’. 
125  A/51/389, para. 13. 
126  Ibidem, para. 14: “a) There must be a good-faith conviction on the part of the force 
commander that an ‘operational necessity’ exists; b) the operational need that prompted 
the action must be strictly necessary and not a matter of mere convenience or expediency. 
It must also leave little or no time for the commander to pursue another, less destructive 
option; (c) the act must be executed in pursuance of an operational plan and not the result 
of a rash individual action; (d) the damage caused should be proportional to what is 
strictly necessary in order to achieve the operational goal”.  
127  A/51/389 (1996) and A/RES/52/247 (1997), para. 9. 
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damage occurred or was discovered, and in any case not a year after the 
termination of the mission's mandate.128 Fourth, compensation would not 
exceed the maximum ceiling of US$50,000, unless the Secretary General 
ascertains that a specific case requires, under exceptional circumstances, a 
higher compensation.129    
 As it concerns the relationships between the UN and TCCs, the official 
documents of the UN resort once again to the notion of liability. According to 
the Model Memorandum of Understanding, the UN would be liable towards 
participating States for deaths and disability incidents of their personnel 
attributable to UN service.130 In case of loss or damage to national equipment, 
liability will be assumed by the UN only if the item’s market value exceeded 
US$250,000.131 
 In the context of NATO operations, liability is used in the NATO 
SOFA in relation to damages caused by one contracting party to another, 
while it is not specifically utilized with reference to third party claims.132 
Third party claims are regulated similarly to the UN system, where claims 
shall be limited to damages arising out of acts or omissions done in the 
performance of official duty.133 Several limitations apply also to 
compensation claims between State parties to the SOFA: by way of example, 
contracting States participating in a NATO mission (including the host 
country) agree to waive all claims for damages to their own property caused 
                                                 
128  A/RES/52/247 (1997), para. 8. 
129  Ibidem, para. 9 (d) and (e). 
130  A/C.5/66/8, annex A, see also A/RES 52/177 of 18 December 1997 and the “Guidelines 
for submitting claims arising from death and disability incidents” included in A/52/369 
of 17 September 1997. 
131  A/C.5/66/8, annex B, para. 19 and A/C.5/55/39. 
132  NATO SOFA, art. VIII, para. 2 a),19 Jun. 1951, “In the case of damage caused or arising 
[…] to other property owned by a Contracting Party and located in its territory, the issue 
of the liability of any other Contracting Party shall be determined and the amount of 
damage shall be assessed, unless the Contracting Parties concerned agree otherwise, by a 
sole arbitrator selected[...]”. 
133  Ibidem, art. VIII, para 5. It is noteworthy that claims for damages resulting from off-duty 
‘tortious acts or omissions’ are not completely excluded from this architecture. It is indeed 
suggested that ex gratia payments should be granted by the sending State of the 
responsible personnel when the claim is considered meritorious also on the base of a 
report prepared by the host state that receive the claim in the first instance, ibidem, art. 
VIII, para. 6. 
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in the performance of the mission when the damage is less than US$ 1,400.134 
Even more significantly, contracting parties stipulate to waive all claims for 
damages for injuries or death suffered by members of their forces occurred in 
the performance of their official duties during a NATO mission.135 Despite the 
lack of express reference to liability in the NATO SOFA in the context of third 
party claims, the numerous limitations imposed on compensable claims 
suggest to conclude that we should regard the NATO claims system as a 
liability regime.136 
 As it concerns EU operations, both the EU Model Status of Force 
Agreement (EU SOFA) and the Model Status of Mission Agreement (EU 
SOMA) provide for liability regimes as they set forth a series of limitations, 
not differently from the systems analysed so far, in establishing claim 
settlement procedures.137 Also in the case of EU operations, damages or loss 
of civilian and governmental property occurred in the exercise of ‘operational 
necessity’, in particular in the course of civil disturbances and in any case in 
connection with the mandate protection, are not compensable.138  
Eventually, as it regards the practice of States participating in peace 
operations, they generally use the notion of liability too, in particular to 
indicate the form of responsibility of TCCs towards third parties.139  
 It has been shown that liability is the responsibility regime generally 
chosen by States and international organisations in peace operations both to 
deal with third party claims and to address bilateral or multilateral claims 
                                                 
134  Ibidem, art. VIII, para. 2, (e).  
135  Ibidem, art. VIII, para. 4.  
136  See infra chapter IV. 
137 The EU Model SOFA (concerning military missions) and SOMA (concerning civilian 
missions) have been adopted by the Council in 2005, after a first phase of EU operations 
characterised by the negotiation of single and separate agreements in the absence of a 
general model, see 2659th Council Meeting (General Affairs and External Relations), 23 
May 2005, at 10 and 2674th Council Meeting (General Affairs and External Relations), 
18 July 2005, at p. 21. See Sari, “Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements 
under the ESDP: The EU’s Evolving Practice”, in European Journal of International Law, 
vol. 19, 2008, pp. 67-100. 
138  EU Model SOFA, art. 15 and EU Model SOMA, art. 16.  
139 Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement between the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan and the United States of America, 30 September 2014, art. 22, para. 3 “In 
settling third party claims, United States forces authorities shall take into account any 
report of investigation or opinion provided to them by Afghan authorities regarding 
liability or amount of damages”, italics added.  
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between member States or between them and an international organisation. 
Several reasons can explain the favour for this regime. The assessment on the 
wrongfulness of the act that caused the damage is precluded or, in any case, 
is not required. This relieves claimants from the burden of proof both of the 
wrongfulness of the act and of attribution of conduct, which would otherwise 
be required, by contrast, to determine international responsibility. At the same 
time, it does not require neither the State nor the organisation to acknowledge 
or assess their acts were carried out in violation of international law.  
States and international organisations may impose further limitations 
on the already limited scope of claimants’ instances, not only by establishing 
financial ceilings on the compensable amount, but also by excluding their 
liability for certain types of damages, as we have seen regarding the UN’s and 
NATO’s ‘operational necessity’ delimitation.  
 Liability is governed by the rules created by the liable party and it is 
enforceable solely throughout the mechanisms established by the same rules. 
In other words, the existence and the functioning of liability regimes in peace 
operations depend on the will of the State or the international organisation in 
question.140 Intuitively, this feature has a very different weight depending on 
whether the claimant is a third party or a contracting party of one of the legal 
instruments that prescribe the limitations in point. A third party does not 
participate in the negotiation of a SOFA or of a MOU and has a very–if any– 
limited power to influence rule-making.141 States and international 
organisations instead mutually agree upon the conditions of the liability 
regimes they intend to establish. 
 In sum, liability regimes for third parties in peace operations appear 
as a ‘take-it-or-leave-it regime’, where the claimant may opt between 
accepting all the rules imposed by the liable party (limitations, mechanisms, 
etc.) or renounce their claim. Despite these critiques, it cannot be ignored that 
liability regimes generally strike a fair balance between the demand of the 
injured parties to obtain redress of damage suffered and the opportunity for 
                                                 
140  See infra chapter IV. 
141  Contractual claims are generally excluded from the general notion of third party claims 
as they are generally regulated under the terms of the contract itself, A/51/389 (1996). 
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States and international organisations to avoid an assessment on the 
lawfulness of their actions, together with the need to limit the costs connected 
to peace operations’ claims. This fair – or at least not excessively unfair – 
balance between opposed instances seems to explain the success of liability 
in the context of peace operations.
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CHAPTER III 
 
ATTRIBUTING AND DISTRIBUTING  
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
IN PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
 
 
 
1. Whose responsibility? Attribution of conduct in peace 
operations 
 
  
 The question on who – the international organisation leading or 
authorising the mission, troop-contributing nations (TCCs), or both – should 
bear responsibility for violations of international law in peace operations 
represents one of the most vexing issues that has gathered the attention of 
decision-makers and legal scholars for many years now. In the Cold War 
aftermath, peace operations were increasingly seen as promising tools for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, consequently, a growing 
number of peace operations have been established since the 1990s’. However, 
many of these missions failed to live up with the high expectations this 
conflict-resolution instrument rose. Between 1993 and 1995, we witnessed 
the failure of UN missions in Somalia (UNOSOM-I, UNITAF, UNOSOM-
II), in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in and Bosnia Herzegovina (UNPROFOR).1 The 
main shortcomings were associated with the fact that these missions were not 
assigned credible mandates nor adequate resources, thus resulting in the 
inability to protect civilians, namely to avoid that serious violations of human 
rights and international crimes were perpetrated against the population. As a 
consequence, public opinion accountability awareness has grown in those 
years in accordance with the gravity of the facts occurred in peace operations. 
                                                 
1 See supra chapter I. 
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Moreover, while issues of liability for damage have always arisen in peace 
operations,2 the novelty in the early 2000 was a greater demand, brought 
about by individuals before domestic and international fora, for international 
responsibility both of States and international organisations.3  
 The present chapter aims at analysing the state of the art of the 
applicable rules on international responsibility and at shedding light on the 
most controversial aspects of allocating responsibility between TCCs and 
international organisations. Thus, the legal status of national troops 
contributed to an operation, the criterion for the attribution of conduct, the 
meaning of effective control, and the possibility that a conduct would attribute 
to more than one entity – so-called ‘dual’ or ‘multiple’ attribution – will be 
the focus of the following pages. 
 The study will start with the analysis of the ILC 2011 Draft Articles 
on the Responsibility of International Organisations (DARIO)4 and will 
devote significant attention to their drafting history, considering that ILC 
works have constituted a unique forum for the collection of the opinio iuris 
of States and international organisations as well as a precious occasion for the 
classification of relevant practice. Even more importantly, the DARIO have 
expressly and systematically addressed the topic of international 
responsibility in peace operations since the very early stage of the process. 
 In order to collect the opinio iuris of States and organisations to 
properly address the topic of attribution during the DARIO’s drafting process, 
in 2004 – a full year before the start of the Commission's work – the ILC 
submitted the following question 
 
 [t]he Commission would welcome the views of Governments 
especially on the following question [...]: 
 The extent to which the conduct of peacekeeping forces is 
attributable to the contributing State and the extent to which it is 
attributable to the United Nations.5 
                                                 
2 The topic of claims commissions will be dealt with by in detail in chapter IV. 
3 See infra, paras 7 and ff. 
4 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two. 
5 A/58/10 (2003), para. 27, footnotes omitted.  
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This leading question has guided the entire codification and consequently 
originated an unprecedented emergence of States and international 
organisations’ opinio iuris on the topic. This peculiar focus should not be 
surprising, when considering the context in which the ILC was operating. 
When the ILC was about to initiate its works, the international community 
had recently witnessed the events in Kigali, during the 1994 Rwanda 
genocide, when the UN peace operation proved unable to halt those dreadful 
events and the Belgian forces abandoned their compound, leaving all the 
refugees without protection.6 Similarly, one can recall the failure of 
UNPROFOR to protect the Muslim minorities in Bosnia, where the UN 
Dutch battalion abondened the Potocari compound contributing with its 
omissions to  the Srebrenica genocide.7 Moreover, the widespread presence 
of the international community in Kosovo (UNMIK, KFOR, EULEX), and 
the wide powers conferred thereto, led to the first applications lodged before 
the Strasbourg Court against TCCs for alleged human rights violations 
committed in the course of a peace operation in 2007.8   
 The present chapter will devote particular attention to the works of the 
ILC, namely to the numerous reports issued by the Special Rapporteur Gaja 
and to the comments and observations provided by States and international 
organisations. More specifically, it will focus on the rules on attribution of 
conduct as set forth in the DARIO, as well as applied by relevant national and 
international case law. The analysis will mainly deal with the rules on the 
responsibility of international organisations, considering that the majority of 
peace missions are carried out under their umbrella, being established, 
deployed and/or led by the UN or by regional organisations such as NATO, 
the EU and the AU.9 However, inferences from, and parallelisms with, the 
ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (DARS) will be drawn where appropriate.  
                                                 
6 Infra, para. 7.5. 
7 Infra, para. 7.4. 
8 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, 
Germany and Norway, nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, Judgement, 2 May 2007. 
9 For the definition of peace operations and the description of their structure see chapter I. 
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2. The ILC Draft Articles and the general rules on attribution of 
conduct 
 
 The general rule on attribution of conduct, enshrined in art. 4 DARS, 
provides that a State bears responsibility for internationally wrongful acts 
committed by its organs and agents.10 The same rule is mirrored in the 
DARIO, under art. 6, whereby the responsibility of an international 
organisation is premised on the characterization of the entity that has carried 
out the wrongful conduct as organ or agent of that organisation. In other 
words, suffice it to ascertain that a wrongful conduct was carried out by an 
organ or agent of an organisation in the performance of its functions.11 The 
general rule’s strength lies in its simplicity and linearity. Nevertheless, this 
rule alone is unable to address the complexity of conducts performed by 
international organisations that, though international law actors with a legal 
personality, depend heavily on member States for the fulfilment of their 
tasks.12 
 Clear evidence is constituted precisely by peace operations that could 
not exist without the contribution of personnel and assets from States 
participating in each mission. This peculiar feature has been taken duly into 
account by the ILC while depicting patterns of responsibility for international 
                                                 
10 Crawford, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, see in particular “Attribution of Conduct to a State”, pp. 91 ff. 
For a more general analysis of State responsibility rationale see Koskenniemi, “Doctrines 
of State Responsibility” in Crawford-Pellet-Olleson (eds), The Law of International 
Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 45-51. 
11 Klein, “The Attribution of Acts to International Organisations”, in Crawford-Pellet-
Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
pp. 299-315. For an early analysis, preceding the Draft Articles see Eagleton, 
“International Organisations and the Law of Responsibility”, in Recueil des cours de 
l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye, vol. 76, 1950, pp. 323 and Hirsh, The 
Responsibility of International Organisations towards Third Parties: Some Basic 
Principles, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995, in particular at pp. 61-85. 
12 On the legal personality of international organisation see Morgenstern, Legal Problems 
of International Organisation, Cambridge Grotious Publications, 1986; Klabbers, “The 
Changing Image of International Organizations”, in Coicaud-Heiskanen (eds), The 
Legitimacy of International Organizations, 2001, pp. 221-255; id., “Two Concepts of 
International Organization”, in International Organizations Law Review, vol. 2, 2005, 
page 277-293; Weiler-Nissel (eds), The Concept of Legal Personality International Law, 
vol. 2, 2011. For a recent analysis see again Klabbers, “The Transformation of 
International Organizations Law”, in European Journal of International Law, vol. 26, 
2015, pp. 9-82. 
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organisations. Hence, aside the general rule on attribution described above, 
the DARIO also contain a special rule on attribution of conduct of organs or 
agents placed by States at the disposal of international organisations (art. 7 
DARIO).13 In cases of seconded organs or agents, the receiving organisation 
bears responsibility for wrongful acts over which it exercises effective 
control.14  
 The main issues concerning international responsibility in peace 
operations reside in the tension between these two provisions (arts 6 and 7 
DARIO) and with the interpretation of the notion of effective control. On the 
one hand, it remains largely unclear whether peace operations are to be 
considered organs of the international organisation or rather State organs 
placed at the disposal of the international organisation under the aegis of 
which they are deployed, triggering the application of art. 6 or of art. 7 
DARIO, respectively. This concern affects exclusively UN-led operations, as 
the UN claims that peace operations established and led by the organisation 
are UN ‘subsidiary organs’, while this is not the case of UN-authorised 
missions led by regional organisations.15  On the other hand, in the case of 
UN-authorised operations, where art. 7 DARIO should theoretically apply 
without hesitation, considerable uncertainties remain as to the content of the 
                                                 
13 Some authors have highlighted that art. 7 DARIO represents one of the few provisions 
that has brought about some novelty from the patterns followed by ILC from the previous 
drafting of the DARS, introducing a new approach and language in attribution matters. 
See in particular, Montejo, “The notion of ‘effective control’ under the articles on the 
responsibility of international organisation”, in Ragazzi (ed.), Responsibility of 
International Organizations: Essays in Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie, Martinus Nijhoff, 
2013, pp. 389-404. For a general overview on the critique of the so called 'copy and paste 
approach' adopted by the ILC in the second project, see Ahlborn, “The Use of Analogies 
Drafting the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations: An Appraisal 
of the ‘Copy-Paste Approach’”, in International Organizations Law Review, vol. 9, 2012, 
pp. 53-66.  
14 The article encompasses also attribution of conduct of agent lent to an international 
organization by another international organization, but the present analysis will focus 
exclusively on the attribution of conduct of seconded State organs, given that peace 
operations consist of State organs as it will be further elaborated below. 
15 This position has been consistently maintained by the UN since 1990 when it was first 
spelled out in the Model SOFA that UN peace operations are subsidiary organs of the 
organization and therefore enjoy the same privileges and immunities, see A/45/594 
(1990), para. 15. The statement has been later recalled in the core document concerning 
the liability of the organization for activities of UN forces, see A/51/389 (1996) and has 
recently been reaffirmed in the comments submitted by the UN to the Special Rapporteur 
Gaja during the DARIO drafting-process, see A/CN.4/637/Add. 1 (2011), in particular at 
para. 3. 
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effective control test. 
 In order to determine how international responsibility should be 
apportioned between international organisations and troop contributing States 
in peace operations, the chapter will start with tracing the drafting history of 
art. 6 and art. 7 DARIO. Hence, it will build on the letter of these provisions 
and will inquire how they have been applied in the relevant case law and how 
they have been interpreted in literature. Finally, the study will also highlight 
how the specificities of each peace operation, namely its structure (UN-led, 
UN-mandated to regional organisations), the features of troops’ secondment, 
and the chain of command and control can influence the interpretation of the 
attribution criterion. 
  
 
3. The drafting history of art. 6 DARIO 
 
 As explained earlier, art. 6 DARIO on the attribution of conduct of 
organ or agents of an international organisation constitutes the general rule 
on attribution according to which 
 
[t]he conduct of an organ or agent of an international 
organization in the performance of functions of that organ or 
agent shall be considered an act of that organization under 
international law, whatever position the organ or agent holds in 
respect of the organization. 
  The rules of the organization shall apply in the determination of 
the functions of its organs and agents. 
 
It has already been highlighted that this provision echoes substantially the 
general rule on attribution envisaged in the DARS. As a consequence, the 
basic principles underling this rule have enjoyed a vast consent among States, 
while most of the ILC drafting efforts were focused on the necessary 
‘adjustments’ of the DARS general rule to fit to the specificities of 
international organisations. In particular, the ILC had to identify the proper 
parallelisms between the meaning of ‘organic’ or ‘functional’ link between 
the organs and the State (under art. 4 DARS) and the definition of ‘organs or 
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agents’ of an international organisation (under art. 6 DARIO). Article 4 
DARS provides that “the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or 
any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the 
State” and specifies that “an organ includes any person or entity which has 
that status in accordance with the internal law of the State”. Clearly these 
concepts could not be simply replicated but required adjustments to apply to 
international organisations that have no typical State-powers nor any internal 
law, to be understood as domestic law.  
 The solutions originally put forward by the Commission sought to find 
a parallelism between States’ internal law and the rules of the organisation. 
The ILC proposed to describe the rules of the organisation on the basis of the 
definition provided in art. 2 (1)(j) of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties between States and international organisations.16 Due to 
disagreements among States as to the opportunity to define the rules of the 
organisation as well as to the possible definition to be adopted, this approach 
was abandoned by the ILC and only a generic reference to the rules of the 
organisation has survived in the final version.  
 As to the link between the organ and the organisation, the ILC has 
eventually opted for a neutral and linear formula “in the performance of 
functions of that organ or agent” rather than a more elaborated wording 
originally proposed.17 The identification of this functional link seemed to be 
in line with the majority of scholarly writings as expressly underscored by the 
ILC.18  
 For the purpose of the present analysis it is noteworthy that during the 
drafting process, attribution of wrongful conduct in peace operations has not 
                                                 
16 The first draft of art. 6 [then art. 4] DARIO reads as follows “1. The conduct of an organ 
of an international organization, of one of its officials or another person entrusted with 
part of the organization’s functions shall be considered as an act of that organization under 
international law, whatever position the organ, official or person holds in the structure of 
the organization. 2. Organs, officials and persons referred to in the preceding paragraph 
are those so characterized under the rules of the organization. 3. For the purpose of this 
article, ‘rules of the organization’ means, in particular, the constituent instruments, 
[decisions and resolutions] [acts of the organization] adopted in accordance with them, 
and [established] [generally accepted] practice of the organization.” A/CN.4/541 (2004), 
para. 28.  
17 “[E]ntrusted with part of the organization’s functions”, idem. 
18 A/CN.4/541 (2004), para. 17.  
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been tackled under the purview of art. 6 DARIO (conduct of organs or agents 
of an international organisations), while the issue of allocation of 
responsibility in these operations had been singled out by the ILC at the 
beginning of its works.19 As it will be described more in detail below, peace 
operations have generally been considered State organs placed at the disposal 
of international organisations, hence they have been dealt with under art. 7 
DARIO (conduct of organs of a State placed at the disposal of an international 
organisation). 
 The position expressed by the UN according to which UN-led peace 
operations are ‘subsidiary organs’ of the organisation represents a notable 
exception to this trend. This is shown also by the fact that the UN submitted 
most of its comments to the ILC concerning the attribution of conduct in 
peace operations as observations to art. 6 and not to art. 7 DARIO.20 
Furthermore, in its comments the UN specified that not only peace operations 
are UN subsidiary organs but also that national “forces placed at the disposal 
of the United Nations are ‘transformed’ into a United Nations subsidiary 
organ”.21 While the statement concerning the nature of subsidiary organ has 
been consistently expressed by the UN over the years, the element of  
‘transformation’ of national contingents into UN subsidiary organs represents 
to some extent a novelty. To be more precise, the term ‘subsidiary organ’ in 
this context had been used already in the 1990 UN Model Status of Forces 
Agreement (UN SOFA), wherein mention is made to “the United Nations 
peacekeeping operation, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys 
the status, privileges and immunities of the United Nations”.22  In the 2011 
comments submitted to the ILC, the UN specified the provision of the 1990 
Model SOFA in the sense that not all UN peacekeeping operations are 
subsidiary organs, but only the missions authorised and led by the 
Organisation itself.23 Insofar as national contingents contributed to a UN-led 
                                                 
19 Supra, note 5. 
20   A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (2011). 
21   Ibidem, p. 13. 
22 A/45/594, annex, para. 15. 
23 The notion of a UN subsidiary organ was also utilised in 2004 by the United Nations 
Legal Counsel Mr. Hans Corell in a letter addressed to the Director of the Codification 
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peace operation are transformed into a UN subsidiary organ, their conduct 
can be attributed solely to the UN; art. 7 DARIO and the related criterion of 
effective control do not apply.24 In other words, the Organisation has claimed 
to have a twofold power: on the one hand, to establish subsidiary organs, and 
on the other, to ‘transform’ national forces – i.e. State organs –  into subsidiary 
organs. 
 In order to test this hypothesis, we shall examine the definition of 
‘organ’ of an international organisation. Similarly to the ‘rules of the 
organisation’, the term ‘organ’ has been described in general art. 2 DARIO, 
concerning the use of terms. However, the provision provides only a sort of 
truism, according to which “‘organ of an international organisation’ means 
any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the rules of the 
organisation”.25 In other words, an organ of an international organization 
would be what the international organization itself says it is, in accordance 
with its own rules. To that effect, UN authoritative statements affirm that UN-
led missions are UN subsidiary organs and with no doubt the UN Charter 
entrusts the Security Council and the General Assembly with the power to 
establish subsidiary organs to fulfill its tasks.26.As noted by Sarooshi, issues 
of form are not of major importance when defining a UN subsidiary organ; 
rather, suffice that (a) it has been established by a principal organ of the UN 
that has delegated part of its powers for the fulfillment of certain tasks, (b) 
the organisation exercises its authority over the subsidiary organ and (c) at 
the same time the latter maintains some degree of independence.27 We would 
                                                 
Division: “As a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an act of a peacekeeping force is, 
in principle, imputable to the Organization, and if committed in violation of an 
international obligation entails the international responsibility of the Organization and its 
liability in compensation. The fact that any such act may have been performed by 
members of a national military contingent forming part of the peacekeeping operation 
does not affect the international responsibility of the United Nations vis-à-vis third States 
or individuals.” The extract was cited by the Special Rapporteur Gaja in its second report, 
A/CN.4/541, para. 36. 
24  A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (2011), pp. 9-10. 
25 Art. 2 (c) DARIO, the definition corresponds to the wording suggested by the UN in their 
final comments to the ILC, A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (2011), para. 12 p. 13. 
26 Art. 29 of UN Charter or Art. 22 if the mission is established by the General Assembly. 
27 Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security, Oxford 
University Press, 1999, in particular at pp. 86-141. See also Sarooshi, “The Legal 
Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs”, in British Year Book of 
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add to these criteria that the principal organ has first to be entrusted with the 
power to establish a subsidiary organ by the rules of the organisation. One 
can then argue that a UN-led mission is indeed a UN subsidiary organ. It is 
established by the Security Council (or by the General Assembly), in light of 
its powers enshrined in art. 29 and 22 of the Charter. Moreover, the principal 
organ retains some authority over the mission via the chain of command and 
control that is officially headed by the UN Secretary General while, at the 
same time, the mission enjoys certain autonomy, acting largely under 
independent direction and oversight, i.e. separate from the Security Council 
to discharge its duties. 
 It seems less certain, however, whether the UN also has the power to 
‘transform’ State seconded organs (in this case national contingents) into a 
UN subsidiary organ. The comments submitted to the ILC on art. 6 DARIO 
do not offer elements of clarification. The UN has simply stated that this 
‘transformation’ “has been the long-established position of the United 
Nations” 28 and to that effect has quoted the 1990 UN Model SOFA extending 
all the privileges and immunities of the organisation to UN peacekeeping 
operations in consideration of their status of UN subsidiary organs. 
The ILC commentaries to the DARIO maintain that a State seconded 
organ turns into an organ of an international organisation only when it is  
‘fully seconded’ by the sending State to the organisation.29 Unfortunately, the 
ILC has not specified when a State organ could be considered fully seconded, 
but rather has simply stressed that the conduct of a fully-seconded State organ 
would “clearly be attributable only to the receiving organisation” on the basis 
of art. 6 DARIO.30   
It has thus emerged that the secondment’s features would be of 
                                                 
International Law, vol. 67, 1997, pp. 413-478; Conforti-Focarelli, Le Nazioni Unite, 
Cedam, 2012.  See also Klein that refers to Salmon's definition of organ as “an element 
of the structure of an international organisation through which the latter acts, expresses 
its will and discharges its duties”, in Klein, “The Attribution of acts to International 
Organizations”, supra note 11, at p. 298. 
28 A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (2011), p. 13. The provision of the Model SOFA is contained in para. 
15 of the document.  
29 ILC DARIO Commentaries to art. 6, para. 6 and ILC DARIO Commentaries to art. 7, 
para. 1. 
30 ILC DARIO Commentaries to art. 7, para. 1. 
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paramount importance to determine whether the UN has this power to 
‘transform’ State organs in its subsidiary organs in peace operations. 
Differently said, it will be necessary to inquire if States that contribute troops 
to UN-led peace operations fully second their State organs to the organisation 
within the meaning of art. 6, or rather just place them at the disposal of the 
UN, within the meaning of art. 7 DARIO. The DARIO, its commentaries and 
the related drafting process offer no further clues. From this first reading 
though, it seems unlikely that the UN has a ‘transformation power’, whereas 
it seems more reasonable to maintain that it would exclusively depend on a 
State whether or not to fully second one of its organs. A further investigation 
into the issue will be carried out at a later stage, analysing elements of peace 
operations’ practice in order to draw some conclusion as to the secondment’s 
features in UN-led missions.31 
 In sum, the drafting-process of art. 6 DARIO has not expressly 
addressed the topic of attribution of conduct in peace operations with the 
exception of the position expressed by the UN, that deems UN-led peace 
operations as UN subsidiary organs. As a consequence, in the UN view, a 
wrongful conduct committed by national contingents contributed to the 
mission should be considered as a conduct of an organisation’s organ and 
therefore attributed to the UN under art. 6 DARIO. Yet, it has to be ascertained 
whether this position corresponds to the reality of peace operations and 
whether it is endorsed in courts’ practice and supported by States’ opinio 
iuris. 
 
 
4. The drafting history of art. 7 DARIO 
  
 The question of the allocation of responsibility between TCCs and the 
UN for wrongful acts occurred in peace operations has been extensively dealt 
with by the ILC in the drafting of the DARIO. At the beginning of its work 
the Commission submitted to States a specific question as to whether 
                                                 
31 Infra, para. 5.2. 
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wrongful conducts in peacekeeping operations should be attributed to the 
sending State or to the UN and to what extent.32 As explained above, with the 
exception of the UN, the debate has been mainly carried out under the 
purview of art. 7 DARIO; hence, the comments and observations of States 
and of other international organisations have been made mainly to art. 7 
DARIO. From this we understand that, in the opinion of States and of the 
ILC, peace operations have the legal status of State organs placed at the 
disposal of an international organisation, rather than of subsidiary organs. Art. 
7 DARIO, indeed, regulates attribution of conduct of State organs (and organs 
of an international organisation) placed at the disposal of an international 
organisation as follows 
 
     [t]he conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an 
international organization that is placed at the disposal of another 
international organization shall be considered under international 
law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises 
effective control over that conduct.  
 
According to this provision, attribution of wrongful conducts committed by 
national troops in peace operations is premised on two circumstances. On the 
one hand, the national contingent (State organ) should be placed at the 
disposal of the international organisation leading the operation. On the other 
hand, the international organisation should exercise effective control over the 
wrongful conduct.  
 In order to understand the scope of application of this rule we have to 
examine the meanings of ‘disposal’ and ‘effective control’. In light of the art. 
7 drafting history, the term ‘disposal’ in this context indicates the features 
according to which a State organ is transferred to an international 
organisation. More precisely, a State organ is at the disposal of an 
international organisation when the sending State still retains some powers 
and authority over its organ. It essentially differs from the situation envisaged 
by art. 6 DARIO, whereby a State organ can be considered an organ of an 
                                                 
32 Supra, note 5. 
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international organisation when it is ‘fully seconded’ to the latter.33 To clarify 
this subtle but fundamental difference, the Special Rapporteur, in its second 
report, made the example of national troops that are not placed at the full 
disposal of the UN because the sending State retains exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction and disciplinary powers over them.34 Moreover, in the 
commentary to the final version of DARIO the reference to UN peacekeeping 
operations as State organs placed at the disposal of the organisation has been 
made even more evident 
 
 [a]rticle 7 deals with the [...] situation in which the seconded organ 
or agent still acts to a certain extent as organ of the seconding State 
or as organ or agent of the seconding organization. This occurs for 
instance in the case of military contingents that a State places at the 
disposal of the United Nations for a peacekeeping operation, since 
the State retains disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction over 
the members of the national contingent.35 
 
We can conclude, then, that ‘disposal’ within the meaning of art. 7 DARIO 
refers to State organs that are transferred to an international organisation 
without completely losing their organic link to the sending States. 
                  As to the significance of effective control, it has already been 
highlighted that this represents one of the most controversial issues in the 
DARIO’s application and interpretation. The drafting history of art. 7 can 
help to shed some light on this topic as a starting point for the comprehensive 
analysis of the concept that will be carried out below.36 The quest for the 
identification of the attribution criterion in this context has followed two main 
proposals, which were not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the one hand, 
some delegations suggested that wrongful conduct should be attributed to the 
entity that had control over it;37 on the other hand, the ILC was encouraged 
to rely on the responsibility regime established on the basis of the internal 
agreements concluded between the international organisation and TCCs, 
                                                 
33  See ILC DARIO Commentaries to art. 7, para 1. 
34  A/CN.4/541 (2004), para. 38 
35  ILC DARIO Commentaries to art. 7, para 1, footnotes omitted. 
36   Infra, para. 7. 
37   Canada (A/C.6/58/SR.15, para. 3), Greece (ibidem, para. 10), Russia (ibidem, para. 31), 
Spain (ibidem, para. 41), Israel (ibidem, para. 21). 
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typically the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).38 
 As to the meaning of ‘effective control’, the uncertainties that still 
characterise the interpretation of the notion have been present since the 
beginning of the drafting process, despite the fact that the concept had already 
been subject to an intense debate in the purview of the elaboration of the 
DARS, in particular of art. 8. This is due to the elusive character of the term 
and also to the awareness that the scope of application of art. 8 DARS should 
be different from the situations dealt with by art. 7 DARIO. Art. 8 DARS 
concerns the attribution to a State of wrongful conduct carried out by persons 
or groups, upon the condition that they had been instructed, directed or 
controlled by the State. In other words, the notion of control ex art. 8 DARS 
does not concern State organs or agents but individuals.39 Art. 7 DARIO, by 
contrast, regards organs – either of a State or of another international 
organisation – that are placed at the disposal of an international organisation. 
Hence, the features of control exercised by a State over an individual would 
not be the same as the control exercised by an international organisation over 
a State organ placed at its disposal, since both the subject who exercises the 
control and the subjects over which the control is exercised differ 
significantly.  
 Despite its elusive meaning, the use of the notion ‘control’ has been 
welcomed as the proper attribution criterion by the majority of States and 
international organisations during the drafting process of art. 7 DARIO. In 
particular, some governments suggested that control was to be understood as 
‘effective control’;40 others saw it as ‘operative’ or ‘operational control’;41 
other States held the opinion that control has to be understood in connection 
with wider concepts such as ‘authority and command’;42 other delegations 
have preferred to avoid further adjectives to define the term.43 
                                                 
38   Canada (A/C.6/58/SR.15 para. 3), Gabon (ibidem, para. 5), UK (ibidem, para. 9), Israel 
(ibidem, para. 21), Portugal (ibidem, para. 27), Spain (ibidem, para. 41), Mexico 
A/CN.4/547 2004, p. 9.  
39   ILC DARIO Commentary to art. 7, para. 5. 
40 Israel (A/C.6/58/SR.15 para. 21), Russia (ibidem, para. 31). 
41 Spain (A/C.6/58/SR.15 para. 41). 
42 Greece (A/C.6/58SR.15, para. 13). 
43 Italy (A/C.6/58SR.14, para. 46), Canada (A/C.6/58/SR.15 para. 3), Belarus (ibidem, para. 
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 In its first effort to clarify the notion of control, the Special Rapporteur 
has relied widely on the ongoing scholarly debate and on the work of the 
International Law Association to conclude in favour of the adoption of  
‘effective control’;44 although not decisive for the complete understanding of 
such a complex notion, the wording ‘effective control’ was welcomed by 
States and international organisations since its appearance in the first draft of 
art. 7 DARIO.45 More precisely, in the initial proposal the attribution criterion 
was not simply ‘effective control’; its content included “the extent of the 
exercise of effective control over the wrongful conduct”.46 In the opinion of 
the Special Rapporteur a similar wording would have left open to 
interpretation the provision in the sense of dual attribution and to measure the 
extent of responsibility in connection with the extent of control operated.47 
This precise legal reasoning, however, did not gather the approval of States 
and, therefore, was eventually left out from the final version of art. 7 DARIO.  
 The ILC commentary to art. 7 provides for some guidance on the 
ultimate meaning of ‘effective control’. First of all, it is specified that it 
should be understood as ‘factual control’, which takes into account the “full 
factual circumstances and the particular context”.48 It is noteworthy that the 
practice reported in the commentary on this point concerns – almost 
exclusively – peace operations where the case law originated from wrongful 
acts occurred during these types of missions. In particular, the ILC has 
highlighted the divergence emerged in the ECtHR case law in the Behrami 
                                                 
43). 
44  International Law Association, Accountability of International Organisations, Final 
Report, 2004, in particular p. 200. 
45   The first wording of the article, that was initially listed as art. 5, reads as follows: “The 
conduct of an organ of a State or an international organization that is placed at the disposal 
of another international organization for the exercise of one of that organization’s 
functions shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organization to 
the extent that the organization exercises effective control over the conduct of the organ”, 
para. 50.  
46 A/CN.4/541 (2004), para. 48. This proposal was drawn from a suggestion submitted by 
the Canadian delegation to consider “the extent to which the United Nations controlled 
the conduct of the individuals in question”, see A/C.6/58/SR.15 (2003), para. 3. 
47 A/CN.4/541 (2004) 
48 ILC DARIO Commentary to art. 7, para. 4. It has to be noted that this ‘factual’ 
interpretation was offered for the first time by the English delegation during the drafting 
process, see A/C.6/64/SR.16, para. 23.  
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case, where the Court interpreted the attribution criterion in the sense of  
‘ultimate authority and control’ rather than ‘effective factual control’ and 
have found in favour of the attribution to the UN of wrongful conducts 
occurred in the context of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo.49 While 
commenting that the Court did not properly apply the provision envisaged in 
art. 7 DARIO, the ILC has suggested that the resort to ‘operation control’ 
would have been more useful to address the issue of military actions in the 
context of UN peace operations.50 Along the same line, the ILC has quoted 
the UN statement on the Behrami judgement where the Organisation strongly 
disagreed with the conclusions reached by the Court and maintained that the 
proper attribution criterion would have been ‘effective operational control’.51  
 This leads us to consider that the UN also attaches a certain 
importance to the criterion of control, which is confirmed by a closer look at 
the observations and comments submitted by the Organisation to the ILC. The 
UN started with identifying three different types of missions. The UN 
described diverse consequences in terms of international responsibility, 
depending on the legal status of the force, on the control exercised within the 
chain of command and control, and on the content of internal agreements. 
First, the core divide between UN-led operations and UN-authorised 
operations placed under the command and control of a leading nation or of a 
regional organisation is underscored. To this two types of peace operations, 
the UN has added the third category of joint operations, whereby a UN-led 
mission is deployed alongside other forces that remain under national chain 
of command or under the lead of a regional organisation.52 This partition 
would have substantial implications in terms of responsibility. As elaborated 
earlier, according to the UN, when a contingent is placed at the disposal of a 
UN-led operation is ‘transformed’ into a UN subsidiary organ, therefore art. 
7 DARIO would not apply nor the criterion of effective control set forth 
therein, but rather it is art. 6 DARIO that would come into play.53 Besides this 
                                                 
49 For a detailed analysis of the Behrami case see infra section 7.1. 
50   ILC DARIO Commentary to art. 7, para. 10. 
51 Idem. 
52 A/CN.4/637/Add.1, pp. 10-11. 
53 Ibidem, p. 13. 
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structure based on the ‘subsidiary organ theory’, the UN has introduced an 
element of uncertainty by attaching great importance to the principle of 
command and control. The Organisation specified that the criterion for 
attribution is not effective control but rather ‘command and control’. Thus 
creating a certain confusion as to how to reconcile the ‘subsidiary organ’ 
criterion and the ‘command and control’ criterion. In other words, one should 
assume that international responsibility rests with the UN and, also, 
responsibility lies where command and control is vested.54 The whole 
construction of the responsibility of the UN for wrongful conducts in peace 
operations is structured around this tenet, even in the case of UN-led peace 
operations in which a presumption applies that contingents are placed “under 
the exclusive command and control of the United Nations”.55 Moreover, the 
observation submitted by the Organisation underlined that “the residual 
control exercised by the lending State in matters of disciplinary and criminal 
prosecution” and other issues is not relevant for attribution, as long as it “does 
not interfere with the United Nations operational control”.56 It thus remains 
unclear why the UN has introduced the principle of UN command and control 
and stated a presumption of exclusiveness in UN-led operations when the 
nature of subsidiary organs does not require to rely on attribution criteria other 
than the organic link to the organisation. 
 In the UN reasoning, the same criterion of attribution – that 
responsibility lies where command and control is vested – would apply to 
UN-authorised missions that are placed under the control of a State or of a 
regional organisation. In these cases, “each State or organisation is 
responsible for damage caused by forces under its command and control”. In 
other words, the responsibility for the conduct of the forces is entailed by the 
entity that headed the chain of command and control.57  
                                                 
54 The principle had been already elaborated in 1996 in the famous Report of the Secretary 
General on Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of Financing of United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, A/51/389 (1996), in particular at para. 17 which titles “liability 
is engaged where command and control is vested”. 
55 Ibidem, p. 10, para. 2. 
56 Ibidem, p. 14, para. 4 
57 Ibidem, pp. 10-11, paras. 3-7. 
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 Also in the case of joint operations, the UN has relied on the principle 
of command and control, though with an important distinction. In order to 
assess where command and control is vested in this type of operations, one 
has to look at “the arrangements establishing the modalities of cooperation 
between the State or States providing the troops”.58 Only in the absence of 
these agreements, “responsibility would be determined in each and every case 
according to the degree of effective control exercised by either party in the 
conduct of the operation”.59 Differently said, effective control would matter 
exclusively as a residual criterion and would be determined on a case by case 
basis. 
 At the end of this articulated analysis of peace operations and 
attribution criteria the UN has specified that the effective control test set forth 
in art. 7 DARIO has never actually been endorsed by the UN to attribute 
responsibility in military operations60. Moreover, in the 2011 observations 
and comments submitted to the ILC, the UN seems to pivot once again on 
this issue, introducing yet another variable: one of politics. The Organisation 
concluded that 
 
 [f]or a number of reasons, notably political, the United Nations 
practice of maintaining the principle of United Nations 
responsibility vis-à-vis third parties in connection with 
peacekeeping operations and reverting as appropriate to the lending 
State is likely to continue. The Secretariat nevertheless supports the 
inclusion of draft article 6 [now art. 7] as a general guiding principle 
in the determination of responsibilities between the United Nations 
and its Member States with respect to organs or agents placed at the 
disposal of the Organization, including possibly in connection with 
activities of the Organization in other contexts.61  
 
It thus seems that the UN doctrine of international responsibility for wrongful 
acts occurred in peace operations is to be understood in no small part through 
political considerations, in particular on the will of the organisation to 
maintain the ‘unity of responsibility’ vis-à-vis third parties in UN-led 
                                                 
58 Ibidem, p. 10, para. 3. 
59 Idem.  
60 Ibidem, p. 14 para. 3. 
61 A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (2011), para. 6. 
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operations and to rely on each command and control arrangement in all other 
types of operations.  
 It remains to analyse the relevance of internal agreements for the 
purpose of attribution of wrongful conduct. Many States have underscored 
the relevance of internal agreements between TCCs and the UN for the 
identification of existing rules to attribute responsibility in peace operations.62 
Despite wide reference States have made to these accords, the Special 
Rapporteur, in his second report, categorically affirmed that internal 
agreements do in fact regulate relationships between parties and do not alter 
the issue of attribution under general international law.63 In the drafting 
process, however, States quickly abandoned references to these internal 
agreements while the UN and NATO attached greater importance to them for 
the purpose of attribution.64 
 It has already been shown that the UN has identified internal 
agreements between States and the organisation as the relevant criterion to 
determine where command and control is vested in joint operations. A further 
example of the relevance of internal agreements in UN practice is evident in 
the right of recovery envisaged in art. 9 of the UN Model MoU, according to 
which the UN has a right to seek recovery from the sending State “if the loss, 
damage, death or injury arose from gross negligence or willful misconduct of 
the personnel provided by the Government, the Government will be liable for 
such claims”.65 This mechanism was referred to as ‘concurrent responsibility’ 
in the 1996 Report of the Secretary General66 and later recalled by the UN in 
the 2011 observations and comments to the ILC.67  
 During the DARIO’s drafting process, NATO did not endorse the 
                                                 
62 Canada A/C.6/58/SR.14 (2003), para. 3; Gabon (ibidem, para. 5), UK (ibidem, para. 9), 
Israel (ibidem, para. 21), Portugal (ibidem, para. 27), Spain (ibidem, para. 41). 
63 A/CN.4/541 (2004), para. 43. 
64 For comments and observations of the UN see A/CN.4/637/Add. 1 (2011) in particular at 
para. 5, where reference is made to art. 9 of the UN Model MoU. For comments and 
observations of NATO see A/CN.4/637 (2011), paras 7-9, where reference is made to the 
procedures for the settlement of claims envisaged in art. VIII of the 1951 Status of Force 
Agreement and to similar accords concerning non-NATO States participating in 
partnership programmes or anyway contributing to NATO missions. 
65 A/C.5/60/26, chapter. 9, art. 9. 
66 Ibidem, paras 42 and ff. 
67 A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (2011), para. 5. 
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framework proposed by the ILC concerning attribution of wrongful conduct, 
but attached greater relevance to internal agreements drafted between the 
organisation and States taking part in peace operations.68 Moreover, NATO 
did not state neither its opinion on to the legal status of forces (whether 
subsidiary organs of the organisation or State organs placed at the disposal of 
an IO) nor on the preferred attribution criterion. It raised instead concerns for 
the little consideration given by ILC to the ‘specific situation’ of NATO, 
namely to its rules of the organisation.69 In fact, the 2011 observations and 
comments submitted by NATO to the ILC stressed the peculiar features of the 
decision-making procedures that are based on the equal participation of States 
and thus on consensus.70 Hence, it seemed to imply that the structure and the 
functioning of NATO would not allow for attribution of conduct to the 
organisation itself, that is to say NATO would not recognize distinct 
responsibility among Member States. This view can be further supported by 
the reference made in NATO observations and comments to the procedures 
for settlement of claims envisaged in its internal agreements, namely the 1951 
Model SOFA.71 Art. VIII of this Model Agreement envisages an articulated 
system of apportionment of costs to compensate damages that can arise from 
acts or omissions of members of forces in the performance of their official 
duties. The Model SOFA attributes to the receiving State the prime 
responsibility to receive and to adjudicate the claim. If compensation is due, 
the suggested amount is communicated to the responsible sending State. The 
sending State has two months to express or refuse its consent, while in default 
of a reply the proposal of the receiving State is considered accepted. Besides 
these procedural aspects, it is particularly interesting to note that costs linked 
to the compensation are always distributed between State parties. Three 
different schemes to allocate the costs are envisaged. First, when only one 
                                                 
68 Ibidem, p. 11. 
69 Idem. 
70 Idem. 
71 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their 
Forces, 19 June 1951, last updated 14 October 2009 (hereinafter NATO SOFA); see also 
Prescott, “Claims”, in Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, pp. 159-186, for NATO claims see in particular pp. 163-166. 
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sending State is responsible, costs are divided between the sending State 
(75%) and the receiving State (25%)72. Second, when more than one State is 
responsible, costs are split equally between them and the receiving State has 
to bear 50% of the quota of each State.73 Lastly, when it is not possible to 
attribute the damage to one or more States, the costs are distributed equally 
between all sending States and, as in the previous case, 50% of each quota is 
paid by the host State.74 As far as damages arising out of non-official-duty 
acts are concerned, art. VIII para. 6 of the Model SOFA provides that the 
sending State of the responsible member of the force can decide to offer an 
ex gratia payment on the basis of facts revealed in the host State’s incident 
report.75 
 From the analysis of this document it emerges that responsibility – 
more precisely liability in compensation – is borne exclusively by States that 
are parties to the SOFA, including the host State that is always asked to 
contribute to the costs incurred by sending States for compensation.  NATO, 
however, does not accept any form of responsibility nor liability in 
compensation. In sum, the underlying principle that regulates responsibility 
for wrongful acts in NATO operations seems to result from a combination of 
the general attribution of conduct to the sending ‘responsible’ State and a 
form of subsidiary responsibility of the receiving State. What remains elusive 
is the criterion according to which responsibility is attributed to member 
States. The 2011 observations and comments presented to the ILC do not offer 
any useful elements of clarification here. NATO appeared keener on stressing 
the relevance of internal agreements, namely SOFAs, rather than expressing 
its opinion on the legal criteria proposed by the ILC. The NATO comments 
further specified that in cases of joint operations with non-NATO members, 
attention shall be focused on the content of internal agreements76. It may thus 
seem that NATO refuses any form of international responsibility arising from 
wrongful conduct occurred in NATO operations. This understanding was 
                                                 
72 NATO SOFA, art. VIII, para 5, lett e) i. 
73 Ibidem, art. VIII, para 5, lett e) ii. 
74 Ibidem, art. VIII, para 5, lett e) iii. 
75   For a thorough analysis on the NATO claims system see infra chapter IV. 
76   A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (2011), p. 13. 
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already suggested by the German government in its observations and 
comments to the ILC in 2005.77 NATO’s 2011 comments, however, suggested 
a different conclusion on the issue of responsibility. It has held that the Model 
SOFA is – as the name suggests – just a model agreement, whereas in practice 
such agreements may vary greatly. This is shown, for example, by the recently 
adopted SOFA between NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
whose art. 20 provides for the responsibility of ‘NATO Forces Authorities’ to 
settle third-party claims and to pay compensation when due, whereas no 
responsibility or liability in compensation is envisaged for the host State.78 
 As it concerns the position expressed by the European Union during 
the DARIO’s drafting, the EU Commission’s noted that the ILC’s work on 
art. 7 was largely based on UN practice and ECtHR case, seemingly implying 
that EU practice had not been taken into due account.79 The EU Commission 
took note of the leading question posed by the ILC and of the ongoing debate 
on the meaning of ‘effective control’. However, the EU did not show any 
interest in participating to this debate, avoiding to state its opinio iuris on the 
matter. The Organisation rather preferred to focus on the features of the EU 
responsibility regime, praising the accountability mechanisms available 
under EU law.80  In sum, the EU has not contributed to the drafting of art. 7 
DARIO. The Organisation’s opinion on the attribution criterion applicable to 
EU peace operations was expressed some years later, in occasion of the 
negotiations for the EU accession to the ECHR. After several revirements, 
the final version of the 2013 Draft Agreement on the Accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, under its 
article 1, para. 4, stipulates that conduct carried out by Member States’ organs 
                                                 
77   A/CN.4/556 (2005), in particular at p. 52. 
78  Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan on the Status of NATO Forces and NATO personnel conducting mutually 
agreed NATO-led activities in Afghanistan, 30 September 2014, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_116072.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
79 ILC, Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations, 
A/CN.4/637, p. 22. 
80  “European Union’s institutions are fully accountable vis-à-vis each other and European 
Union member States for acts and failure to act”, ibidem, p. 23. The comments further 
stated that “the Union does not invoke jurisdictional immunity when European Union 
acts are challenged by private parties, as long as this is done in European Union courts”, 
idem. 
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or persons acting on their behalf are attributable solely to the former, even 
when the States are implementing EU law.81 The applicability of this 
attribution rule to EU peace operations (i.e. to Common Foreign Security 
Policy operations) was confirmed also by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) in its opinion on the compatibility between the Draft 
Agreement and the EU constituent Treaties.82 The CJEU specified that the 
provision of art. 1 para. 4, of the Draft Agreement would have prevented the 
ECtHR from applying, to relations between the EU and its Member States, 
its previous case law on the responsibility of an international organisation in 
relation to acts performed by a Member State in peace operations.83 
Interestingly, the Draft Agreement did not preclude dual attribution, that it is 
to say it envisage the possibility for the EU of being responsible as ‘co-
                                                 
81  Fifth Negotiation Meeting Between the CDDH ad hoc Negotiation Group and the 
European Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Final Report to the CDDH, 47+1(2013)008rev2, 10 June 
2013, art. 1, para. 4: “For the purposes of the Convention, of the protocols thereto and of 
this Agreement, an act, measure or omission of organs of a member State of the European 
Union or of persons acting on its behalf shall be attributed to that State, even if such act, 
measure or omission occurs when the State implements the law of the European Union, 
including decisions taken under the Treaty on European Union and under the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union”. See Naert, “The International Responsibility of 
the Union in the Context of its CSPD Operations, in Evans (ed.), The International 
Responsibility of the European Union: European and International Perspectives, Hart, 
2013; Welles-den Hertog, “EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: A Competence-
Responsibility Gap?”, ibidem; Cannizzaro, “Postscript to Chapter 12”, ibidem; Den 
Hejier-Nollkaemper, “A New Framework for Allocating International Responsibility. The 
EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights”, 31 January 2014, available 
at http://www.sharesproject.nl/publication; Spagnolo, L’attribuzione delle condotte 
illecite nelle operazioni military dell’Unione Europea, Editoriale Scientifica, 2016, at pp. 
216-217 and 224-226; Delgado Casteleir, The International Responsibility of the 
European Union. From Competence to Normative Control, Cambridge University Press, 
2016. See also the analysis carried out in the previous chapter, supra chapter II. 
82   Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion 2/13,18 December 2014. 
83    Ibidem, para. 95: “In the fist place, as regards the attributability of acts, military 
operations in application of the CFSP are conducted by the Member States, in accordance 
with the fourth sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24 (1) TEU and Articles 
28 (1) TEU, 29 TEU and 42 (3) TEU. The Commission states that, in order to take account 
of that characteristic, Article 1 (4) of the draft agreement provides that, even with respect 
to operations conducted in the framework of the CFSP, the acts of the Member States are 
to be attributed to the Member State in question and not to the EU. That clarification 
should preclude the possibility that the case-law of the ECtHR  –  whereby the ECtHR 
has ruled on the responsibility of an international organisation in relation to acts 
performed by a Contracting Party for the purpose of implementing a resolution of that 
organisation (decision of the ECtHR in Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v 
France, Germany and Norway, nos 71412/01 and 78166/01, 2 May 2007, and judgment 
of the ECtHR in Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom, no. 27021/08, 2011)  –  might be applied 
to relations between the EU and its Member States”. 
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respondent’ for the same act of omission attributed to a Member State both to 
sending States and to the EU.84 Art. 3 of the Draft Agreement prescribed an 
amendment to art. 36 of the ECHR that, by adding thereto a fourth paragraph, 
would have read as follows 
 
[t]he European Union or a member State of the European Union may 
become a co-respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the 
circumstances set out in the Agreement on the Accession of the 
European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case.85  
 
Some authors have inquired whether the Draft Agreement may constitute 
evidence of a lex specialis on attribution of conduct in EU peace operations, 
for the purposes of art. 64 DARIO. It has generally been excluded that this 
can be the case, considering that internal agreement can apportion 
responsibility between the parties, while it will not affect the applicability of 
the rules on attribution of conduct between the organisation and third 
parties.86 Also, it cannot be said that a customary lex specialis has emerged, 
as the analysis of case law do not accommodate this understanding.87 
The missed accession of the EU to the ECHR will prevent from having what 
would have certainly constituted a rich and enlightening case law on the 
matter. Anyhow, even if the Accession Agreement has not entered into force, 
and most likely never will, in the Draft Agreement the EU expressed a very 
clear opinio on the attribution criterion to be applied in EU peace operations, 
whereby article 7 DARIO will not come into question. Consequently, we can 
conclude that also the EU has eventually rejected the rule on attribution of 
conduct enshrined in the DARIO. 
                                                 
84   Fifth Negotiation Meeting, supra note 81, art. 1, para. 4: “This shall not preclude the 
European Union from being responsible as a co-respondent for a violation resulting from 
such an act, measure or omission, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 4, of the 
Convention and Article 3 of this Agreement”. 
85   Italics added. On the co-respondent mechanisms see Den Hejier-Nollkaemper, supra note 
81, p. 7-8 and Gaja, “The ‘Co-Respondent Mechanisms’ According to the Draft 
Agreement for the Accesion of the EU to the ECHR”, in ESIL Reflections, vol.2, 2013. 
86   Spagnolo, supra note 81, at p. 234, see the observation of the Special Rapporteur Gaja on 
the relationship between internal agreements and the rules on international responsibility, 
supra note 85. 
87   Spagnolo, supra note 81, at p. 234. 
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5. The legal status of UN missions 
 
 It has been shown that different approaches exist as to the definition 
of the legal status of national troops contributed to peace operations. In 
particular, from the analysis of the opinio iuris of States and of international 
organisations as well as from the study of arts. 6 and 7 DARIO and their 
commentaries, opposed positions have emerged. On the one side, the ILC and 
the majority of States have considered national contributed troops as State 
organs placed at the disposal of the organisation within the meaning of art. 7 
DARIO. On the other side, the UN has claimed that in the case of UN-led 
missions, i.e. operations not only established by but also placed under the 
command and control of the UN, are to be considered subsidiary organs of 
the UN; moreover, national troops contributed to this type of operations are 
‘transformed’ into UN subsidiary organs.88  The DARIO have not taken into 
account the remarks of the UN as to this peculiar legal status of UN-led 
missions. On the contrary, the ILC has discussed the issue of peace operations 
only under art. 7 (attribution of conduct of seconded State organs) and not 
under art. 6 (attribution of conduct of organs of the IO).  
 It is evident that the determination of the legal status of contributed 
personnel to peace operations is far from purely theoretical. If one assumes 
that national contingents forming part of a UN-led mission are ‘transformed’ 
into a subsidiary organ of the UN, what naturally follows is that the applicable 
rule to determine the international responsibility would be art. 6 DARIO. In 
other words, if contributed troops are UN subsidiary organs their wrongful 
conducts committed in the performance of their functions would be attributed 
to the UN, while there would be neither the scope to determine the 
responsibility of the sending State nor the need to apply the effective control 
test. By contrast, if one assumes that national contingents are and remain State 
                                                 
88 Supra, note 53.  
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organs placed at the disposal of the UN, the applicable rule to assess the 
international responsibility of the UN and/or of the sending State would be 
art. 7 DARIO and thus the effective control test would apply. 
 The aforementioned distance between the two positions has not only 
emerged during the DARIO’s drafting-process but it has characterised the 
diverse approaches followed by national and international courts as well as 
the ongoing debate among scholars.89 As it will be shown, the Strasbourg 
Court and the most recent jurisprudence of English Courts have fully 
endorsed the UN position, while Dutch Courts, Belgian Courts and older 
English case law have embraced the approach followed by the ILC, according 
to which all national contingents are State organs placed at the disposal of the 
international organisation.  
 The legal status of UN-led peace operations has garnered the attention 
of the European Court of Human Rights, since 2007 when the famous 
Behrami and Saramati case was adjudicated.90 The suit concerned two joint 
cases of responsibility of certain troops contributing States of UNMIK and 
KFOR for the alleged violations of the right to life and the right to freedom 
due to the improper de-mining process carried out by UNMIK and to the 
unlawful arrest of Mr Saramati carried out by KFOR forces, respectively. In 
the part of the judgment where the Court investigated whether the failure to 
de-mine the area91, which allegedly caused the death of Behrami, was 
attributable to UNMIK it clearly stated that  
 
 [i]n contrast to KFOR, UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN 
[...]. UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN institutionally 
directly and fully answerable to the UNSC [...]92  
                                                 
89 Infra, para. 5.1. 
90 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, 
Germany and Norway, nos 71412/01 and 78166/01, Admissibility Decision, 2 May 2007. 
 
91 The present analysis will be limited to the attribution of acts of UNMIK as it deals 
specifically with conducted carried out by troops contributed to a UN-led mission whose 
status is contentious. The attribution of acts of KFOR will be tackled the following 
paragraph considering that the legal status of KFOR contributed-troops do not come into 
play, on the contrary the (contested) approach followed by the Court concerned the 
interpretation of effective control which implies that KFOR troops were considered State 
organs placed at the disposal of the organisation. See infra para. 7.1.  
92 Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, para. 142. 
  137 
 
Accordingly, the Court noted that UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN 
created under Chapter VII of the Charter so that the impugned inaction was, 
in principle, ‘attributable’ to the UN in the same sense.93 This interpretation 
has been cited in numerous rulings. In 2008, it was recalled by the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords in Al Jedda, when distinguishing the nature 
of the Multi-national Force in Iraq from the status of UNMIK, whereby only 
the latter had to be considered a UN subsidiary organ.94 These rulings were 
further recalled in 2011 by the European Court itself in the Mothers of 
Srebrenica case, where, for the purpose of exploring the extent of immunity 
enjoyed by the UN, the European Court quoted the 1996 UN Secretariat 
Report on the budgetary and financial aspects of peacekeeping, according to 
which UN-led peace operations are subsidiary organs of the Organisation.95 
Finally, this position was cited recently by the English Court of Appeal in the 
Serdar Mohammed case concerning the responsibility of the English 
contingent contributed to ISAF for the alleged unlawful detention of the 
claimant.96 Again, while examining the scope of UN immunity, the Court of 
Appeal quoted extensively a letter dated 17 April 2015 submitted to the UK 
Permanent Representative by the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs 
and United Nations Legal Counsel, where not only does it re-state the well-
known opinion on the legal status of UN-led peace operations, but it also 
traced the core divide between the UN-led and UN-authorised peace 
operations, which do not enjoy the legal status in this case 
 
 operations authorized by the Security Council and conducted under 
the control of States or regional organizations – as was the case with 
ISAF – are distinct and separate from the United Nations. These 
authorized operations are therefore different from United Nations 
                                                 
93 Ibidem, para. 143. The expression “in the same sense” has to be intended as reference to 
the concept of attribution within the meaning of the DARS, hence as one of the essential 
elements of international responsibility. See paras. 3-29 and 121 of the judgement. 
94 House of Lords, Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence, UKHL 58, 12 December 2012, 
in particular at para. 24.  
95 ECtHR, Third Section, Stiching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands, no. 
65542/12, Decision, 11 June 2013, at para. 141. 
96 England and Wales High Court, Queen's Bench Division, Mohammed et al. v Secretary 
of State et al., EWHC 1369, 2 May 2014. 
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operations, such as peacekeeping operations, that are considered to 
be subsidiary organs of the Security Council. The Organization’s 
longstanding practice on the issue is reflected, for instance, in the 
amicus briefs submitted by the United Nations to the European 
Court of Human Rights regarding the cases Behrami and Behrami v. 
France [...] as well as regarding the case Atallah v. France.97 
 
The opposite stream of cases which has regarded UN missions as composed 
of State organs placed at the disposal of the UN starts with the landmark 
ruling of the House of Lords in the Nissan case.98 Although this judgement 
was issued well before the beginning of the ILC’s works, its analysis would 
prove the paramount importance of the legal status issue for the purposes of 
allocating international responsibility in peace operations. The suit concerned 
a claim for compensation and damage proposed by a British citizen who 
owned a luxury hotel in Nicosia, Cyprus, that was occupied by the British 
forces as headquarter during their engagement in the assistance mission to 
Cyprus. During a first period (from 29 December 1963 to 27 March 1964) the 
British contingents were deployed at the request of the government of Cyprus 
to restore peace and security. Few months after their deployment, the mission 
was transformed into the UN-led mission UNFICYP and the named 
contingents were thus contributed to the UN mission. For the purpose of the 
present analysis suffice it to say that the English courts had to assess whether, 
during the second period, after the establishment of UNFICYP, British 
soldiers were to be considered UN subsidiary organs or State organs and 
therefore their conducts were attributable to the UK or rather to the UN. In 
this regard, the House of Lords clearly stated that 
 
[f]rom the documents it appears further that, though national 
contingents were under the authority of the United Nations and 
subject to the instructions of the commander, the troops as 
members of the force remained in their national service. The 
British forces continued, therefore, to be soldiers of Her 
Majesty.99  
 
 
                                                 
97 Ibidem, para. 78. 
98 House of Lords, Attorney General v Nissan, Appeal and cross appeal judgment, UKHL 
3, 11 February 1969. 
99 Idem. 
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With its ruling the House of Lord overturned both the findings of the Queen's 
Bench division and of the Court of Appeal, that held the impugned acts 
attributable solely to the UN wherein British soldiers acted as agents of the 
UN.100 
 Another series of domestic judgements before Dutch courts 
concerning the responsibility of the Dutch contingent of UNPROFOR for the 
events during the fall of Srebrenica are useful to shed some light on the topic. 
In the Nuhanovic case, the Court of Appeal of The Hague upheld the 
plaintiff’s claim stating that the appropriate criterion for attribution of conduct 
would consist in the ‘effective control’ test as laid down in art. 7 DARIO, 
thus implying that national troops of UN-led missions have to be regarded as 
State organs seconded to the UN.101 The same approach was then upheld by 
the Supreme Court of the Netherlands that further clarified the role of art. 7 
DARIO in answering to the government's submission according to which the 
Court of Appeal would have failed to apply art. 6 DARIO, whereby the Dutch 
contingent was a subsidiary organ of the UN. In this regard the Supreme Court 
of the Netherlands affirmed that the applicable rule on attribution was 
precisely art. 7 DARIO and dismissed the cassation appeal on this point.102 
More recently, in 2015, this reasoning was followed also by District Court of 
the Hague in the second suit brought by the Mothers of Srebrenica against the 
UN and the NLs, making express reference to the ruling of the Supreme Court 
in the Nuhanovic case.103 In particular, the Court endorsed and applied the 
effective control set forth in art. 7 DARIO as the valid attribution criterion.104 
It thus seems that before the Dutch judges there is no longer scope for the UN 
position claiming the ‘transformation’ of national contingents into subsidiary 
                                                 
100 For a thorough analysis of the three judgements, see Hirsh, The Responsibility of 
International Organisations Toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles, Nijhoff, 1995, 
at pp. 74 ff.  
101 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Nuhanović v the Netherlands, LNJ: BR5388, 5 July 2011. 
It should be noted that at the time of the judgement the Court has expressly referred to 
the DARIO. 
102 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Nuhanović v the Netherlands, 12/03324 LZ/TT, 6 
September 2013, in particular at para. 3.10.1.  
103 District Court of The Hague, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands and the 
United Nations, RDBH:A8748, 16 July 2014. 
104 Ibidem, para. 4.33. 
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organs and for the exclusive attribution of wrongful conducts to the UN. 
 Another instructive case can be found in the Belgian case law, where 
the Brussels Court of first instance was asked to adjudicate the liability in 
compensation of the Belgian State and of two Belgian high officers for the 
actions and omissions of the Belgium contingent of the ‘Mission des Nations 
Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda’ (MINUAR).105 While the Court did not 
make express reference to the DARIO it did however apply the criterion of 
control exercised by the State over its troops contributed to MUNUAR, 
namely over the decision to de-mobilise the Belgian contingent from the 
Kigali compound. Hence the Belgian judge has implicitly rejected the UN 
position as to the subsidiary-organ status. 
 The issue of the legal status of the forces has been analysed 
extensively also in scholarly writings where the general view recognises that 
national troops contributed to UN-led operations have a double institutional 
status, as both State organ and at the same time as UN organs. Despite this 
common premise, authors may reach very different conclusions in terms of 
attribution of conduct in peace operations.106 Writing in the late 1990’s, 
                                                 
105 Infra, para. 7.5. 
106 Condorelli, “Le statut des forces de l'ONU et le droit international humanitaire”, in Rivista 
di diritto internazionale. vol. 78, 1995, pp. 881-906; later followed by “Le statut des 
forces des Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire”, in Emanuelli (ed.), Les 
casques bleus: policiers ou combattants?, Wilson & Lafleur Itée, 1997, pp. 89-113; 
Dorigo, “Imputazione e responsabilità internazionale per attività delle forze di 
peacekeeping delle Nazioni Unite”, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, vol. 85, 2002, pp. 
903-945; Palchetti, “Azioni di forze istituite o autorizzate delle Nazioni Unite davanti alla 
Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo: i casi Behrami e Seramati”, in Rivista di diritto 
internazionale, vol. 90, 2007, pp. 681-704; Tsagourias, “The Responsibility of 
International Organisations for Military Missions”, in Odello-Piotrowicz (eds), 
International Military Missions and International Law, Brill, 2011, pp. 245-265; Sari, 
“UN Peacekeeping Operations and Article 7 ARIO: The Missing Link”, in International 
Organizations Law Review, vol. 9, 2012, pp. 77-85; Spagnolo, “Imputazione di condotte 
lesive dei diritti umani nell'ambito delle operazioni militari delle Nazioni Unite e rimedi 
per le vittime”, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, vol. 7, 2013, pp. 285-314; 
Condorelli, “De la responsabilité internationale de l'ONU et/ou de l'État denvoi lors 
d'actions de Forces de Maintien de la Paix: l'écheveau de l'attribution (double?) devant le 
juge néerlandais”, in Questions of International Law, 2014, pp. 3-15; D’Argent, “State 
Organs Placed at the Disposal of the UN, Effective Control, Wrongful Abstention and 
Dual Attribution of Conduct”, in Questions of International Law, 2014, pp. 17-31; 
Spagnolo, “The ‘reciprocal’ approach in article 7 DARIO: A reply to Pierre d'Argent”, 
ibidem, pp. 33-41; Palchetti, “The Allocation of Responsibility for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts committed in the Course of Multinational Operations”, in International 
Review of the Red Cross, vol. 95, 2013, pp. 727-742; Palchetti, “Attributing the Conduct 
of Dutchbat in Srebrenica: the 2014 Judgment of the District Court in the Mothers of 
  141 
Condorelli was the first author to tackle the issue of UN peacekeepers’ status, 
describing it as a double organic status (‘double statut organique’), according 
to which nationally contributed personnel are to be considered at once as 
‘experts on mission’, or as ‘fonctionnaires’ of the UN, and simultaneously as 
organs of the sending State.107 The author has further elaborated in a later 
work that the organic link with the State is neither frozen nor broken as result 
of the secondment to the UN, thus peacekeepers become ‘agents double’, i.e. 
of the sending State and of the UN. For Condorelli, peacekeepers of UN-led 
missions are under the authority of the UN nations and under the authority of 
the contributing country; in other words, they are placed under a ‘double 
commandement’.108 As a consequence of this double hat (the legal status) and 
of this double command (chain of command and control), wrongful acts of 
UN peacekeepers should in principle be attributable both to the organisation 
and to the lending State. It should be specified that Condorelli’s first work 
preceded the DARIO by nearly a decade. Necessarily, the author's findings 
are not linked to, nor do they suggest the application of, any specific provision 
set forth in the DARIO. Even in Condorelli's later work, he has not shown 
great interest in possible implications for either art. 6 or of art. 7 DARIO, 
whereas his main focus has remained on double attribution, both to the UN 
and to the TCC as a result of the dual status of contributed troops.109  
 It is noteworthy that while developing his theory, Condorelli identified 
two different approaches to determine the consequences of this double status 
for international responsibility. On the one hand, the ‘minimalist approach’ is 
based on the assessment of the control exercised by the sending State over the 
impugned conduct (e.g. by the authorisation or by the order to act). Here, the 
                                                 
Srebrenica Case”, in Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 62, 2015, pp. 279-294; 
Palchetti, “International Responsibility for Conduct of UN Peacekeeping Forces: The 
question of attribution”, in Sequencia, n. 70, 2015, pp. 19-56. 
107 Condorelli, “Le statut des forces de l'ONU et le droit international humanitaire”, and “Le 
statut des forces des Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire”, supra note 106. 
108 Condorelli, “Le statut des forces des Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire”, 
at p. 95. 
109 Condorelli, “De la responsabilité internationale de l'ONU et/ou de l'État denvoi lors 
d'actions de Forces de Maintien de la Paix: l'écheveau de l'attribution (double?) devant le 
juge néerlandais”, supra note 106. It has to be highlighted that the main aim of this piece 
of literature was to comment and critique the landmark judgements of the Srebrenica case 
before the Dutch Courts, hence its focus stayed on double attribution. 
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sending State would be responsible for the wrongful conduct of its contingent 
when it has exercised a form of control over it.110 On the other hand, the 
‘maximalist approach’ – endorsed by Condorelli – is rooted in the double 
legal status of the members of the force (State agents and agents of the UN). 
Accordingly, a wrongful conduct occurring during a UN-led peace operations 
would be attributed to the UN and to the lending State without the need to 
inquire into the control exercised by the latter.111 To translate these two 
approaches in the parlance of the Draft Articles, one can conclude that the 
minimalist approach seemingly would result in the application of art. 7 
DARIO, interpreted in a fashion that would allow for double attribution to the 
UN and to the sending State. By contrast, the maximalist approach would call 
for the combined application of art. 6 DARIO (peacekeepers are agents of the 
UN) and of art. 4 DARS (peacekeepers remain State organs). 
 Another author has reached a quite different conclusion, even while 
departing from very similar considerations. Sari has in fact affirmed that 
members of UN-led peace operations have a ‘dual institutional status’ and has 
claimed that the applicable provisions on the allocation of international 
responsibility must be based on the legal status of the forces and not on the 
factual criterion of effective control.112 It is affirmed that the transfer of 
authority from the lending State to the UN generates a presumption that 
national contingents act on behalf of the UN while assigned to the mission; 
accordingly, insofar as they are UN subsidiary organs, art. 6 DARIO (not art. 
7) would apply. Thus, the author has clearly valued the legal status rather than 
the analysis of the factual circumstances of the case in order to determine the 
applicable rules on attribution of conduct. 
 This approach has been followed by another author, who has 
welcomed and developed the idea of the presumption but has drawn different 
conclusions from that premise. Palchetti has maintained that members of UN-
                                                 
110 Condorelli, “De la responsabilité internationale de l'ONU et/ou de l'État denvoi lors 
d'actions de Forces de Maintien de la Paix: l'écheveau de l'attribution (double?) devant le 
juge néerlandais”, supra note 106, see in particular pp. 11-15. 
111  Idem. 
112 Sari, “UN Peacekeeping Operations and Article 7 ARIO: The Missing Link”, supra note 
106.  
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led operations have a dual status as organs both of the UN and of the sending 
State.113 Nevertheless, it is further stated that what matters is not the legal 
status of subsidiary organ but rather the internal agreement between the UN 
and the sending State governing the secondment of personnel. In particular, 
the formal transfer of powers to the organisation creates a presumption 
according to which wrongful conducts are in principle attributable to the UN. 
Hence, although the author has recognised that troops contributed to UN-led 
operations are UN subsidiary organs, he has however resorted to some extent 
to art. 7 DARIO, thereby setting forth a presumption of attribution to the 
organisation where the effective control test, in principle, would not be of use. 
It is further clarified that the presumption can be rebutted in cases of wrongful 
acts originated from orders given by the sending State and performed under 
a mere ‘formal authority’ of the UN.114 Thus, despite the dual nature of UN 
peacekeepers (both UN and State organs), the author has given more weight 
to the status of State organs of peacekeepers. Accordingly, he has ruled out 
the applicability of art. 6 DARIO in favour of a peculiar interpretation of art. 
7 that establishes a rebuttable presumption of attribution to the receiving 
international organisation.115  
 
 
5.1 National troops contributed to UN peace operations are UN 
subsidiary organs or State organs placed at the UN disposal?  
 
 It has been shown that major disagreements have emerged in defining 
the legal status of national troops contributed to UN-led missions. On the one 
hand, during the DARIO’s drafting the UN has firmly stated that UN-led 
peace operations are subsidiary organs of the organisations and that national 
                                                 
113 Palchetti, “The Allocation of Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts committed 
in the Course of Multinational Operations”, supra note 106. 
114 Idem, at p. 734. 
115 See also Palchetti, “Attributing the Conduct of Dutchbat in Srebrenica: The 2014 
Judgment of the District Court in the Mothers of Srebrenica Case”; “International 
Responsibility for Conduct of UN Peacekeeping Forces: the question of attribution”, and 
“Azioni di forze istituite o autorizzate delle Nazioni Unite davanti alla Corte europea dei 
diritti dell'uomo”, all supra note 106. 
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contingents contributed thereto are ‘transformed’ in subsidiary organs as 
well. On the other hand, the ILC and the majority of States have regarded 
troops contributed to these missions as State organs placed at the disposal of 
the organisations. Moreover, scholars have often claimed that national 
contingents enjoy a dual status, both as organ of the UN and as State organs 
and, although departing from the same assumption, they have reached 
different conclusions on the applicable attribution rules. Some authors have 
favoured the institutional link with the organisation, highlighting the 
relevance of art. 6 DARIO, others have stressed the importance of control 
mechanisms and have called for the application of art. 7 DARIO accordingly. 
 The present chapter maintains that the issue of the legal status of UN-
led peace operations should be a matter of fact and of law.  It is certainly true 
that UN peace operations present elements of complexity due to the multiple 
connections they have both with the sending States and with the receiving 
organisations and due to the specific powers the Organisation has to establish 
subsidiary organs. It has been highlighted earlier that the issue has arisen 
exclusively in connection with UN-led operations, while neither NATO nor 
the EU have claimed that peace operations established under their aegis 
would be considered as subsidiary organs.116 
 In our opinion the disagreement centres on two issues, namely the UN 
powers to actually establish subsidiary organs and the power to transform a 
State organ into an organ of the organisation. In other words, the UN Charter 
entitles both the General Assembly and the Security Council to establish 
subsidiary organs “as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions”, under arts. 22 and 29 respectively. Furthermore, art. 2 (c) DARIO 
has made clear that an “‘organ of an international organization’ means any 
person or entity which has that status in accordance with the rules of the 
organization”. This leads one to consider that peace operations established by 
the Security Council (or by the General Assembly) cannot be deemed 
anything else but a UN subsidiary organ. 
 It is common knowledge that the UN, as any other international 
                                                 
116  Supra para. 4 
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organisation, would not be able to act without the contribution of its Member 
States. This is particularly evident in peace operations, where States 
contribute civilian and military personnel and assets to the mission. The UN 
has claimed that once military contingents are contributed to the mission they 
are ‘transformed’ in UN subsidiary organs. While we have demonstrated that 
wide powers to establish subsidiary organs are recognised by the Charter to 
the main UN organs, no other ‘power of transformation’ is entrusted to the 
UN in order to turn State organs into organs of the organisation. To be more 
precise, a similar transformation may occur but it would exclusively depend 
of the sending State’s will to ‘fully second’ its organ to the receiving 
organisation.117 A State organ would be fully seconded when it would cease 
to act as organ of its sending State, hence when it would be subjected 
exclusively to the authority of the receiving organisation. The core question 
to determine the legal status of UN peace operations is, thus, whether 
contributed personnel are fully seconded to the organisation. Only if the 
answer is affirmative we could share the UN view that national organs are 
transformed in UN subsidiary organs. 
 
 
 
 5.2. The features of national contributed troops’ secondment 
 
 In order to find an answer to this pivotal question we will explore the 
features of secondment in UN peace operations. As mentioned earlier, ILC 
commentaries provides for some clarification when defining the scope of 
application of art. 7 DARIO that would not include State organs fully 
seconded to an organisation, to which art. 6 is dedicated, but rather State 
organs placed at the disposal of an organisation. Commentaries further 
specify that military contingents contributed to UN peace operations are a 
perfect example of lent – but not fully seconded – State organs whereby “the 
State retains disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction over the members 
                                                 
117 ILC DARIO Commentary to art. 7, para. 1. 
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of the national contingent”.118 Although helpful to place national contingents 
in the DARIO’s pattern, the ILC considerations do not represent the most 
illustrative features of the secondment.  
This study suggests that the attention should rather be focused on the 
authority that States do not hand over to an organisation when lending their 
troops in peace operations, namely ‘full command’. “Full command implies 
the totality of command authority and covers all aspects of organisation and 
directions of forces and is only possessed and exercised at the national 
level”.119 A typical example of full command is the power States have to 
withdraw their troops from the mission, prior notification to the receiving 
organisation.120 Full command can never be transferred nor delegated to an 
international organisation or another State, as widely understood in literature 
and pointed out in several pieces of military doctrine.121 NATO, for example, 
has clearly stated that “[n]o NATO or coalition commander has full command 
over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations 
will delegate only operational command or operational control”.122 The same 
                                                 
118 Idem. 
119 Gill, “Legal Aspects of the Transfer of Authority in UN Peace Operations”, in 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 42, 2011, pp. 37, at. p. 46. Other authors 
generally resort to the definition provided by the NATO standardisation office, according 
to which “full command is the military authority and responsibility of a commander to 
issue orders to its subordinate. It covers every aspect of military operations and 
administration”, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, ‘full command’, AAP-06 
(2014). 
120 See for example the decision of the Belgian government to withdraw its troops from 
MINUAR, reported in the Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira case, infra para. 7.5. 
121 Cathcart, “Command and Control in Military Operations” in Gill-Fleck (eds), Handbook 
of international military operations, pp. 235-245; Gill, “Legal aspects of the transfer of 
authority”, supra note 119; Murphy, “Legal framework of UN forces and issues of 
command and control of Canadian and Irish forces” in Journal of Armed Conflict Law, 
vol. 4, pp. 41-73, in particular at. p. 50. Comprehensive review of the whole question of 
peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, command and control of United Nations 
peace-keeping operations Report of the Secretary General, A/49/681 (1994), para. 6; 
Sanfelice di Monteforte, “Operational Command versus Organic Command: who is in 
charge?”, in Beruto (ed.) International Humanitarian Law Human Rights And Peace 
Operations, Proceedings of the 31st Round Table on Current Problems of International 
Humanitarian Law Sanremo, 4-6 September 2008, pp. 280-283; D'Argent, “State organs 
placed at the disposal of the UN, effective control, wrongful abstention and dual 
attribution of conduct”, in Questions of International Law, vol. 1, 2014, pp. 17-31; 
Tsagourias, “The responsibility of International Organisation for Military Missions”, in 
Odello-Piotrowicz (eds), International Military Missions and International Law, Brill, 
2011, pp. 245-265. 
122 AAP-06 (2014), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, ‘full command’. 
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holds true in UN operations’ practice where “United Nations command is not 
full command and is closer in meaning to the generally recognised military 
concept of ‘operational command’”.123 
 Moreover, States may impose further limitations to the secondment of 
their contingents, the so-called national caveats, which include any restriction 
imposed by the sending State over several aspects of the deployment and 
employment of troops. The general definition of caveat elaborated by the 
NATO Standardisation Office reads as follows 
 
  any limitation, restriction or constraint by a nation on its military 
forces or civilian elements under NATO command and control or 
otherwise available to NATO, that does not permit NATO 
commanders to deploy and employ these assets fully in line with 
the approved operation plan.  
  Note: A caveat may apply inter alia to freedom of movement 
within the joint operations area and/or to compliance with the 
approved rules of engagement.124 
 
They generally concern – but are not limited to – the area where troops can 
be deployed, the prohibition to employ troops outside the agreed area of 
operation, the use of force as authorised in the rules of engagement (ROE).125 
                                                 
123 A/49/681 (1994), para. 6 
124 AAP-06 (2014), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, ‘caveat’. See also Gill, “Legal 
aspects of the transfer of Authority”, supra note 119. Art. 8 of the UN Model 
Memorandum of Understanding, provides for specific conditions, exemplified by: 
environmental condition factor, intensity of operations factor and hostile action/forced 
abandonment factor and that can be agreed between TCCs and the UN for every mission, 
see A/C.5/66/8, chapter 9. 
125 The rules of engagement “are issued by competent authorities and assist in the delineation 
of the circumstances and limitations within which military forces may be employed to 
achieve their objectives. ROE appear in a variety of forms in national military doctrines, 
including execute orders, deployment orders, operational plans, or standing directives. 
Whatever their form, they provide authorisation for and/or limits on, among other things, 
the use of force, the positioning and posturing of forces, and the employment of certain 
specific capabilities”, Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, Institute of 
International Humanitarian Law, 2009, p. 1.  ROE are one of the most strategic document 
in combatant activities and are by definition classified materials. They are issued by 
national military authorities and may vary significantly amongst different national 
contingents and these difference may cause problems in multi-national operations. “In 
multi-national operations participating nations should operate under coherent ROE 
arrangements. Policy and legal differences can lead to different ROE among the members 
of a multi-national force. Different ROE can be a source of friction in conducting 
operations. Problems of this sort are best resolved through negotiations rather than 
through a process that leads to an ROE that reflects the lowest common denominator”, 
ibidem, p. 2. 
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In some cases, caveats may extent instead of restricting national powers and 
responsibilities, as exemplified by the UK caveat applied to ISAF detention 
policy in Afghanistan in 2009 according to which English troops contributed 
to ISAF would be entitled to detain individuals for longer than the 96 hours 
allowed under NATO detention standards.126  
 These limitations may stem from political and strategical 
disagreements among contributing States on the way to achieve a given 
mandate and their rationale lies with the need to take part to the peace 
operation without derogating from national laws and regulations.127 In this 
regard, some commentators have described caveats as ‘self-protection 
mechanisms’ States may employ in multi-national operations to avoid 
potential violations of their domestic legal framework.128 These constrains 
can be officially formulated by contributing States, for example while 
transferring the authority over their contingent to the Force Commander or 
while reaching a shared definition of common ROE, or can be opposed at a 
later stage in course of operation.129 Besides this official pattern, the practice 
of ‘hidden caveats’ may also be common in multi-national operations, 
whereby sending States do not formalise their limitations, but contributed 
troops may refuse to take part in actions that would require crossing a ‘red 
line’, or demarcation between competing standards of engagement.130 From 
                                                 
126 The issue has been dealt with by extensively in Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence et al., 
supra note 96, in particular at paras 46-53. For more details on the case and its 
implications in the present analysis see infra section 7.3. 
127 Marucci, “Il caveat, strumento di garanzia o di gestione delle Operazioni Fuori Area?”, 
in Informazioni della Difesa, vol. 2, 2009, pp. 35-40. 
128 Telalian, “Responsibility and Compensation for Damages Caused During Peace 
Operations”, in Beruto (ed.) International Humanitarian Law Human Rights and Peace 
Operations, supra note 121, pp. 319-323. 
129 Marucci, supra note 117; Institute of International Humanitarian Law, Sanremo 
Handbook on the rules of engagement, 2009, in particular at p. 70; the present 
considerations are also based on the information and the teaching materials provided 
during the ROE workshop that the writer has attended at the Sanremo Institute in 
September 2015. 
130 UN press release, “Civilian Protection, Restrictions by Troop Contributors, Asymmetrical 
Attacks Top Operational Hurdles to Implementing Peacekeeping Mandates, Security 
Council Told”, 17 June 2015, SC/11930, available at: 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11930.doc.htm. ‘Hidden caveats’ are also referred to 
as ‘informal’ or ‘unknown’, see Auerswald-Saideman, “NATO at War: Understanding the 
Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan”, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association in Toronto, 2-5 September 2009, available at: 
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/nato%20at%20war.pdf.   
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this we infer that national caveats may have a great impact on a peace 
operation and on the mandate’s achievement, especially when they are 
excessive in number and in complexity. By way of example, it has been 
reported that during the deployment of ISAF, between fifty and eighty 
national caveats existed, while the number of the ‘hidden’ ones was – by 
definition – unknown.131 Lately, caveats have been identified by the UN as 
one of the ‘top operational hurdles’ in implementing peace operations 
mandates.132 International organisations, in particular NATO and the UN, 
disapprove of this practice and have encouraged member States over the years 
to avoid or at least to significantly reduce national caveats in multi-national 
operations.133 It is noteworthy that the June 2015 Report of the High-level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations has suggested that the UN should 
embrace a very strict attitude for the future on national caveats. So strict that 
the Panel has advised the UN Secretariat to “weight the specific caveats when 
a contingent is offered against the value of its deployment, and it must be 
willing to decline an offer if the caveats will impede performance”134 and 
even more importantly it has been suggested that hidden limitations should 
be treated as “disobedience of lawful command”.135  Despite the growing 
awareness that national caveats should be limited in multi-national 
operations, it is unlikely that contributing States would renounce this practice, 
which, in essence, represents a corollary of full command retained and 
exercised by every State over its national contingents. 
 In conclusion, it has been shown that national troops contributed by 
sending States to UN peace operations cannot be fully seconded to the 
organisation due to the wide powers and authority that States keep in their 
hand, exemplified in primis by ‘full command’ that can only be exercised at 
the national level and never be handed over to any other entity and in secundis 
                                                 
131 Auerswald -Saideman, supra note 130. 
132 UN press release, supra note 130. 
133 Supra note 130. 
134 Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our 
Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People, A/70/95 - S/2015/446, 17 June 
2015, para. 220. 
135 Ibidem, at para. 105 (c). 
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by the set of limitations (caveats) that a State, in its exercise of full command, 
may impose over various aspects of its troops’ deployment and employment. 
In the absence of a full secondment the alleged ‘transformation’ of national 
organs in UN subsidiary organs cannot take place. The inference is therefore 
that the UN has the power to establish subsidiary organs and UN peace 
operations would be correctly deemed as one, and that contributed national 
troops, lacking the full secondment to the organisation, would not be 
considered as UN subsidiary organs. 
 
 
 5.3. UN peace operations as ‘composed subsidiary organs’ 
 
 The present work suggests that the contrast between the two opposed 
views that see UN-led peace operations, on the one hand, as UN subsidiary 
organs and, on the other hand, as national seconded organs can be reconciled 
by looking at UN missions as ‘composed subsidiary organs’. That is to say, 
UN-led operations should be considered UN subsidiary organs composed of 
State organs (i.e. national troops) placed at the disposal of the mission. 
Accordingly, wrongful conducts should be attributed on the basis of the rule 
concerning the conduct of organs placed at the disposal of an international 
organisation, art. 7 DARIO. This interpretation would reconcile the powers 
of the UN to establish subsidiary organs with the need to assess international 
responsibility of the entities involved in UN missions in a better suited 
fashion in order to encompass the complexity of peace operations.  
 In the first place, it should be highlighted that maintaining that a UN-
led mission is a subsidiary organ of the organization does not equate to saying 
that national contingents contributed to the mission are themselves subsidiary 
organs of the UN. To put it differently, the subsidiary organ of the 
organization is the UN mission, not national contingents contributed to the 
mission. By contrast, national troops are State organs placed at the disposal 
of the UN mission. Hence, the UN mission should be regarded as an abstract 
entity, established according to the powers entrusted by the UN Charter to the 
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Security Council (or the General Assembly) and composed of State organs 
placed at the disposal of the mission.  
 It has been shown that the UN does not have the power to directly 
create a subsidiary organ made of State organs. The only possibility is that 
States place their national organs at the disposal of the organization. As 
demonstrated earlier, a State organ can be ‘transformed’ in a subsidiary organ 
of an international organisation only upon the will of the sending State to 
fully-second its organ to the organisation. In the previous section it has been 
highlighted how the set of features characterising the secondment of national 
troops to UN peace operation preclude that they are fully seconded to the 
organisation, due to the powers retained by lending States (in particular full 
command and the application of national caveats). Thus, it cannot be said that 
UN peacekeepers enjoy a double status of State organs and of organs or agents 
of the organisation, but they are and remain State organs. The fact that 
national contingents are placed at the disposal of an IO does not interfere with 
their original status; i.e., they do not cease to be State organs to become organs 
of the organisation. By contrast, the core feature of a peace operations has to 
be identified in the ‘placement at the disposal of the organisation’, i.e. the 
(non-full) secondment. As a consequence of the secondment of national 
forces to the UN – and not because of an alleged transformation of their legal 
status into UN subsidiary organs – special rules on attribution of conduct 
come into play. More precisely, in peace operations States contribute troops 
to the UN mission, thus to the subsidiary organ, not directly to the UN. The 
act of contributing national contingents (and assets) is an ad hoc activity that 
regulates the specific participation of a country to a given mission. The details 
of the agreement are contained in several documents including, for example, 
the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the TCC and the UN, and 
the transfer of authority (TOA).136 Notwithstanding the existence of a UN 
MoU Model, such agreements are concluded each time for every single 
mission. Moreover, the text of the UN Model itself makes clear that States 
                                                 
136 Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, A/C.5/66/8, chapter 9. 
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contribute troops (and assets) to the UN mission and not generically to the 
UN.137 
 In terms of attribution, peacekeeping troops form part of the 
subsidiary organ of the UN that is the UN-led mission, but are not to be 
considered themselves organs of the organisation. On the contrary, national 
contingents should be regarded as State organs placed at the disposal of the 
UN mission. Peace operations are a peculiar example of subsidiary organs as 
the mission in practice can act only through the deployment of the troops that 
are placed at its disposal by TCCs. Therefore, it can be understood that since 
peacekeepers are not UN organs, it follows that the relevant link between 
conduct and the responsible entity is the factual link between the conduct and 
the mission or/and the sending State, not the institutional link between the 
organization and its organ. Hence, wrongful conduct that may arise during 
UN missions should be attributed in light of art. 7 DARIO, according to the 
rule of attribution of conduct of State organs placed at the disposal of an 
international organization. This framework appears particularly respondent to 
reality as, on the one hand, it is able to endorse the UN official position and, 
on the other hand, it takes into due considerations the implications of placing 
State troops at the disposal of the UN. In sum, it seems that it would be 
possible to reconcile the existing opposed positions as to the legal status of 
contributed troops to UN-led operations by regarding UN peace operations as 
‘composed subsidiary organs of the UN’.  
 
 
6. The relevance of art. 7 DARIO and the effective control test 
 
 Once demonstrated that attribution of conduct should be determined 
on the basis of art. 7 DARIO in all types of peace operations (UN-led, UN-
authorised and joint), it is then crucial to interpret the key provision contained 
therein: the effective control test. If the whole process of attribution of 
                                                 
137 Ibidem, “Contribution of the Government: Art. 5.1 The Government shall contribute to 
[United Nations peacekeeping mission] the personnel listed in annex A. 
  153 
wrongful conduct of seconded organs is based on the assessment of whether 
the receiving organisation was exercising effective control over the impugned 
conduct, it follows that the meaning of effective control is crucial to the 
determination of international responsibility. It has been shown above that the 
criterion of effective control had been largely welcomed by States and 
international organisations during the DARIO drafting process. Despite 
widespread acceptance of the effective control test, its precise meaning and 
content has been and still is at the heart of an intense debate that involves 
scholars as well as domestic and international judges.  
 The following analysis will highlight the different interpretations 
offered in legal literature and in the relevant case law. We will then seek to 
answer questions left open in the current debate, namely whether: (i) effective 
control in peace operations would translate into operational control; (ii) it 
would allow for dual or multiple attribution to the receiving organisation and 
to the contributing State, and (iii) effective control has emerged as a general 
attribution criterion that applies to sending States in the default of effective 
control exercised by the receiving organisation. 
 
 
 
6.1. Effective control as operational control? A look into peace 
operations’ chain of command and control 
 
 As shown by the drafting history of art. 7 DARIO, a widespread 
agreement existed among States as to the attribution criterion based on 
‘effective control’.  Even though the very meaning of the notion remains 
elusive, some guidance in its interpretation can be found in the ILC's work 
and the related commentaries. First, we should bear in mind that the criterion 
of effective control has been elaborated in response to the Special 
Rapporteur's question of whether wrongful acts occurred in UN peacekeeping 
operations should be attributed to sending States, the UN or both. Second, the 
commentary to art. 7 DARIO  specifies that effective control should be 
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understood as a factual criterion and take into due account “all the factual 
circumstances”.138 Third, the same commentary has suggested that ‘effective 
control’ in peace operations should translate into ‘operational control’.139 
Evidently, as already noted by some authors, the notion clearly has ‘a military 
genesis’.140 It is hence appropriate to explore the meaning of operational 
control in military parlance and in light of related concepts used to describe 
the chain of command and control, namely full command, operational 
command, operational control, tactical command, and tactical control. Wide 
reference will be made to UN and NATO doctrines, considered the most 
influential in shaping national approaches and standards to be followed 
during peace operations.  
 Full command, as described earlier, “implies the totality of command 
authority and covers all aspects of organisation and direction of forces and is 
only possessed and exercised at the national level”.141 In the exercise of its 
full command a troop-contributing State may decide to impose national 
limitations on the deployment of its force (so called caveats), and at the same 
time retain administrative and disciplinary powers over its troops as well as 
exclusive jurisdiction.142 More importantly for the purpose of the present 
analysis, in the exercise of its full command a sending State may decide the 
level of authority that would be transferred to a multi-national military 
commander when seconding its troops to a peace operation. In other words, 
a TCC can determine whether its contingents would be under operational 
command, operational control, tactical command, or tactical control of the 
receiving organisation. More precisely, States may transfer the 
aforementioned levels of authority in the Memorandum of Understanding 
                                                 
138 ILC DARIO Commentary to art. 7, para. 10 
139 Idem, the ILC has stressed its favour for ‘operational control’ as opposed to the ‘ultimate 
control’ elaborated by the ECtHR in the Behrami and Saramati case, the utimate authority 
and control approach followed by the Court, which resulted in the exclusive attribution 
of the impugned acts to the UN, has been criticised also by the UN itself, see S/2008/354, 
para. 16. See also more extensively infra para. 7.1 
140 Montejo, “The Notion of ‘Effective Control’ under the Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations”, in Ragazzi (ed.) Responsibility of International 
Organizations: Essays in Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013, pp. 389-
404. 
141 Supra para. 5.1. 
142 Idem. 
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agreed upon with a receiving organisation or in a Transfer of Authority (ToA) 
agreement, which is the formal act through which national contingents are 
placed under an agreed level of authority of a designated commander for a 
determined period of time.143 According to UN doctrine, ToA takes place 
when units arrive in a mission area and is reverted back to the sending State 
on completion of assignment or when repatriated.144 The actual transfer of the 
level of command may also occur in the absence of a ToA, as was the case of 
the Dutchbat contributed to UNPROFOR, for example, as noted by Dutch 
judges in some judgements concerning the events of Srebrenica.145 When 
transferring authority in peace operations a State can hand over operational 
command or, at a lower level, operational control. This is confirmed, for 
example, by the definition of the NATO Glossary elaborated by the 
Standardisation Office, which describes the ToA as “an action by which a 
member nation [...] gives operational command or control of designated 
forces to a NATO Command”.146 
 Generally, States prefer to delegate operational control rather than 
operational command as exemplified by the Guidelines for troop contributing 
countries to UNMIS, where it is clearly stated that the Force Commander “is 
assigned operational control of the military component including all military 
personnel and formed military units” which “come under the operational 
control of the Force Commander upon arrival”.147 This is further confirmed 
                                                 
143 Gill, “Legal Aspects of the Transfer of Authority in UN Peace Operations”, supra note 
119 and Leck, “International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: 
Command and Control Arrangements and the Attribution of Conduct”, in Melbourne 
Journal of International Law, vol. 10, 2009, pp. 316-364; Fleck, “Multinational Units” in 
Gill-Fleck (eds), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces, supra note 71, in particular 
at pp. 39-43; Houck, “The Command and Control of United Nations Forces in the Era of 
‘Peace Enforcement’“, in Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 4, 
1993, pp. 1-69. 
144 Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN 
DPKO, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2008.4, 2009, in particular at para. 15.  
145 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Nuhanovic v the Netherlands, para. 5.7 and District Court 
of The Hague, Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands, para. 4.37. 
146 AAP-06 (2014), ‘transfer of authority’, see also COPD-V 1.0 (2010), lett. (e) and AJP-3-
4-1 (2014), section VIII. 
147 Guidelines for Troop Contributing Countries Deploying Military Units to the United 
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), in Oswald-Durham-Bates (eds), Documents of the 
Law of UN Peace Operations, Oxford University Press, 2010, at 531-555, quotations at 
paras. 74 and 79 respectively. 
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in the MoU concerning the contribution of troops to the Stabilisation Force 
in Iraq under which “[O]perational Control of all National Contingents 
contributed to MND(CS) [Multi National Division – Central South] will be 
assigned to a superior Commander”.148 The main difference between the two 
levels of command may be deduced by comparing the following definitions. 
Operational command (OPCOM) is defined by the UN as the  
 
 authority granted to a commander to assign missions or task to 
subordinate commanders to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to 
retain or delegate operational and tactical control; it is the highest 
level of operational authority which can be given to an appointed 
commander who is acting outside of his own national chain of 
command and is seldom authorised by Member States.149 
 
It is worth highlighting that while some authors have maintained that general 
and universally accepted definitions are lacking,150 it appears to the contrary 
that the concepts under analysis enjoy quite a shared understanding; by way 
of example, the NATO definitions of OPCOM sounds quite identical to the 
UN one.151 
Operational control (OPCON), on the other hand, can be described as  
 
 the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that 
the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are 
usually limited by function, time or location by troop-contributing 
countries in the Security Council Resolution/mandate, to deploy 
units and retain or assign tactical control of those units.152  
 
                                                 
148 Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Latvia et al. concerning 
Command Arrangements and Related Matters for The Multinational Division Central 
South (MND-CS) within the Stabilisation Force in Iraq, 2003, available on the Offical 
Gazette of Latvia at https://www.vestnesis.lv/body_print.php?id=99221. 
149 Glossary Prepared by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Unit, 1998, 
available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/glossary, lemma ‘operational 
command’. 
150 Cathcart, supra note 111. MacDougall, “United Nations Operations: Who Should Be in 
Charge?”, in Revue de droit militaire et de droit de la guerre, vol. 33, 1994, pp. 21-92.  
151 AAP-06 (2014), ‘operational command’ reads as follows: “[t]he authority granted to a 
commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to 
reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the 
commander deems necessary. Note: It does not include responsibility for administration”. 
152 Glossary Prepared by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations: lemma ‘operational 
control’. 
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The UN Glossary goes on to specify that authority vested in a commander in 
the case of OPCON is more restrictive than in the case of OPCOM, which 
implies that under OPCON “a commander cannot change the mission of those 
forces or deploy them outside the area of responsibility previously agreed to” 
nor he or she can “separate contingents by assigning tasks to components of 
the units concerned”.153  
 While this UN peacekeeping glossary offers clear and discrete notions 
of OPCOM and OPCON, UN Peacekeeping Operations Policy Guidance, on 
the contrary, adds some elements of confusion.154 While OPCON is described 
in line with the above-mentioned definition, OPCOM is absent and seems to 
be replaced by another term, ‘United Nations Operational Authority’ that is 
vested with the Secretary General and implies  
 
 the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of 
(1) a specific mandate of the Security Council; (2) an agreed period 
of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a 
contingent would require the contributing country to provide 
adequate prior notification; (3) a specific mission geographic area 
(the mission area as a whole).155 
 
This operational authority is also referred to as ‘overall authority’ and, 
while being vested in the Secretary General, it is exercised in the field by 
the Head of Mission (HOM), also called the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG), who is generally a diplomat appointed by the 
Secretary General. At the same time, the Head of the Military Component 
(HOMC), also referred to as the Force Commander (FORCOM), who is 
generally a senior military commander of one of the contributing nations 
appointed by the Secretary General, exercises OPCON over national 
military contingents seconded to the mission.156 According to these 
definitions, the United Nations seems to merge military notions describing 
the chain of command and control with terms concerning political 
                                                 
153 Idem. 
154 Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, supra 
note 144. 
155 Ibidem, para. D.7. 
156 Ibidem, in particular at paras 15-21-25-29-45. 
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authority exercised over a mission. 
In our opinion, the main source of the uncertainties in the 
interpretation of ‘effective control’ lies precisely with the overlapping use 
of the notions of political authority and military authority. A clear example 
of this confusion can be found in the Behrami case, where the ECtHR 
interpreted effective control as ‘ultimate authority and control’ and 
accordingly attributed, not only the conduct of UNIMIK, but also the acts 
occurred in the framework of KFOR, to the UN.157 If the Court had 
endorsed the interpretation proposed by the ILC – according to which 
effective control means operational control – it would not have focused on 
who had the political authority over the mission, but rather on where 
operational control was vested, looking at the military chain of command 
and control.158  
 To summarise the above considerations, the chain of command and 
control in peace operations can be described as follows: the multinational 
Force Commander (FORCOM), appointed by the international organisation 
leading the operation, exercises operational control over national contingents 
contributed to the mission. A part of this authority may be delegated to 
subordinate commanders in the form of tactical command (TACOM) or 
tactical control (TACON) in order to fulfill specific missions or tasks within 
a specific area and time frame. At the same time, troop-contributing States 
                                                 
157 Infra para. 7.1. 
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retain full command over their troops, which is exercised on a daily basis 
throughout the national contingent commander. This national senior 
commander has the direct responsibility to liaise with FORCOM and with his 
own sending State, assuring that troops are employed within the limits 
imposed by their transfer of authority as well as by potential national 
caveats.159 Political authority may lie with: (i) the Secretary General via its 
Special Representative in UN peace operations; (ii) the North Atlantic 
Council via SHAPE in NATO-led operations; (iii) both the Secretary General 
and a single nation (or regional organisation), in joint operations. It is 
important to underscore that to inquire where the political authority lies 
should fall outside the scope of analysis of attribution of international 
responsibility, considering that effective control should be understood as a 
factual criterion. In conclusion, when operational control over a wrongful 
conduct is exercised by FORCOM, conduct should be attributed to the 
international organisation who is leading the operation.  
 
 
6.2. Effective control and dual or multiple attribution 
 
 Despite the apparent clarity of the proposed structure, some core 
issues remain unanswered. On the one hand, it is not evident whether 
operational control can be exercised jointly by FORCOM and a sending State 
and consequently if more than one entity can exercise effective control over 
a wrongful conduct. In other words, could art. 7 DARIO be interpreted to 
allow dual attribution? On the other hand, it is not clear what would be the 
proper attribution criterion when the organisation is not in effective control. 
Would that imply a fall-back on State responsibility rules under the DARS, 
namely, the general rule of attribution of conduct of State organs, or would 
the effective control test be applied as a general criterion? 
In order to address these issues, the study will first focus on the doctrinal 
                                                 
159 Leck, “International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: 
Command and Control Arrangements and the Attribution of Conduct”, in Melbourne 
Journal of International Law, vol. 10, 2009, pp. 316-364 
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debate concerning dual attribution, including a reference to the pertinent 
drafting history of the DARIO; second, it will turn to analyse the answers 
provided by relevant domestic and international case law.  
Multiple attribution has recently been at the heart of a lively scholarly 
debate, due to the unprecedented judgements of the Dutch Courts in the 
Nuhanovic case that have ruled in favour of double attribution both to the UN 
and to the Netherlands of wrongful conducts committed by the UNPROFOR 
Dutch Battalion (Dutchbat), after the fall of Srebrenica.160 Moreover, dual or 
multiple attribution has gathered great momento in relation to the broader 
discourse on shared responsibility in international law.161 
  Nevertheless, in light of art. 7 DARIO the problem of multiple 
attribution is not new, rather it has been dealt with by States and the ILC 
during the DARIO drafting process, with particular regard to wrongful 
conducts occurred in peace operations. Hence, a brief look at the DARIO 
drafting history in this perspective will help to shed light on the current 
debate.  
 When States submitted their first comments at the request of the ILC 
in 2003, several delegations considered dual attribution as an available 
option, however the topic was not addressed thoroughly. Some States put 
forward the hypothesis of ‘concurrent responsibility’ between the UN and 
TCCs in cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct of sending States.162 
It was not clear, though, what form of responsibility was envisaged in this 
case. In fact, this proposal echoes the pattern described in authoritative 
statements of the UN, whereby the Organisation, once it has assumed the 
responsibility vis-à-vis third parties, has a right to seek recovery from sending 
State to which wrongful conduct was attributable in cases of gross negligence 
and willful misconduct.163 In other words, the term ‘concurrent responsibility’ 
in this context pertains more to a right of redress than to a form of 
responsibility as such. Other delegations mentioned, more specifically, the 
                                                 
160 For more details, see infra para. 7.4. 
161 Nollkaemper-Jacobs, “Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual 
Framework”, in Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 34, 2013, pp. 359-438.  
162 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (A/C.6/58/SR.14, para. 21). 
163 Inter alia A/51/389 (1996). 
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possibility of attributing wrongful conduct concurrently to the UN and to the 
TCCs.164 The notion ‘concurrent or subsidiary liability’ was also used to refer 
to the matter of dual attribution.165 
In sum, at the early stage of the ILC work the possibility of attributing 
wrongful conduct both to the UN and to TCCs as a result of the effective 
control test was not excluded but was addressed only in quite generic terms. 
The sound legal reasoning of the Special Rapporteur Gaja was essential in 
clarifying the contours of the issue. Professor Gaja, in his second report, noted 
that dual attribution cannot be excluded and that international responsibility 
can be incurred simultaneously by an international organisation and member 
States as the result, for example, of the planning and of performance of a 
military action.166 Similarly, there can be a case of dual attribution between 
two States as, for example, resulting from the establishment of a joint 
organ.167 The inference therefore, is that the wording of article 7 DARIO 
would allow for dual attribution both to the UN and a sending State. This has 
been confirmed at a later stage in the 7th Report of the Special Rapporteur of 
2009, where it was articulated that the criterion envisaged in art. 7 [former 
art. 5 DARIO] can lead in many cases “to the conclusion that conduct has to 
be attributed both to the lending State and to the receiving international 
organisation”.168 However, it cannot be ignored that this openness towards 
dual attribution later faded and in the last report of the Special Rapporteur we 
cannot find any reference to the point.169 At the same time, very few 
delegations kept expressing their favour for the interpretation of that draft 
article in the sense of dual attribution.170 Eventually, even the DARIO 
commentary remains vague on whether art. 7 should lead to dual or exclusive 
                                                 
164 Italy (A/C.6/58/SR.14, para. 45). 
165 Greece (A/C.6/58/SR.15, para. 13).  
166 A/CN.4/541, para. 7, with particular reference to the possible dual attribution to NATO 
and to lending States. 
167 Ibidem, para. 6. No reference is made here to a concrete example, but one can note that, 
just few months before the issue of the Report, the USA and the UK had established the 
Coalition Provisional Authority to administer Iraq during the occupation phase, prior to 
the formation of the new interim government. The CPA represents a typical example of 
joint organ. 
168 A/CN.4/610, para. 25. 
169 A/CN.4/640. 
170 Mexico (A/CN.4/636/Add.1, p. 10). 
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attribution to the entities that have exercised effective control over the 
conduct. On the one hand, the commentaries specified that the criterion of 
control serves to assess “to which entity – the contributing State or 
organisation or the receiving organisation – conduct has to be attributed”.171 
In the opinion of some authors, this wording would only accommodate an 
interpretation in support of exclusive attribution.172 On the other hand, the 
DARIO commentary extensively quoted the decision of the Court of Appeal 
of the Hague, mentioned above, that allowed for dual attribution of the 
Dutchbat's conduct in Srebrenica simultaneously to the UN and the 
Netherlands, together with the rich literature accompanying and supporting 
this approach.173 
 Eventually, one has to take into account another provision of the 
DARIO, which seems to imply that dual attribution is an available option, art. 
48 DARIO indeed stipulates that  
 
 where an international organization and one or more States or other 
international organizations are responsible for the same 
internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of each State or 
organization may be invoked in relation to that act. 
 
Although it has been highlighted that this provision does not concern 
attribution of responsibility but rather its invocation,174 it seems however 
reasonable to infer that – at the least – that the DARIO do not preclude dual 
responsibility. Nonetheless, it is not self-evident whether this joint 
responsibility would result from dual attribution under art. 7 DARIO.175 
                                                 
171 Art. 7 DARIO, para 5. 
172 Messineo, “Attribution of Conduct”, in Nollkaemper-Plakokefalos, Principles of Shared 
Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art, Cambridge 
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174 Direk, “Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: Revisiting the Proper Test for 
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Hence, the issue of art. 7 DARIO interpretation in light of exclusive or dual 
attribution does not find a definite answer in the work of the ILC.  
 In the absence of clear rules on the matter, it is noteworthy that 
dual/multiple attribution is generally seen favourably by scholars, although 
on the basis of slightly different arguments. For example, Condorelli, as 
already mentioned, has linked dual attribution to the dual status of 
peacekeepers: State organs and agents of the organisation.176 Leck has 
suggested that the nature of multinational operations imply the necessity that 
every decision is jointly agreed upon by the leading organisation and the 
sending State, namely between FORCOM and the National Contingent 
Commander (NCC). In his opinion, no action could be taken without the 
contribution of the NCC that would take part in the decision-making process 
and would perform an essential function in transmitting orders to his or her 
national contingents. Accordingly, acts would always be joint and the 
attribution criterion should be identified in ‘the extent of effective control’ 
exercised over the wrongful conduct, as originally suggested by the Special 
Rapporteur Gaja.177 Also Spagnolo has endorsed this interpretation,178 while 
Palchetti has described dual attribution as a residual criterion to apply 
whenever it would not be possible to assess whether the national contingent 
was acting under the authority of the sending State or the receiving 
organisation.179 Tsagurias, instead, has identified in dual attribution the 
                                                 
wrongful conduct. On the contrary international responsibility results from other 
behaviours carried out in connection with the wrongful act or resulting from the 
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178 Spagnolo, “The ‘reciprocal’ approach in article 7 ARIO”, supra note 106. 
179 Palchetti, “The allocation of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts committed in 
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applicable criterion in joint operations, while Ryngaert has expressed a 
general favour for ‘shared responsibility’ in peace operations on the basis of 
accountability considerations, as it would limit the separate responsibility of 
the actors involved and rather “locates responsibility where it lies”.180 
Once shown the general view expressed in the scholarly debate on effective 
control, the inquiry shall now be completed with the study of the relevant case 
law. 
 
 
 
7. La bouche de la loi: the judges’ interpretation of effective 
control 
 
 7.1. Effective control before the ECtHR: Behrami and Saramati, Al 
Jedda and related case law… 
  
With the Behrami and Saramati cases, in 2001, the ECtHR was asked 
for the first time to adjudicate the responsibility of member States 
participating in a peace operation. More precisely, the case concerned the 
alleged responsibility of France, Germany and Norway for wrongful conduct 
committed during their participation to UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo.181 The 
joint cases present a high level of complexity as they concern the alleged 
international responsibility of TCCs both in a UN-led mission (UNMIK) and 
in a UN-authorised mission conducted under the aegis of NATO (KFOR). The 
claimant in the Behrami and Behrami case asserted that France was 
responsible for the death of his son caused by the explosion of a bomb while 
playing in an area that should have been cleared in the course of de-mining 
                                                 
the course of multinational operations”, and “International Responsibility for Conduct of 
UN Peacekeeping Forces: The question of attribution”, supra note 106. 
180 Ryngaert, “Apportioning Responsibility”, in particular at p.167. For a different approach 
on the opportunity to share the accountability burden see Ahlborn, “To Share or Not to 
Share? The Allocation of Responsibility between International Organizations and their 
Member States”, in Die Friedens-Warte, vol. 88, 2013, pp. 45-75. 
181  ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, 
Germany and Norway, nos 71412/01 and 78166/01, Admissibility Decision, 2 May 2007. 
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under the responsibility of UNMIK, and precisely of the French contingent; 
while the claimant in the Saramati case claimed the responsibility of France, 
Germany and Norway for his unlawful detention carried out by KFOR forces. 
The Court was asked to adjudicate the international responsibility of TCCs 
and it decided to address the issue under the viewpoint of attribution of 
conduct. In other words, in order to determine the Court’s competence the 
judges investigated whether the impugned acts were attributable to the 
respondent States or rather to the UN or to NATO. The judges found that the 
de-mining fell within the responsibility of UNMIK, which was considered a 
UN subsidiary organ, accordingly the conduct (the alleged failure to de-mine 
the area) was attributed to the UN.182 As to the detention of Mr Saramati, the 
Court deemed that the detention mandate fell within the responsibility of 
KFOR and it further inquired whether the conduct of KFOR (alleged illegal 
detention) was attributable to the UN or to KFOR. In a notorious passage of 
the sentence it was affirmed that “the Court finds that the UNSC retained 
ultimate authority and control and that effective command of the relevant 
operational matters was retained by NATO”,183 hence the conduct in point 
was attributed to the UN.184 As a consequence, the case was declared 
inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction.  
 Although the Court made express reference to the ILC's work and 
specified that it “used the term ‘attribution’ in the same way as the ILC in 
Article 3 of its draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organisations”185, the judges resorted to unprecedented concepts such as 
‘ultimate authority and control’ and ‘effective command’. The Court’s 
findings have been harshly criticised not only in scholarly writings, but also 
by the UN itself.186 
 Notwithstanding the widespread criticism against the ‘Behrami 
                                                 
182 Ibidem, paras 127 and 142-3. 
183  Ibidem, para. 140. 
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approach’, the Court has followed the same reasoning in several other 
judgements such as in Kasumaj v. Greece187 and in Gajic v. Germany,188 
which concerned, respectively, the alleged violation of property rights by 
Greece and Germany during their participation in KFOR. Both cases have 
been declared inadmissible due to the Court's lack of competence ratione 
personae, as the impugned conducts of KFOR forces were attributed to the 
UN. It is worth mentioning the Beric case as well, that represents a further 
confirmation of the ‘ultimate authority and control test’189, with a minor 
innovation according to which the Court has partially rephrased the concept 
by referring to ‘effective overall control’.190 Wording notwithstanding, also 
this case was dismissed, as the impugned acts of the High Representative for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina were attributed to the UN, hence the Court has 
declared its lack of jurisdiction. 
 The ‘Behrami approach’ has been criticised for a number of reasons. 
First, it has been pointed out that the Court should have addressed the 
preliminary issue of jurisdiction within the meaning of  art. 1 of the ECHR 
rather than resolving the case on the basis of attribution of conduct.191 Other 
authors have also noted that the case should not have been decided by 
applying rules of international responsibility.192 On a different line, some 
scholars have maintained that the interpretation of rules of international 
responsibility, applied in this stream of cases, was indeed not in line with the 
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understanding put forward by the work in progress of the ILC. According to 
this critique, the Court has not relied on the effective control criterion but, to 
the contrary, has created a new attribution standard, namely the  ‘overall 
authority and control’ linked to the legality and the scope of the delegation of 
powers by the Security Council to a certain mission.193 It has also been 
highlighted that the solution foreseen in Behrami could have the regrettable 
consequence of allowing States participating in peace operations to shield 
themselves from their international responsibility.194 Furthermore, concerns 
have been raised as to the lack of judicial protection of potential victims of 
internationally wrongful acts occurred in peace operations due to immunity 
from jurisdiction the UN enjoys before domestic courts, combined with the 
proved ineffectiveness of non-judicial remedies established by the UN.195  
 A new hope for human rights advocates, commentators and effective-
control supporters was brought with the Al Jedda case in 2011.196 It can be 
said that with the Al Jedda judgement the Court operated a very accurate 
analysis of all issues of attribution in multinational operations. Even if Multi-
National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) can hardly be considered a peace operation 
under the working definition elaborated in the first chapter, the attribution 
issue dealt with by the Court does not differ from those arising in peace 
operations strictu senso. The Court had to adjudicate the international 
responsibility of the UK for the alleged unlawful detention of the claimant 
during the presence of the MNF-I authorised by SC RES 1511 and later by 
SC RES 1543. The impugned acts occurred when the governing powers had 
been transferred from the joint organ set up by the US and the UK (the 
Coalition Provisional Authority) to the Iraqi Interim Government.197 The 
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Court followed to some extent the approach chosen in Behrami, it first 
assessed the issue of attribution in order to determine its competence. 
Nevertheless, it revisited the ‘overall authority and control test’ in favour of 
the ‘effective control test’ relying apertis verbis on the letter of what is now 
art. 7 DARIO. In particular, the Court has moved away from the unfortunate 
interpretation based on the delegation of powers and has rather favoured a 
factual understanding of effective control.198 Therefore, it concluded that the 
authorisation of MFN-I contained in the above-mentioned SC resolutions did 
not imply that the UN has assumed any degree of control over the acts of the 
MNF-I. Hence, the judges concluded that  
 
[t]he Court does not consider that, as a result of the authorisation 
contained in Resolution 1511, the acts of soldiers within the Multi-
National Force became attributable to the United Nations or – 
more importantly, for the purposes of this case – ceased to be 
attributable to the troop-contributing nations.199 
 
 
Moreover, in resorting to the effective control test the Court has fostered a 
factual interpretation thereof in the following terms: “[i]n a multi-State 
operation, responsibility lies where effective command and control is vested 
and practically exercised”.200 Accordingly, the Court came to the conclusion 
that the conduct was attributable to the UK and not to the UN, therefore it 
affirmed its competence.  
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 The decision was welcomed with enthusiasm for its careful fact-
finding and for the quite precise application of the rules on attribution and on 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present analysis a few 
further remarks are in order to underscore remaining criticisms in the Court's 
reasoning.  
 First, it may be too soon to state that the judges have definitely 
abandoned the Behrami approach, considering that the Al Jedda judgement 
has dedicated an entire paragraph to point out the differences between the 
two cases.201 In fact, one cannot disregard that the factual background of the 
two cases differs significantly. The first judgement concerned the attribution 
of conduct allegedly committed both by UNMIK forces and KFOR forces, 
that is to say by national contingents contributed to a UN-led mission and to 
a UN-authorised mission led by a regional organisation (NATO), 
respectively. The Al Jedda case, instead, dealt with human rights violations 
committed by a State participating in a UN-authorised mission led by 
coalition of States, and not by a regional organisation. Namely, the case 
addressed the responsibility of the UK as one of the two leading nations 
(together with the US) of MNF-I. In other words, during MNF-I no 
international organisation came into questions as the mission was led by two 
States and not by a regional organisation (as it was instead KFOR) and 
certainly not by the UN (as it was instead UNMIK).  
 Second, while the Court indeed superseded the delegation-of-powers 
reasoning (the UN authorisation does not imply any degree of control 
assumed by the organisation), at the same time it did not depart completely 
form the ‘overall authority and control’ test. The judges have clearly affirmed 
that “the United Nations Security Council had neither effective control nor 
ultimate authority and control over the acts and omissions of troops within 
the Multi-National Force”.202 This wording was seemingly chosen to leave 
some scope to the application of the ‘ultimate authority and control’ criterion 
in future case law and certainly to imply that the Court did not intend to reject 
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its previous reasoning.  
 Third, it seems that the Court has not revised the understanding 
elaborated in Behrami. UNMIK was in fact defined as a UN subsidiary organ, 
therefore the alleged violation following within the mandate of UNMIK, 
namely the failure to de-mine the area, was attributed to the UN, even if the 
judges did not make express reference to the terms of art. 6 DARIO. In Al 
Jedda the Court reiterated the argument that UN-led missions are subsidiary 
organs of the Organisation, with reference to the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) that was operating as a political mission aside to 
MNF-I.203 The inference should then be that in future cases of alleged 
wrongful conducts occurred in UN-led operations the Court could again 
determine exclusive attribution to the UN, applying again the ‘authority and 
control’ criterion, instead of the effective control test.  
 Fourth, the Al Jedda case was the last judgement of the Strasbourg 
Court dealing specifically with the attribution of conduct and of the related 
effective control test in multinational military operations. Hence, it would 
not seem wise to claim that the Court has definitely moved away from the 
Behrami approach, yet. 
 
 
 7.2... Al Skeini, Hassan and Jaloud: anything new in post-Al Jedda 
case law? 
 
 Other relevant judgements, concerning the responsibility of member 
States for human rights violations occurred in Iraq in the context of the MNF-
I or other multinational military operations that have accompanied the 
presence of the MNF-I, have been issued by the Strasbourg Court, namely Al 
Skeini v UK, Hassan v UK and  Jaloud v The Netherlands.204 None of these, 
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though, have addressed openly the issue of attribution of wrongful conduct 
nor, consequently of effective control. To be more precise, the cases that will 
be examined in this section made use of the concept of ‘effective control’ but for 
the purpose of determining extraterritorial jurisdiction and not attribution of 
conduct. The following analysis will thus help to shed light on one of the most 
problematic aspects in the Strasbourg case law: the use of the term ‘effective 
control’. On the one hand, it is considered a criterion to determine jurisdiction 
under art. 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights, namely when dealing 
with cases of extraterritorial application of the Convention. When a State 
exercises ‘effective control over an area’ as result of lawful or unlawful military 
operations beyond its national borders, the requirement of the jurisdictional link 
between the alleged victim finding himself in that area and the respondent State 
is met. The criterion was created for the first time in the Lozidou case and has 
been extensively elaborated along the development of the Court's case law, in 
particular in the Al Skeini case, which is considered the landmark judgement 
pointing out the criteria to interpret jurisdiction within the meaning of art. 1.205 
On the other hand, effective control indicates the criterion to determine 
attribution of conduct (hence, of responsibility) in cases concerning State organs 
seconded to an international organisation, as referred to in Behrami and Al 
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Treaties: Law Principles, and Policy, Oxford University Press, 2011; Milanovic, “Al-
Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg”, supra note 193; Da Costa, The Extraterritorial 
Application of Selected Human Rights Treaties, 2013. 
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Jedda.  
 The Jaloud case is particularly instructive to elucidate the difficulties 
faced by the Court in keeping attribution and jurisdiction separate.206 The 
claim concerned the responsibility of the Netherlands for the alleged failure 
to investigate into the death of Mr Jaloud's son, shot by a Dutch soldier in a 
check-point incident occurred in a post that was under the responsibility of the 
Netherlands contingent participating to MNF in Iraq.207 The Court’s reasoning 
presents several elements of novelty, even though the final outcome raises some 
concerns as to the interpretation pattern followed by the Court. The judges have, 
correctly, first addressed the issue of jurisdiction within the meaning of art. 1 of 
the Convention. Quite surprisingly though, to assess whether the Netherlands 
had exercised its jurisdiction over the victim the judges analysed in great detail 
to the chain of command and control of the mission, including the inquiry of the 
levels of authority transferred within the operational framework. In other words, 
the Court relied extensively, for the first time, on the chain of command and 
control toolkit, we have referred to above. From the analysis of several 
documents, including the MoU made public by the Latvian government and 
applied by analogy to the respondent government,208 the Court has concluded 
that the Dutch battalion was under the “operation control of the British division 
as an independent unit”,209 while at the same time the battalion remained under 
the full command of its sending State.210 The judgement has gone further, stating 
that, despite being placed under the operational control of the UK, the Dutch 
troops where not ‘placed at the disposal’ nor ‘under the exclusive direction or 
                                                 
206 Sari, “Untangling Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction from International Responsibility in 
‘Jaloud v. Netherlands’: Old Problem, New Solutions?”, in Revue de droit militaire et de 
droit de la guerre, vol. 53, 2014, pp. 287-317; Tzevelekos, “Reconstructing the Effective 
Control Criterion in Extraterritorial Human Rights Breaches: Direct Attribution of 
Wrongfulness, Due Diligence, and Concurrent Responsibility”, in Michigan Journal of 
International Law, vol. 36, 2014, pp. 129-178. 
207 Jaloud, para. 152: “Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud met his death when a vehicle in which he was 
a passenger was fired upon while passing through a checkpoint manned by personnel 
under the command and direct supervision of a Netherlands Royal Army officer”. 
208 The Memorandum of Understanding is generally considered by States a classified 
document and accordingly State may refuse its disclosure to the Court, as it has been the 
case of the Netherlands, see ibidem, para. 102. By contrast the Latvian government has 
made public on the National Gazette its MoU concerning the MND-Central South, 
available at: https://www.vestnesis.lv/body_print.php?id=99221. 
209 Ibidem, paras 57 and 115. 
210 Ibidem, paras 57 and 103 (5.2). 
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control’ of any foreign power, i.e. neither under the UK nor the Iraqi 
government, whose forces they were assisting.211 In drawing this conclusion the 
Court has made express reference to art. 6 DARS “mutatis mutandis”.212 Besides 
the doubts linked to the very meaning to attach to this exception clause, serious 
concerns raise from the use of attribution rules in order to determine jurisdiction. 
The same critique applies to resorting to operational concepts such as full 
command and operational control in order, not to attribute wrongful act, (as 
suggested by the ILC and by the entire analysis proposed so far) but only insofar 
as to inquire whether the jurisdiction requirement was met. It is noteworthy that 
the attribution issue has been indeed dealt with by the Court in relatively short 
shrift, as few as 20 lines, wherein the criterion chosen by the judges seems to be 
the one of State organs ex art. 4 DARS, even though no direct reference to the 
Draft Articles is made.213  
 This approach was criticised by some of the judges themselves, in the 
concurring opinion of Judge Spielmann, joined by Judge Raimondi, who 
stressed how the Court in Jaloud missed an opportunity to elaborate on the 
critical distinction between the two issues of attribution and jurisdiction. The 
two judges made clear that the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ essentially refers to: 
(i) the territorial principle; (ii) State agent authority and control; (iii) effective 
control over an area and, (iiii) the Convention legal space,214 while attribution 
“essentially concerns the sensitive issue of the ‘imputability’ of 
internationally wrongful acts”.215 Accordingly, the two jurists claimed that 
the reference to the ILC Draft Articles, discussed above, that were made in 
                                                 
211 Ibidem, para. 151. 
212 In brackets the Court specified: “compare, mutatis mutandis, article 6 of the ILC Articles 
on State Responsibility”, idem. 
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judicial authorities. As such they are capable of giving rise to the responsibility of the 
Netherlands under the Convention”. 
214 Jaloud, Concurring opinion of Judge Spielmann, joined by Judge Raimondi, para. 3. 
215 Ibidem, para. 4. 
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the jurisdiction’s section of the judgement, was essentially “ambiguous, 
subsidiary and incomprehensible”.216  
 In sum, the analysis of the ECtHR case law has highlighted some 
major inconsistency as to the interpretation of attribution rules in general, 
and the effective control test in particular. First, the criterion of ‘ultimate 
authority and control’ forged by the Court in order to attribute every conduct 
of the UN has emerged. Second, this approach has been – apparently – 
abandoned to endorse the effective control test, understood as a factual 
criterion. Nevertheless, caution is in order before stating that the Court has 
definitely superseded the ‘ultimate authority and control’ approach, 
considering the very diverse factual backgrounds underlining the different 
precedents. After Behrami and Saramati, the ECtHR has never been asked to 
adjudicate responsibility arising from wrongful acts occurred in UN-led 
operations but only in UN-authorised operations. Third, when it comes to 
UN-led operations, the Court has, in effect, continued claiming the nature of 
UN subsidiary organs. Hence, attribution of conduct would operate ex art. 6 
DARIO and would not imply any effective control assessment. In other 
words, a core tension between a normative interpretation (UN as subsidiary 
organs and application of art. 6 DARIO) and a factual interpretation (art. 7 
DARIO and effective control as a factual criterion) seems to characterise the 
current Court’s interpretation of attribution rules. This interpretative tension 
mirrors to a certain extent the confusion caused by the conceptual overlap 
between the political dimension and the military framework of a UN 
operations, mentioned earlier. Where the concepts of ‘operational authority’ 
and ‘overall authority’ (exerted by the UN Secretary General via the Head of 
Mission in peace operations) are often (conf)used with the notion of ‘operational 
control’ (exercised by the Force Commander).217 
 In the end, no support is to be found in the Court's findings regarding 
the interpretation of effective control as operational control in military operation, 
which has been proposed by the ILC commentaries of art. 7 DARIO. As shown 
                                                 
216 Ibidem, para. 5. 
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above, the judges have demonstrated a recent interest in looking at the mission's 
chain of command and control but the use they have made of the chain of 
command and control toolkit (operational command and control, transfer of 
authority, full command, etc.) has been misguided and therefore misapplied, 
leading to determinations concerning jurisdiction instead of attribution. In 
conclusion, the ECtHR offers an ambiguous and incoherent picture of the 
interpretation of attribution rules, which adds confusion to an already complex 
scenario rather than clarifying its framework. 
 
 
 
 7.3. Effective control before English Courts: Bici and Bici, and Serdar 
Mohammed 
 
 While the ECtHR was examining its first case concerning State 
responsibility in peace operations, in 2004 the Queen's Bench Division 
adjudicated a case concerning the liability in compensation of the UK for the 
killing, the wounding and the illness caused to two Kosovar Albanians who were 
shot by UNMIK British forces in 1999.218 The plaintiffs were travelling in a car 
in the streets of Pristina during the ‘Kosovo National Day’. One of the victims 
was sitting on the roof of the car and, according to the findings of the Court, had 
fired his gun in the air during the gathering of that celebration day; the other 
claimants were sitting inside the car. The British soldiers, who were defending a 
building while the car was passing by fired back at the car in alleged self-
defence. The gunfire resulted in the killing of the person sitting on the car’s roof, 
in the injuring and in the psychiatric illness of the other two plaintiffs seated in 
the car. The sentence, which found the UK liable in compensation, touched upon 
the issue of attribution of wrongful conduct quite succinctly. In fewer than 40 
words on the subject, the findings reported a very interesting opinio iuris of the 
UK on the attribution of conduct of its forces seconded to a UN-led mission, 
expressed in the following terms 
 
[t]he defendant has conceded that it is vicariously liable for any 
                                                 
218 Queens Bench Division, Bici and Bici v. Ministry of Defence, EWHC 786, 7 April, 2004. 
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wrongs committed by any of the soldiers. The Crown retained 
command of the British forces notwithstanding that they were 
acting under the auspices of the U.N.219 
 
 
In other words, the UK has accepted its liability in compensation for the 
wrongful acts committed by its soldiers. Moreover, it has stressed the 
requirement of national command exercised over the forces, implicitly 
refusing the theory of UN-led mission as UN subsidiary organs and the related 
exclusive attribution to the Organisation.  It is well known, however, that the 
UK has significantly changed this approach by claiming before the Strasbourg 
Court in several occasions the exclusive attribution to the UN of wrongful 
conducts occurring not only in UN-led, but also in UN-authorised, 
operations.220   
Another example of this change can be found in the Mohammed case, 
where the UK maintained the exclusive attribution to the UN of conduct of 
its soldiers in Afghanistan.221 The claim concerned the illegal detention of the 
plaintiff by British Forces participating in ISAF, the first case dealing with 
the responsibility of the UK for alleged violations occurred during their 
presence in Afghanistan. The judge of the Queen's Bench division, Justice 
Leggatt, carried out a careful analysis of the facts and of the legal precedents 
to respond to the government's argument, investigating, on the one hand, 
whether the conducts of ISAF were generally attributable to the UN and, on 
the other hand, whether the impugned actions were attributable to the ISAF 
or solely to the UK.  
 In order to inquire the attribution link between ISAF and the UN, 
Justice Leggatt looked into the chain of command and control of ISAF, 
stressing that since August 2003 “overall operational command had been 
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220 See Behrami, Al Saadon, Al Jedda, Al Skeini. It is interesting to note in the Al Skeini case 
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221  Mohammed v Ministry of Defence et al. and Secretary of State v Mohammed et al., Court 
of Appeal, EWCA 3846, 30 July 2015. See also the Supreme Court Judgment that 
eventually upheld the crown of State act defence, while not dealing with attribution 
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vested with NATO”222 (beforehand ISAF had been under the alternating 
leadership of the UK, Turkey, and, jointly, Germany and The Netherlands). 
The impugned acts occurred in April 2010, hence in the context of NATO-
led ISAF, that is to say of a UN-authorised mission, as opposed for example 
to UNMIK which was a UN-led operation. These considerations 
notwithstanding, the Judge was convinced that  
 
the chain of delegation of command for ISAF is essentially similar 
to the chain of delegation and command for KFOR, as described 
in the judgement of the European Court in the Behrami and 
Saramati cases.223 
 
From this premise, the Judge drew another unfortunate parallelism with the 
Behrami case, maintaining that “the UN Security Council has ‘effective 
control’ (and ‘ultimate authority and control’) over ISAF in the sense required 
to enable wrongful conduct of ISAF to be attributed to the UN”.224 As a 
consequence, Justice Leggatt, stated that should the detention of Mr 
Mohammed be authorised by COMISAF (ISAF Commander), the wrongful 
act would be attributable to the UN, similarly to the detention of Mr Behrami 
that was authorised by the COMKFOR (KFOR Commander) and hence 
attributed to the UN by the ECtHR.225 
 In the Court's reasoning it was thus crucial to determine which entity 
authorised the detention, whether the UK or COMISAF, or both. To resolve 
this pivotal issue, Justice Leggatt relied again on the mission’s chain of 
command and control, this time with a special focus on existing policies and 
special arrangements for detention. The evidence before the Court showed 
that since November 2009 the UK operated in Afghanistan according to its 
national detention policy, which implied, on the one hand, that the applicable 
laws and regulations were set forth not in ISAF standards but rather in UK 
national standards; on the other hand, the authority to detain was vested in 
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the UK national chain of command and not with COMISAF.226 In other 
words, prisoners detained by UK forces participating in ISAF were under UK 
authority, through the Commander of Joint Force Support who reported to the 
UK Permanent Joint Headquarter and finally to the Ministry of Defence; 
whereas the relationship between the UK and ISAF on the issue of detention 
was “of liason and coordination only”.227 
 Furthermore, the Standard Operating Procedures of detentions of UK 
forces differed significantly from those of ISAF. Under the latter, an 
individual can only be detained for 96-hours, afterwards she or he had to be 
released or handed over to Afghan authorities. A possible extension can only 
be authorised by COMISAF. The UK applied a caveat to NATO ISAF 
guidelines stating that the detention regime was the troop contributing 
nation’s “sovereign business and based upon UK national sovereignty”.228 
Accordingly, the UK had informed NATO of its intention to detain 
individuals for longer than 96 hours based on the main concern that the time 
lapse foreseen in NATO standards was too limited to grant effective 
information-gathering, which was deemed essential to the mission.229 Due to 
the lack of objection from NATO, the judge inferred that the caveat had been 
eventually accepted by the Organisation.230  
 Once the general detention-policy framework in Afghanistan was 
depicted, the Court ascertained that in the circumstances of the case the 
capture and the detention of Mr Mohammed was authorised and periodically 
revised by the UK and that his internment took place in the military base of 
Camp Bastion, under the “full and exclusive de facto control of the UK”.231 
Hence Justice Leggatt concluded that the impugned acts were only 
attributable to the UK as the  conduct took place solely under the national 
chain of command and control. Differently said, the wrongful acts are not 
attributable to ISAF as no authorisation concerning Mr Mohammed detention 
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had been sought by COMISAF. Accordingly, no attribution to the UN could 
be envisaged, lacking a previous attribution of conduct to ISAF.232  
 As to the conduct's wrongfulness, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's 
detention beyond the initial 96 hours was arbitrary, as no power to detain 
beyond that period was entrusted to the respondent country, neither under the 
UN mandate nor under ISAF mandate, not under Afghan law, nor under 
international humanitarian law. Consequently, the Ministry of Defence has 
incurred liability for violations of art. 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and of section 6 of the Human Rights Act.233 The Court's 
findings have been confirmed in the appeal.234 
 The impact of this case law on the interpretation of attribution under 
international law is a mixed blessing. The judgement’s main shortcomings lie 
with the application of the rules on international responsibility as the 
domestic judge seems more familiar with the ECtHR jurisprudence rather 
than with the DARIO. While the sentence relied extensively on the Behrami 
approach, it only resorted to the DARIO in a brief consideration on ultra vires 
acts.235 Furthermore, a major inconsistency in the Court's reasoning lies with 
the use of the effective control test, that has been interpreted both in a 
normative and in a factual fashion. In the first part of his analysis, Justice 
Leggatt determined that the UN SC had ‘effective control’ and ‘ultimate 
authority and control’ over ISAF for the purposes of attributing conducts of 
ISAF to the UN. The inference was therefore that the impugned conduct 
would be attributable to the UN insofar as it would be attributable to ISAF. 
In the second part of the judgement, in order to determine whether the 
wrongful acts were attributable to ISAF, the Judge included a very detailed 
factual analysis of the chain of command and control of the mission in 
general, and also of the impugned detention in particular.  The Court resorted 
extensively to military concepts, as well as to military documents and to the 
witness of several military high-ranking officers. Hence, in this section of the 
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judgement the criterion of effective control was intended as a factual test 
(inquiring which entity had authorised the detention within the mission’s 
chain of command and control) and not as normative standards (the ‘ultimate 
authority and control’ test), although the term ‘effective control’ was never 
used in this part of the sentence.  
 In sum, the Mohammed judgement constitutes another meaningful 
example of the existing tension between the normative and the factual 
interpretation of attribution criteria. Despite the inconsistencies highlighted 
so far, this case provides for an extremely accurate analysis of how a factual 
effective control test can be applied to peace operations, focusing on the chain 
of command and control that was followed to carry out the internationally 
wrongful act at hand. 
 
 
 7.4. Effective control before Dutch courts: Nuhanovic, Mustafic and 
the Mothers of Srebrenica  
 
 The Dutch courts, confronted with the liability in compensation of the 
State for the dreadful events following the withdraw of the Dutch Battalion 
of UNPROFOR from the compound in Potocari, Srebrenica, have shown an 
increasing familiarity with the rules on attribution and have significantly 
contributed to the development of some key concepts, in particular of 
effective control and dual attribution.  
 Many next of kin of the victims who were killed by the Bosnian Serb 
troops of Mladic and by related paramilitary militias after the Dutchbat left 
the compound in July 1995, sued the Dutch State before Dutch courts to seek 
compensation for the alleged damages suffered following those events. The 
series of claims brought before the national judges have originated a judicial 
saga, similarly to what has happened before British courts for the 
responsibility of the UK during its involvement in Iraq.  
 In 2008 the first case was brought by the association ‘Mothers of 
Srebrenica’ and other claimants against the Netherlands and the UN for 
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alleged breaches of their obligation to prevent the crime of genocide as set 
forth in the 1948 Genocide Convention. The Court dismissed the case as it 
lacked jurisdiction ratione personae due to the immunity of the UN.236 The 
sentence was appealed before The Hague Appeal Court and, later, before the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands.237 The findings of the District Court were 
confirmed by both superior Courts. The plaintiffs finally brought a related 
case against the Netherlands before the Strasbourg Court claiming a violation 
of art. 6 of ECHR.238 The claimants maintained that the respondent State had 
violated their right to a fair trial by granting UN jurisdictional immunity in 
presence of alleged violations of peremptory norms of international law (the 
prohibition of genocide), in particular in the absence of alternative remedies. 
The European Court of Human Rights issued a landmark judgement on this 
delicate topic, concerning the balance between immunity and the right to a 
fair trial and to an effective remedy, affirming that the grant of UN immunity 
from domestic jurisdiction by the respondent State served a legitimate 
purpose and was proportionate, hence the responsibility of the State was not 
entailed.239 The whole focus of the judgement rested on the immunity of the 
former, while attribution of wrongful conduct carried out in Srebrenica was 
never at issue before the ECtHR in this case. 240 
                                                 
236 District Court of the Hague, Stitching Mothers of Srebrenica v the Netherlands and United 
Nations, n. LJN:BD6796, 10 July 2008. 
237 Court of Appeal the Hague, Stitching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands and 
United Nations, LNJ: BR538830, 30 March 2010 and Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 
Stitching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands and United Nations, 13 April 
2012. 
238 European Court of Human Rights, Third Section, Stiching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v 
the Netherlands, no. 65542/12, Decision, 11 June 2013. 
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Srebrenica, see infra. 
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 The twin judgements of Nuhanovic v. The Netherlands241 and of 
Mustafic v The Netherlands242 represent a watershed in the case law 
concerning the responsibility of the Netherlands for the acts and omissions 
committed by the Dutchbat of UNPROFOR during the fall of Srebrenica and 
are likely to have a significant influence on the developments of the 
international rules on attribution of conduct. Giving that the two cases 
concern very similar facts and have been decided by the Court in a parallel 
manner, the analysis will focus primarily on the Nuhanovic case, but the 
general considerations are valid for both judgements.  
 Mr Nuhanovic worked as an interpreter for United Nations military 
observers seconded to UNPROFOR and forming part of the Dutchbat. After 
the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, when the troops of the Bosnian Serbs 
Army entered into the UN safe area of Srebrenica, Nuhanovic's family 
(mother, father and brother) sought refuge in the Potocari compound under 
the protection of UNPROFOR. Due to the impossibility to protect the area 
with the resources and the mandate available, the UN and the Dutch State 
decided to evacuate the area and to withdraw the Dutchbat. UN employees, 
such as Mr Nuhanovic, were authorised to evacuate along with the Dutch 
troops, while any other person present in the compound was handed over to 
the troops of Mladic, who should have been responsible to safely evacuate 
those people following the agreement reached with the UN in this regard.  
 Numerous commissions of inquiry and international judgements 
concerning these events have provided evidence to conclude that, soon after 
the withdrawal of the Dutchbat, the able-men handed over to the troops of 
Mladic were separated from the rest and executed in the proximity of the 
compound. About 7000 Bosnian Muslim men lost their lives in what was then 
defined as the first genocide on the European territory since World World II. 
Additionally, many other people fleeing from the compound upon the arrival 
of the Bosnian Serbs troops were killed. This was the fate of the entire family 
of Mr Nhuanovic, despite that he had tried to convince the Dutchbat 
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commander to allow them to be evacuated along with him and the Battalion. 
The plaintiff thus claimed the responsibility of the Netherlands for the failure 
to protect his family in breach of the UN mandate and of the ECHR and the 
ICCPR and the consequent State's liability in compensation for loss suffered.  
 In the case only the responsibility of the State – and not of the UN – 
was at issue. Nevertheless, the Netherlands government maintained that the 
impugned conduct was attributable to the UN and no responsibility of the 
State was entailed. The District Court of The Hague addressed the issue of 
attribution under the purview of the rules of international responsibility, but 
instead of looking at the DARIO it applied the DARS. More precisely, it 
resorted to art. 6 DARS and applied ‘by means of analogy’ the criterion of 
‘direction and control’ to the case in point, concluding that since ‘operational 
command and control’ of the Dutchbat was transferred to the UN, the acts of 
the Dutchbat were considered exclusively attributable to the UN.243  
 The Court of appeal of The Hague overruled the first instance 
judgement fostering a series of innovative concepts of attribution of conduct 
in peace operations, namely dual attribution, ‘reciprocal’ effective control 
and the power-to-prevent.244 It has thus represented a focal point in the 
current debate on attribution issues.245 The above-named aspects will be 
analysed in turn.  
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 In the first place, the Court of Appeal resorted to the effective control 
test as attribution criterion, as suggested by the claimant's defence according 
to which “the decisive criterion for attribution is not who exercised 
‘command and control’, but who actually was in possession of ‘effective 
control’”.246 The Court upheld this ground of appeal giving weight also to the 
work of the ILC, namely to art. 7 [then art. 6] DARIO and to the doctrinal 
debate in the following terms 
 
 in international law literature, as also in the work of the ILC, the 
generally accepted opinion is that if a State places troops at the 
disposal of the UN for the execution of a peacekeeping mission, the 
question as to whom a specific conduct of such troops should be 
attributed, depends on the question which of both parties has 
‘effective control’ over the relevant conduct.247  
 
In the second place, the Court specified that the criterion of effective control 
does not only apply to attribution of conduct to an international organisation, 
but can also be used to inquire whether the conduct is attributable to the 
sending State of the seconded organ.248 A major implication of this innovative 
‘reciprocal’249 understanding of effective control consisted in the possibility 
to allow for dual attribution, according to which  
 
 the Court adopts as a starting point that the possibility that more than 
one party has ‘effective control’ is generally accepted, which means 
that it cannot be ruled out that the application of this criterion results 
in the possibility of attribution to more than one party.250     
 
In the third place, the power-to-prevent argument extended the reach of State 
responsibility claiming that effective control does not only encompass 
conducts carried out in the execution of a specific order or instruction but also 
includes omissions the State had the power to prevent.251  Consequently the 
Court found that  
                                                 
246 Court of Appeal of the Hague Nuhanovic v the Netherlands, para. 5.7. 
247 Ibidem, para. 5.8. 
248 Idem. 
249 D'Argent and Spagnolo, supra note106  
250 Court of Appeal of the Hague, Nuhanovic v the Netherlands, para. 5.9. 
251 Idem. 
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 it is beyond doubt that the Dutch Government was closely involved 
in the evacuation and the preparations thereof, and that it would have 
had the power to prevent the alleged conduct if it had been aware of 
this conduct at the time.252 
  
Furthermore, considering that in the Court’s opinion the effective control test 
should take into account all the circumstances of the case, the judges carried 
out a long and accurate analysis of the facts and of the decision-making 
processes that took place in the days of the fall of Srebrenica and of the 
Dutchbat withdrawal. The judges concluded that the decision to evacuate the 
compound and to take only UN employees was agreed upon by the NLs and 
the UN, and more specifically that the decision not to allow the family of Mr 
Nuhanovic to evacuated along with him was taken by the Dutchbat's 
commander. As result, the Court of Appeal concluded that the decision to 
evacuate the compound was taken jointly by the UN and the Dutch 
government.253 This implies that the Netherlands – through the decision-
making process and through its organ – had effective control over the 
wrongful conduct. Consequently, the District Court decision was quashed and 
the respondent government was condemned for the first time, for the failure 
to protect Mr Nuhanovic's family. In sum, effective control, ex art. 7 DARIO, 
was then chosen by the Court of Appeal as the appropriate attribution 
criterion and interpreted as a factual criterion in light of all relevant 
circumstances of the case.254  
        The Supreme Court255 confirmed the Court of Appeal's ruling and 
                                                 
252 Ibidem, para. 5.18. 
253 Ibidem, para. 5.12. 
254 The following passage is explanatory of the factual approach chosen by the Court: “The 
fact that The Netherlands had control over Dutchbat was not only theoretical, this control 
was also exercised in practice: the Government in The Hague [...] took the decision for 
the evacuation of Dutchbat and of the refugees, Minister Voorhoeve gave the instruction 
that Dutchbat was not allowed to cooperate in a separate treatment of the men, and he 
told Karremans that he had to save as much as possible. [...] According to the judgment 
of the Court, in all these cases it was a matter of orders being given and not just 
transmitting the wishes or expressing the concerns, which Nicolai understood very well 
(if the Dutch Government says something like that, as a military officer you just carry it 
out)”, ibidem, para. 5.18. 
255 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Nuhanovic v the Netherlands, LZ/TT 12/03324, 6 
September 2013. 
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further elaborated on the attribution criteria, providing for extremely valuable 
elements to the present study. While considering the first ground of cassation 
based on the alleged wrongful application of international rules on 
attribution, the Court expressly rejected the theory of UN organs put forward 
by the appellant State, according to which the Dutchbat was an organ of the 
UN and its conduct should consequently be attributed solely to the UN under 
art. 6 DARIO. The Court stated that troops contributed to a UN mission have 
to be considered State organs placed at the disposal of the organisation, in 
accordance with art. 7 DARIO; and specified that the Dutchbat enjoyed this 
status, considering that the sending State retained disciplinary powers and 
criminal jurisdiction over its troops.256 As it concerns effective control – to 
be interpreted as a “factual control over a specific conduct”257 – the Court 
effectively rejected the idea that a State must necessarily have countermanded 
the mission's chain of command and control, or have exercised independent 
operational command, in order for a State to have effective control.258 On the 
contrary, the ground for attribution was identified in the circumstance that, 
after the fall of Srebrenica, the decisions concerning the compound's 
evacuation were taken jointly by the UN and the Dutch government.259 In this 
context, it was the Court's opinion that dual attribution of conduct represented 
the correct outcome of a thorough and factual interpretation of art. 7 DARIO 
red in conjunction with art. 48 DARIO.260 In sum, the Court showed a sound 
understanding of the ILC Draft Articles and commentaries, which were 
quoted several times within the judgement. Moreover, it strongly restated the 
dual attribution argument created by the Court of Appeal. The sole perplexity 
arising from the judgement's approach to attribution lies with the Court's 
conclusion stating that the Court of Appeal had correctly identified in art. 7 
DARIO the attribution criterion “partly in view of what is provided in the 
attribution rule of article 8 DARS”.261 It remains unclear whether the Court 
                                                 
256 Ibidem, para. 3.11.  
257 Ibidem, para. 3.12. 
258 Ibidem, para. 3.11.3. 
259 Ibidem, para. 3.12.2. 
260 Ibidem, para. 3.9.4. 
261 Ibidem, para. 3.13. 
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intended to suggest, or imply, that effective control should be interpreted in 
light of the ‘direction and control’ concepts set forth in art. 8 DARS.  
 As mentioned earlier, the association Mothers of Srebrenica brought 
a new lawsuit against the Netherlands and the United Nations – following the 
successful results of the Nuhanovic and Mustafic cases – which was decided 
by the District Court of the Hague in 2014.262 Despite the identical factual 
background, this last case was a more wide-ranging suit, concerning the 
respondents’ liability towards more than 320 victims killed after the 
evacuation from the Potocari compound. Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed a 
long list of alleged wrongful acts which ranged from abandoning blocking 
positions to the cooperation in the ‘deportation’ of the refugees from the 
compound.263 Similarly, the claimants have invoked the violations of a 
plurality of international rules, namely international humanitarian law, in 
particular 1977 First Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions, the 
1948 Genocide Convention and the right to life enshrined both in the ECHR 
and in the ICCPR.264  
 After a lengthy and thorough analysis of the facts and the law, the 
Court concluded that the liability of the Netherlands was entailed due to the 
Dutchbat cooperation with the deportation of about 320 men, which 
constituted a breach of  art. 2 ECHR and art. 6 ICCPR as well as a violation 
of the ‘standard of care’ prescribed by Book 6, Section 162 of the Dutch Civil 
Code.265 These groundbreaking findings stigmatised for the first time the 
Netherlands for its overarching responsibility in the dreadful events of 1995, 
and no longer focused solely on isolated misconducts, as it was in the 
Nuhanovic and Mustafic cases.  
                                                 
262 District Court of the Hague, Sticting Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands. For 
an introductory note including a full English translation of the judgment see Ryngaert, 
“Srebrenica Continued. Dutch Court Holds the Netherlands Liable for Cooperating with 
Bosnian Serbs”, in Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 61, 2014, pp. 365-454. 
For a thorough comment see Palchetti, “Attributing the Conduct of Dutchbat in 
Srebrenica: the 2014 Judgement of the District Court in the Mothers of Srebrenica Case”, 
ibidem, pp. 279-294. 
263 For the comprehensive list of allegations see District Court of the Hague, Mothers of 
Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands, para. 3.2.1. 
264 Ibidem, para. 4.147. 
265 Ibidem, paras 4.329 and 4.338. 
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Besides, the judgement also offers important elements contributing to 
the interpretation of attribution before national courts. The District Court 
extensively relied on the previous rulings of the Supreme Court, and of the 
Court of Appeal, in Nuhanovic and Mustafic and fully endorsed their findings 
on the attribution criterion. The judge of first instance resorted to art. 7 
DARIO, specifying that the Supreme Court considered that the DARIO (and 
the DARS) “may generally be accepted as a reflection of current unwritten 
international law and were apparently accepted as such even in 1995”.266 
While the first part of this statement may be generally endorsed, the extension 
back to 1995 seems quite hazardous, considering that in those years the 
DARS were still being negotiated and the DARIO were not even in the mind 
of its Special Rapporteur yet. Second, the District Court undertook an 
interpretation of effective control that has been fostered by the Court of 
Appeal, according to which 
 
  though this provision of effective control [art. 7 DARIO] is only 
mentioned in relation to attribution to the UN the same criterion 
holds when answering the question whether action of troops must be 
attributed to the State that placed them at the disposal of the 
others.267 
 
This ‘reciprocal approach’, which had already generated some debate in the 
aftermath of the Nuhanovic appeal268, has been recently criticised in the 
literature, where it has been underscored that art. 7 DARIO does not 
accommodate such an interpretation. It has been stated that, in the default of 
effective control by the organisation, there should be a fallback on the rules 
on State responsibility according to which the conduct of State organs is 
always attributable to the State.269 Nevertheless, this rigorous interpretation 
of the Draft Articles does not take into account the complexities of a field 
operation; namely, the possibility that the chain of command and control 
                                                 
266 Ibidem, para. 4.33. 
267  District Court of The Hague, Stitching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands, 
case n. ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8748, 16 July 2014, para. 4.33. 
268 The opposed views of D'Argent, and Spagnolo see supra note 235. 
269 Palchetti, “Attributing the Conduct of Dutchbat in Srebrenica: the 2014 Judgement of the 
District Court in the Mothers of Srebrenica Case”, supra note 245. 
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might not always be crystal clear, which was precisely the case at hand. If one 
prevents to extend the ‘effective-control inquiry’ on sending States, this 
would necessarily preclude the possibility of dual attribution. This case 
shows, on the contrary, that dual attribution might be more respondent to 
operational reality, especially in moments of crisis, as was the case in the fall 
of Srebrenica in 1995. In support to its reasoning, the District Court inquired 
whether and to what extent the Dutchbat was seconded to UNPROFOR. The 
judges thus found that the Battalion was seconded to the UN, following a ToA 
under which the Dutchbat was in OPCON of UNPROFOR; nevertheless, the 
Court pointed out that the  
 
 transfer of command and control over the operational 
implementation of the mandate to the UN is not decisive and 
leaves open the possibility that the State exercises effective 
control over Dutchbat’s actions.270    
 
These findings originated from a statement made by the then Minister of 
Defence Voorhoeve, according to which in strictly legal terms it was possible 
to argue that once troops were seconded to the UN, the State had only the 
right to withdraw them, while every other power was exercised by the 
organisation; “[i]n practice however things were not like that”, concluded the 
Minister.271 
 In this context, the District Court affirmed that effective control means 
“the actual say or ‘factual control’ of the State over Dutchbat’s specific 
actions”272, accordingly it carried out a detailed factual analysis into the 
events and into the chain of command and control, prior to and after the fall 
of Srebrenica. The outcome is particularly valuable for the purpose of the 
present study as the judges singled out which State conducts amounted to 
effective control and which did not. Hence, the fact that UNPROFOR Dutch 
officers and Dutchbat officers had in some occasions direct contacts did not 
                                                 
270 District Court of the Hague, Stitching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands, 
para. 4.48, italics added. 
271 Ibidem, para. 4.47. 
272 Ibidem, para. 4.34. 
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imply effective control of the State.273 Similarly, the maintenance of a direct 
contact between Dutch officers and The Hague did not imply any exercise of 
such control, the request of information by the sending State is a normal 
operational standard. Differently, after the fall of Srebrenica, in July 1995, the 
Dutch government together with the UN decided to evacuate the area. 
Accordingly, the Court found that the sending State, in the few days 
constituting the ‘transitional period’ between the fall of Srebrenica and the 
final Dutchbat's withdrawal (11-21 July 1995)274, exercised over its troops 
effective control limited to the operations concerning the preparation and the 
evacuation of the Potocari compound.275  
 After having conducted this detailed inquiry, the Court then added 
some confusion to its reasoning, examining what it called ‘ultra vires’ acts. 
The judges determined that the order given by the government to the Dutchbat 
on 9 July 1995 to avoid unnecessary casualties was contrary to the order given 
by General Gobilliard (Deputy Commander of UNPROFOR Headquarter) on 
11 July 1995 to “take all reasonable measures to protect refugees and 
civilians”.276 More precisely, in the Court’s view, all actions taken by the 
Dutch troops contrary to Gobilliard's order (i.e. not doing enough to protect 
the refugees) were to be considered ultra vires in respect to the mandate and 
hence – again in the Court's opinion – attributable to the State.277  
 Some critiques of this passage seem necessary. In the first place, it is 
not clear why the Dutch order to avoid casualties should be deemed in 
                                                 
273 Ibidem, para. 4.51. 
274 Ibidem, 4.84 and 2.41-2.44. 
275 The full list of attributable actions reads as follows: “(i) abandoning the blocking posts; 
(ii) Not reporting war crimes; (iii) Not providing the refugees with adequate medical care; 
(iv) Handing over weapons and other equipment to the Bosnian Serbs; (v) Maintaining 
the decision not to allow any refugees into the compound; (vi) Separating the men from 
the other refugees during the evacuation; (vii) Cooperating in the evacuation of refugees 
who had sought refuge at the compound.” ibidem, para. 4.1444. Among these, only 
cooperating in the evacuation of refugees who had sought refuge at the compound and 
not reporting war crimes were deemed unlawful, but only the first conduct entailed the 
State’s liability as the Court determined that the causal link between the failure to report 
war crimes and the death of the victims was not met.  
276 Ibidem, para. 2.37. 
277 Ibidem, paras 4.67-4.89 where the Court affirmed that “for this reason too [exercise of 
effective control by the State] and inasmuch as Dutchbat acted contrary to Gobilliard's 
order (see: 2.37) this ultra vires action must be attributed to the State”. 
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contrast with Gobilliar's order, considering also that the latter followed the 
Dutch order. In the second place, the order sent from the government should 
be read in the broader context of the operation, namely in accordance with 
the UN ‘Post Airstrike Guidance’ of May 1995 which expressly stated that 
“the execution of the mandate is secondary to the security of UN 
personnel”.278 In the third place, the order coming from The Hague had 
passed through the UN chain of command and control, hence it cannot be said 
that it had interfered with it. Although these circumstances were already 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court, the District judges did not draw from 
them consistent conclusions in terms of attribution. 
 In our opinion, none of the above-mentioned activities should be 
regarded as ultra vires acts. Furthermore, under art. 8 DARIO, ultra vires 
conduct should be attributed to the Organisation and not the sending States. 
Even more precisely the provision is not at all designed to encompass the 
conduct of seconded organs, but only of organs of an international 
organisation.279 It might be the case that the Court intended to consider the 
orders coming from The Hague not only as an exercise of effective control, 
but also as cutting-across orders,280 in line with the UN position concerning 
non-attributable acts resulting from national interferences in the UN chain of 
command. Should this be true, a similar finding of cutting-across orders 
would similarly contrast with the ruling made by the same judges on the joint 
exercise of effective control by the UN and the Dutch government following 
the fall of Srebrenica. In sum, the Court's twisted reasoning on ultra vires acts 
appears both redundant, as an attribution criterion had already been soundly 
                                                 
278 The rationale of this Guidance lays with the facts preceding the air strike, when hundreds 
of UN personnel were kidnapped by Bosnian Serbs troops in order to use the hostage to 
blackmail their national government to refrain from the air strike. See ibidem, paras 2.20, 
4.66 and 4.72. 
279 Article 8 DARIO: “Excess of authority or contravention of instructions. The conduct of 
an organ or agent of an international organization shall be considered an act of that 
organization under international law if the organ or agent acts in an official capacity and 
within the overall functions of that organization, even if the conduct exceeds the authority 
of that organ or agent or contravenes instructions”. 
280  In military jargon the term ‘cutting-across orders’ defines orders that will ‘cut’ the official 
chain of command and control, generally sent by a troop contributing nation to its own 
contingent, irrespective of the fact that the contingent has been put under the authority of 
another entity, in this case under UN operational control, see supra note 113. 
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identified in art. 7 DARIO, and misleading, as the ultra vires ex art. 8 DARIO 
rule does not encompass the conduct of seconded organs.  
 
 
 7.5. Effective control in Brussels: the Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira case  
 
 The Court of first instance of Brussels was asked to adjudicate the 
liability in compensation of the Belgian State and of two Belgian high officers 
for the actions and omissions of the Belgium contingent of the ‘Mission des 
Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda’ (MINUAR).281 The case was 
brought by nine survivors and next of kin of those killed in the mass killing 
of Tutsi and moderated Hutu that sought refuge in a school in Kigali that was 
then the headquarter of the Belgium contingent participating to MINUAR, in 
the context of 1994 Rwanda genocide. After Belgium decided to withdraw its 
troops from the mission, including the contingents in the school that became 
a de facto refugee camp in April 1994, most of the refugees – about two 
thousand people – were killed by the Hutu's militias during the genocide; only 
some hundreds people managed to escape the massacre.282 The claimants 
maintained that the killings were a direct consequence of the evacuation of 
the Belgium contingent and therefore the Belgium State and the respondent 
commanding officers failed to fulfill the mission’s mandate to protect 
civilians.  
 The judgement, which is just an interim decision, tackled several 
issues including the question of statute of limitations under Belgian law. For 
the purpose of the present analysis it is particularly interesting to highlight 
the Court’s findings as to jurisdiction and to attribution of conduct.  
 The respondent State contented that the Court lacked jurisdiction 
because in order to adjudicate the claim it would have had to assess the 
responsibility of the UN and of the other member States participating in the 
                                                 
281 Court of first instance of Brussels, Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira et al. v Belgium et al., RG 
No 04/4807/A, 07/15547/A, 8 December 2010. 
282 Ibidem, paras 8-17. 
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mission. In the State’s reasoning, the Court would have clearly been 
precluded to do so due to the jurisdictional immunity of the Organisation. The 
Court did not share this view and positively affirmed its jurisdiction stressing 
that only the liability of Belgium and of two Belgian nationals was at issue 
because the impugned acts were attributable exclusively to the State.283 The 
inquiry conducted by the Court showed that the decision to evacuate the 
Belgium contingent from the camp was taken exclusively by the Belgium 
State in the exercise of its full command. In fact, Belgium at that time had not 
only withdrawn troops from the school-camp but had withdrawn its whole 
participation from MINUAR.284 Hence the Court determined that  
 
[...] la thèse défendue par les parties demanderesses est précisément 
que le contrôle des troupes stationnées à l’ETO [the compound] a été 
retiré à la MINUAR et placé sous la responsabilité exclusive de l’ETAT 
BELGE lequel aurait commis seul les fautes reprochées, entraînant 
une responsabilité qui lui est propre […] comme le précisent les 
demandeur, “les faits reprochés à l'Etat belge ne relèvent pas de son 
action en qualité d'Etat participant à la MINUAR”.285 
 
 
It should be noted that the Court did not make any explicit reference to the 
provisions of the DARIO, but it is quite evident that it endorsed to a certain 
extent the effective control test and, more precisely, a factual interpretation 
thereof, by looking into the chain of command of the contingent's withdrawal 
from the refugee camp.286  
                                                 
283 Ibidem, para. 26. 
284 Ibidem, para. 14.  
285 Ibidem, para. 26. 
286 In this sense see the comment to the sentence by Ryngaert in Oxford Reports on 
International Law, ILDC 1604 (BE 2010), and of the same author “Apportioning 
Responsibility Between the UN and Member States in UN Peace-support Operations”, 
supra note 148. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
REMEDIES FOR HARMFUL CONDUCTS 
IN PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In international law the term ‘remedies’ has a twofold meaning, the 
first concerns procedural aspects, while the second focuses on substantial 
characteristics.1 In the first sense, remedies can be understood as the set of 
processes by which a claim for violations of international law can be heard 
and adjudicated. These include both judicial and non-judicial institutions such 
as courts, tribunals and administrative bodies.2 In sum, the procedural 
meaning of remedies defines remedial institutions and procedures to which 
injured parties can bring their claims.3 As to the substantial notion of 
remedies, it generally refers to the relief afforded to the successful claimant, 
hence to the outcome of the procedure or proceeding instituted by the injured 
party; in this sense it is also called redress.4 
 As noted by some authors, an international law of remedies does not 
exist and the matter is characterised by a significant ‘terminological 
disorder’.5 This is exemplified by the fact that the concept does not only have 
a twofold meaning as described above, but it is also generally used as a 
                                                 
1    Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 2005, 
p. 7; id., “Human Rights, Remedies”, in MPEPIL, 2006; Schmalenbach, “International 
Organizations or Institutions, Legal Remedies against Acts of Organs”, in EPIL, 2006. 
2     Shelton, supra note 1. 
3    Schmalenbach, “International Organizations or Institutions, Legal Remedies against Acts 
of Organs”, supra note 1, para. 2. 
4    Shelton, supra note 1, pp. 7-8. 
5    Gray, “Is there an International Law of Remedies?”, in British Yearbook of International 
Law, vol. 56, 1985, pp. 25-38; id., Judicial Remedies in International Law, Calendon 
Press, 1987; Haasdijk, “The Lack of Uniformity in the Terminology of the International 
Law of Remedies”, in Leiden Journal of international law, vol. 5, 1992, pp. 245-263, at 
245. 
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synonym of reparation in the law of international responsibility, including 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction.6 Moreover, in the ILC Draft 
Articles on the international responsibility of States and of international 
organisations the term ‘remedies’ is employed only to indicate the rule of the 
previous exhaustion of local remedies concerning the admissibility of claims.7 
The term clearly refers to the procedural aspect of remedies, to be understood 
as the mechanisms available to the injured party within the responsible State’s 
domestic legal system and to the instruments provided by international 
organisations, that may also include arbitral tribunals, national courts or 
administrative bodies when an oorganization has accepted their competence 
to examine claims.8 
This leads us to consider that, although used to some extent in this 
context, the notion of remedies is generally not associated with the theory of 
international responsibility. On the contrary, the concept has been developed 
and is widely resorted to in the realm of human rights law. In the language of 
the law of international responsibility other concepts are preferred to the use 
of ‘remedies’, such as the invocation of responsibility, as part of the broader 
                                                 
6  Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, 
arts 31-34-35-36-37; Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, with 
Commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two, 
art. 31-34-35-36-37; see also Schachter, “International Law in Theory and Practice: 
General Course in Public International Law”, in Recueil des cours, vol. 178, 1982, pp. 1-
395; Stern, “The Obligation to Make Reparation”, in Crawford et al (eds), The Law of 
International Responsibility, Oxford, 2010, pp. 563-571; Shelton, “Righting Wrongs: 
Reparation in the Articles on State Responsibility”, in American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 96, 2002, pp. 833-856. 
7    Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 6, 
art. 44 (b) and Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 
6, art. 45, para. 2: “When the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies to a claim, an 
injured State or international organization may not invoke the responsibility of another 
international organization if any available and effective remedy has not been exhausted”.  
8  See Commentaries to art. 45 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International 
Organizations, supra note 6, paras 6-9; Cançado Trindade, “Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies and the Law of International Organizations”, in Revue de Droit International 
et de Sciences Diplomatiques, vol. 57, 1979, p. 81-123; id., The Application of the Rule 
of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
1983; Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
2004; Pisillo Mazzeschi, Esaurimento dei ricorsi interni e diritti umani, Giappichelli, 
2004; Thallinger, “The Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in the Context of the 
Responsibility of International Organizations”, in Nordic Journal of International Law, 
vol. 77, 2008, p. 401-428. 
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mechanism of the implementation of responsibility.9 In human rights law, 
remedies are the very content of an autonomous right, namely the right to an 
effective remedy, entrusted to individuals who are victims of human rights 
and international humanitarian law violations, as enshrined in several human 
rights treaties and contained in numerous authoritative statements.10 
The present study embraces the understanding of remedies as 
elaborated in human rights law and prefers it to other concepts of the parlance 
of the law of international responsibility, e.g. the implementation of 
responsibility. This lens of analysis allows one to better view the peculiarities 
of the legal relations existing between individuals and States or international 
organisations that are severely underdeveloped in the law of international 
responsibility, especially in the DARIO. In particular, the attention paid to the 
procedural aspects of remedies will enable one to draw a comprehensive 
picture of possible remedial actions in peace operations, including those 
concerning claims between States and international organisations. 11 
                                                 
9    Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 6, 
arts 42 ff. and Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 
6, arts 43 ff. 
10   European Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, Right to an effective remedy: “Everyone 
whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an 
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity”. Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, art. 47 Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. “Everyone 
whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right 
to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in 
this Article”; International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, art. 3, para 2: “Each 
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights 
or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any 
other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop 
the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall 
enforce such remedies when granted; Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147, 21 
March 2006. Art. 13 ECHR: Right to an effective remedy; International Law Association, 
Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, Hague Conference, 2010. The existence of an 
individual right to a remedy for IHL violations is contended both in national case law and 
in literature, the terms of the debate will be illustrated infra para 6.2. 
11   See for all Gaja, The Position of Individuals in International Law. An ILC Perspective, in 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 21, 2010, pp. 11-14. The issue of the position 
of the individual in international law and the evolution its role has undergone during the 
last century will be considered infra. 
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 The present chapter focuses on the remedies available in peace 
operations to victims of international law violations, whether States or 
individuals, considering both non-judicial and judicial remedies.  As to non- 
judicial or quasi-judicial remedies, the chapter analyses the structure and the 
functioning of various claims systems established in peace operations by 
international organisations and TCCs. Particular attention is devoted to the 
mechanisms devised by the UN and the EU during the international 
administration of Kosovo, namely to the Ombudsperson, the UNMIK Human 
Rights Advisory Panel and the EULEX Human Rights Review Panel, as well 
as to the UN and the NATO claims system. As to judicial remedies, the study 
will shed light on the increasing role played by domestic courts in 
adjudicating individual claims seeking an effective remedy for harms caused 
by the UN and by TCCs in peace operations. The core difficulties in bringing 
these claims before national courts will be highlighted, with particular 
attention to the recent debate concerning the nature and the scope of UN 
immunity from national jurisdiction. Remedies available to settle claims 
between States and between States and international organisations will also 
be discussed, by way of examining the normative framework regulating them. 
The understanding of the term remedies chosen in this chapter essentially 
concerns mainly its procedural aspect, which is to say, the set of mechanisms 
available to an injured party to seek reparation for damage suffered. However, 
the study will also take into consideration the substantive aspect of remedies, 
namely the outcome of the procedure or proceeding initiated by injured 
parties. The chapter investigates what type of remedy is generally granted to 
a claimant and whether the general principle of full compensation applies. 
 
 
 
2. The United Nations Claims System 
 
 Under the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations the UN has a general duty to provide for dispute settlement 
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mechanisms in order to allow plaintiffs to bring claims of private law 
character, whose justiciability would be otherwise precluded due to the 
jurisdictional immunity of the Organisation and of its personnel.12 Art.  VIII, 
section 29 of the General Convention prescribes that 
The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes 
of settlement of: 
 (a) Disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private 
law character to which the United Nations is a party; 
 (b) Disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by 
reason of his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not 
been waived by the Secretary-General.13 
 
Specifically concerning disputes arising from harmful outcomes of UN peace 
operations, art. 51 of the UN Model SOFA stipulates that disputes of a private 
law character involving a UN peacekeeping mission shall be settled by a 
‘standing claims commission’ composed of three members, one appointed by 
the UN, another by the host State, while a third, serving as chairman, would 
be nominated by the other two members.14 The commission's award would be 
final and binding, however with the possibility of appealing it before an ad 
hoc arbitration tribunal upon mutual agreement of the UN and the host State.15   
 In practice, the standing claims commission envisaged under the UN 
Model SOFA has never been established, resorting instead to a different 
mechanism, the ‘local claims review board’, generally established at the 
missions’ headquarters on the territory of the host State, upon the decision of 
each UN head of mission.16 These local boards can be defined as UN 
                                                 
12   Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (hereinafter General 
Convention or GCPI), 13 February 1946. 
13   Article VIII, section 29, italics added. 
14   A/45/594, 9 October 1990, art. 51. 
15   Ibidem, arts. 51 and 53. 
16   The missed establishment of the standing claims commission is acknowledged in several 
reports of the SG, see inter alia, A/51/389, para. 22. In order to explain this practice that 
does not abide by the terms of the relevant legal sources, the General Assembly 
maintained that “this [the fact that a standing claims commission has never been 
established] may have been the result of a lack of political interest on the part of host 
States, or because the claimants themselves may have found the existing procedure of 
local claims review boards expeditious, impartial and generally satisfactory”, A/51/903, 
para 8. This reasoning notwithstanding, it remains uncertain why the Organisation has 
never amended the 1990 Model SOFA to uphold this subsequent practice and why both 
the UN and host States continue to conclude SOFAs under which third party claims would 
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administrative organs operating in the receiving country and composed 
exclusively of UN personnel tasked with the settlement of third party claims 
for personal injury, death and property loss, as well as for damages 
attributable to acts performed in connection with official duties by civilian or 
military members of a mission.17 
 
 
 2.1. The ‘private law character’ of third party claims 
 
 According to art. VIII of the General Convention and to art. 51 of the 
UN Model SOFA, third party claims are receivable by a standing claims 
commission, rectius local claims review boards, insofar as the claims are ‘of 
private law character’. Despite the paramount importance of this notion to the 
functioning of the entire UN claims system, the ‘private law character’ of a 
dispute lacks an official definition. An interpretation of policy and legal 
documents of the Organisation, together with some claims practice, may help 
in seeking a tentative definition of the concept. 
 The reports of the Secretary General concerning third party claims in 
peace operations expressly exclude claims arising out of accidents involving 
UN vehicles, contractual claims and off-duty actions claims.18 The Secretary 
General has also enumerated the type of claims that are considered receivable 
under the UN claims system, including cases of personal injury and death, as 
well as damage and property losses. 
 One must also consider the peculiar use of the term ‘private law 
character’, which recalls the divide between public law and private law under 
                                                 
be settled by a never-to-be-established standing claims commission. See for example the 
SOFA of UNMISS signed in 2011, whose art. VIII, para. 55 provides this dispute-
settlement mechanism. See also the commentary edited by Reinisch, The Conventions on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. A 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2016. 
17   A/51/389, para 22. Schmalenbach, “Third Party Liability of International Organizations. 
A Study on Claim Settlement in the Course of Military Operations and International 
Administration”, in International Peacekeeping. The Yearbook of International Peace 
Operations, vol. 10, 2006, pp. 33-51, p. 42; Wellens, Remedies against international 
organisations, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 103 ff. 
18   A/51/389, note 1 and A/51/903, note 3. 
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domestic law and thus seems to suggest the intention to draw a distinction 
between damages occurred in the ordinary operation of the mission and those 
resulting from political or policy decisions of the Organisation. In other 
words, we may deem that a dispute of private law character concerns damages 
caused by a peace operation when the Organisation is acting as a ‘private law 
entity’, thus causing injuries that at the domestic level would be regulated 
most likely by domestic tort law. On the other hand, a claim would not be of 
private law character when its adjudication would imply an inquiry into the 
performance of the mission’s mandate, that is to say, a review of the exercise 
of UN powers. 
The case of the UN’s refusal to receive claims concerning health 
damages suffered by third parties as result of a lead contamination in an 
internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Mitrovica, Kosovo, under the 
responsibility of UNMIK, seems to support this understanding of ‘private law 
character’. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs declared the 
claims neither receivable under Section 29 of the General Convention nor 
under the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/52/247, stating that “the 
claims do not constitute claims of a private law character and, in essence, 
amount to a review of the performance of UNMIK’s mandate as the interim 
administration in Kosovo”.19 
         One would thus conclude that for a dispute to be deemed of private law 
character it must concern personal injuries, death, property loss or damage to 
an individual on the territory of the host State, caused by the ordinary 
operations of a UN peace operation; thus only when the adjudication of the 
claims does not require or imply a review of the performance of the mission’s 
mandate. However, a closer analysis of UN claims practice in peace 
operations raises some concerns as to the possible misuse of the notion by the 
Organisation, resulting in the exclusion of meritorious claims of reparation. 
For example, in the above-mentioned case of health damages deriving from 
lead pollution during UNMIK international administration of Kosovo, one 
                                                 
19   Letter of the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Patricia O'Brien concerning 
claim for compensation on behalf of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian residents of Internally 
Displaced Person camps in Mitrovica, Kosovo, 25 July 2011. 
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might rightly question whether this exclusion was too generic and too far-
reaching in rejecting any potential claims concerning those events. The case 
concerned the alleged responsibility of UNMIK for placing IDPs belonging 
to the Roma minority in camps contaminated by the mines located nearby, in 
the area of Trepča. As a result of the contamination and the lack of health 
treatment made available to the IDPs, 138 victims, including many children, 
were poisoned and several died. After being rejected by the claims board for 
the above-mentioned reasons, the claims were brought by the plaintiffs before 
the Human Rights Advisory Panel that found UNMIK responsible “for 
compromising irreversibly the life, health and development potential of 
children who were born and grew up in the camps”.20 This leads us to suspect 
that there were political implications in the adjudication of this case, and 
potentially high costs to compensate damage. One may thus wonder whether 
the ‘private character exception’ is intended to serve as a shield for the 
Organisation, especially in cases that would shed light on gross violations and 
on the related responsibility of the UN. 
 Another recent and critical example is the Haiti cholera case. In this 
case, the UN flatly refused to establish local review boards to address third 
party claims for death and health damages following the epidemic outbreak 
caused by the UN Nepalese contingent of MINUSTAH, a fact that has been 
proved by several sources.21 The letter of the UN Under-Secretary-General 
                                                 
20   Human Rights Advisory Panel, “The Human Rights Advisory Panel History and Legacy 
Kosovo, 2007-2016. Final Report”, 30 June 2016, hereinafter The Final Report, pp. 79-
82; Mivrov, “Local Impact of UN 'Accountability' Under International Law. The Rise and 
Fall of UNMIK's Human Rights Advisory Panel”, in International Peacekeeping, vol. 19, 
2012, p. 3-18; The plaintiffs had also filed a lawsuit against UNMIK before the ECtHR, 
that was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, see Human Rights Watch, “Better Late than 
Never. Enhancing the Accountability of International Institutions in Kosovo”, June 2007, 
p. 11. For a detailed analysis of the functioning of the Human Rights Advisory Panel, see 
infra para. 3.2. 
21   Global Health Justice Partnership, Yale Law School and Association Haitienne de Droit 
de L’Environnment, Peacekeeping without Accountability. The United Nations’ 
Responsibility for the Haitian Cholera Epidemic, 2013; Pavoni, Choleric notes on the 
Haiti Cholera Case, in QIL, 2015, p. 19; Freedman-Lemay Hebert, “Towards an 
Alternative Interpretation of UN Immunity. A Human Rights-Based Approach to the Haiti 
Cholera Case”, in Questions of International Law, 2015, pp. 5-18; Pillinger-Hurd-
Barnett, “How to Get Away with Cholera. The UN, Haiti, and International Law”, in 
Perspectives on Politics, vol. 14, 2016, pp. 70-86; Alvarez, “The United Nations in the 
Time of Cholera”, in AJIL Unbound, 4 April 2016; Statement by Professor Philip Alston, 
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, UN Responsibility for the 
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for Legal Affairs declared the claims not receivable pursuant to Section 29 of 
the General Convention because “consideration of these claims would 
necessarily include a review of political and policy matters”.22 Even though 
the letter does not mention the ‘private law character’ requirement, its 
relevance is evident from the reference made to Section 29 of the General 
Convention. It seems quite questionable that health claims of the local 
population should not be receivable under the UN claims system, especially 
considering the facts that led to the epidemic outbreak. Reportedly, the UN 
failure to properly screen the Nepalese contingent together with the negligent 
maintenance of sanitary facilities by the Nepalese troops caused the 
contamination. Both these activities (screening troops and running units’ 
facilities) are undoubtedly ordinary activities in a peace operation that relate 
to the routine planning and functioning of a mission, rather than to political 
and policy matters. 
 This case has had great resonance thanks to the association created by 
victims to seek justice and access to an effective remedy.23 As part of this 
action, the Haitian victims sued the United Nations before the Court of New 
York claiming the violation of their rights and challenging UN immunity on 
grounds of its alleged functional nature, conditional upon the existence of 
alternative remedies, that were denied in their case. As it will be explained 
further in this chapter, the suits (first instance and appeal) were unsuccessful 
in winning UN immunity but proved to be very successful in raising 
awareness and swaying public opinion, so much so that the UN was pressured 
into considering – for the first time – to give “cash payments from a proposed 
$400 million cholera response package”,24 especially after the statement by 
Professor Alston, Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, 
                                                 
Introduction of Cholera into Haiti, General Assembly 71st session, Third Committee, 
Item 6825, October 2016. 
22   Letter of the Under-Secretary-General, supra note 19, italics added.  
23  Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti and Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, 
http://www.ijdh.org. 
24   Sengupta-Katz, “U.N. Plans to Pay Victims of Cholera Outbreak It Caused in Haiti”, in 
New York Times, 24 October 2016, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/world/americas/haiti-united-nations-
cholera.html?smid=fb-share&_r=1. 
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affirming the “UN responsibility for the introduction of cholera into Haiti”.25 
 In conclusion, considering the precedents analysed thus far, one is left 
with the clear impression that the notion of ‘private law character’ of claims 
lacks a precise legal definition. The scope left to the interpretation of the 
terms, and thus to reject instances of claims settlements, seems to ensure a 
legal pathway for the Organization to avoid the costs of mass claims as well 
as potentially negative political implications that could stem from the 
adjudication of these claims.   
 
 
 2.1 The new claims policy of the United Nations: the era of limitations 
 
 Since the first UN peace operation, UNFEF I in 1956, the UN has 
handled third party claims through internal review mechanisms and 
mediation.26 The system of local claims review boards developed by the 
practice of the Organisation proved to be quite successful in dealing with 
operation-related third party claims at the early stage of UN peace operations. 
Despite the initial success of these mechanisms, the growing number of UN 
peacekeeping operations deployed after the end of the Cold War and the 
related increased number of claims highlighted the shortcomings of the 
existing system. 
 The unsatisfactory claims experience in Congo first and later in the 
Balkans are illustrative of the difficulties faced by both the Organisation and 
the claimants. By way of example, the local review boards’ procedures in the 
ONUC mission was so lengthy and ineffective that the boards remained 
operational for three years after the end of the mission, until 1967 and, despite 
the extension, at that time not all claims were espoused, with the consequence 
                                                 
25   Statement by Professor Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights, UN Responsibility for the Introduction of Cholera into Haiti, supra note 
21. 
26   Schmalenbach, “Dispute Settlement (Article VIII Sections 29-30 General Convention)”, 
in Reinisch (ed.), The Conventions, supra note 16, pp. 529-587; Spagnolo, L'attribuzione 
delle condotte illecite nelle operazioni militari dell'Unione europea, Editoriale 
Scientifica, 2016, pp.185-187. 
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that the remaining claims had to be handled directly by the UN headquarter 
until 1970.27 
 The UNPROFOR claims system in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia 
received numerous submissions, some for very high amounts, that challenged 
the limited financial and human resources of the mission.28 The workload due 
to the scarse personnel available to investigate claims, together with the 
impossibility to compensate the high amounts claimed, caused widespread 
dissatisfaction among the civilian population that gave rise to several 
incidents of local people taking the law into their own hands. It was reported 
that locals, who believed to have been waiting too long to have their claims 
settled, had stolen UN vehicles with the support of local police, especially in 
areas controlled by the Serbs.29 Furthermore, the governments of Bosnia 
Herzegovina and Croatia jointly submitted a claim for about 70 million US 
dollars claiming the liability of the UN for damage caused to roads and main 
infrastructure.30 Following this claim, the General Assembly in 1996 called 
for urgent reform of the UN claims policy with the aim of introducing several 
ceilings to reduce UN liability towards third parties.31 
 The Secretary General upheld the request of the General Assembly 
and elaborated a new liability policy centred on limitations and ceiling 
imposed both on the admissibility of claims and on the maximum amount of 
compensation. These limits were divided into three categories: temporal, 
financial and subject-matter limitations.32 The UN General Assembly 
endorsed the recommendations of the 1997 Secretary-General Report in 
Resolution 52/247 of 17 July 1998 that officially introduced the new third 
party liability policy of the UN. These new limitations became legally binding 
                                                 
27   Idem. Schmalenbach, “Dispute Settlement”, supra note 26. 
28   Prescott, “Claims” in Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, 159-186, p. 172. 
29    Idem. See also Report of the Secretary General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of 
the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, A/51/389, para 8. 
30    Shraga, “UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law 
and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage”, in American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 94, 2000, pp. 406-412, at p. 410; see also NATO Legal Deskbook, 
2010, p. 274 ff. 
31    A/51/13. 
32    A/51/389. 
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on Member States due to the liability clauses contained in missions SOFAs, 
which mirror the general principles of limited liability provided in GA RES 
52/247.33 
 
 
  2.2.1. Temporal and financial limitations 
  
 GA RES  52/247 of 1998 prescribes a time limit within which a claim 
can be submitted to the local review board: six-month from the time the 
damage was sustained or discovered by the injured party, and in any event no 
later than one year after the termination of the mandate.34 
 Several limitations were also imposed on the financial liability of the 
Organization, namely by excluding some types of losses from compensation 
and by setting a maximum ceiling on the compensable amount. According to 
the SG Report, only the economic loss related to personal injury, illness and 
death is compensable, while non-economic loss such as “pain and suffering 
and mental anguish” are excluded from UN liability.35 In any case, the 
maximum amount of compensation due to a claimant shall not exceed 50,000 
US dollars, even if in exceptional circumstances the Secretary General, 
following a specific authorisation by the General Assembly, may determine 
that a particular case would justify the need to exceed this financial 
                                                 
33  A/51/903, paras 37-41. See also art. VII of the Status of Force Agreement between the 
United Nations and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan concerning the 
United Nations Missions in South Sudan (UNMISS), that titles “Limitation of Liability of 
the United Nations”: “Third party claims for property loss or damage and for personal 
injury, illness of death arising from or directly attribute to UNMISS, except for those 
arising from operational necessity … shall be … submitted within six months following 
the occurrence of the loss, damage or injury or, if the claimant did not know or could not 
reasonably have known of such loss or injury, within six months from the time he or she 
had discovered the loss or injury, but in any event not later than one year after the 
termination of the mandate of the operation. Upon determination of liability as provided 
in this Agreement, the United Nations shall pay compensation within such financial 
limitations as have been approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 52/247 of 26 
July 1998”, italics added. 
34   A/51/903, 1997, paras 17-20. 
35   Economic loss typically includes medical expenses, loss of income or financial support, 
medical expenses and burial expenses. See A/51/903, para. 25, see also A/RES/52/247, 
para. 9. 
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limitation.36 
 This new claims policy contemplates a further rule in cases of 
damages resulting from gross negligence or wilful misconduct of members of 
the force in the course of a UN peace operation. In such case, the UN would 
assume liability in compensation towards third parties, while retaining at the 
same time the right to seek recovery from the responsible individual or 
sending State. Under similar circumstances, financial limitations would not 
apply.37  
  
 
 2.2.2 The subject-matter admissibility criterion: the ‘operational 
necessity’ exception 
 
 GA Resolution 52/247 introduced a further limitation to compensable 
claims. Under the exception based on the suggestion proposed by the SG in 
his 1996 Report on budgetary and financial aspects of peacekeeping 
operations38, damage is not compensable when it resulted from “necessary 
actions taken by a peacekeeping force in the course of carrying out its 
operations in pursuance of the mandate”.39 
 ‘Operational necessity’ echoes to some extent the concept of military 
necessity in jus in bello; it cannot be defined in advance because it depends 
on the discretionary powers of the force commander.40 In describing the 
notion, the Secretary General, rather than providing for a formal definition, 
indicated four cumulative criteria against which local claims review board 
should assess, ex post facto, whether the impugned acts where carried out in 
the exercise of operational necessity. First, the force commander should deem 
                                                 
36   A/RES/52/247, para. 9, let. e). 
37   A/51/903, para. 14; A/RES/52/247, para. 7.  
38   A/51/389, para. 13 ff. 
39   Ibidem, para. 13. 
40   See art. 48 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions; Draper, “Military Necessity 
and Humanitarian Imperatives”, in Revue de droit pénal militaire et de droit de la guerre, 
vol. 12, 1973, pp. 129-151; Dunbar, “The Significance of Military Necessity in the Law 
of War”, in Juridical Review, vol. 67, 1955, pp. 201-212; Gardam, Necessity, 
Proportionality and the Use of Force by States, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
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in good faith that an operational necessity existed. Second, the harmful act 
should be strictly necessary and not carried out for mere convenience or 
expediency. Third, the act should be part of an operational plan. Fourth, the 
damage caused should be proportional to the achievement of the operational 
goal anticipated.41 
 The notion of operational necessity did not originate in the 1996 
Secretary General Report, on the contrary it was already mentioned in the 
1958 UNEF I Report by SG Hammarskjold and later also in the agreement 
between the UN and Canada regulating the contribution of Canadian forces 
to UNFICYP mission.42 Initially, the concept of operational necessity was 
developed by the UN to justify the non-consensual use of privately-owned 
property and premises. 
 Host States generally have a duty to provide the UN and the mission 
with the necessary premises, and in case of occupation of private property by 
the mission, the host State should bear the burden of compensation.43 More 
precisely, when the receiving State does not abide by its obligation to make 
adequate premises available to the UN, and the Organisation shoulders the 
burden of compensation, the UN should pay adequate compensation 
calculated on the fair rental value of the property. In this case, the UN has a 
right to seek redress from the host State.44 Moreover, while claims by private 
parties should be submitted to the host State that has the prime responsibility 
in compensation, it has often happened in the practice of UN peace operations 
that third parties sought redress directly from the Organisation.45 In order to 
                                                 
41   A/51/389, para. 14. Shraga, “UN Peacekeeping Operations”, supra note 30, pp. 410-411. 
Arsanjani, “Claims against International Organizations: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes”, 
in Yale Journal of World Public Order, vol. 7, 1981, pp. 131-176. 
42   A/3943, para. 142: “The question of privately-owned land used because of operational 
necessity, and for that reason required to be provided under the Agreement, has been the 
subject of discussion between Egyptian authorities and the Secretary-General…”, italics 
added. 
43  These obligations are generally prescribed in the SOFAs concluded between the 
Organisation and the host states, see Schmalenbach, “Third Part Liability of International 
Organizations”, supra note 17; Shraga, “UN Peacekeeping Operations, supra note 30, p. 
411. 
44   UN Model SOFA, art. 16, see also A/51/389, paras 9-12. 
45   See for example the case of UNEF I, where many property-related claims were submitted 
to UNEF by the Egyptian Liaison Office. Following an agreement with the government 
under which it was established a joint assessment procedure according to which Egypt 
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limit to the maximum extent possible for this type of claims, the UN has thus 
developed the operational necessity rule. 
  
 
2.3. Lump Sums Agreements in the Congo 
 
 The practice of UN claims has also been characterised by rare cases 
of third party claims settled by lump sums agreements concluded between the 
UN and the State of nationality of the claimants, acting in diplomatic 
protection. In the course of ONUC mission in Congo in the late 1960s the UN 
agreed to resolve claims for damages and injuries to foreign citizens occurred 
in the territory of the Congo and attributable to the mission by way of lump 
sums agreements.46 These agreements were concluded, in the form of 
exchange of letters, with the governments of Belgium, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland.47 As a result, the UN undertook to pay a fixed 
amount of compensation to each State, while the responsibility to distribute 
the sums among the entitled plaintiffs rested on the State of nationality. By 
accepting the sum offered by the UN, the claimants waived any further cause 
of action against the Organisation, while at the same time the States accepted 
                                                 
assisted UNEF in the oversight of the property allegedly damaged or occupied. Upon the 
assessment carried out, the UNEF undertook the commitment to pay compensation to 
third party and to seek redress from the Egyptian government on due course. In this case, 
damages resulted from operational necessity were found compensable as result of an 
intense negotiation on this issue with the Egyptian government. As it has been observed 
by some commentators Egypt stand out from the general lack of interest of host state in 
protecting the interests of third party claims that suffered damages on their territory. 
A/3943, 3 October 1958, para. 142, see also Schmalenbach, “Dispute Settlement”, supra 
note 26. 
46  Hirsch, The Responsibility of International Organizations Toward Third Parties: Some 
Basic Principles, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995; Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support 
Operations, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, p. 80 ff.; Wouters-Schmitt, “Challenging Acts of 
Other United Nations’ Organs, Subsidiary Organs and Officials”, in Reinisch (ed.), 
Challenging Acts of International Organisations Before National Courts, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, pp. 77-110. 
47   United Nations and Belgium Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Relating to 
the Settlement of Claims Filed Against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian 
Nationals, 20 February 1965. Identical provisions were included in analogous lump sums 
agreements concluded with Italy, Greece, Luxembourg and Switzerland. With regard to 
the same operation, further settlements were made with Zambia, the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France and also 
with the International Committee of the Red Cross, see Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra note 6, art. 36, para. 1. 
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to provide for complementary compensation of meritorious claims when the 
amount decided by the UN was not deemed equitable. 
 Although the instrument of lump sums agreements has been 
frequently resorted to in order to settle international claims in other realms of 
international law, it has never been replicated in the practice of third party 
claims in peace operations.48 Some commentators have identified the 
uniqueness of the ONUC case in the political reasons that led to the choice of 
this means of dispute settlement. Reportedly, many States in the General 
Assembly refused the hypothesis to establish local claims boards or other 
forms of ad hoc mechanisms to receive individual claims for Belgian citizens, 
that were considered by many responsible of the dreadful situation in the 
Congo that led to UN intervention.49 Moreover, the UN preferred not to go 
into a detailed analysis of the activities – and possible violations – carried out 
by ONUC forces, nor to incur the high cost – in terms of compensation 
amounts and personnel – necessary to handle a high number of individual 
claims. Eventually, the idea to settle third party claims by lump sums 
agreement, hence by una tantum compensation agreements, seemed to 
accommodate the interests both of the UN and of States acting in diplomatic 
protection. 
 The ONUC example was thus considered by many commentators and 
decision-makers as a successful precedent; however, the fact that these 
agreements represent a unicum in the experience of third party claims raises 
some important questions. One can argue that two reasons may have led to 
the de facto lack of success of this precedent, which was never repeated in 
UN claims practice. First, one can contemplate a burden-sharing problem 
between the UN and States of nationality of the claimants; one also cannot 
ignore the likely negative consequences for the UN should it acknowledge its 
                                                 
48   Lillich, International Claims. Their Settlement by Lump Sum Agreements, University 
Press of Virginia, 1975; Weston-Lillich-Bederman, International Claims: Their 
Settlement by Lump Sum Agreements, 1975-1995, Transnational, 1999; id., “Lump Sum 
Agreements. Their Continuing Contribution to the Law of International Claims”, in 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 82, 1988, pp. 69-80. 
 49  Wouters-Schmitt, “Challenging Acts of Other United Nations’ Organs”, supra note 46, p. 
105. 
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international responsibility in peace operations. 
 As it concerns the burden-sharing problem, one can make the 
hypothesis that States may not be willing to participate in the claims 
settlement process because it may turn out very costly. For example, States 
can be asked to provide for elaborate internal procedures to distribute the 
sums among meritorious claimants. States also risk to be sued by those 
claimants that consider their right to an equitable compensation was breached 
by the lump sums agreement or by the internal procedure.50 Considering that 
most UN Members States contribute financially and also directly with their 
personnel and assets to UN peace operations, and given that the UN has a 
specific obligation to settle third party claims by establishing specific 
procedures under the General Convention and the SOFA,51 it is not 
inconceivable that member States may have avoided to shoulder a burden 
considered excessive compared to that carried by the Organisation itself. 
 As to the issues concerning the responsibility of the UN, a preliminary 
analysis of the text of the agreements is in order. In the letter dated 20 
February 1965 the Secretary General U Thant stated  
The United Nations has agreed that the claims of Belgian nationals 
who may have suffered damage as a result of harmful acts committed 
by ONUC personnel, and not arising from military necessity, should 
be dealt with in an equitable manner. 
It has stated that it would not evade responsibility where it was 
established that United Nations agents had in fact caused unjustifiable 
damage to innocent parties.52 
                                                 
50    Schmitt, “Mendelier v Organisation des Nations Unies et Etat Belge (Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangères), Tribunal Civil, 11 May 1966, Journal de Tribunaux, 10 December 
1966, No. 4553, 121”, in Ryngaert et al. (eds), Judicial Decisions on the Law of 
International Organisations, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 364-374. In the present 
case the plaintiff argued that the UN was bound to provide for appropriate methods of 
settlement for third-party disputes of a private law character in accordance with Article 
VIII, section 29 of the General Convention. The claimant argued that this failure was in 
breach of Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights and of Article 6 of 
the ECHR. The UN maintained that the lump sum agreement concluded with the Belgian 
constituted an appropriate method of dispute settlement under article VIII, section 29. 
The tribunal rejected the UN argument, stating that “the UN took a unilateral decision by 
which [...] it believed itself bound to limit its spontaneous intervention”. This reasoning 
notwithstanding, the Tribunal eventually dismissed Mr Menderlier case upholding the 
UN defence on absolute immunity from jurisdiction. The judgement was later affirmed 
by the Appeals Court.  
51   General Convention, art. VIII, Section 29. 
52   United Nations and Belgium Exchange of Letters, supra note 47. 
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In this section the UN expressly acknowledged its responsibility for 
‘unjustifiable damage’ caused by its agents. It is not clear, however, towards 
whom it would bear this responsibility, whether towards the ‘innocent parties’ 
or the State itself. Another passage of the Agreement referred to the ‘financial 
responsibility’ that the UN must bear in a ‘list of individual cases’, suggesting 
that the responsibility should be understood vis à vis third parties. 
As to the legal concepts recalled by the Organisation in the Letter, 
some elements of confusion can be noted. In the first section analysed above, 
the UN used the notion of ‘responsibility’, that is later defined ‘financial 
responsibility’, as follows 
Upon the entry into force of this exchange of letters, the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations shall supply to the Belgian Government all 
information at his disposal which might be useful in effecting the 
distribution of the sum in question, including the list of individual cases 
in which the United Nations has considered that it must bear financial 
responsibility, and any other information relevant to the determination of 
such responsibility. 
 
The concept of ‘financial responsibility’ is unusual in the realm of 
international responsibility of international organisations and it seems closer 
to the notion of ‘liability’ that has later become the core of UN claims policy, 
as illustrated earlier in chapter II.53 A further element of confusion in the 
language of the Agreement lies with the use of the notion of liability, where 
the Organisation raised the military-necessity exception, excluding its 
liability for damage   
[...] the United Nations does not assume liability for damage to persons 
or property which resulted solely from military operations or which, 
although caused by third parties, has given rise to claims against the 
United Nations; such cases are therefore excluded from the proposed 
compensation.54 
 
In sum, the UN used interchangeably the notions of ‘responsibility’, 
‘financial responsibility’ and ‘liability’, with the result of a general 
                                                 
53   Supra chapter II, about the set of limitation see for all A/51/389. 
54  United Nations and Belgium Exchange of Letters, supra note 47, italics added. 
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uncertainty of the legal concepts involved. In other words, it is not clear 
whether the UN incurred its international responsibility, hence implying the 
acknowledgement that its actions were internationally wrongful; or whether 
it intended to recognise the damage caused without an assessment on the 
conduct’s wrongfulness, thus assuming its liability for damage (or ‘financial 
responsibility’). 
  
 
 3. The experience of UNIMIK and EULEX in Kosovo: the Human 
Rights Advisory Panel and Human Rights Review Panel 
 
 Following SC Resolution 1244 (1999), the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) was deployed with the mandate to carry out the interim 
administration of the territory of Kosovo, pending the final determination on 
its status.55 UNMIK was empowered both to exercise legislative and 
executive authority and to administer the justice system. The Special 
Representative to the Secretary General and the Secretary General who 
headed UNMIK’s chain of command, together exercised governmental 
functions by imposing their authority over the inhabitants of Kosovo. As an 
interim administration, UNMIK was thus positioned, not differently than any 
national governmental authority, to infringe upon individual rights and violate 
human rights standards and it was indeed accused of several such abuses and 
violations.56 The variety and extent of quasi-governmental powers of the 
                                                 
55 Milano, “Security Council Action in the Balkans. Reviewing the Legality of Kosovo’s 
Territorial Status”, in European Journal of International Law, vol. 14, 2003, pp. 999-
1022; id., Formazione dello Stato e processi di ‘state-building’ nel diritto internazionale. 
Kosovo 1999-2013, Editoriale Scientifica, 2013; Ryngaert, “The Accountability of 
International Organizations for Human Rights Violations. The Case of the UN Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN ‘Terrorism Blacklist’”, in Fitzmaurice-Merkouris (eds), 
The Interpretation and Application of the European Convention of Human Rights. Legal 
and Practical Implications, Nijhoff, 2013, pp. 73-91; Knoll-Uhl, “Too Little, Too Late. 
The Human Rigths Advisory Panel in Kosovo”, in European Human Rights Law Review, 
vol. 12, 2007, pp. 534-549; Palchetti, “Les autorités provisoires de gouvernement (PISG) 
du Kosovo, EULEX et ONU. Les principes d'attribution à l'é́preuve”, in Revue Belge de 
Droit International, vol. 47, 2013, pp. 45-5. 
56 Many allegations were made against UNMIK police, accused of brutality, looting and 
excessive use of force against individuals, especially during riots in the Mitrovica 
province. UNMIK was also accused of illegal seizures of private property, unlawful 
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interim administration were not, therefore, duly counterbalanced by the 
establishment of judicial review mechanisms as a system based on the rule of 
law would prescribe. Furthermore, in August 2000 UNMIK regulation n. 47 
stated the immunity of UNMIK, KFOR and related personnel from any legal 
process, thereby halting any chance of judicial checks and balances.57 
 UNMIK’s ‘superpower’ raised serious concerns among scholars and 
human rights advocates as to the lack of responsibility characterising 
Kosovo’s administration.58 In response to these allegations, UNMIK 
established some accountability and liability mechanisms to receive 
individual claims, namely the Ombudsperson,59 the Human Rights Advisory 
Panel (HRAP)60 and the Claims Commission.61 
 
 
 
                                                 
detentions and generally for violating the right to an effective remedy. See Istrefi, “Should 
the United Nations Create an Independent Human Rights Body in a Transitional 
Administration”, in Wouters et al. (eds), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by 
International Organisations, Intersetia, 2010, pp. 355-372, at p. 355; Amnesty 
International, “Kosovo, Setting the Standard? UNMIK and KFOR's Response to the 
Violence in Mitrovica”, March 2000; see also the various reports issued by the Office of 
the Ombudsperson on specific topics, inter alia, “Special Report No. 4, Certain Aspects 
of UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/18 on the Establishment of a Detention Review 
Commission for Extra-Judicial Detention Based on Executive Orders”, 12 September 
2001; Human Rights Watch, “Better Late than Never. Enhancing the Accountability of 
International Institutions in Kosovo”, June 2007. 
57 UNMIK/REG/2000/47, 18 August 2000. 
58 Human Rights Watch, “Better Late than Never.”, supra note 56; Venice Commission, 
“Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo. Possible Establishment of Review Mechanisms”, 
Opinion no. 280/2004, CDL-AD (2004)033, Strasbourg, 11 October 2004. 
59 Infra, para. 3.1. 
60 Infra, para. 3.2. 
61 UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47, section 7, provided for the establishment of UNMIK 
and KFOR claims commissions to settle third party claims for “property loss or damage 
and for personal injury, illness or death arising from or directly attributed to KFOR, 
UNMIK or their respective personnel and which do not arise from 'operational 
necessity'”. According to Human Rights Watch and to the Venice Commission, the lack 
of public information on the creation and operating of these claims commissions made 
impossible to determine whether they had ever been established. Human Rights Watch, 
“Better Late than Never.”, supra note 56, p. 18; Venice Commission, “Opinion on Human 
Rights in Kosovo”, supra note 58, pp. 13-14. Admittedly, the UNMIK claims commission 
did come into existence in consideration of the provision contained in the Administrative 
Direction No. 2009/1, section, 2.2, under which the criterion of the previous exhaustion 
of all available domestic avenues to determine the admissibility of a case before the 
HRAP encompassed explicitly “third party claims process or proceeding”. For further 
analysis of the HRAP, its subsequent reforms and the admissibility criteria, see infra, 
para. 3.2. 
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3.1 The UNMIK Ombudsperson 
 
 The Ombudsperson was established by UNMIK regulation 2000/38 
and charged to “receive and investigate complaints from any person or entity 
in Kosovo concerning human rights violations and actions constituting an 
abuse of authority by the interim administration or any emerging central and 
local institution”.62 Besides receiving claims, the Ombudsperson was also 
entitled to initiate ex officio investigations.63 The main shortcoming of this 
institution is to be found in its limited, if any, enforcement powers, whereby 
the Ombudsperson was only able to make recommendations to the Secretary 
General and to suggest the adoption of specific measures. Despite its limited 
powers, the Ombudsperson was soon regarded as a trusted human rights 
defender. Polish human rights lawyer Marek Antonin Nowicki, along with 
Hilmi Jashari as deputy, together built for the office an admirable reputation.64 
Furthermore, the Ombudsperson issued regular reports providing both for an 
annual comprehensive assessment of its activity and for an account on 
specific issues that contributed to the dissemination, outreach and 
transparency of the institution’s work.65 
 In February 2006, UNMIK issued Regulation no. 6 providing for the 
so called ‘Kosovarization’ of the office of the Ombudsperson, which was no 
longer under the auspices of UNMIK, to become a local institution. This 
change was advocated as part of the local-ownership process in light of the 
progressive transfer of powers from the interim administration to the 
developing local institutions, following the 2001 Constitutional Framework 
                                                 
62 UNMIK regulation No. 2000/38, section 3.1. It is worth noting that the Ombudsperson 
also had jurisdiction over NATO KFOR's actions based on an agreement with the 
Commander of the Kosovo Forces (COMKFOR). For a detailed analysis of this 
institution see Murati, “The Ombudsperson Institution vs the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK)”, in Wouters et al. (eds), Accountability, supra note 58, p. 373, see 
also Istrefi, “Should the United Nations Create an Independent Human Rights Body”, 
supra note 58. 
63UNMIK regulation No. 2000/38, section 3.1. 
64Besides the central body, the institution established also satellite offices throughout Kosovo 
in order to penetrate the territory and reach out to almost all communities, Human Rights 
Watch, “Better Late than Never.”, supra note 56, p.13. 
65 Human Rights Watch Report, Venice Commission; Murati, “The Ombudsperson 
Institution vs the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)”, supra note 56. 
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for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo.66 However, this change in nature 
from an international to local authority brought about a radical modification 
in the functioning of the Ombudsperson, whereby the institution was 
essentially deprived of its powers as Regulation 2006/6 stipulated that 
UNMIK actions were no longer within its jurisdiction.67 The impact of this 
reform in the institutional framework can be seen through the lens of statistics 
provided in the Ombudsperson annual reports, according to which in the 
period between 2000 and 2009 it received approximately 1,400 complaints, 
while after the mandate change, the number of cases diminished 
precipitously, approaching zero.68   
  
 
3.2 The UNMIK Human Rights Advisory Panel 
 
 The Human Rights Advisory Panel (HRAP) was established pursuant 
to UNMIK Regulation 2006/12 in March 2006 and became operational in 
November 2007, following the appointment of the three members forming 
the panel, and completed its mandate in June 2016.69 The HRAP was the 
quasi-judicial mechanism that de facto substituted the Ombudsperson after its 
‘Kosovarization’. It was mandated to examine individual complaints of 
violations of human rights, as set forth in the main human rights treaty 
bodies,70 attributable to UNMIK. It received complaints relating to actions or 
                                                 
66 UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9 of 15 May 2001. 
67 Ibidem, section 3. A residual option was envisaged in the regulation concerning the 
possibility for the Ombudsperson to enter into agreements with the Secretary-General to 
establish “procedures for dealing with cases involving UNMIK”, ibidem, section 3.4. 
There are no reports that any form of cooperation had actually been established, due to 
the “no-answer-policy” undertaken by UNMIK, see Istrefi, supra note 53, p. 362. Under 
this new legal framework, the Ombudsperson lost its capacity to deal with KFOR cases, 
see Human Rights Watch, “Better Late than Never”, supra note 56, p. 14. 
68 Mivrov, “Local Impact of 'UN Accountability' Under International Law. The Rise and 
Fall of UNMIK's Human Rights Advisory Panel”, in International Peacekeeping, vol. 19, 
2012, p. 3-18. 
69 UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12, 23 March 2006; Human Rights Advisory Panel, The 
Final Report; Mivrov, supra note 68; Milano, Formazione dello Stato e processi di ‘state-
building’ nel diritto internazionale, supra note 55, pp. 159 ff.; Istrefi, supra note 53. The 
HRAP was composed of three members appointed by SRSG upon the proposal of the 
President of the European Court of Human Rights. 
70   UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12, 23 March 2006, section 1.2, enumerated the following 
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omissions that occurred from 23 April 2009 onwards; applications were 
receivable until 31 March 2010.71 The outcome of this unprecedented 
oversight mechanism was limited to the submission of final findings and 
recommendations to the SRSG. 
 The applications received by the Panel concerned mainly property 
cases, the responsibility of UNMIK for failure to investigate into 
disappearance, abduction and unlawful killings, and access to justice, and two 
high profile cases concerning the killing and injuring by UNMIK police of 
four demonstrators in Pristina in March 2004 and the lead contamination of 
the Roma internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in the UNMIK camp in 
the proximity of Trepca mines, as mentioned before.72 
 The creation of the Human Rights Advisory Panel seemed a promising 
initiative, showing the UN’s goodwill to fill the accountability gap underlying 
its activities in peace operations, in general, and of UNMIK, in particular. 
However, since its inception, serious shortcomings in the HRAP architecture 
hindered the functioning of this newly-created mechanism. It was soon 
contested that, as an entity created by UNMIK, the HRAP was hardly to be 
considered an independent body, the panellists were appointed by the SRSG 
and the institutional framework governing its functioning was designed by 
UNMIK itself, issuing regulations and administrative directions.  
Despite these ontological limitations, the HRAP’s independence and 
impartiality was achieved through the appointment of qualified and 
outstanding panellists, whose candidacy was subject to the proposal of the 
                                                 
instruments as the HRAP institutional framework: a) The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 10 December 1948; b) The European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and the Protocols 
thereto; c) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 
and the Protocols thereto; d) The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights of 16 December 1966; e) The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965; f) The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 17 December 1979; g) The Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 17 
December 1984; and h) The Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 December 1989. 
71   Ibidem, section 2. The cut-off day was set forth in the Administrative Direction No. 
2009/1, section 5. 
72  A detailed analyses of cases examined by the HRAP is provided in its “HRAP Final 
Report”, 30 June 2016, paras 139-228; see also Mivrov, supra note 68, pp. 11-13. 
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ECtHR’s President. 73 However, the HRAP’s functioning faced serious 
challenges due to the non-cooperative approach of the SRSG, who undertook 
a very intrusive policy in the exercise of its prerogatives. As it will be 
illustrated below, the SRGR issued regulations and orders that limited and 
eventually subverted the authority and the powers of the Panel, while no 
cooperation was granted to the HARP and its recommendations were not 
implemented. 
 On several occasions the SRSG stressed that the HRAP was “neither 
a judicial, nor a quasi-judicial body, but simply an advisory panel” of 
UNMIK, thus functional to the mission, as it was only entitled to issue 
findings and recommendations; while the authority to take any action rested 
solely with the SRSG and ultimately with the SG.74 In this spirit, the SRSG 
felt entitled to cancel the public hearing of one of the most important cases 
brought to the attention of the HRAP, the Balaj et al. concerning the alleged 
violence of UNMIK police in Pristina that caused the death of two 
demonstrators and serious injuries to two others.75 In the opinion of the SRSG 
the public hearing was believed to put forward a misconception of the powers 
entrusted with the HRAP, which was not a court. When the HRAP decided 
not to cancel the hearing, but to hold it at closed doors, its work was harshly 
criticised by the SRSG, according to whom the adversarial mode under which 
the hearing was conducted was inappropriate for an advisory panel and it left 
room for complainants to misuse the hearing as a “forum that holds court over 
                                                 
73   UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12, section 5. Despite this guarantee of independence and 
impartiality, the tense relationship between the SGRG and the HRAP also affected the 
appointment of the panellists; for example, for several months in 2009 the members had 
to work without a formal charge as their mandate had expired without being renewed. 
Furthermore, the mandate renewal was limited by the SGRS to a few months instead of 
a full year as provided in UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12, impairing the operation of 
the Panel. Also the election of a new member, following the resignation of a component, 
caused major problems and paralysed the HRAP for several months. Finally, the 
appointment process was revised by the Administrative Direction 2009/1, section 3.1, 
under which “[i]f no proposals or an insufficient number of proposals are received by 
UNMIK within a period of one calendar month of such request, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General may make the necessary appointment without 
the requested proposal and following consultation with relevant international Human 
Rights bodies”. See HRAP Final Report, 30 June 2016, para. 107 ff. 
74   See the HRAP Final Report, para. 83, where it is reported a quotation from the letter from 
SRSG to HRAP Secretariat Executive Officer, 15 December 2008. 
75   A detailed oversight of the case is presented in the HRAP Final Report, para. 62 ff. 
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UNMIK or the UN”.76 
 Following these events in October 2009, in order to reduce once for 
all the espace de manoeuvre of the HRAP, UNMIK issued Administrative 
Direction No. 2009/1(hereinafter AD), prescribing various limitations. Public 
hearings were only allowed if held “in such a manner and setting that allow a 
clear sense of non-adversarial proceedings”.77 It introduced the cut-off date 
for submission of complaints of 31 March 2010, allegedly due to the limited 
involvement of UNMIK in the transition phase from that moment on.78 
Moreover, the HRAP was no longer entitled to interpret the admissibility 
criteria, namely the rule of the previous exhaustion of all available avenues. 
Section 2.2 of the AD prescribed that cases submitted for compensation to the 
UNMIK Claims Commission, established pursuant to UNMIK regulation 
2000/47, were to be declared inadmissible.79 The implementation of this 
amendment caused the HRAP to dismiss, as inadmissible, the two highest 
profile pending cases, even if they were found admissible prior to the entry 
into force of the AD.80 
                                                 
76   Ibidem, para 87 ff. See the letter from SRSG to the HRAP Presiding Member, 8 May 
2009, cited in the Final Report, para. 88, footnote 70. 
77   Administrative Direction No. 2009/1, 17 October 2009, section 1.1. 
78   Ibidem, section 5. 
79   Ibidem, section 2.2. 
80  Mivrov, supra note 68. In the opinion of the author the Administrative Direction was 
serving not only the purpose of limiting HRAP powers, in general, but it aimed 
specifically at the dismissal of the complaints whose examination risked to highlight 
major violations and responsibility by UNMIK, namely the Balaj and Others and the X 
and Others. It should be noted that after the UN Claims Commission rejected the claims 
of  X and Others, the 138 victims of the lead contamination in the IDP camps in the 
Mitrovica region, the HRAP found the case admissible again and in 2015 finally gave its 
opinion affirming UNMIK responsibility for health damages to the plaintiffs suffered as 
a consequence of the UNMIK decision to establish the camps in that area, and the later 
omissions of not moving the camps upon the allegations of severe pollution of soil and 
water and for the lack of health care offered to the claimants. See HRAP Final Report, 
paras 227-228. Despite the firm opposition of UNMIK, the HRAP was able to reopen 
also the Balaj and Others case, concerning the deaths and injuries occurred following the 
riots in the Mitrovica region. Setting a precedent, later named the Balaj exception the 
HRAP considered the claim receivable even if it was re-submitted after the cut-off date 
(namely in 2012) because of the time needed by the claims commission to process the 
claim. The HRAP based its decision upon the consideration that the deadline was initially 
met by the first submission, and by the fact the applicable regulation has change after the 
claims was filed before the Panel. Also in this case, the HRAP found that UNMIK violated 
human rights standards, by failing to investigate into the incident and by using excessive 
force against protesters, considered by the Panel “disproportionate and not necessary in a 
democratic society”. See HRAP Final Report, paras 225-228.  
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 Underscoring the antagonistic relationship between the HRAP and 
UNMIK, observers have noted that not a single recommendation issued by 
the Panel to offer compensation to the victims or to provide for other means 
of reparation, as for example official excuses, was undertaken by the SGRG, 
during the entire mandate of the HRAP.81 
 
 
 
3.3 The EULEX Human Rights Review Panel 
 
 In February 2008, few days before the unilateral declaration of 
independence of Kosovo of 17 February 2008, the Council of the European 
Union established the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), with 
the mandate to assist Kosovo in developing the rule of law, namely in the 
domain of police, justice and customs, hence EULEX was intended to 
progressively substitute UNMIK in its Pillar I functions.82 
 Largely inspired by the UNMIK HRAP, the EULEX Human Rights 
Review Panel (HRRP) was established pursuant to a decision of the EU of 20 
October 2009 and became operational in June 2010. Very similarly to its UN 
twin, the HRRP was mandated to review individual complaints of human 
rights violations – as enshrined in the main human rights treaty bodies83 – 
                                                 
81  Amnesty International, “Kosovo: Unmik’s Legacy the Failure to Deliver Justice and 
Reparation to the Relatives of the Abducted”, 2013. 
82   EU Council Joint Action 2008/124/PESC/4, February 2008; Spernbaur, EU Peace 
building in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Nijhoff, 2014, p. 369 ff. On the legal basis of the 
EULEX presence in Kosovo as well as on the complex issues arisen from the multilayer 
presence of several actors in the Kosovo-transition, especially on the change from 
UNMIK to EULEX see Milano, “Il trasferimento di funzioni da UNMIK a EULEX”, in 
Rivista di diritto internazionale, vol. 4, 2008, p. 967 ff. and id., Formazione dello Stato e 
processi di ‘sate-building’ nel diritto internazionale, supra note 56, p. 172 ff. 
83  The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948); The European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention, 1950); The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD, 1965); The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR, 1966); The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR, 1966); The Convention on 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979); The 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT, 1984); The International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 
1989). 
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committed by EULEX in the performance of its functions.84 
  Composed of 3 members, appointed by the EULEX Head of Mission, 
one of which is a EULEX Judge, the HRRP has jurisdiction over violations 
occurred since 9 December 2008 and it is still operational at the time of 
writing, having held its 31st session in October 2016. The Panel is exclusively 
of an advisory nature, as it may submit findings and recommendations, 
suggesting remedial actions different from monetary compensation, to the 
EULEX Head of Mission (HoM), who can bring the matter to the attention of 
the respective member State involved in the facts at issues.85 
Recommendations exclude monetary compensation because in the EULEX 
architecture third party claims are dealt with pursuant to the ‘Third Party 
Liability Scheme’, following investigations carried out by the EULEX 
International Investigation Unit. Thus, compensation for damages caused by 
EULEX activities are not handled by the HRRP but are settled through the 
mission insurance cover.86 
 According to official data provided by the HRRP, since its inception 
188 cases have been filed, of which 140 were considered by the time the last 
annual report was finalised in December 2016.87 The complaints concern 
mainly violations of the right of access to justice and the right to an effective 
remedy, typically claiming the alleged failure of the EULEX Prosecutor or of 
the police to take action and to properly investigate; other claims focus on the 
breach of property rights and on cases of ‘excessive use of force’ by EULEX 
police.88   
 HRRP has received so far limited attention both in the media and in 
                                                 
84  Milano, Formazione dello Stato, p. 203 ff.; Klein, “Panel, Mediateur et Mecanisms 
Informels de Controle des Activités des Organisations Internationales: entre 
accountability et responsibility”, in Crawford (ed.), Select Proceedings of the European 
Society of International Law, vol. 3, 2010, p. 217-228. HRRP Annual Report, 1 January-
31 December 2015, pp. 7-8; Venice Commission, “Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo”, 
p. 12 ff. 
85   Venice Commission, “Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo”, p. 14. See also Spernbauer, 
p. 369 ff. 
86   Venice Commission, “Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo”, p. 16; HRRP Report 2015, 
p. 8. 
87   HRRP Annual Report 2016, p. 7. 
88  The full list of closed cases is provided in the HRRP Annual Report 2015, p. 44 ff. 
Indications on the pending case can be found on the HRRP official website at: 
http://www.hrrp.eu/Pending.php. 
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literature, especially when compared to the harsh critiques made to the 
UNMIK HRAP, but it has generally be found substantially respondent to 
standards of independence.89 Also in terms of implementation of Panel's 
recommendations, the relation between the HRRP and EULEX HoM proved 
to be more successful than the one between the HRAP and UNMIK SRSG, 
showing a better relationship between the chief of mission and its oversight 
body.90 
 The better functioning of the EULEX Review Panel, compared to the 
UNMIK Advisory Panel, can be explained by considering that the EU mission 
has been established when a considerable part of governmental powers had 
already been handed over to the newly constituted authorities of Kosovo. By 
contrast, UNMIK was initially deployed in a post-conflict situation with full 
responsibilities as interim territorial administration of Kosovo. In other 
words, EULEX had a much more limited scope and power to infringe upon 
human rights of individuals on the territory of Kosovo. This can explain, to a 
certain extent, the different nature of the relationships existing between the 
HoM and the oversight mechanism in the two missions and the difficulties 
faced essentially by UNMIK HRAP only. 
 The HRRP of EULEX, however, is not exempt from criticisms. It 
should be noted, for example, that the HRRP was established under the 
provisions of a restricted document, namely the so called ‘EULEX 
Accountability Concept’, purportedly because the Accountability Concept is 
part of the mission’s Operational Plan, a strategic document whose details 
have not been disclosed.91 It seems extremely questionable that the mandate 
establishing a mechanism tailored to grant accountability (which implies 
transparency) of the EU mission is contained in a restricted document and can 
be accessed exclusively in so far as it is made partly available in other 
documents, upon the decision of EULEX.92 
                                                 
89   Venice Commission, “Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo”. 
90   See for example the Decision on the Implementation of the Panel's Recommendations, X 
and 115 other complainants v. EULEX, case n. 2011-20, 11 November 2015, where the 
Panel found that the HoM has implemented, at least in part, the its recommendations. 
91    HRRP Annual Report 2015, p. 9. 
92   See the critique in this sense of the Venice Commission, “Opinion on Human Rights in 
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4.  NATO claims policy 
 
 The NATO claims commissions system is generally considered a well-
developed and adequate instrument to address both inter-State and individual-
State disputes arising from Organisation’s operations.93  The general legal 
framework for the NATO claims system is set forth in the 1951 Model SOFA, 
which was later complemented by several policy documents as, for example, 
the Non-Binding Guidelines for Payments in Combat-Related Cases of 
Civilian Casualties or Damage to Civilian Property.94  
 Article VIII of the NATO Model SOFA deals with both inter-State 
claims and third party claims. Inter-States claims include disputes between 
NATO Member States participating in a mission and disputes between 
Member States and the host State. Third party claims concern disputes 
between individuals and member States participating in a mission. 
Contractual claims between States and between States and third parties are 
specifically excluded from the SOFA and are generally settled pursuant to the 
contract terms.95 
As to inter-States claims, the Model SOFA provides for a general 
waiver of all claims for damages to military property and injuries and death 
of military personnel occurred in the course of military exercises or 
operations.96 However, damages to non-military properties amounting to 
                                                 
Kosovo”, p. 13, note 17. 
93   A/CN.4/637, paras 7-9; Prescott, “Claims”, in Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of the Law of 
Visiting Forces, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 159-185; Naert, “The International 
Responsibility of the Union in the Context of its CSDP Operations”, in Evans-Koutrakos 
(eds), The International Responsibility of the European Union, European and 
International Law perspectives, Hart, 2013, pp. 313-338; Degezelle, “General Principles 
of the NATO Claims Policy”, in NATO Legal Gazette, vol. 28, 2012, pp. 13-19, re-edited 
in the NATO Legal Gazette-Special Edition, August 2016, pp. 93-99; NATO Legal 
Deskbook, Second Edition, 2010, pp. 271-280. 
94  Available in NATO Legal Deskbook, p. 280; see also the NATO Claims Policy for 
Designated Crisis Response Situations, Annex 1, AC/119-N (2004) 0058, 19 May 2004.  
95   Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their 
Forces, (hereinafter NATO Model SOFA), 19 June 1951, last updated, 14 October 2009, 
art. VIII. 
96  NATO Model SOFA, art. VIII, para 4. See also Military Technical Agreement between 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of 
Afghanistan, Annex A, 5 March 2005, para. 10, later replaced by the RS Agreement, 20 
September 2014, art. 20, para. 1. 
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more than 1,400 US dollars are not waived.97 These are minor claims that 
generally do not occur during peace operations, but rather in the use of 
diplomatic premises or headquarters on the territory of a member State.98  
Third party claims can be divided into two main categories, ‘official 
duty’ and ‘non-official duty’ claims depending on whether the tortious act or 
omission was carried out in the performance of official duty or not. 
Official-duty third party claims are handled by the host State that will 
settle or adjudicate them in accordance with its domestic law, whereas the 
costs of the compensation eventually awarded to the injured party will be 
shared between all participating States, including the host State.99 Under art. 
VIII of the Model SOFA, the expenses incurred to compensate meritorious 
claims are shared between States participating in the operation and the host 
country. Under this cost-sharing arrangement the receiving State is 
responsible for 25% of the expenses.100 This rule is intended as a form of 
burden-sharing with the sending States to partly compensate the costs of their 
assistance.101 When it is not possible to identify the responsible TCCs, 
compensation costs may be distributed equally between all participating 
States, or, as it happened in some missions, the payment was made from the 
account of the related headquarters.102 
Instead, non-official duty third party claims shall be reported by the 
host State to the ‘responsible’ sending State, whereby the latter may decide 
to offer an ex gratia payment to the claimant. The plaintiff may accept the 
offer in full satisfaction of the claim, otherwise the Model SOFA stipulates 
the claimant may seek compensation by resorting to host State’s court, thus 
affirming the jurisdiction of national courts in cases of tortious acts carried 
out by a member of a force not done in the performance of its official duty.  
                                                 
97   NATO Model SOFA, art. VIII, para. 2 (e).  
98  An example of this type of claim concerned damages to car of the Belgian Minister of 
Justice resulting from the incorrect operation of security poles at the entrance of the US 
embassy in Brussels, see Degezelle, “General Principles of the NATO Claims Policy”, 
supra note 93, p. 94. 
99   NATO Model SOFA, art. VIII, para. 5, lett. a), b), e).  
100  NATO Model SOFA, art. VIII para 5 (e) (i), see supra chapter III. 
101  NATO Model SOFA, art. VIII para. 5 let. e) establishes the reimbursement system. 
102  For example, this was the procedure chosen during EUFOR/IFOR and KFOR missions, 
see NATO Legal Deskbook, supra note 95, p. 274 and 276. 
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The general framework of NATO claims provided in art. VIII of the 
Model SOFA, negotiated in 1951, was essentially designed to apply in peace-
time situations between the Alliance’s Member States, typically to deal with 
claims related to ordinary operations on the territories of member States. As 
it will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, the practice of NATO 
SOFAs concluded in peace operations may differ in several aspects from the 
rules envisaged in Model SOFA. For example, all NATO SOFAs (or 
equivalent military agreements) signed in the course of peace operations 
prescribe the absolute immunity from jurisdiction, arrest and detention of 
NATO personnel.103 In these SOFAs, immunity applies also to off-duty 
actions, differently from what provided in the NATO Model SOFA. 
The practice concerning the claims system in peace operations 
requires a closer analysis, that will be carried out in the following paragraphs. 
The dichotomy between on-duty and off-duty claims remains crucial to the 
understanding of NATO claims policy, hence the study will consider these 
two categories of claims in turn. 
 
 
 4.1. Official duty claims 
 
 Defining the difference between on-duty and off-duty actions is one 
of the most challenging aspects of the claims system. While one may think 
                                                 
103  Dayton Peace Agreement, Appendix B to Annex 1-A, 21 November 1995, arts 2, 7, 8, 15; 
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, Appendix 
B, 9 June 1999, art. 3; Military Technical Agreement between the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan, Annex A, 5 
December 2001, arts 1, 3, 4, 10. Both the Dayton Appendix and the ISAF Military 
Technical Agreement expressly recall the General Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations of 1946, see respectively arts 2 and 1; Agreement 
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
on the Status of NATO Forces and NATO personnel conducting mutually agreed NATO-
led activities in Afghanistan, 30 September 2014, art. 11, stipulates that Afghanistan 
recognises that the sending State shall have “the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction 
over” its personnel (para. 1), while NATO agrees to inform the host State of the status of 
any criminal proceedings allegedly committed in Afghanistan at the request of the 
government (para. 2). Interestingly, the host State maintains the “right to exercise 
jurisdiction only over NATO contractors and NATO Contractor Employees (para. 5).   
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military personnel deployed in a mission should be considered ‘round the 
clock on duty’,104 neither sending States nor the Organisation subscribe to this 
understanding. NATO does not define on-duty/off-duty actions nor is a 
definition contained in the NATO Model SOFA, in the NATO Glossary, or in 
any other relevant NATO policy document.105  
The procedures to distinguish between on-duty and off-duty are not 
specified in the NATO Model SOFA; generally, the sending State determines 
whether the impugned actions of its personnel were carried out in the 
performance of official duty.106 In practice, when the claims process is 
administered by the host State, the sending State is asked to provide the claims 
commission with an ‘on duty attest’, stating whether the member of the force 
was on duty at the time of the alleged incident.107 Art. VIII, para. 8 of the 
Model SOFA prescribes that if there is a dispute as to whether the tortious act 
was carried out in the performance of official-duty, the issue of the nature of 
the conduct can be settled with a conclusive and final decision by an 
arbitrator.108 
Under article VIII of the Model SOFA, third party claims for damage 
arising out of official-duty acts are submitted to the competent authority 
established in the host State and are settled and adjudicated in accordance 
with its laws and regulations.109 This system has obvious advantages for the 
claimants because the applicable law is accessible as well as the remedy itself, 
                                                 
104  Schmalenbach, “Third Party Liability of International Organizations”, supra note 30, p. 
38. 
105  According to information gathered in informal meetings with NATO high ranking officer, 
it can be said that, example, tortious acts committed by forces while on leave or during 
their spare time, such as engaging in a bar fight or committing acts of sexual violence, 
tend to be considered off-duty actions. 
106 Cooley, Base Politics. Democratic Change and the US Military Overseas, Cornell 
University Press, 2008, p. 44. 
107  Degezelle, “General Principles of the NATO Claims Policy”, supra note 93, p. 95. 
Woodliffe, “The Stationing of Foreign Armed Forces Abroad in Peacetime”, in 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 43, 1994, p. 443 ff., at p. 456.   
108  Degezelle, “General Principles of the NATO Claims Policy”, supra note 93, p. 96. For 
example, art. 20, para. 5 of the Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Status of NATO Forces and NATO 
personnel conducting mutually agreed NATO-led activities in Afghanistan, supra note 
102, established an “Afghanistan-NATO Implementation Commission” in order to deal 
with “any issues that may arise regarding the implementation of this Article [art. 20- 
claims]”. 
109  NATO Model SOFA, art. VIII, para. 5 (a). 
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especially if compared to the alternative of suing a sending State before its 
own domestic courts. These procedures notwithstanding, in conflict or post-
conflict situations it is often unlikely that the receiving State will have 
sufficient economic and institutional means to establish and administer the 
claims. Hence, despite the specific provision contained in the Model SOFA, 
often each troop contributing State would adjudicate its own claims in loco 
by the respective headquarters or the Organisation would set up a specific 
system operation on the territory of the receiving State. 
For example, during IFOR’s mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia, under the terms of the Claims Annexes to the Dayton Agreement and 
to the Technical agreements, third party claims were originally submitted to 
an ad hoc claims commissions established by the host States (Bosnia 
Herzegovina and Croatia), whose decisions could be appealed before a three-
member arbitration tribunal.110 In case of non-compliance by the sending 
State of the payment order, the claim could be sent to the NATO 
Headquarter.111 This framework proved too complicated and ineffective, 
especially due to the inability of the host States to process claims. 
Consequently, the Claims Annexes to the Dayton SOFA and to the Technical 
agreements were re-negotiated in order to make sending States primarily 
responsible for receiving and settling claims. In case of disagreements 
between the sending State and the claimant, the dispute was referred to the 
IFOR Claims Offices in Sarajevo and Zagreb for mediation. If mediation had 
failed, the claim was then brought before the Claims Commission, with the 
possibility of further appeal before an arbitral tribunal.112 
Another peculiarity of the IFOR claims system consisted in the 
absence of the usual claims waiver between sending States and the receiving 
States.113 This led to some issues resulting from claims for billions of US 
                                                 
110  NATO Legal Deskbook, supra note 95, pp. 273-275. 
111  Idem. 
112  Idem. 
113  Dayton Peace Agreement, Appendix B to Annex 1-A, supra note 105, art. 15: “Claims 
for damage or injury to Government personnel or property, or to private personnel or 
property of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, shall be submitted through 
governmental authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the designated 
NATO Representatives”. See also NATO Legal Deskbook, supra note 93, p. 274. 
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dollars for road damage in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia during IFOR and 
later SFOR operations caused by NATO vehicles.114 These claims were 
eventually dismissed by NATO as non-compensable because they were 
considered ‘unavoidable results of conducting the operation’, similar to 
combat-related damages or to the operational necessity exemption.115 
 Moreover, not all SOFAs or military agreements provide for a duty to 
compensate damages occurred in the performance of official duty. For 
example, the 1999 Military Technical Agreement concerning KFOR did not 
contemplate the liability of KFOR forces for any damages caused in “the 
course of duties related to the implementation” of the Agreement.116  
Another example can be found in art. 10 of the 2001 ISAF Agreement, 
where compensation for damage occurred pursuant the mission’s mandate 
was excluded in the following terms 
 
The ISAF and its personnel will not be liable for any damages to 
civilian or government property caused by any activity in pursuit 
of the ISAF Mission. Claims for other damage or injury to Interim 
Administration personnel or property, or to private personnel or 
property will be submitted through Interim Administration to 
ISAF.117 
 
Interestingly, under the NATO SOFA re-negotiated with the new Afghan 
government in 2014, the provisions concerning claims are much more 
elaborated than in the previous Agreement and afford sounder guarantees for 
injured parties. Under art. 20 of the 2014 NATO-Afghanistan SOFA, NATO 
Forces shall  
 
pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of 
meritorious third party claims arising out of acts or omissions 
                                                 
114  NATO Legal Deskbook, supra note 93, p. 274. 
115  Prescott, “Claims”, supra note 93, p. 179. 
116  Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, supra 
note 105, Appendix B, art. 3. 
117  Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan, supra note 105. 
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[…] done in the performance of their official duties and incident 
to the non-combat activities.118  
 
Comparing the two SOFAs of the Afghanistan missions, one will note the 
change in the language used and the related expansion of the duty to 
compensate incumbent upon sending States. One can conclude that the less 
fragile (or needy) is the host State negotiating the SOFA, the more elaborated 
and solid will the claims provisions be. Hence, despite the framework 
provided by the Model SOFA, the actual structure of the NATO claims system 
may vary significantly in each mission, depending on several factors, mainly 
on the situation of the host State.  
 
 
4.2 Non-official duty claims 
 
 Non-official duty claims include all claims against members of a force 
resulting from tortious acts or omissions carried out not in the performance 
of official duties. Under NATO claims policy, sending States are not 
responsible for acts or omission of their forces not done in the performance 
of official duty, hence member States do not have a duty to compensate non-
official duty claims. However, under the Model SOFA sending States may 
decide to settle this type of claims by offering ‘ex gratia payments’ to 
meritorious claimants.119  
When the receiving State is in charge of the claims process, it can issue 
a report on the case assessing whether the claim is meritorious and potentially 
compensable and recommend to the sending State to provide for redress.120 
When TCCs administer the claims process, each sending State evaluates the 
claim’s merits and decides whether to offer an ex gratia payment. In both 
cases, final decision on whether to make payment rests solely with the 
                                                 
118  Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan on the Status of NATO Forces and NATO personnel conducting mutually 
agreed NATO-led activities in Afghanistan, supra note 105. 
119  NATO Model SOFA, art. VIII para. 6; see also Prescott, “Claims”, supra note 93. 
120  NATO Model SOFA, art. VIII para. 6, let. (a). 
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sending State.  
If payment is offered, the claimant can accept it in ‘full satisfaction’ 
of his or her claim.  As a consequence, when the payment is made, the 
receiving State is deprived of exercising local jurisdiction over the claim. By 
contrast, the Model SOFA provides that absent the claimant’s acceptance of 
payment in full satisfaction, local courts retain jurisdiction.121 As shown 
earlier, though, in all NATO operations undertaken so far the receiving State’s 
jurisdiction was precluded in any case as result of personnel immunity. Ex 
gratia payments are widely used by TCCs to settle other non-compensable 
claims, such as combat-related and operational necessity claims. In these 
cases, the terms ‘solatia’ or ‘condolence’ payments are also used.122  
Even if both types of claims are premised on the wrongfulness of the 
force’s acts or omissions, there are two main differences between ‘on-duty’ 
and ‘off-duty’ claims. First, with ‘on-duty claims’, the sending State assumes 
responsibility, or more precisely, it accepts liability.  While in ‘off-duty’ 
claims, TCC may acknowledge the impugned act was tortious, i.e. in breach 
of the law of the receiving State, while not recognising any responsibility. For 
many States, ex gratia payments are accompanied by a statement expressively 
excluding any acknowledgement of liability or responsibility for violations 
of international humanitarian law.123 Second, with ‘on duty’ claims the State 
seeks to come to an agreement with the claimant as to the amount of the 
compensation, and absent an agreement, or when the claimant finds the 
                                                 
121  Immunity from jurisdiction does not apply to members of the force outside their official 
duty, NATO Model SOFA, art. VIII para. 6, let. (c), (d). 
122 These concepts have been elaborated by US practice, especially during the ISAF 
campaign. They refer to different damages and diverse procedures: solatia payments are 
made in accordance with local customs to convey personal feeling and condolence to 
injured civilians, up to two thousands US Dollars, the costs are incurred by the Unit 
Operations and Maintenance Fund. Condolence payments covers both damages to 
property and death of civilians up to 2000 and 2,500 US Dollars, respectively, the costs 
are covered by the “Commander's Emergency Response Programme”. See Money as a 
Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A), USFOR-A Pub 1-06, December 2009, p. 13 
ff., Oswald-Wellignton, “Reparations for Violations in Armed Conflicts and the Emerging 
Practice of Making Amends”, in Liivoja-McCormack (eds), Routledge Handbook on the 
Law of Armed Conflicts, Routledge, 2016, p. 520 ff., p. 534. 
123 Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 2015, 
p. 180, see also US practice: US Department of the Army, “Legal Claims Service 
Procedures”, 21 March 2008. 
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State’s offer unsatisfactory, the claimant can resort to a further instance of 
adjudication, a sort of appeal. In contrast, ex gratia payments are not 
negotiated between the parties, the sum is offered and once accepted and paid 
by the State, the settlement is final.   
 
 
 4.3. Operational claims: combat-related activities and operational 
necessity exemption 
 
  ‘Operational claims’ encompass claims for damages to third parties 
resulting from combat operations and related activities.124 These damages are 
not envisaged in the NATO Model SOFA, nor are they generally compensable 
under the NATO claims system.125 In other words, there is no international 
obligation for States participating in a mission to compensate these types of 
claims. 
 NATO practice contemplates two categories of claims excluded from 
compensation: ‘combat and combat-related activities’ and ‘operational 
necessity’. The first includes acts typically carried out for the safety of 
personnel involved in combat operations and to achieve the military objective 
anticipated, e.g. firing weapons in force protection, manoeuvring in combat, 
etc.126 The second category excludes damages arising from inevitable harmful 
activities necessarily linked to the pursuance of the mission’s mandate but not 
due to combat activity. 
     The similarities in the two categories may cause some uncertainties in their 
interpretation and practical application. For example, during the SFOR 
mission in 2002, NATO troops searched a Bosnian village for an individual 
indicted by the ICTY, Karadzic, and subsequently several villagers claimed 
property damages. Their claims were submitted to the SFOR claims 
commission but were denied because they fell under the ‘combat and combat-
                                                 
124 See Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations, supra note 48, p. 115 ff. 
125 Prescott, “Claims”, supra note 93; Degezelle, “General Principles of the NATO Claims 
Policy”, supra note 93. 
126 NATO Legal Deskbook, p. 274. 
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related’ exemption.127 The main difference seems to lie with the fact that 
combat activities were actually conducted.  However, considering that the 
purpose of these concepts is the same, namely to serve as exceptions to 
compensable claims, it is not clear why the Organisation’s practice needs two 
separate notions to this end. 
These exceptions have been increasingly tempered by the practice of 
ex gratia, solatia and condolence payments.128 For example, in the case of 
damages related to the search of Karadzic, even if barred under the SOFA 
compensation systems, TCCs made ex gratia payments to repair the 
village.129 More recently, during ISAF mission the claims provisions of the 
Military Technical Agreement proved to be ill-suited to address the very 
volatile situation of high-intensity combat activities, where the numerous 
civilian casualties and property damages were having a very negative impact 
on the local population.130 According to NATO practice, third party claims for 
these types of damages were not compensable and this caused major local 
distrust towards the mission, with the collateral risk of jeopardising the 
mission success.  
For strategic reasons in order to maintain and not alienate local 
support, NATO and sending States changed their claims policy.131 Ex gratia, 
solatia and condolence payments were paid to victims of combat-related 
activities, with the TCC sustaining the costs, especially the US, and by 
making contributions to the ‘Post-Operational Humanitarian Relief Fund’ 
established for this purpose.132  
This shows that each TCC can develop its own policies and 
procedures and be primarily responsible for claims related to the conduct of 
its personnel, hence the settlement of these claims depends exclusively on the 
                                                 
127 Ibidem, p. 275. 
128 Supra para. 4.2.   
129 NATO Legal Deskbook, p. 275. 
130 Degezelle, “General Principles of the NATO Claims Policy”, supra note 93. 
131  Idem; Corn-Van Landingham-Reeves, US Military Operations. Law, Policy and Practice, 
Oxford University Press, 2016, 467 ff. 
132 Holewinski, “Fixing the collateral damage”, in the New York Times, 7 March 2007. 
Despite the meritorious initiatives only a handful of countries contributed to the fund, 
causing major critique and hampering the potential of the Fund to address the inequity 
experienced by the local population affected by combat activities. 
  233 
will of TCCs. Moreover, State parties can make reservations when signing or 
ratifying the SOFA or decide not to sign the NATO SOFA and sign a separate 
SOFA with the host country.133 Also, the SOFA can be amended at a later 
stage in the course of the operation in order to adapt to operational realities 
and requirements such as, for example, the inability of the receiving State to 
administer the claims process due to a general institutional collapse. 134 In this 
way, each TCC can develop its own policies and procedures and be primarily 
responsible for claims related to the conduct of its personnel. As a 
consequence, despite the existence of a general legal framework under which 
claims can be settled in NATO operations, it is difficult to identify a uniform 
NATO claims practice because each Member State and NATO Partners135 
may settle claims according to their own regulations and policy.  
Seeking to develop a more uniform claims practice, NATO elaborated 
in 2010 a new policy specifically addressing combat-related damages, the 
Non-Binding Guidelines for Payments in Combat-Related Cases of Civilian 
Casualties and Damage to Civilian Properties, based on Afghanistan lessons 
learned.136 It encouraged ex gratia payments and in-kind assistance, while 
stressing that ex gratia payments do not imply any admission of legal 
liability.137 However, it should be borne in mind that, differently from a 
SOFA, these Guidelines are expressly understood as non binding and it is 
specified by the Organisation that “TCNs must be free to follow their own 
                                                 
133  For example, it is common in US practice to sign bilateral agreements with the host State. 
This practice's rationale aligns with the intention to enter into specific and detailed 
agreement with the host state for the purpose of granting far reaching immunity of US 
personnel (military and civilian), not only from the domestic jurisdiction of the receiving 
State but also from the possible transfer to an international (criminal) tribunal. See the 
Security and Defence Cooperation Agreement between the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan and the United States of America, art. 13. The mission Resolute Support is 
by contrast regulated by the SOFA of September 2014. 
134 This was for example the case of IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosnia Herzegovina and 
Croatia, NATO Legal Deskbook, pp. 273-275. 
135  The term “NATO Partners” indicates States that are non-members of the Washington 
Treaty but enter in several cooperation agreements with the NATO, the full list is available 
on the official website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/51288.htm 
136 Available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_65114.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
137 Ibidem, rule n. 9: “Payments are made and in-kind assistance is provided without 
reference to the question of legal liability”, italics added. 
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fiscal laws and regulations”.138 Accordingly, similar documents may provide 
for a useful tool to harmonise State practice only insofar States are willing 
and able to implement them. 
 
 
 
5. Remedies made available by States and international 
organisations in peace operations: an assessment 
 
As to claims that arise between States and between States and 
international organisations, generally a far-reaching waiver applies under the 
NATO model SOFA and the UN model MoU. Where the waiver does not 
apply, claims may be settled amicably or via arbitration. The legal framework 
governing these claims systems in peace operations generally shares wide 
endorsement among the parties, as it is negotiated and agreed upon by the 
same actors that are also the addressees of those provisions, namely States 
and international organisations, acting on an equal footing. While some States 
and international organisations may exert a certain leverage on others, thereby 
conditioning the negotiation of bilateral agreements (and of claims 
provisions) nevertheless, with few exceptions, SOFAs and MoUs have 
generally led to agreed claims settlement procedures, providing for scope for 
subsequent amendments, should the existing systems prove to be 
ineffective.139 It can thus be concluded that the claims systems regulating 
disputes between States and international organisations do not present major 
criticisms.  
By contrast, remedies made available to individuals by international 
                                                 
138 NATO Legal Deskbook, p. 279. 
139 One may think, for example, of the Claims Annexes to the Technical Arrangements, 
concerning IFOR in the Balkans, that was amended by several appendices to improve the 
existing claims system, to make it more functional. Another example can be found in the 
issue of claims for damages brought by Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia against the UN 
for damage to roads and infrastructures during UNPROFOR and IFOR, that were later 
dismissed by the UN on grounds of the “operational necessity exception”. It should be 
noted that in the present case the claimant States were able to submit these claims absent 
a general waiver provision in the first mission agreement, see NATO Legal Deskbook, p. 
274. 
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organisations in peace operations have shown several shortcomings. For 
example, since UN claims commissions (rectius local review boards) are 
established upon the goodwill of the Organisation, in some cases, despite 
strong evidence of violations committed by the UN, such as we have seen in 
Srebrenica and in Haiti, local review boards have never been created. 
Moreover, victims are not allowed to participate in the procedure on equal 
footing with the United Nations, whereby under UN claims policy victims 
can only submit claims and decide whether or not to accept sums offered in 
compensation by local review boards. Furthermore, review boards’ decisions 
are final: the UN claims system does not include any appeal mechanism. In 
this regard, the NATO claims system is more sophisticated, as it gives scope 
for further mediation when the compensation offered does not satisfy the 
victims’ requests and also provides for the possibility to appeal the decision, 
should the mediation fail, generally before missions’ headquarters. 
 As it concerns the substantive aspect of remedies, i.e. the outcome of 
the remedial process, the analysis has demonstrated how the principle of full 
compensation does not apply to claims system of international organisations 
in peace operations. Financial ceilings and various limitations are imposed 
both under the UN and the NATO claims policy.  
Only claims concerning official duty actions or omissions are 
considered compensable, whereas off-duty wrongful acts of members of a 
force can be settled amicably with the intervention of the sending State 
through the practice of ex gratia payments. It should be highlighted that these 
sums offered by States or international organisations shall not to be 
considered compensation, as no liability nor international responsibility is 
incurred by sending States under the claims system’s legal framework. 
Generally, they are offered for strategic purposes, such as to gain or to keep 
the consent of the host population, deemed essential to the mission’s 
success.140  
Furthermore, the UN prescribes that only claims of ‘private law 
nature’ are receivable by local review boards. It has been highlighted how the 
                                                 
140  See NATO policy, that substantially mirrors US policy in military operations. 
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interpretation offered by the Organisation of this threshold criterion has 
allowed some distortions in more than one case, de facto preventing 
accessibility of meritorious claims to the claims system, when the claims 
would have had a too high political impact on the UN.141  
Moreover, numerous claims are excluded from compensation under 
specific exceptions prescribed by each claim system. Exceptions of 
‘operational necessity’ and ‘military necessity’, whereby harmful outcomes 
of activities that were necessary to mission accomplishment, are neither 
compensable under UN nor NATO claims policy. 
Other limiting factors include that compensation offered in UN-led 
missions shall not exceed certain financial limitations prescribed by the 
Organisation itself and that claims shall be submitted within a fixed 
timeframe, generally within 6 months from when the damage occurrence and 
not-later than a year after the mission accomplishment.   
The peculiar remedies established in Kosovo, during the Interim 
administration of UNMIK and later during EULEX mission, have also shown 
major pitfalls. Initially, it seemed promising that, for the first time, two 
international organisations were acknowledging the possibility to be held 
internationally responsible for violations of human rights, as enshrined in 
most human rights treaties. The UNMIK Ombudsperson, the HRAP and the 
HRRP have been designed to receive individual claims of human rights 
violations committed by UNMIK or EULEX forces and personnel. This 
unprecedented recognition implied that the UN and the EU shall abide by 
human rights norms, as prescribed in the human rights treaties explicitly 
recalled in the Panels' mandates, and that their subsidiary organs – UNMIK 
and EULEX respectively – can be held responsible for human rights 
violations occurred during the mission and that are attributable to them. 
This enthusiasm was however tempered by the fact that these 
oversight bodies had a limited mandate both ratione materie and ratione 
                                                 
141  The distorted implications of the misuse and misinterpretation of this vague notion have 
been illustrated above, with specific reference to the dismissal of serious claims related 
to health issues of Roma IDP in Kosovo during UNMIK administration and of Haitian 
victims of cholera during MINUSTAH, supra paras 2.1 and 3.2. 
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temporis, which in the case of the UNMIK Ombudsperson and the HRAP 
were progressively restricted as the mission went on. Even more importantly, 
these mechanisms were/are of advisory nature only, being entitled to submit 
findings and recommendations to the SRSG or the Head of Mission, where 
those recommendations could not include monetary compensation.  
In any case, the UN has quickly betrayed the high expectations of 
responsibility and accountability, giving its substantial lack of good will to 
respect the independence of the Panel, cooperate with the HRAP and 
undertake reparatory actions towards victims endorsing the finding and 
recommendations of the Panel.  
The EULEX HRRP has shown so far to be a more effective forum for 
victims than the HRAP, also given the efforts of the HoM to grant effective 
cooperation with the Panel’s functioning. However, the HRAP’s lack of 
power to grant compensation to meritorious claims, together with 
independence and transparency issues, cannot be disregarded. In sum, none 
of the mechanisms established during the Kosovo state building process can 
be consider a successful example of effective remedy for victims affected by 
the UN and the EU missions. 
 
 
 
6. The role of domestic courts 
 
 In light of the main limitations and shortcomings of remedial actions 
made available by international organisations and States in peace operations, 
and considering also a complete lack of remedial actions in some cases, many 
individuals have turned to domestic courts to seek a more effective remedy 
(or a remedy tout court), both from the UN and from TCCs.  
Although some isolated suits dated back to late 1960s,142 domestic 
claims concerning peace operations have been on the rise since the early 
                                                 
142 Mendelier v Organisation des Nations Unies et Etat Belge (Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangères), Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, 11 May 1966, Journal de Tribunaux, 10 
December 1966, No. 4553, 121. 
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2000s. The significant increase in cases brought before domestic judges is 
also a consequence of the growing efforts of the international community in 
conflict and post-conflict situations, namely in the form of peace operations 
and enforcement actions.143 
 Bringing an individual claim for violations occurred in peace 
operations before domestic courts presents serious difficulties. The most 
troublesome issues faced by plaintiffs concern three main problems: a) the 
immunity of the United Nations, which translates in the dismissal of the case 
for lack of jurisdiction, b) the question of attribution, namely whether the 
impugned acts shall be attributed to the UN (which brings us back to the first 
issue), or to the sending State or both, and c) the justiciability of rights, that 
is to say the determination of whether an international norm can be invoked 
by an individual vis à vis the respondent State. The issue of attribution has 
been dealt with extensively in the previous chapter, hence the present analysis 
will focus on UN immunity and on the justiciability of individual rights. 
 
 
6.1 The immunity of the United Nations before domestic courts 
 
 The immunity of the UN from national jurisdiction of Member States 
is prescribed under art. 105 of the UN Charter stipulating that “the 
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its 
                                                 
143 As evidenced in several conflicts: The former Yugoslavia, from NATO military 
intervention to the deployment of several UN and EU peace operations up to include the 
interim administration of Kosovo.The Afghanistan war, followed by a series of post-
conflict efforts, including several training missions, and two broad NATO operations, 
ISAF till 2015 and the ongoing RS. It is however difficult to draw a clear line between 
pure military intervention and post-conflict efforts of the international community in this 
country as the situation remains extremely volatile, as shown by several combat incidents, 
such as the latest Kunduz bombing of the MSF hospitals by US air forces, just to cite one. 
The coalition intervention in Iraq, which was first a war of invasion and later a complex 
of measures that included the interim administration of the Country by the US and the 
UK through the CPA, with the cooperation of several partners, including the Netherlands 
and Italy. Mention should also be made to the notorious MINUSTAH peace operation in 
Haiti, that did not present difficulties in terms of categorization as it falls straight under 
the category of peacekeeping, but that has represented a benchmark to measure the 
accountability gap of the UN. 
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purposes”.144 The immunity rule is deemed necessary for the achievement of 
the Organisation’s mandate, to protect its independence and to resist the 
potential interference of States. 
 A few years after the entry into force of the Charter, the general rule 
of immunity was further elaborated and specified in a dedicated treaty signed 
by all member States, the General Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations and Related Personnel (GCPI), under which  
the United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by 
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process 
except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity 
shall extend to any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.145 
 
Furthermore, according to art. VIII, section 29 of the GCPI, the UN has a duty 
to make provisions in order to provide for appropriate dispute settlement 
mechanisms to adjudicate claims that would otherwise be dismissed in 
domestic courts due to the immunity of the Organisation, namely contract 
disputes, disputes of ‘private law nature’146 and disputes concerning UN 
officials, where immunity has not been waived by the SG.147 
                                                 
144  Arsanjani, “Claims against International Organizations. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes”, 
in Yale Journal of World Public Order, vol. 7, 1981, pp. 131-176; Singer, “Jurisdictional 
Immunity of International Organizations. Human Rights and Functional Necessity 
Concerns”, in Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 36, 1996, pp. 53-165; Reinisch 
(ed.), International Organizations before National Courts, Cambridge University Press, 
2000; Zanghì, Diritto delle Organizzazioni Internazionali, Giapichelli, 2001, pp. 317-
339; Pingel-Lenuzza, “International Organizations and Immunity from Jurisdiction. To 
Restrict or to Bypass”, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 51, 2002, 
pp. 1-15; Ryngaert, “The Immunity of International Organizations Before Domestic 
Courts. Recent Trends”, in International Organizations Law Review, 2010, pp. 132 ss.; 
Reinisch (ed.); Challenging Acts of International Organizations Before National Courts, 
Oxford University Press, 2010; De Brabandere, “Immunity of International Organizations 
in Post-conflict International Administrations”, in International Organizations Law 
Review, vol. 7, 2010, pp 79-111; Rashkow, “Immunity of the United Nations Practice and 
Challenges”, in International Organizations Law Review, vol. 10, 2013, pp. 332-348; 
Irmscher, “Immunities and the Right of Access to Court. Conflict and Convergence”, in 
Sarooshi (ed.), Remedies and Responsibility for the Actions of International 
Organizations, Nijhoff, 2014, pp. 443-492; De Brabandere, “Immunity as a Guarantee 
for Institutional Autonomy”, in Collins-White (eds), International Organizations and the 
Idea of Autonomy, Routledge 2011, pp. 278-296. 
145 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and Related 
Personnel, 1946, art. II, section 2. 
146  For an extensive analysis of the notion and its implications see supra para 2.1. 
147 “The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) 
Disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to which the 
United Nations is a party; (b) Disputes involving any official of the United Nations who 
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 In the realm of peace operations, this general obligation to settle third 
party disputes of ‘private law character’ is reiterated and further specified in 
the Model SOFA, whose art. 51 prescribes that these disputes shall be settled 
by a standing claims commission to be established by the UN.148 However, as 
explained in detail earlier, art. 51 is dead letter, since the UN has devised a 
different mechanism to settle third party claims in peace operations, namely 
the local review boards. UN practice shows that these boards are not 
necessarily established in each UN mission, as their creation depends on the 
political will of the Organisation.   
 It does not seem a mere coincidence that from those very cases in 
which the UN refused to establish a claims procedure have originated the 
most important lawsuits brought against the Organisation for its wrongful acts 
in peace operations. We are referring here to the case of the Mothers of 
Srebrenica v the UN and the Netherlands adjudicated by Dutch Courts and 
by the ECtHR149 and of the Georges et al. v the UN, recently ruled by the 
Court of Appeal of New York.150 The different factual background of the cases 
                                                 
by reason of his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by 
the Secretary-General.” 
148  On the missed establishment of standing claims commissions and on the creation of their 
substitute local claims review board, see supra para. 2.  
149  Court of Appeal the Hague, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands and 
United Nations, LNJ: BR538830 March 2010; Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 
Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands and United Nations, 13 April 
2012; European Court of Human Rights, Stiching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the 
Netherlands, no. 65542/12, Decision 11 June 2013; District Court of The Hague, Stichting 
Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands and the United Nations, RDBH:A8748, 16 
July 2014. This case law has been extensively analysed in the previous chapter, see supra 
chapter III, inter alia, Palchetti, “Attributing the Conduct of Dutchbat in Srebrenica: The 
2014 Judgment of the District Court in the Mothers of Srebrenica Case”, in Netherlands 
International Law Review, vol. 62, 2015, p. 279; Schmalenbach, “Preserving the Gordian 
Knot. UN Legal Accountability in the Aftermath of Srebrenica”, ibidem, pp. 313-328; 
Krieger, “Addressing the Accountability Gap in Peacekeeping. Law-Making by Domestic 
Courts As a Way to Avoid UN Reform?”, ibidem, p. 259. 
150  Soutern District Court of New York, Georges et al. v. United Nations, 13 cv 07146, JPO, 
Decision and Order, 9 January 2015; Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Georges et al. v. 
United Nations, 15‐455‐cv, 18 August 2016 For comments and notes see Pavoni, 
“Choleric notes on the Haiti Cholera Case”, in Questions of International Law, 2015, pp. 
19-41; Freedman-Lemay-Hebert, “Towards an Alternative Interpretation of UN 
Immunity. A Human Rights-Based Approach to the Haiti Cholera Case”, in Questions of 
International Law, 2015, p. 5; Pillinger- Hurd-Barnett, “How to Get Away with Cholera. 
The UN, Haiti, and International Law”, in Perspectives on Politics, vol. 14, 2016, pp. 70-
86; Alvarez, “The United Nations in the Time of Cholera”, in AJIL Unbound, 4 April 
2016. 
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notwithstanding, the plaintiffs raised very similar arguments, claiming that 
UN immunity is not absolute but functional and that it is conditional upon the 
availability of other remedies for the victims, hence the respective national 
courts were competent to hear the case, they maintained.151  
 The Supreme Court of the Netherlands confirmed lower Courts’ 
judgements, upon the consideration that the right to court is not absolute.  
Consequently, the Court found that the limitation imposed by UN immunity 
from jurisdiction was proportional to the aim served by the immunity rule. 
That is to say, proportional to the goal of preserving UN independence while 
carrying out its mission to maintain international peace and security.152 The 
judges also specified that the right of access to court was not undermined by 
UN immunity, nor by the absence of alternative remedies against the UN, for 
two orders of reasons. First, the claimants could have sued the individual 
perpetrators before a ‘court of law’, and failed to explained why they did 
not.153 Second, the plaintiffs were able to claim the international 
responsibility of the Dutch State for its failure to act precisely before Dutch 
courts. Accordingly, the right of access to court was not considered infringed 
upon. 
 When bringing their case before the ECtHR, the applicants in Mothers 
of Srebrenica claimed that by upholding UN immunity, Dutch courts 
infringed upon their right to access to court, as enshrined in art. 6 of the 
                                                 
151  Another interesting argument put forward by the Mother of Srebrenica concerned the very 
nature of their claims bearing on the (alleged) responsibility of the UN for failing to 
prevent genocide, hence it dealt with jus cogens violations. Upon this consideration, in 
the claimants' view, their submissions should override immunity from suit of the UN. 
This reasoning was rejected by the ECtHR also based on the ICJ precedent in 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgement 
3 February 2012. As it now well known the ICJ finding was later indirectly overuled by 
the Italian Constitutional Court with the judgment 238/2015, see Tanzi, “Un difficile 
dialogo tra Corte Internazionale di Giustizia e Corte Costituzionale”, in Comunità 
internazionale, vol. 70, 2015, pp. 13-36.  
152 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the 
Netherlands and United Nations, n. 10/04437, 13 April 2012, para. 4.1.1 
153  District Court of The Hague, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and ors v the Netherlands 
and United Nations, n. 07-2973, 30 March 2010, para 5.11: “it has not clearly emerged 
from the Association’s arguments why there would not be an opportunity for them to 
bring the perpetrators of the genocide, and possibly also those who can be held 
responsible for the perpetrators, before a court of law meeting the requirements of article 
6 ECHR”. 
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ECtHR and in art. 14 of the ICCPR.154 In the plaintiffs' opinion, no 
proportionality can exist where there is not a remedy, alternative to national 
courts, available to victims. In making this argument, the claimants relied on 
the Waite and Kennedy and the Beer and Regan precedents, where the ECtHR 
carefully analysed whether the legal framework of the international 
organisations (claiming their immunity from domestic jurisdiction), provided 
for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and eventually, upon the 
finding of alternative remedies available to the claimants, the Court dismissed 
the case.155 
 Also the ECtHR dismissed the case at issue, stating that “the grant of 
immunity to the United Nations served a legitimate purpose and was not 
disproportionate”.156 The Court, while acknowledging the relevance of the 
precedent quoted by the claimants, quite interestingly affirmed that the two 
cases (Beer and Regan and Waite and Kennedy) cannot be interpreted in 
absolute terms and that from the lack of alternative remedies it does not 
necessary follow that granting immunity before domestic courts to 
international organisations violates art. 6 ECtHR.157 
 The victims of the cholera outbreak in Haiti brought a lawsuit against 
the UN before US Courts, claiming that the fulfilment of the duty to establish 
third-party claims settlement procedures (ex art. VIII, section 29 of the GCPI) 
is a condition precedent to UN immunity. Absent this requirement, the 
Organisation should not be entitled to invoke immunity – to benefit of the 
‘bargain’, in the plaintiffs’ words.158. The submission was rejected by the 
District Court first, and by the Court of Appeals later. The latter court decided 
                                                 
154 European Court of Human Rights, Stiching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the 
Netherlands, no. 65542/12, Decision, 11 June 2013. 
155  European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Waite and Kennedy v Germany, no. 
26083/94, Judgment, 18 February 1999 and Grand Chamber, Beer and Regan v Germany, 
no. 28934/95, Judgement, 18 February 1999; see Pustorino, “Immunità giurisdizionale 
delle organizzazioni internazionali e tutela dei diritti fondamentali. Le sentenze della 
Corte europea nei casi Waite et Kennedy e Beer et Regan”, in Rivista di diritto 
internazionale, vol .83, 2000, pp. 132-150. 
156  European Court of Human Rights, Stiching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the 
Netherlands, para. 169. 
157  Ibidem, para. 165. 
158  Southern District Court of New York, Georges et al. v. United Nations, 13 cv 07146, JPO, 
Decision and Order, p. 5. 
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the case based on a textual interpretation of the General Convention, coming 
to the conclusion that only one exception exists to UN immunity from suit: 
the express waiver by the Secretary General, and it was not met in the present 
case.159 
The question of UN immunity from jurisdiction has generated a lively 
debate among scholars and practitioners. Many authors have praised the 
immunity rule, considering it quintessential to the notion of functionality and 
of independence. By contrast, other commentators have harshly criticised 
how the interpretation of UN immunity, as absolute, turned into a shield 
protecting the UN from bearing international responsibility for its wrongful 
acts. As evidenced by the case law analysed so far, several arguments have 
been advanced seeking to strike a fair balance between the victims' right to a 
remedy and to court and the functional independence of the Organisation. 
None of the suggested interpretations has until now succeeded in taking down 
a brick in the wall of UN immunity. 
In our opinion, there might be some scope for challenging the current 
overly extensive understanding of UN immunity by interpreting the immunity 
rule through the prism of functionality. Immunity should not be claimed as 
conditional upon the existence of other remedies, as indeed the texts of the 
General Convention and of the Charter do not accommodate such an 
understanding. Similarly, the proportionality test, that weighs the general 
purposes pursued by the UN against the right to a remedy and the right to 
access to court, can offer a different solution. According to the ECtHR’s 
reasoning, in the context of peace operations, the purposes pursued by the UN 
should be understood by reference to the very broad notion of the 
maintenance of international peace and security. It is evident that any 
individual – though fundamental – right would be overridden by such a far-
fetching goal. This is even more evident when dealing with ‘not-absolute 
rights’ or ‘derogable rights’ as the right to access to court and the right to an 
effective remedy. 
It is our opinion that by looking at the problem from a different angle, 
                                                 
159  Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Georges et al. v. United Nations, 15‐455-cv, p. 12. 
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there would be some scope to win the immunity defence, namely by focusing 
on the very breaches of the SOFA and of the GCPI and not of human rights 
instruments. In other words, a suit should be based on the breaches of art. 51 
of the Model SOFA and art. VIII, section 29 of the General Convention 
entailed by the UN failure to provide for third party dispute settlement 
mechanisms. In this case, the core claim would not concern human rights 
violations allegedly perpetrated by the UN during peace operations, hence in 
the performance of its functions in the context of chapter VII powers, but 
rather the violation of the duty to settle third party claims that does not 
concern the exercise of a UN mandate. Thus, we would not claim that the UN 
failed to prevent genocide, or failed to properly screen peacekeepers from 
cholera, or violated the right to life and health of hundreds of people. Under 
the proposed defence, victims could more simply maintain that the UN, by 
not establishing remedial mechanisms, has infringed upon a general 
obligation that it has undertaken, stipulating the General Convention and the 
SOFA. In other words, it will not be questioned how the UN operated in the 
execution of a mission’s mandate, i.e. while achieving its functions, but rather 
it will be submitted that the UN, even after the accomplishment of the 
mandate, has breached a general treaty obligation to set up claim 
commissions or equivalent instruments to receive third party claims. 
 This reasoning is premised on a further issue, the justiciability of 
rights. In order for individuals to claim a breach of art. VIII, section 29 of the 
GCPI and of art. 51 of the UN Model SOFA (i.e. international treaties), the 
provision in point has to grant an individually enforceable right, namely the 
right to have their claims received by a dispute resolution mechanism to be 
established by the UN. If this is not the case, only the parties to the treaty will 
be entitled to raise the issue of compliance with the treaty. To address this 
core question, the analysis will now discuss when international norms create 
individual enforceable rights that can constitute a cause of action when 
claiming the responsibility of international organisations and of States before 
domestic courts. 
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6.2 The issue of individually enforceable rights 
 
 The issue of when an international treaty confers enforceable rights 
upon individuals has been addressed in several cases concerning peace 
operations. National case law, however, has not offered so far consistent 
answers. The majority of national courts tend to exclude that international 
treaties, namely the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, the 
GCPI, missions SOFAs, and in some cases even human rights conventions, 
can be invoked by individuals. It is generally understood that these 
international conventions regulate exclusively legal relationships between 
States and between States and international organisations.160 At the same 
time, though, some courts have come to different conclusions as to the 
possible enforcement of international norms by individuals.161 Similarly, 
scholarly writings disagree on whether international treaties relevant in 
military operations, especially IHL, should be interpreted as granting 
individual rights. 
In 2001, the Italian Court of Cassation, deciding the Markovic case 
had to determine whether the Italian government, by cooperating with 1999 
NATO bombing of the radio-television in Belgrade, violated several treaty 
provisions among which arts 35.2, 48, 49, 51, 52 and 57 of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and also arts 2 and 15.2 of the ECHR.162 
The Court dismissed the case on the basis of a generic assessment: although 
the norms invoked by the claimant are tailored to protect civilians in case of 
attack, they regulate exclusively inter-States relations, being international 
                                                 
160  Italian Court of Cassation, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri c. Markovic et al., Order, 
sez. Un., 8 February 2008; District Court of Bonn, Kunduz case, n. 1 O 460/11, Judgment 
11 December 2013;  
161  European Court of Human Rights, Stiching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands, 
no. 65542/12, 11 June 2013; District Court of The Hague, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica 
et al. v the Netherlands and the United Nations, RDBH:A8748, 16 July 2014. 
162  Italian Court of Cassation, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri c. Markovic et al., Order, 
sez. Un., 8 February 2008; Ronzitti, “Azioni belliche e risarcimento del danno”, in Rivista 
di Diritto Internazionale, 2002, p. 683; Frulli, “When are States Liable Towards 
Individuals for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law, The Markovic Case”, in JICJ, 
2003, p. 406. 
  246 
norms.163 Moreover, in the Court’s opinion, nothing in Italian laws 
implementing the Geneva Conventions and the ECHR prescribes explicitly 
they can be individually enforced to claim damages suffered as the result of 
violations thereof.164 The Court’s conclusions appear quite questionable, 
especially in light of a precedent of the same Court, stating in 1998 that ECHR 
norms impose on State parties legal obligations immediately binding that, 
once implemented in a domestic system, become a source of rights and duties 
for all subjects of that legal system.165 
 Several years later in 2014, the application of Additional Protocol I to 
individual-State relations came again into question in the second Mothers of 
Srebrenica case, where the plaintiffs asked the District Court of the Hague to 
adjudicate that the Netherlands violated art. 87 of AP I to the Geneva 
Conventions.166 The claimants submitted that the Dutch government – 
through its officers participating to UNPROFOR – breached its obligation to 
report war crimes witnessed prior to the evacuation of the Srebrenica 
compound.167 The District Court of the Hague did not elaborate on whether 
the norm creates individually enforceable rights, nevertheless it found that the 
State, through its officials, violated its duty to report war crimes; it thus 
                                                 
163  Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri c. Markovic et al., para. 3: “[l]e norme del 
Protocollo di Ginevra del 1977 ... e della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo ..., 
che disciplinano la condotta delle ostilità, hanno bensì come oggetto la protezione dei 
civili in caso di attacchi, ma in quanto norme di diritto internazionale regolano rapporti 
tra Stati”. 
164  Idem. 
165  Italian Court of Cassation, Galeotti Ottieri Della Ciaja et al. c. Ministero delle Finanze, 
Judgement n. 6672, 8 July 1998, the Court stated that ECHR norms “impongono agli 
Stati contraenti veri e propri obblighi giuridici immediatamente vincolanti e, una volta 
introdotte nell'ordinamento statale interno, sono fonte di diritti ed obblighi per tutti i 
soggetti”; see Raspadori, I trattati internazionali sui diritti umani e il giudice italiano, 
Milano, 2000. 
166 Art. 87, para. 1, I PA stipulates the following: “The High Contracting Parties and the 
Parties to the conflict shall require military commanders, with respect to members of the 
armed forces under their command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, 
where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the 
Conventions and of this Protocol”. 
167  District Court of The Hague, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands and 
the United Nations, RDBH:A8748, 16 July 2014, par. 4.147. “Claimants adopt the 
position that the State has violated international law in the following ways: ... [v]iolating 
international humanitarian law (the Geneva Conventions, Article 87 of the First 
Supplementary Protocol to these Conventions and the SOP) by not reporting war crimes 
Dutchbat had observed whereby Claimants also appeal to Article 1 paragraph 3 of the UN 
Charter”. 
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implicitly acknowledged that the norm in point is individually enforceable.168 
It should not be disregarded, however, that the Dutch Court preferred to 
identify the source of the obligation to report war crimes in customary law, 
rather than in the treaty provision invoked by the plaintiffs.169  
In the same proceeding, it was also claimed that the Netherlands 
violated the 1948 Genocide Convention by the UNPROFOR Dutchbat failure 
to prevent genocide.170As it concerns the Genocide Convention, the Court 
carried out a textual and contextual interpretation of the norms, that were also 
read in light of the Convention drafting history and of the UN Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation,171 and concluded 
that the norms invoked were “not as yet ‘enforceable’”.172 The Court agreed 
with the claimants’ argument that the Genocide Convention enshrines jus 
cogens norms, however, in the Court’s view it was not possible to infer from 
this sole feature that the Convention was meant to create individually 
enforceable rights.173  As a matter of fact – the Court stated – the Genocide 
Convention does codify the crime of genocide and imposes specific 
obligations on States, but nothing in its text confers right upon individuals. 
 The Geneva Conventions have also been invoked before German 
courts in the Kunduz case, where the plaintiffs asked the District Court of 
Bonn to adjudicate the responsibility of the German government for bombing 
two oil trucks with the ‘collateral damage’ of killing of about 90 people near  
Kunduz, Afghanistan, during an ISAF operation directed by a German 
Commander.174 According to the claimants, the government violated, inter 
                                                 
168  It should be specified that, despite that the Court found the State in breach of the said 
obligation, the judge eventually found that the casual link between the violation and the 
damage suffered by the victims was absent, hence this part of the claim was eventually 
dismissed. Ibidem, paras 4.235 and 4.278. 
169  Ibidem, para 4.264. 
170  Ibidem, para. 3.2. 
171  Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, Assemblea generale, risoluzione n. 60/147 del 21 
marzo 2006. 
172  District Court of The Hague, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the Netherlands and 
the United Nations, RDBH: A8748, 16 July 2014, para. 4.163. 
173  Ibidem, par. 4.164. 
174  District Court of Bonn, Kunduz case, n. 1 O 460/11, Judgment 11 December 2013, see 
introductory note and comment by Aust, in ORIL, ILDC 1858 (DE 2012); Achten, 
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alia, its duty to give an ‘effective advance warning’ prior to the attack as 
codified in art. 51 para. 1 (c) del I AP.175  The German Court did not consider 
if the norm in point was enforceable or not, instead it focused on the argument 
that international humanitarian law does not confer upon individuals a right 
to claim reparation. Hence it was concluded that the plaintiff had no standing 
before German courts and the case was dismissed. This reasoning was later 
confirmed also by the German Constitutional Court in the Varvarin bridge 
case.176 
As mentioned earlier, the alleged material breach of the GCPI and of 
the UN-Haiti SOFA was invoked by the cholera victims in Haiti suing the UN 
before US courts in the Georges et al. case. The 2015 Opinion and Order of 
Justice Oetken of the Southern District Court of New York did not offer many 
elements to elaborate on this very topic, as he upheld the UN absolute 
immunity defence and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the thoughtful argument proposed by the United States 
Attorney in its letter to Justice Oetken provides for some insights. It 
maintained that “the obligations under the General Convention and the SOFA 
are owed by the UN to the other parties to those agreements, not to the 
Plaintiffs”.177 By contrast, the judgement of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, even if it upheld the first instance ruling, 
nonetheless responded in detail to the claimants’ submission concerning the 
                                                 
“Compensation Claims of Individuals for Violations of Rules on Conduct of Hostilities. 
Comment on a Judgment of the District Court of Bonn, Germany – LG Bonn 1 0 460/11, 
11 December 2013”, in Humanitares Volkerrecht, 2015, p. 34; Henn, “The Development 
of German Jurisprudence on Individual Compensation for Victims of Armed Conflicts. 
The Kunduz Case”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2014, p. 615. 
175  Art. 51 AP I, para 1 (c) stipulates that “constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian 
population, civilians and civilian objects”. Specifically, it is prescribed that an “effective 
advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless 
circumstances do not permit”.  
176  District Court of Bonn, Varvarin brigde case, n. 1 O 361/02, Judgement 10 December 
2003, appealed before the Regional Court of Colonia, n. 7 U 8/04, 28 July 2005, and 
eventually before the Federal Constitutional Court, n. 2 BvR 2660/06, Judgement 13 
August 2013; see Mehring, “The Judgement of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht 
concerning Reparations for the Victims of the Varvarin Bombing”, in International and 
Comparative Law Review, vol. 15, 2015, pp. 191-209; see also the introductory note to 
the Judgement of the Regional Court of Colonia by Aust, in Oxford Reports of 
International Law, ILDC 887 (DE 2006). 
177  Letter of the United States Attorney to Southern District of New York to Justice Oeteken,7 
July 2014, section B, pp. 11-12. 
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UN material breach of the Convention and the SOFA.178  
Relying on several precedents, the Court stated that in the present case 
plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the argument.179 The Court started with 
illustrating the general rule governing the private enforcement of international 
norms and then focused on the analysis of its exceptions. In the Court’s view, 
plaintiffs would have had standing only to the extent that a sovereign State 
party to the General Convention or to the SOFA would have claimed its 
violation.180 This rule sees two exceptions: the ‘express language’ and the 
‘responsive posture’ exclusions. Under the first, the plaintiffs would have had 
standing if the treaty contained ‘express language’ that created privately 
enforceable rights to be vindicated by individuals themselves.181 Under the 
second exception, plaintiffs could have invoked a treaty provision (otherwise 
not directly enforceable) in a ‘responsive posture’, which may occur in two 
cases a) “to defend against a claim by the United States government”, b) “to 
defend against a claim by another private party under State or federal law”.182 
In the opinion of the Court, none of these conditions was satisfied by the 
plaintiffs, hence it concluded they had no standing to raise the material breach 
of the treaty. 
 It is interesting to note that the ECtHR in the Mothers of Srebrenica v 
the Netherlands, even if just touching upon the issue that was not at the heart 
of its reasoning, came to the opposite conclusion as it concerns the private 
enforcement of SOFA provisions on the UN duty to establish a claims 
commission by stating that 
[t]he only international instrument on which individuals could base a 
right to a remedy against the United Nations in relation to the acts and 
omissions of UNPROFOR is the Agreement on the status of the United 
Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina [...], which in its 
                                                 
178  United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Georges v. United Nations, 18 
August 2016. 
179  United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Georges v. United Nations, p. 19. 
The Court quoted United States v. Garavito‐Garcia, 2016 WL 3568164, at 3 (2d Cir. July 
1, 2016); see United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 390 (6th Cir. 2001): “It is well 
established that individuals have no standing to challenge violations of international 
treaties in the absence of protest by the sovereign involved.” 
180  Idem. 
181  Ibidem, p. 20. 
182  Ibidem, pp. 20-21. 
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Article 48 requires that a claims commission be set up for that 
purpose.183 
From this study of national and international case law, we can deduce the 
absence of a uniform rule used by domestic judges to determine whether an 
international norm is individually enforceable. The question, however, is of 
great importance to respond to the quest for justice for victims of serious 
violations occurred in peace operations. The paradigm change occurring in 
international law, where individuals are becoming “primary international 
legal persons” holding rights and bearing duties in the international legal 
order, reveals the limits of the argument according to which international law 
would only regulate relations between States and international 
organisations.184  
 It seems thus questionable that a court can dismiss a case of 
individuals claiming a violation of IHL, or a breach of the duty to establish 
third party claims systems provided in the SOFA and in the GCPI, upon the 
sole and generic consideration that international norms operate only between 
States and international organisations. Even less compelling is the argument 
that these norms cannot be invoked before domestic courts because they do 
not expressly provide for an individual right to reparation. This idea shows a 
very limited approach to the matter, both under the prism of international law 
and of domestic law, given that a right to a remedy exists under international 
law and a right to a remedy to injured parties is generally provided for in 
every domestic legal system based on the rule of law.  
 It is undoubtable that an autonomous right to a remedy exists under 
international law, as enshrined for example in art. 13 of the ECHR,185 in art. 
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,186 and 
                                                 
183  European Court of Human Rights, Stiching Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v the 
Netherlands, par. 162. 
184  Peters, Beyond Human Rights, Cambridge Universtiy Press, 2016. 
185  European Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, Right to an effective remedy: “Everyone 
whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an 
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity”. 
186  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47 Right to an effective 
remedy and to a fair trial. “Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law 
of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in 
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articulated with specific regard to IHL and HR violations in the UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law.187 Furthermore, it is 
commonly understood that reparation represents the remedial action par 
excellence, as clearly stated in the Commentary to the ILA Declaration on 
Reparation for Victims for Armed Conflict, where it is specified that “the term 
‘reparation’ […] represents the basic remedy laid down in the present 
Declaration”.188 Similarly, in the UN Guidelines, appropriate remedies are 
understood to include reparation; art. VII, para 11 encompasses reparation as 
one of the appropriate forms of remedies 
Remedies for gross violations of international human rights law and 
serious violations of international humanitarian law include the 
victim’s right to the following as provided for under international law: 
(a) Equal and effective access to justice; 
(b) Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; 
(c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and 
reparation mechanisms.189   
 
It is thus evident that many scholarly writings and the restrictive 
jurisprudence analysed here err in focusing on the alleged non-existence of 
an individual right to reparation for IHL violations. An individual right to 
reparation exists under international law as part of the broader right to an 
effective remedy for serious violations of fundamental rights and 
humanitarian law.  
Moreover, the issue of reparation is not the only relevant problem 
linked to the nature of privately enforceable international norms. International 
treaties provisions can be invoked not only as ground for compensation, in 
cases of violations, but also as source of rights to be defended. This is 
exemplified by the US jurisprudence developed in relation to the treatment of 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay and to the implementation of the notorious 
                                                 
compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article”. 
187  A/RES/60/147, 21 March 2006, hereinafter “UN Guidelines”. 
188  ILA Declaration, 2010, Art. 1 Commentary, para 1. 
189  A/RES/60/147, art. I, para 2 lett (c), italics added. 
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Military Commissions Act. The plaintiffs invoked the violation of common 
art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions not to claim damages, but to have their rights 
respected by the US Government, namely the right to habeas corpus, to be 
informed of the charges, to be judged by a regularly constituted court.190  
It is thus evident that the question does not centre upon the right to 
reparation but rather on the very nature of the international norms invoked by 
plaintiffs in each case, and whether or not they confer individually 
enforceable rights upon individuals. To challenge the unsatisfying answer 
given by many courts that individuals are not the addressees of international 
norms just because the latter are ‘for States only’, the present study suggests 
that each case should be decided, not based on aprioristic considerations. 
Instead, a thorough interpretation of the very provisions invoked by the 
plaintiffs should be carried out, in order to assess whether that specific 
international norm creates individual rights.  
In the opinion of Sloss, treaty norms give rise to individual rights 
when they impose “a specific, vertical duty that a State owes to an identifiable 
class of individuals”. 191 A similar reasoning can also be identified in a 
passage of the judgement quoted by the Court of Appeal of the Southern 
District of New York in the Haiti case 
 
It is true that there is an exception to this rule where a treaty 
contains ‘express language’ “creat[ing] privately enforceable rights 
[…] or some other indication that the intent of the treaty drafters 
was to confer rights that could be vindicated in the manner sought 
by […] affected individuals”.192 
It is thus crucial to understand when an international norm provides for a 
                                                 
190  Sloss, “When do treaties create individually enforceable rights? The Supreme Court 
Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas”, in Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law, vol. 45, 2006, pp. 20-113; Pavoni, “Norme non self-executing in materia di diritti 
umani e diritto umanitario e violazione del diritto di accesso alla giustizia nella recente 
prassi statunitense”, in Fancioni-Gestri-Scovazzi-Ronzitti, Accesso alla giustizia 
dell'individuo nel diritto internazionale e dell'Unione Europea, Milano, 2008, pp. 305. 
191  Sloss, Self- executing Treaties and Domestic Judicial Remedies, in ASIL Proceedings, n. 
98, 2004, p. 346. 
192  Georges et al., p. 20, quoting United States v. Suarez, 791 F.3d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 2015). 
The rule mentioned concerned the application of international treaties exclusively to 
sovereign States. 
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vertical duty of a State vis à vis a specific private addressee. The ICJ reasoning 
elaborated in the LaGrand and in the Avena cases offers an enlightening 
guidance to adjudicate when international norms set forth individual rights.193 
In the LaGrand case, the Court was asked to decide whether art. 36, par. 1 (b) 
of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations stipulates an individual 
right of detainees to be informed of the rights they are entitled under the 
Convention and to demand the detaining authorities to inform their State of 
nationality. Based on a textual and contextual interpretation of the 
Convention, the Court noted that the paragraph in point clearly provides for 
an obligation for State parties towards not only other State parties, but also 
towards the detainees themselves.194 The ICJ further emphasised the language 
used by the Convention underlying that “the said authorities shall inform the 
person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph”.195 
Following the careful interpretation of the norms, the Court concluded that 
“the clarity of these provisions, viewed in their context, admits of no doubt”, 
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) creates individual rights.196 This interpretation was 
later confirmed in the Avena case, concerning the violation of individual 
rights of Mexican citizens.197 
 All the above leads us to conclude that international treaties do not 
necessarily regulate only relations between States or international 
organisations, but between States or international organisations and 
individuals as well. If not all, certainly some provisions of international 
                                                 
193  ICJ, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgement, 27 June 2001, para. 
77; Vierucci, “La tutela dei diritti individuali in base alla Convenzione di Vienna sulle 
relazioni consolari: in margine al caso LaGrand”, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, vol. 
84, 2001, pp. 686-710; Milano, “Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights Before the 
International Court of Justice. Re-fashioning Tradition?”, in Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, vol. 35, 2004, pp. 85-142. 
194  LaGrand, par. 77. 
195  Idem, the emphasis was added by the ICJ itself. 
196  Idem. The Court of Appeal did not come to the conclusion that article VIII, Section 29 of 
the GCPI contained this “express language” creating an enforceable right of individuals 
to have their claims settled by   
197  ICJ, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, 
31 March 2004, para. 40; Sossai, “L'esecuzione della sentenza Avena negli Stati Uniti”, 
in Rivista di diritto internazionale, vol. 89, 2006, pp. 423-447; Orakhelashvili, “Judicial 
Compentence and Judicial Remedies in the Avena Case”, in Leiden Journal of 
International Law, vol. 18, 2005, pp. 31-48. 
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agreements do create individual rights, and a domestic court seized on the 
matter should operate a proper interpretation of the law. This interpretation 
should consider whether the norm invoked by the plaintiff sets forth specific 
rights entrusted to a given individual, or group of individuals, that correspond 
to obligations States or international organisations shall abide by. In other 
words, it should be analysed if a vertical relation between a State/organisation 
and individuals exists whereby the former has an obligation to grant to the 
latter a certain right.  Once a judge has come to the conclusion that the norm 
in point creates an individual right, then the judge should not ask the further 
– and pleonastic – question of whether that individual right is enforceable. 
Every individual right that comes to light in a domestic legal system (whether 
or not it stems from an international norm) is enforceable, otherwise, it would 
not be an individual right, but rather some other ‘legal situations’ recognised 
under domestic law, such as for example, prerogatives or legitimate 
interests.198 And the enforceability of individual rights includes access to 
appropriate remedies (typically reparation) for, as in the words of Lord 
Denning, “a right without a remedy is no right at all”.199 
 Against this backdrop, it seems evident that art. VIII, Section 29 of 
the GCPI and art. 51 of the UN Model SOFA can be interpreted in the sense 
of prescribing a duty of the UN to establish dispute settlement mechanisms 
to adjudicate third party claims that otherwise would be barred by UN 
immunity from jurisdiction. Even if the letter of these articles does not 
expressly mention the term ‘right’, however, it sets forth an obligation for the 
UN, as the use of the verb ‘shall’ clearly indicates. It follows that this 
                                                 
198  Satta, Diritto Processuale Civile, Cedam, 1973, pp. 104 ff.; Zegveld, “Remedies for 
Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, in International Review of the 
Red Cross, vol. 85, 2003, pp. 497-527. In the Italian legal system “Il diritto soggettivo è 
tradizionalmente definito come un interesse protetto dal diritto oggettivo. Lo si può [...] 
descrivere come la pretesa di un soggetto ad esigere da un altro soggetto l'osservanza di 
un dovere che una norma impone al secondo nell'interesse del primo”. The main 
difference between individual rights and legitimate interest rests with the different level 
of protection the law grants to “human interests”, Galgano, Diritto Privato, Padova, 2004, 
pp. 20. 
199  Lord Denning in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, AC, 1978, p. 435, cited by 
Higgins, “The role of domestic courts in the enforcement of international human rights: 
The United Kingdom”, in Conforti-Francioni (eds), Enforcing International Rights in 
Domestic Courts, Nijhoff, 1997, p. 38.  
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obligation is due by the UN to aggrieved third parties, thus creating a ‘vertical 
relation’ between them and the Organisation, where the latter has a duty 
towards the former. In other words, we can affirm that indivuals affected by 
harmful conducts carried out in UN peace operations have an indivually 
enforceable right to access alternative remedies to be established by the UN 
according to its internal rules and procedures.200 From this we can further 
infer that, should the UN fail to respect this obligation, aggrieved third parties 
deprived of their right to access a remedy would be entitled to claim a 
violation of art. VIII, Section 29 of the GCPI and art. 51 of the UN Model 
SOFA; eventually challenging UN immunity on this basis, as suggested 
earlier in this study. 201 
 
 
 
                                                 
200 This conclusion de iure condendo is also suppored by a contextual interpretation of the 
treaty provisions commented here, carried out in light of the relevant international rules 
on the right to an effective remedy analysed in this section. As prescribed by customary 
rules on treaty interpretation, enshrined in art. 31.3 (c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties and in art. 31.3 (c) of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations, “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context: […] any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”.  
201 Supra para. 6.1. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Over the last 20 years, peace operations have been increasingly 
deployed all around the globe in conflict and post-conflict situations. The core 
shift from inter-States to intra-States conflicts has called on peace operations 
to operate with robust mandates in extremely volatile environments, and to 
discharge ambitious mandates through a wide array of functions and powers. 
Accordingly, peace operations have had a growing impact on the territory and 
on the population of missions’ receiving States. The difficulties in fulfilling 
overly ambitious mandates, combined with the challenging geopolitical 
scenario of deployment, have hampered the success of many operations. The 
main pitfall has to be identified in the failure to protect civilians, who were 
affected by harmful conducts carried out by the very peace operations’ forces 
that were called upon to protect them.  
 The occurrence of harmful conducts to the detriment of civilians, 
which in some cases amounted to serious violations of international law, have 
generated a growing demand for justice by aggrieved individuals. This has 
led us to our main research question, looking at the legal consequences under 
international law of harmful conducts carried out by States and international 
organisations in peace operations. 
The research has shown that the legal consequences of the occurrence 
of a wrongful act in peace operations can be described through the lens of 
multiple responsibility regimes, namely international responsibility, liability 
and accountability. Each offers its own perspective as well as possible legal 
outcomes for civilians, States and international organisations. 
It has emerged that these responsibility regimes essentially 
complement each other. In the first place, injured parties tend to turn to 
liability regimes developed by each international organisation or by member 
States in a given operation. It is the case of claims commissions in NATO 
missions and of UN local claims review boards. Through these remedial 
instruments, claimants essentially seek, and in some cases obtain, 
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compensation for damages suffered. 
Aggrieved individuals also resort to accountability mechanisms as, for 
example, the Ombudsperson, the UNMIK HRAP and the EULEX HRRP. In 
other cases, especially at the occurrence of serious crimes, the public opinion 
has triggered the establishment of other accountability tools, namely national 
and international had hoc committees and inquiry commissions. This was the 
case of Srebrenica and Haiti, for example. Through these remedial 
instruments, victims are entitled to ‘tell their stories’, while no form of redress 
is envisaged. To be more precise, none of the accountability mechanisms 
established so far in peace operations have either compensated damages 
caused to third parties, nor developed other forms of compensation per 
equivalente. 
When third parties have found these remedial mechanisms 
unsatisfactory – or inaccessible – they have turned to national courts, and in 
some cases to the Strasbourg Court, hence calling into question the 
international responsibility of States and international organisations.  
Once described this general pattern, we can now move to our second 
research question, in order to determine whether these ‘multi-level’ 
responsibility regimes have been able to fulfill the growing demand for justice 
generated by the failure to protect civilians during peace operations. At first 
glance, this articulated system may seem well-suited to respond to the 
multiple instances of injured individuals. However, the study has 
demonstrated that each regime presents some major shortcomings that cause 
an uneven distribution of responsibility between States and international 
organisations, and among member States themselves, eventually depriving 
plaintiffs of an effective remedy. 
The liability claims systems, especially of the UN, impose too 
stringent limitations on compensable claims and on compensable damages. It 
is well understood that liability does not foresee an obligation to provide for 
full reparation. Accordingly, several ceilings can be imposed by the liable 
entity on the compensation due to the injured party. The main problem of 
UN’s compensation policy lies with the – often arbitrary – interpretation 
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given by the Organisation of the notion of ‘private law character’ of disputes. 
As it has been explained, under art. 51 of the UN Model SOFA and art. VII 
para. 29 of the GCPI third party claims that are not of ‘private law character’ 
are not receivable. For example, the UN has refused to receive certain claims, 
upon the justification that the submissions were not ‘of a private law 
character’. This was the case of plaintiffs of the Srebrenica massacre during 
UNPROFOR, of the victims of the cholera outbreak in Haiti during 
MINUSTAH, and of the internal displaced persons stationed in a lead-
contaminated camp during UNMIK administration of Kosovo. The distort use 
of this elusive notion de facto provides for a leeway for the UN to escape its 
liability, especially in cases with potential high financial and political 
implications. Hence numerous victims of very serious international law 
violations were left without a remedy and without redress. 
 Absent the possibility to obtain some form of redress through the 
liability regime, claimants have turned to accountability mechanisms, calling 
for the establishment of independent inquiries on the events or referring to 
existing accountability bodies, as in the case of UNMIK and EULEX in 
Kosovo. They seemed at first promising tools to address the instances of 
aggrieved parties. However, the UN recognizes no obligation to adhere to 
their findings. The fact that no legal consequences derived from the 
assessment of these bodies, neither in terms of reparation nor of official 
apologies, has hampered their very mission. Moreover, the UN refusal to 
endorse and enforce the recommendations of the HRAP and the progressive 
reduction of the Ombudsperson’ powers further hinders the effectiveness of 
these mechanisms. Considering that – as just mentioned – accountability 
mechanisms do not provide for redress but are limited to some form of official 
‘story telling’, the resort to accountability regime have had essentially two 
main consequences. On the one hand, victims were left again without 
compensation for damages suffered. On the other hand, the fact-finding 
process often brought to light ample evidence of the responsibility of States 
and international organisations for the impugned conducts. It follows that 
victims have often faced situations where serious violations of human rights 
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were ascertained, but no redress was offered for the damages they have 
incurred, nor the actors involved acknowledged their international 
responsibility. This was again the case of the UNPROFOR involvement in 
the Srebrenica massacre, and of the outbreak of cholera following 
MINUSTAH deployment in Haiti. 
Against this background, plaintiffs have then resorted to domestic 
jurisdiction and, in some cases, to regional courts of human rights, as the 
ECtHR, thus calling into question the international responsibility of States 
and of international organisations, especially the UN.  
Also this last responsibility regime has proved to have several pitfalls, 
both of substantial and procedural nature. As to the former, no rule on 
attribution of wrongful conducts exists at the present time under international 
law. National and international judges have thus come to sometimes very 
different, if not opposite determinations. In some cases, they have attributed 
wrongful acts exclusively to the UN, while in others solely to the sending 
State, and in still others both to the UN and to TCCs; to the detriment of the 
certainty of law and of the right to an effective remedy of victims.  
As to procedural issues, States generally do not act in diplomatic 
protection of their nationals in peace operations, with the sole exception of 
the ONUC mission in the 60s, where the UN entered into lump sums 
agreements with many States of nationality of aggrieved third parties.1 
Consequently, when individuals have turned to national courts and regional 
courts of human rights, namely the ECtHR, they have faced two pervasive 
obstacles. Firstly, plaintiffs’ suits were often dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
due to the immunity of the UN, which has never waived its immunity before 
national courts in this type of case law. Applying UN immunity has thus 
repeatedly resulted in closing the door to any individual instance. Secondly, 
plaintiffs’ lawsuits have been barred by a very limited interpretation of the 
notion of privately enforceable rights. Accordingly, individuals were not 
entitled to claim a violation – nor the reparation for that violation – of most 
international law norms vis à vis the respondent State. 
                                                 
1 See supra chapter IV, para. 2.3. 
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As a further consequence, these procedural obstacles have determined 
an uneven distribution of responsibility between TCCs and the international 
organisation leading the operation, and between TCCs themselves. On the 
one hand, the immunity of international organisations, especially the UN, has 
caused States to be the sole responsible entity; even when the responsibility 
of the leading international organisation was clearly at issue. This is 
exemplified by the Srebrenica case law, where solely the responsibility of the 
Netherlands was adjudicated by Dutch Courts, although there was clear 
evidence that the decision to evacuate the compound was taken jointly by the 
UN and the Dutch government. Moreover, some TCCs are de facto more 
responsible than others, for example, because their domestic legal systems 
are more accessible or because they are parties of regional human rights 
instruments, such as the ECHR.  
In order to better address the growing demand for justice for wrongful 
acts occurred in peace operations, this study has suggested that a ‘multi-level 
effort’ could be undertaken. Such a determination to improve the current 
setting is described as ‘multi-level’ for it concerns every responsibility 
regime, upon the consideration that they complement each other. 
Consequently, a tentative reform of this responsibility system would require 
a multi-level effort of all actors involved in peace operations, namely States, 
international organisations, especially the UN, national and international 
courts, as well as individuals. 
This ‘multi-level effort’ would begin with the UN’s reconsideration 
of its notion of ‘private law character’ of disputes submitted thereto. The UN 
could engage in a non-distorted interpretation of the notion of ‘private law 
character’ of disputes, no longer excluding claims of numerous plaintiff with 
highly political and financial implications. These are precisely the kinds of 
claims that plaintiffs would later bring before national and regional courts of 
human rights, as it was the case of the events in Srebrenica and Haiti. This 
with the uneven consequences described so far in terms of access to justice 
and distribution of responsibility among multiple actors.  
To redistribute the burden of responsibility, the UN could also reform 
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its claims system establishing a permanent UN claims tribunal to adjudicate 
human rights violations occurred in UN peace operations. The creation of 
such a forum would offer effective protection to victims while safeguarding 
UN autonomy. A permanent tribunal within the UN system to assess UN 
responsibility already exists. The UN Dispute and Appeals Tribunal has been 
created by the General Assembly in 2007 to adjudicate disputes between the 
Organisation and its employees.2 Despite the very different subject matter, 
this Tribunal exemplifies the powers of the GA to establish an internal 
judicial body entitled to render binding decisions and order appropriate 
remedies.  
As to accountability mechanisms, the Ombudspersons and other 
advisory bodies could become more effective if the international organisation 
establishing them would confer thereto the power to order some forms of 
indemnization or reparation per equivalente. Reasonable ceilings can be 
imposed, recalling some of the limitations existing under the relevant claims 
policies. International organisations, moreover, could undertake to respect 
recommendations issued by their advisory bodies, which was identified as the 
main failure of the HRAP structure.3 It is our opinion that accountability 
mechanisms, such as those established in Kosovo, once corrected could 
provide for a very effective forum for victims. In all the above-mentioned 
hypotheses TCCs also have an important role to play. Principally, they could 
choose to exert their diplomatic influence for the development of these 
mechanisms. Along with other parties, TCCs would clearly benefit from a 
more even distribution of responsibility. 
As it concerns the international responsibility regime, national courts 
and the Strasbourg Court could develop a more consistent interpretation of 
attribution rules applicable in peace operations. As suggested, the factual 
approach premised on the consideration that national forces are State organs 
put at the disposal of the receiving organisation is the attribution criterion to 
apply and to elaborate on. A judge should thus inquire who exercised 
                                                 
2 GA RES 61/261 (2007). 
3 See supra chapter IV, para. 3. 
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effective control over the impugned act in the situation at issue. Effective 
control should be interpreted as operational control, to be understood looking 
at the features of the chain of command and control in that specific operation. 
Accordingly, the proposed interpretation would allow the interpreter to take 
into account all the factual circumstances of the case. Moreover, effective 
control should be interpreted following a ‘reciprocal approach’, with the 
effect of determining whether, not only the international organisation, but 
also the sending State exerted effective control over the wrongful conduct. 
This implies that the relevance of the DARS to attribute wrongful acts in 
peace operations should eventually be excluded. Moreover, this reciprocal 
approach would allow both dual attribution (when the international 
organisation and the State exercised effective control over the conduct) and 
exclusive attribution to the sending State (in the case the chain of command 
and control was ‘broken’).4  
Moreover, national courts could develop a sounder theory of privately 
enforceable rights when they are called to determine whether an international 
norm confers rights upon individuals. So far, many lawsuits have been 
dismissed upon the consideration that the international norms invoked by the 
plaintiffs did not confer upon them individual rights, the main justification of 
the dismissal being that international norms regulates only the relationship 
between States or between States and international organisations. In our 
opinion, a sounder legal theory on the issue can be developed by focusing on 
the interpretation of the very norms invoked and not on a priori 
considerations. In interpreting international law for this purpose, national 
judges should consider whether the norm invoked by the plaintiff sets forth 
specific rights entrusted to a given individual, or group of individuals, that 
correspond to obligations States or international organisations shall abide by. 
To put it differently, the interpreter should inquire whether a vertical relation 
between a State (or an international organisation) and individuals exists, 
whereby the former has an obligation to grant to the latter a certain right. 
When a judge has ascertained that the norm invoked by the plaintiff does 
                                                 
4 See supra chapter III, para. 6. 
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confer an individual right, he or she should necessarily come to the conclusion 
that the individual right in question is enforceable. For, every individual right 
that comes to light in a domestic legal system – whether or not it stems from 
an international norm – is enforceable. Through this more solid textual 
interpretation of international law norms, national judges would allow 
aggrieved parties to see their rights granted before a court of law. 
Eventually, claimants can elaborate alternative defences to challenge 
the immunity of the UN before domestic courts. It has been shown in the 
present study that the plaintiffs’ defence based on the consideration that UN 
immunity is conditional upon the existence of alternative remedies to victims 
has failed before several courts. Indeed, this submission found no support in 
the text of the relevant treaty provisions. In contrast, this study has suggested 
that there can be some scope to challenge the current overly extensive notion 
of UN immunity by interpreting the immunity rule through the prism of 
functionality. In other words, a suit against the UN could focus on the very 
breaches of art. 51 of the UN (Model) SOFA and of art. VIII, section 29 of 
the GCPI entailed by the UN failure to provide for third party dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Hence, the core claim would not centre upon human 
rights violations allegedly perpetrated by the UN during peace operations, but 
rather the violation of the duty to settle third party claims, that does not 
concern the exercise of a UN missions’ mandate. For example, one would not 
claim that the UN failed to prevent genocide, or failed to properly screen 
peacekeepers from cholera, or violated the right to life and health of hundreds 
of people. Rather, under the proposed defence, victims would more simply 
maintain that the UN, by not establishing remedial mechanisms, has infringed 
upon a general obligation that it has undertaken, as stipulated in the General 
Conventions and in the SOFA. This would imply that the claimed violation 
does not concern the UN failure to fulfil its mandate, that is to say it does not 
concern an assessment on how the UN pursued its core mission to maintain 
international peace and security. This defence should allow national courts to 
assess that UN immunity does not serve a legitimate purpose, and it is not 
proportioned to the aim pursued. The benchmark would be the respect of a 
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simple and general treaty provision on the duty to establish third party 
remedies for claims that would be otherwise barred by the Organisation’s 
immunity. This is certainly a consideration de iure condendo, however in our 
opinion the present construction would provide plaintiffs with an alternative 
defence that has not been rejected by courts, yet. 
In conclusion, none of these responsibility regimes alone is able to 
address issues of individuals affected by wrongful acts in peace operations, 
yet with broad promise these regimes can effectively complement one 
another. This system of ‘multi-level responsibility regimes’ is not at the 
present stage able to adequately respond to the growing demand for justice 
arisen as a consequence of the significant failure to protect civilians during 
peace operations. However, a ‘multilevel effort’ carried out in the multiple 
directions traced in this study would contribute to close the existing 
responsibility gap and would reduce the current uneven distribution of 
responsibility between States and international organisations.  
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Andreoli, “Immunità delle Nazioni Unite et protezione equivalente: l'affare 
‘associazione madri di Srebrenica’“, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, vol. 
97, 2014, pp. 443-462 
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denvoi lors d'actions de Forces de Maintien de la Paix: l'écheveau de 
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